

MUIRHEAD LIBRARY OF PHILOSOPHY

An admirable statement of the aims of the Library of Philosophy was provided by the first editor, the late Professor J. H. Muirhead, in his description of the original programme printed in Erdmann's *History of Philosophy* under the date 1890. This was slightly modified in subsequent volumes to take the form of the following statement:

'The Muirhead Library of Philosophy was designed as a contribution to the History of Modern Philosophy under the heads: first of different Schools of Thought—Sensationalist, Realist, Idealist, Intuitivist; secondly of different Subjects—Psychology, Ethics, Aesthetics, Political Philosophy, Theology. While much had been done in England in tracing the course of evolution in nature, history, economics, morals and religion, little had been done in tracing the development of thought on these subjects. Yet "the evolution of opinion is part of the whole evolution".

'By the co-operation of different writers in carrying out this plan it was hoped that a thoroughness and completeness of treatment, otherwise unattainable, might be secured. It was believed also that from writers mainly British and American fuller consideration of English Philosophy than it had hitherto received might be looked for. In the earlier series of books containing, among others, Bosanquet's *History of Aesthetic*, Pfleiderer's *Rational Theology since Kant*, Albee's *History of English Utilitarianism*, Bonar's *Philosophy and Political Economy*, Brett's *History of Psychology*, Ritchie's *Natural Rights*, these objects were to a large extent effected.

'In the meantime original work of a high order was being produced both in England and America by such writers as Bradley, Stout, Bertrand Russell, Baldwin, Urban, Montague, and others, and a new interest in foreign works, German, French and Italian, which had either become classical or were attracting public attention, had developed. The scope of the Library thus became extended into something more international, and it is entering on the fifth decade of its existence in the hope that it may contribute to that mutual understanding between countries which is so pressing a need of the present time.'

The need which Professor Muirhead stressed is no less pressing today, and few will deny that philosophy has much to do with enabling us to meet it, although no one, least of all Muirhead himself, would regard that as the sole, or even the main, object of philosophy. As Professor Muirhead continues to lend the distinction of his name to the Library of Philosophy it seemed not inappropriate to allow him to recall us to these aims in his own words. The emphasis on the history of thought also seemed to me very timely; and the number of important works promised for the Library in the near future augur well for the continued fulfilment, in this and other ways, of the expectations of the original editor.

H. D. LEWIS

MUIRHEAD LIBRARY OF PHILOSOPHY

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EDITED BY H. D. LEWIS

SCIENCE OF LOGIC

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HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC

TRANSLATED BY
W. H. JOHNSTON, B.A., AND
L. G. STRUTHERS, M.A.

VOLUME TWO

LONDON: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD
NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

First published in German 1812-1816 under the title "Wissenschaft der Logik."

*The greater part of this translation was made from the edition published in 1923
by Felix Meiner, Leipzig, edited by Dr. Georg Lasson, of Berlin.*

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UNWIN BROTHERS LIMITED

WOKING AND LONDON

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VOLUME I

OBJECTIVE LOGIC

BOOK TWO

THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE

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•

THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE

THE truth of Being is Essence.

Being is that which is immediate. Knowledge seeks to understand that truth which Being is, in and for itself, and therefore, pressing beyond the immediate and its determinations, penetrates further, assuming that behind this Being there is something other than Being itself, and that this background constitutes the truth of Being. This cognition is mediated knowledge, for it is not lodged immediately with and in Essence, but begins at an Other, Being, and has to make a preliminary passage, the passage of transition beyond Being, or rather of entrance into it. Only when knowledge, coming out from the sphere of immediate Being, *internalizes* itself, does it through this mediation discover Essence.—Language has in the verb *Sein* (“to be”) preserved *Wesen* (“Essence”) in the past participle *gewesen* (“been”); for Essence is Being which has passed away, but passed away non-temporally.

When this movement is imagined as the road of knowledge, the beginning, which is made at Being, and the progress which transcends this category and so reaches Essence as something mediated, appear to be an activity of cognition, external to Being and irrelevant to its proper nature.

However, this movement is the movement of Being itself. It was seen in Being that its own nature causes it to internalize itself, and that thus entering into itself it becomes Essence.

If at first, then, the Absolute was determined as Being, it is as Essence that it is now determined. Cognition cannot stand still at the manifold of Determinate Being, nor yet at Being—Pure Being: the reflection immediately asserts itself that this Pure Being, the negation of everything finite, presupposes an internalization and a movement which have purged immediate Determinate Being into Pure Being. Being accordingly is determined as Essence, that is, as such a Being as suffers complete negation of what is determinate and finite. It is thus indeterminate and simple unity, from which whatever is determinate has in an external manner been removed; what is determinate

was itself external to this unity, and after this removal has been made it still remains opposed to it; for it has been transcended not in itself but only relatively and with respect to this unity.—It was mentioned above that if pure Essence is defined as the Sum-total of all Realities, then these realities themselves are subject to determinateness and abstracting reflection, and this sum-total reduces itself to empty simplicity. In this manner Essence is only a product or construction. That external negation which is abstraction does no more than lift clear from that which remains as Essence every determinateness of Being; it pushes these, so to speak, from place to place, while they retain the attribute of being. But in this manner Essence is neither in itself nor for itself: it is through an Other, namely external and abstracting reflection, and it is for an Other, namely abstraction, and, generally, for that existent which still stands opposed to it. In its determination, therefore, it is a dead and empty absence of determination.

But Essence as it is now is what it is not by virtue of a negativity foreign to it, but by virtue of its own movement, which is the infinite movement of Being. It is Being-in-and-for-Self:—absolute Being-in-Self, since it is indifferent to every determinateness of Being, and otherness and the relation to other have simply been transcended. But it is not only this Being-in-Self, for as mere Being-in-Self it would be only the abstraction of pure Essence: equally essentially it is Being-for-Self; it is itself that negativity which is the self-transcendence of otherness and determinateness.

So far then Essence, as the complete return of Being upon itself, is Essence indeterminate: in it every determinateness of Being is transcended; it contains these *in itself*, but not *as* posited in it. In this simple existence with itself absolute Essence has no Determinate Being. Into this, however, it must pass; for it is Being-in-and-for-Self, that is, it differentiates the determinations which in itself it contains. It is self-repulsion or self-indifference, a negative self-relation, and thus opposes itself to itself and is infinite Being-for-Self only in so far as it is self-unity in this its self-differentiation.—This determining is then of a nature different from that of the determining which takes place in the sphere of Being, and a determination of Essence differs in character from a determinateness of Being.

Essence is the absolute unity of Being-in and Being-for-Self; its determining power therefore remains confined within this unity and is no Becoming nor transition, while the determinations are neither Other as other nor relations to an other; they are independent, but for this very reason they are such entities only as in their unity are with each other.—At first Essence is simple negativity; now it must posit in its own sphere the determinateness which it contains only in itself, in order to give itself Determinate Being and, next, its Being-for-Self.

Essence in the Whole is what Quantity was in the sphere of Being: absolute indifference to the limit. But Quantity is this indifference in immediate determination, and in it limit immediately is external determinateness; it passes over into Quantum; external limit is necessary to it and in it has being. But determinateness has not being in Essence: by Essence itself it is only posited: it is not free, but exists only in relation to its unity.—The negativity of Essence is Reflection, and the determinations are reflected, posited by Essence itself and remaining in it as transcended.

Essence is midway between Being and Notion: it is the mean between them, and its movement constitutes the transition from Being to Notion. Essence is Being-in-and-for-Self, and that in the determination of Being-in-Self; for its general determination is, that it proceeds out of Being or is the first negation of Being. Its movement is this, that it posits negation or determination in Being, and thus achieves Determinate Being; it becomes as infinite Being-for-Self what it is in itself. Thus the Determinate Being which it achieves is equal to its Being-in-Self; and Essence becomes Notion. For the Notion is the Absolute, absolute or in and for itself as it is in its Determinate Being. But that Determinate Being which Essence achieves is not yet Determinate Being as it is in and for itself, but such as Essence achieves it or as it is posited; so far, therefore, it is different from the Determinate Being of the Notion.

Essence first *shows into itself* or is Reflection; next it *appears*; thirdly it *manifests* itself. In its movement it posits itself in the following determinations:—

I. as *simple* Essence which is in itself in its determinations within itself;

II. as emerging into Determinate Being, or according to its existence and *Appearance*;

III. as Essence which is one with its Appearance, that is, as *Actuality*.

SECTION ONE

ESSENCE AS REFLECTION INTO SELF

ESSENCE comes out of Being ; and in so far, it is not immediate in and for itself, but is the result of that movement. Or if Essence is provisionally taken as immediate, it is a determinate existence, to which another stands opposed : it is essential only as against unessential existence. But Essence is Being transcended in and for itself, and what is opposed to it is only Show. Now Show is the self-positing of Essence.

Essence is, first, Reflection. This Reflection determines itself ; its determinations are a positedness which also is Reflection into Self.

Secondly, these Reflection-determinations or Essentialities are to be considered.

Thirdly, Essence, as the Reflection of determining into itself, becomes Ground, and passes over into Existence and Appearance.

CHAPTER I

SHOW

ESSENCE comes out of Being and appears to stand opposed to it; here this immediate Being is the Unessential.

But secondly, it is more than only the Unessential, it is Essenceless Being, it is Show.

Thirdly, this Show is not external and Other to Essence, but is its own Show. The showing of Essence in itself is Reflection.

A

THE ESSENTIAL AND THE UNESSENTIAL

Essence is Being transcended. It is simple self-identity, but only in so far as it is the general negation of the sphere of Being. Essence is thus opposed by immediacy, which immediacy is of such a kind that it caused Essence to arise out of it, conserving and maintaining itself in this transcendence. Essence itself, in this determination, is *existent* immediate Essence, and Being is negative only in relation to Essence and not in and for itself; Essence is hence a determinate negation. Thus Being and Essence are again related simply as Other, for each has a Being, an immediacy, and these are indifferent to each other, and according to this Being both are of equal value.

But at the same time Being in opposition to Essence is the Unessential; it is determined with regard to the latter as already transcended. But in so far as it is related to Essence merely as an Other, Essence is not properly Essence, but only an existence otherwise determinate—the Essential.

The distinction between Essential and Unessential has allowed Essence to fall back into the sphere of Determinate Being, for so far Essence is here determined as an immediate existent, and therefore merely as Other as opposed to Being. Here then the sphere of Determinate Being is the basis: it is

a further determination, external to Determinate Being, that that which is Being in this Determinate Being is Being-in-and-for-Self; and conversely, while Essence is Being-in-and-for-Self, it is this only in opposition to an other—that is, in a determinate respect.—Hence, in so far as an Essential and an Unessential are distinguished in any Determinate Being, this distinction is an external positing, a severance of one part of a Determinate Being from another part, which, however, does not touch the Determinate Being itself,—a separation which falls within a third element. What belongs to the Essential and what to the Unessential is here left indeterminate. What constitutes it is some external consideration or point of view, and the same content must therefore be regarded at one time as essential and at another as unessential.

More closely considered, Essence is reduced to Essential as opposed to Unessential because Essence is taken only as transcended Being or Determinate Being. In this way Essence is only first negation, or that negation which is determinateness, and which narrows down Being to Determinate Being, and Determinate Being to Other. But Essence is the absolute negativity of Being: it is Being itself, Being determined not merely, however, as an Other, but Being which, both as immediate Being and as immediate negation (negation which is infected with Other-being), has transcended itself. Being or Determinate Being has here not preserved itself as Other than Essence; and that immediacy which is still distinguished from Essence is not merely an unessential Determinate Being, but an immediacy which is null in and for itself; it is mere Unessence, or Show.

B

SHOW

1. Being is Show. The Being of Show consists entirely in the fact that Being is transcended and is null; it has this nullity in Essence, and apart from its nullity and from Essence it is not. It is the Negative posited as Negative.

Show is all the rest which remains over from the sphere of Being. But it has the appearance of having an immediate side independent of Essence, and, generally, of being its Other.

The Other in general contains the two moments of Existence and Non-existence. And since the Unessential has no Being, it retains nothing of its Other-being save the pure moment of Non-existence: Show is this immediate Non-existence, and it is this—in the determinateness of Being—in such a manner that it has existence only in relation to another, in its Non-existence: it is that instability which is *only* in its negation. There remains for it therefore only the pure determinateness of immediacy; it exists as *reflected* immediacy, that is, as that immediacy which exists only through the mediation of its negation, and is nothing in relation to its mediation but the empty determination of the immediacy of Non-existence.

Show then is the *phenomenon* of scepticism; or again the *appearance* of idealism is such an immediacy, which is neither Something nor Thing, and, generally, is not an indifferent Being which could *be* outside its determinateness and relation to the subject. Scepticism did not dare to affirm “it is”; modern idealism did not dare to regard cognition as a knowledge of the Thing-in-itself: with the former, Show was supposed to have no basis at all in any Being; with the latter, the Thing-in-itself was supposed incapable of entering into cognition. But at the same time scepticism admitted manifold determinations of its Show, or rather its Show had for content all the manifold riches of the world. In the same manner the “appearance” of idealism comprehends the whole range of these manifold determinatenesses. Thus both Show and “appearance” are immediately determined as manifold. The content may then have no basis in any Being nor in any thing nor thing-in-itself: for itself it remains as it is: it has only been translated from being into Show; thus Show contains these manifold determinatenesses, which relatively to one another are immediate, existent, and other. Show itself is, then, immediately determinate. Its content may be this or that; but whatever content it has is not posited by itself but belongs to it immediately. The idealism of Leibniz, Kant or Fichte, or any other form of idealism, did not reach beyond Being as determinateness, beyond this immediacy; and scepticism also failed. Scepticism allows the content of its Show to be given it: for it, it is an immediate datum, what content it is to have. The monad of Leibniz develops its presentations out

of itself; but it is no creative and combining force,—the presentations arise in it like bubbles; they are indifferent and immediate relatively to one another, and therefore to the monad itself. Similarly Kant's "phenomenon" is a *given* content of perception: it presupposes affections, determinations of the subject which are immediate to one another and to the subject. The infinite "resistance-principle" of Fichte's idealism refuses, perhaps, to be based on any thing-in-itself, so that it becomes purely a determinateness in the Ego. But this determinateness is immediate and a barrier to the Ego, which, transcending its externality, incorporates it with itself; and though the Ego can pass beyond the barrier, the latter has in it an aspect of indifference by virtue of which it contains an immediate Not-being of the Ego, though itself contained in the Ego.—

2. Show thus contains an immediate presupposition, an aspect independent of Essence. But it is not to be proved of Show that, in so far as it differs from Essence, it transcends itself and returns to Essence;—for Being has returned into Essence in its totality, but Show is that which in itself is null. All that is to be proved is, that the determinations which distinguish it from Essence are also determinations of Essence, and, further, that that determinateness of Essence which Show is, is transcended in Essence itself.

It is the immediacy of *Not-being* which constitutes Show; but this Not-being is nothing else than the negativity of Essence in itself. In Essence, Being is Not-being. Its *nullity* in itself is *the negative nature of Essence itself*. But the immediacy or indifference which this Not-being contains is the proper and absolute Being-in-Self of Essence. The negativity of Essence is its self-identity, or its simple immediacy and indifference. Being has preserved itself in Essence in so far as the latter has this self-identity in its infinite negativity; and by virtue of this, Essence itself is Being. Hence the immediacy which, in Show, belongs to determinateness with respect to Essence, is nothing else than the immediacy of Essence itself, an immediacy, however, which is not, but is just mediated or reflected; and this is Show,—Being not as Being, but only as the determinateness of Being as against mediation: Being as Moment.

Two moments thus constitute Show: Nullity, which how-

ever persists, and Being, which however is Moment; or again negativity which is in itself, and reflected immediacy. Consequently these moments are the moments of Essence itself: there is no Show of Being *in* Essence, nor Show of Essence *in* Being; Show in Essence is not the Show of an Other, but Show in itself, Show of Essence itself.

Show is Essence itself in the determinateness of Being. Essence has a Show by virtue of the fact that it is determinate in itself and thereby distinguished from its absolute unity. But this determinateness is equally transcended in it. For Essence is stability; that is, it is self-mediating through its negation, and this it is itself. It is thus the identical unity of absolute negativity and of immediacy.—This negativity is negativity in itself; it is its own self-relation, and thus immediacy in itself; but it is negative self-relation and repulsive self-negation, and thus this immediacy which is in itself, is negation or determinateness with regard to it. But this determinateness is itself absolute negativity, and is this determining which immediately as determination is self-transcendence and return upon itself.

Show is the negative which has a being, but in an Other, in its negation: Show is instability which in itself is transcended and is null. It is thus the negative which returns into itself, or instability as that which in itself is unstable. This relation to itself of the negative or of instability is its immediacy; it is other than itself; it is its determinateness as against itself, or it is negation as against the negative. But negation as against the negative is negativity which refers itself to itself only: it is absolute transcendence of determinateness itself.

In Essence then Show is a determinateness which is infinite: it is the negative which coincides only with itself: it is thus determinateness which as such is stability and is not determinate.—Conversely stability as self-relating immediacy equally is, absolutely, determinateness and moment, and exists only as self-relating negativity.—This negativity which is identical with immediacy, and thus this immediacy which is identical with negativity, is Essence. Thus Show is Essence itself, but Essence in a determinateness, and this in such a manner that determinateness is only its moment: Essence is the showing of itself in itself.

In the sphere of Being, Being, as immediate, is faced by Not-being, which also is immediate, and their truth is Becoming. In the sphere of Essence, first Essence and the Unessential, next Essence and Show, are opposed to each other; and the Unessential and Show are remnants of Being. But both (as well as the difference of Essence from them) consist in nothing else than the fact that Essence first is taken as something immediate, not as it is in itself (not, that is, as immediacy which is such as pure mediation or absolute negativity). Thus this first immediacy is only the determinateness of immediacy. And this determinateness of Essence is accordingly transcended simply when it is shown that the Unessential is only Show, and that Essence rather contains Show in the form of that infinite internal movement which determines its immediacy as negativity and its negativity as immediacy, and thus is its showing within itself. In this its self-movement Essence is Reflection.

C

REFLECTION

Show is the same as Reflection; but it is Reflection as immediate: for Show which has entered into itself and thereby is emptied of its immediacy, we have the term, borrowed from a foreign language, of Reflection.

Essence is Reflection—the movement of Becoming and transition which remains within itself; here that which is distinguished is determined simply as that which is negative in itself, as Show.—In the Becoming of Being, Being is the basis of determinateness, which is relation to other. The reflecting movement on the other hand is the Other as negation in itself, which has being only as self-relating negation. Or again, this self-relation being this very negation of negation, we have here negation as negation, or as such as has its being in its negation, that is, as Show. Thus here the Other is not Being plus negation or limit, but negation plus negation. But the primary entity which is opposed to this Other—immediacy or Being—is just this self-identity of negation,—negated negation, or absolute negativity. Hence this self-identity or immediacy is not a primary entity which forms a point of departure and

passes over into its negation, nor is it an existent substratum moving through Reflection; rather immediacy is this movement itself and no more.

Becoming in Essence—its reflective movement—is hence the movement from Nothing to Nothing and through Nothing back to itself. The transition or Becoming transcends itself in its transition: that Other which arises in the course of this transition is not the Not-being of a Being but the Nothing of a Nothing; and it is this—the fact that it is the negation of a Nothing—which constitutes Being.—Being exists only as the movement of Nothing to Nothing, and thus is Essence; and Essence does not contain this movement in itself but is this movement, an absolute Show and pure negativity, which has nothing without it that could negate it, but negates only its own negativity, which is only in this negation.

This pure and absolute Reflection which is the movement from Nothing to Nothing, further determines itself.

It is, first, Positing Reflection.

Secondly, it begins from the presupposed immediacy and thus is External Reflection.

Thirdly, however, it transcends this presupposition, and, since in this act of transcendence it itself presupposes, it is Determining Reflection.

(a) POSITING REFLECTION

Show is that which is null or essenceless; but this null or essenceless has not its Being in an Other, in which it shows, but its Being is its own self-identity; this self-interchange of the negative has determined itself as the absolute Reflection of Essence.

This self-relating negativity is, then, its own negation. In the same measure, therefore, in which it is negativity, it is negativity transcended. Or again, it is itself the negative, it is simple self-identity, or immediacy. Its substance therefore is that it is, and is not, itself; and this in one unity.—

Reflection is, first, the movement of Nothing to Nothing, it is negation which coincides with itself. This coincidence with self is just simple self-identity, or immediacy. It is not, however, the case that this collapse is the transition of negation

into identity with self as into its otherness; but Reflection is transition as the transcendence of transition, for it is immediate collapse of the negative with itself. This coincidence is, then, first, self-identity or immediacy; but, secondly, this immediacy is the self-identity of the negative, or self-negating identity; it is that immediacy which is in itself the negative, the negative of its own self, in that it is what it is not.

Thus the self-relation of the negative is its return to itself; it is immediacy as the transcendence of the negative; but it is immediacy absolutely only as this relation, or as return from a negative, and thus it is self-transcending immediacy.— This is positedness, immediacy purely as determinateness or as self-reflecting. This immediacy, which exists only as the return of the negative to itself, is the same immediacy which constitutes the determinateness of Show, and from which the reflecting movement appeared above to begin. But it cannot begin from this immediacy, which in fact exists only as return or Reflection itself. Reflection, then, is the movement which is return, and therefore at this point alone is that which begins or returns.

It is a positing, in so far as it is immediacy as a return; for there is no Other there, nor anything out of or into which it could return; it exists therefore only as return, or as the negative of itself. But further this immediacy is transcended negation and transcended return to self. As the transcendence of the negative, Reflection is the transcendence of its Other, namely, of immediacy. Reflection is, then, immediacy as a return, as the self-coincidence of the negative, and thereby it is also the negation of the negative as such: Reflection is Presupposition.— Or again, immediacy as return is only the negative of itself, it is just the fact that it is not immediacy; but Reflection is the transcendence of the negative of itself, it is self-coincidence; thus it transcends its positing, and is presupposition because in its positing it is the transcendence of positing. In presupposition, Reflection determines the return to itself to be its own negative, or that the transcendence of which is Essence. It is its attitude to itself, but to itself as its own negative; and thus only is it self-confined and self-relating negativity. And altogether immediacy is manifested only as return, and is the same kind of negative as is that Show of the beginning which

is negated in the return. The return of Essence is thus its own self-repulsion. Or, intro-Reflection is essentially the presupposing of that out of which it is the return.

It is only through the transcendence of its self-identity that Essence is self-identity. It presupposes itself, and it is itself the transcendence of this presupposition; and conversely this transcendence of its presupposition is the presupposition itself.—Reflection thus finds itself faced with something immediate, beyond which it passes, and out of which it is the return. But this return is only the presupposition of that which has been found. And this latter arises only as it is left behind; its immediacy is transcended immediacy.—Conversely transcended immediacy is return to self, the *arrival* of Essence at itself, Being simple and self-identical. Thus this arrival at self is self-transcendence, it is self-repellent and presupposing Reflection; and its self-repulsion is its arrival at itself.

From these considerations it results that the reflecting movement must be taken as absolute recoil into itself. For the presupposition of return into self—that from which Essence emerges (and except as this return it cannot *be*)—lies only in the return itself. The over-passing beyond the immediate, whence Reflection begins, arises in fact only from this over-passing; and the over-passing beyond the immediate is the arrival at the immediate. The movement taken as a progress immediately reverses within itself, and thus only is self-movement,—movement which arises from itself in so far as positing Reflection presupposes, but again, as presupposing Reflection, just posits.

Reflection thus is both itself and its not-being, and is itself only in so far as it is its own negative, for then only is the transcendence of the negative also a coincidence with self.

That immediacy which, as transcendence, it presupposes for itself, exists simply only as positedness, as that which is transcended *in itself*, which is not distinguished from the return into itself, and itself is only this return. But it is also determined as negative, as being immediately opposed to one, and, therefore, to an Other. Thus Reflection is determinate; and, since in this determinateness it has a presupposition and begins from the immediate as from its Other, it is *External Reflection*.

(b) EXTERNAL REFLECTION

Reflection as absolute Reflection is Essence showing within itself, and presupposes only Show, or positedness: as presupposing Reflection it is immediately only Positing Reflection. But External or real Reflection presupposes itself as transcended, as its own negative. In this determination it is twofold. It is, first, that which is presupposed, or that intro-Reflection which is the immediate; and, secondly, it is Reflection which, as negative, refers itself to itself; it refers itself to itself as to that other which is its not-being.

External Reflection, then, presupposes a Being, but, first, not in this sense, that its immediacy is only positedness or moment, but rather that this immediacy is self-relation, while the determinateness exists only as moment. Its relation to its presupposition is this, that the latter is the negative of Reflection, but this in such a manner that this negative as such is transcended.—Reflection in its positing immediately transcends its positing, and thus has an immediate presupposition. Thus it meets Positing as something from which it begins, whence coming it is return to self and negation of this its negative. That this presupposed something is a negative or posited entity in no way, however, concerns it; this determinateness belongs only to Positing Reflection, while in presupposition positedness exists only as something transcended. Whatever determinations external Reflection determines and posits in the immediate, are in so far external to it.—In the sphere of Being Reflection was the Infinite: the Finite passes for the first term, or the Real, and is supposed to be and to remain the foundation from which a beginning is made: intro-Reflection—which remains opposed to it—is the Infinite.

This External Reflection is the conclusion in which the two extremes are the Immediate and intro-Reflection; the relation of the two—the determinate immediate—is the mean, so that one part of the mean (immediacy) belongs only to the one extreme, and the other (determinateness or negation) to the other.

But if the activity of External Reflection is more closely considered, then, secondly, it is a positing of the immediate, which in so far becomes the negative or determinate; but,

immediately, it is also the transcendence of this its positing; for it *pre-supposes* the immediate, and in negation it is the negation of this its negation. But thereby it immediately is also positing, or transcendence of its negative Immediate, and this latter, which seemed alien to it when it was the beginning whence a start was made, exists only in this its beginning. In this manner the immediate is not only *in itself* the same as Reflection (which would mean for us, or in External Reflection), but it is *posited* that it is the same. For by Reflection it is determined as being its negative or its Other; but this determining is negated by Reflection in itself and none other.—Hereby the externality of Reflection, as against the immediate, is transcended; its self-negating positing is the coincidence of itself with its negative (the immediate), and this coincidence is essential immediacy itself. We thus discover that External Reflection is not external but also immanent Reflection of immediacy itself, or that that which exists by virtue of Positing Reflection is Essence which is in and for itself. It is thus Determining Reflection.

Observation

Commonly Reflection is taken in the subjective meaning, of the movement of judgment which passes beyond a given immediate presentation, seeking universal determinations for it or comparing them with it. Kant opposes Reflecting Judgment to Determining Judgment (*Critique of Judgment, Introduction*, p. xxiii. sq.). Judgment in general he defines as the capacity of thinking the particular as contained in the universal. Given the universal (the Rule, Principle, or Law), then Judgment, which subsumes the particular under it, is determinative. But where only the particular is given and the relative universal is to be found, then Judgment is merely reflective. Here too then Reflection is the over-passing beyond an immediate to the universal. The immediate is determined as particular in part only by this its relation to its universal: for itself it is only an isolated unit or an immediate existent. And in part that to which it is related (its universal, its Rule, Principle, or Law) is that which is intro-reflected and self-relating,—Essence or the Essential.

Here, however, neither the reflection of consciousness nor the more determinate reflection of understanding, which has the particular and the universal for its determinations, is in question, but only Reflection in general. That reflection to which Kant ascribes the search for the universal appropriate to any given particular is clearly just External Reflection which is related to the immediate as to something given.—But it also contains the concept of absolute Reflection; for the universal, the principle or rule and law, to which it proceeds in the course of its determining, is counted as the Essence of that immediate from which a beginning is made; the latter is counted as null, and only the return thence (the determining of Reflection) as the positing of the immediate according to its veritable being; and so the operation in it of Reflection, and the determinations thence derived, are counted, not as external to this immediate, but as its proper being.

For some time it was fashionable in modern philosophy to tax Reflection in general with every possible evil, and to regard it and its determining as the antithesis and the arch-enemy of absolute contemplation: here too External Reflection was meant. In fact thinking Reflection too, in so far as its attitude is external, simply starts from an immediate which is given and is alien to it: it considers itself as a merely formal activity, which receives its content and matter from without and for itself is only the movement conditioned by these.—Further (as will soon be seen in more detail in Determining Reflection) the reflected determinations are of a kind different from the merely immediate determinations of Being. Of the latter it is easily admitted that they are transitory and merely relative, related to something other, while the reflected determinations have the form of Being-in-and-for-Self; they accordingly assert themselves as *essential*, and instead of passing over into their opposites, they appear rather as absolute, free, and indifferent to one another. They therefore stubbornly resist their movement: their Being is their self-identity in their determinateness, according to which, while presupposing one another, they yet preserve themselves as absolutely separate in this relation.

(c) DETERMINING REFLECTION

Determining Reflection in general is the unity of Positing Reflection and External Reflection. This must be more closely considered.—

1. External Reflection begins from immediate Being, Positing Reflection from Nothing. External Reflection, which becomes determinative, posits an Other—Essence—in the place of transcended Being; Positing does not posit its determination in the place of an Other; it has no presupposition. But this does not suffice to make it into complete Determining Reflection, and accordingly the determination which it posits is *only* something posited: it is immediate, not because it is self-identical but because it is self-negating; it has an absolute relation to the return to self; it is only in intro-Reflection, and is not this Reflection itself.

That which is posited is therefore an Other, but in such a manner that the self-identity of Reflection is absolutely preserved; for that which is posited exists only as transcended, as a relation to the return to self.—In the sphere of Being, Determinate Being was that kind of Being which contained negation, while Being was the immediate bottom and element of this negation, which therefore was itself immediate. In the sphere of Essence, Positedness corresponds to Determinate Being. It too is a Determinate Being, but its bottom is Being as Essence or as pure negativity; it is a determinateness or negation, not as existent, but immediately as transcended. *Determinate Being is only Positedness*: this is the proposition which Essence makes of Determinate Being. Positedness is opposed first to Determinate Being, and secondly to Essence, and is to be considered as the mean which joins Determinate Being to Essence and conversely Essence to Determinate Being.—If it is said that a determination is *only* a Positedness, this can accordingly have a double meaning: a determination is this in opposition to Determinate Being or alternatively to Essence. In the former meaning Determinate Being is taken as something higher than Positedness, and the latter is ascribed to External Reflection, or to the subjective element. But in fact Positedness is the higher; for as Positedness Determinate Being, as that which it is in itself, as a Negative, is simply just some-

thing which is related to the return to self. For this reason Positedness is *only* a positedness with respect to Essence, as the negation of the state of having returned to self.

2. Positedness is not yet Determination of Reflection: it is determinateness only as negation in general. But now Positing is in unity with External Reflection; in this unity the latter is absolute presupposing, that is, the self-repulsion of Reflection, or the positing of determinateness as itself. As such, therefore, Positedness is negation; but, since Positedness is presupposed, negation is intro-reflected. And thus Positedness is Determination of Reflection.

Determination of Reflection is different from the determinateness of Being, which is Quality; the latter is immediate relation to other in general; and though Positedness too is relation to other, it is relation to intro-reflectedness. Negation as Quality is negation as *existent*: Being constitutes its ground and element. But Determination of Reflection has for foundation intro-reflectedness. Positedness crystallizes into determination just because Reflection in its negatedness is self-identity; and therefore its negatedness is intro-Reflection. Determination here does not subsist by virtue of Being but of self-identity. Being (which is the support of Quality) is that which is not equal to negation, and for this reason Quality is unequal in itself, and is therefore a transitory moment which vanishes in an Other. Determination of Reflection, on the other hand, is Positedness as negation, negation which has negatedness for foundation and thus is not unequal in itself: it is accordingly essential and not transitory determinateness. It is the self-identity of Reflection, which contains the negative only as negative (or as something transcended or posited), that gives to it persistence.

By virtue of this intro-Reflection the Determinations of Reflection appear as free Essentialities, floating in the void without mutual attraction or repulsion. In them determinateness has confirmed and fixed itself as infinite through self-relation. It is the determinate entity which has subjected to itself its transition and mere positedness, and has converted its Reflection into other into intro-Reflection. By virtue of this these determinations constitute determinate Show as it is found in Essence, or Essential Show. For this reason Determining

Reflection is Reflection which has passed outside itself; the self-identity of Essence is lost in negation, which now prevails.

In Determination of Reflection there are then two sides, which at the outset are distinguished. First it is Positedness, negation as such: secondly it is intro-Reflection. As Positedness, it is negation as negation, which thus already is its unity with itself. But so far it is this only *in itself*; in other words, it is the immediate as transcending itself in it, or as its own Other.—In so far Reflection is determining which remains within itself. Here Essence does not pass outside itself: the distinctions are simply posited and drawn back into Essence. But, from the other side, they are not posited, but intro-reflected; negation *as* negation is self-identical, and is not reflected into its Other, its Not-being.

3. Determination of Reflection is, then, reflected relation in itself, and it is also Positedness; from this immediately its nature may be more clearly understood. For as Positedness it is negation as such; it is a Not-being opposed to another entity, namely, absolute intro-Reflection, or Essence. But as self-relation it is intro-reflected.—There is a difference between these two states—its Reflection and its Positedness; the latter is more truly its transcendedness, but its intro-reflectedness is its subsistence. In so far then as it is Positedness which also is intro-Reflection, the reflection-determinateness is the relation to its other-being in itself.—It is not a determinateness which is, and rests, and is related to an Other in such a manner that the related term and its relation are different one from the other, the former being a Being-in-Self, a Something which excludes its Other and its relation to this Other from itself. On the contrary, the Reflection-Determination is in itself the determinate side and the relation of this determinate side as determinate, that is, relation to its negation.—Quality passes over into other through its relation: in its relation its change begins. Determination of Reflection on the other hand has re-absorbed its other-being. It is Positedness, or negation, which negation, however, bends back into itself relation to other,—negation which is self-identical, the unity of itself and of its Other, so that for this reason (and this reason only) it is Essentiality. Thus it is Positedness—negation—but, as intro-Reflection, it is also the accomplished transcendence of this Positedness, or infinite self-relation.

CHAPTER II

THE ESSENTIALITIES OR DETERMINATIONS OF REFLECTION

REFLECTION is determinate Reflection; accordingly Essence is determinate Essence, or Essentiality.

Reflection is the showing of Essence into itself. Essence, as infinite return upon itself, is not immediate, but negative, simplicity: it is a movement through different moments, absolute self-mediation. But it "shows" into these its moments; and therefore they are themselves intro-reflected determinations.

Essence is, first, simple self-relation, pure Identity. This is its determination, which makes it, rather, indeterminateness.

Secondly, the proper determination is Difference, partly as external or indifferent Difference, *Variety* in general, and partly as opposed Variety or *Opposition*.

Thirdly, as Contradiction, Opposition reflects itself into itself and returns into its own ground.

Observation

The Determinations of Reflection were formerly cast into the form of propositions, in which it was said of them that they were of universal application. These propositions were counted as the universal Laws of Thought, lying at the root of all thought, absolute and undemonstrable in themselves, but recognized as true, and acknowledged, immediately and without contradiction, by every intelligence which seized their meaning.

Thus the essential determination of Identity is enunciated in the proposition: *Everything is identical with itself*, $A = A$; or, negatively, *A cannot at once be A and not A*.

It is not immediately evident why only these simple Determinations of Reflection are to be cast into this particular form, and not also the other categories, such as every determinateness of the sphere of Being. We would then have such propositions

as *Everything is, Everything has Determinate Being*, and so on; or, *Everything has Quality or Quantity*, and so forth. For Being, Determinate Being, and the rest, are logical determinations, and as such are predicates of *everything*. Category, according to its etymology and its Aristotelian definition, is that which is predicated or asserted of the existent.—But a determinateness of Being is essentially a transition into the opposite; the negative of any determinateness is as necessary as the determinateness itself; and each immediate determinateness is immediately opposed by the other. When therefore these categories are embodied in such propositions, then the opposite propositions equally appear: each offers itself with equal necessity, and as an immediate assertion has at least an equal standing. One therefore would demand a proof as against the other, and hence these assertions could no longer have the character of immediately true and incontrovertible propositions of thought.

The Determinations of Reflection on the other hand are not of a qualitative kind. They are self-relating determinations, which hence are also free from determinateness as against any other. And further, since each such determinateness is a relation in itself, it contains the propositional form in itself already to that extent. For the main distinction between proposition and judgment is this, that in the former *the content* itself constitutes *the relation*, or that it is a *determinate relation*. Judgment on the other hand removes the content into the predicate as a universal determinateness, which exists for itself and is distinguished from its relation, the simple copula. When a proposition is to be converted into a judgment, the determinate content is changed—when, for instance, it is a verb—into a participle, by which method the determination itself and its relation to a subject are separated. The propositional form on the contrary lies ready at hand for the Determinations of Reflection, for they are an intro-reflected Positedness.—But, since they are pronounced as universal Laws of Thought, they require a subject for their relation, and this subject is *Everything*, or an *A*, which equally means each and every Being.

This propositional form on the one hand is a superfluity: the Determinations of Reflection are to be considered in and for themselves. And further these propositions are distorted in that they have for subject Being, or Every Something. For hereby they

resuscitate Being, and predicate the Determinations of Reflection—Identity and so forth—of Something as a Quality, which belongs to the latter, not in the speculative meaning, but in this—that Something remains as subject in such a Quality because it is *existent*, and not that it has passed over into Identity and so on as into its truth and its essence.

And, finally, though the Determinations of Reflection have the form of being self-identical, unrelated to other, and without opposite, yet they are determinate relatively to one another—as will appear when they are more closely examined, or as is immediately clear when they are considered as Identity, Variety, and Opposition; their form does not remove them from the sphere of Reflection, from transition and contradiction. Accordingly the various propositions which are set up as absolute Laws of Thought, are, more closely considered, opposite to one another, they contradict and cancel one another.—If everything is self-identical it is not distinguished: it contains no opposition and has no ground. Or when it is assumed that there are no two identical things, that is, each thing is different from every other, then A is not equal to A , A is therefore not opposite, and so on. If either of these propositions is assumed, the assumption of the other is barred.—A thoughtless consideration of these propositions enumerates them one after the other, so that they appear quite unrelated; it thinks only of their intro-reflectedness, without paying attention to their other moment, Positedness or their determinateness as such, which drags them forward to transition and to their negation.

A

IDENTITY

1. Essence is simple immediacy as transcended immediacy. Its negativity is its Being: it is self-identical in its absolute negativity, by virtue of which otherness and the relation to Other has simply vanished in itself into pure self-equality. Essence is, then, simple Self-identity.

This Self-identity is the immediacy of Reflection. It is not the kind of Self-identity which is Being or also Nothing, but that kind which constructs itself into unity,—not a reconstruction out of an Other, but this pure construction out of

and in self, which we have just examined: Essential Identity. In so far it is not abstract Identity, and not the product of a relative negation taking place outside it, and leaving the distinguished entity separated from it but in other respects subsisting external to it as before. On the contrary Being and every determinateness of Being has transcended itself, not relatively, but in itself: and this simple negativity of Being in itself is neither more nor less than Identity. In so far Identity is as yet the same as Essence.

Observation 1

Such thought as remains within the sphere of External Reflection, and knows no other kind of thought than this, can never succeed in recognizing Identity as it has here been taken, or—what is the same thing—Essence. Such thought concerns itself only with abstract Identity and—beside this and apart from it—with Difference. This thought takes Reason to be no more than a loom on which it combines externally and intertwines the warp (Identity) and then the woof (Difference); or again it imagines that by analysis it separately extracts Identity, and beside it also preserves Difference, and is an alternate positing of these two,—a positing of Identity when abstraction is made from Difference, and a positing of Difference when abstraction is made from positing Identity.—These assurances and opinions about the operation of Reason must quite be left on one side, for in a sense they are merely historical; and moreover, the contemplation of everything that is shows, in itself, that in its self-identity it is self-contradictory and self-different, and in its variety or contradiction, self-identical; it is in itself this movement of transition of one of these determinations into the other, just because each in itself is its own opposite. The concept of Identity (that it is simple self-relating negativity) is not a product of external reflection, but the result which appeared from Being itself. Now this Identity which is supposed to be external to Difference, and this Difference which is supposed to be external to Identity, are, on the other hand, products of that external reflection and abstraction which arbitrarily fixes itself at this point of indifferent variety.

2. This Identity at this point is Essence itself, and not yet any determination of it; it is the whole Reflection, and not a distinct moment of it. As absolute negation it is that negation which immediately negates itself; it is a Not-being and Difference which vanishes as it arises, or a differentiation which, differentiating nothing, immediately collapses into itself. Differentiation is the positing of Not-being as the Not-being of Other. But the Not-being of Other is cancellation of Other, and therefore of differentiation itself. Thus then differentiation is here found to be a self-relating negativity, a Not-being which is its own Not-being, having its Not-being in itself and not in another. So that we have here self-relating or reflected Difference, or pure Absolute Difference.

Or again Identity is intro-Reflection, which is Identity only as internal repulsion; and it is this repulsion as being intro-Reflection, repulsion which immediately recalls itself into itself. It is therefore Identity as self-identical Difference. But Difference is self-identical only in so far as it is not Identity but absolute Non-identity. But Non-identity is absolute in so far as it contains nothing which is Other to it, but only itself, that is, in so far as it is absolute Self-identity.

In itself then Identity is absolute Non-identity. But also it is the determination of Identity as against this. For as intro-Reflection it posits itself as its own Not-being; it is the whole, but as Reflection it posits itself as its own moment, as positedness; and it is the return from this to itself. Only when it is thus taken as moment does it become Identity as such, as *determination* of simple Self-identity, as opposed to Absolute Difference.

Observation 2

In this Observation I shall more closely consider Identity as the Law of Identity, which is commonly adduced as the first Law of Thought.

In its positive expression $A = A$ this law is nothing more than empty tautology. It has therefore rightly been observed that this Law of Thought is without content and leads no further. Those therefore are stranded upon empty Identity who take it to be a truth in itself, and are in the habit of repeating that Identity is not Variety, but that Identity and Variety are

different. They do not see that they are themselves here saying that Identity is *different*, for they say that Identity is different from Variety; and since this must at the same time be admitted to be the nature of Identity, their assertion implies that Identity has the quality of being different not externally but in its very nature.—But further, since they cling to this rigid Identity which has its opposite in Variety, they do not see that they are thereby making it into a one-sided determinateness, which as such has no truth. It is admitted that the Law of Identity expresses only a one-sided determinateness, that it contains only formal truth, which is abstract and incomplete.—But this correct judgment immediately implies that truth is complete only in the union of Identity with Variety, and therefore consists only in this unity. When it is asserted that this Identity is imperfect, the mind has before it as perfection that totality measured against which the Identity is imperfect; but when, on the other hand, Identity is held fast as absolutely separate from Variety, and in this separation is taken as essential, valid, true, then these conflicting assertions are nothing more than the mistake of combining the two ideas, first that Identity as abstract is essential, and secondly that, as such, it is also imperfect. There is here a lack of understanding of the negative movement, which Identity itself is represented to be in these assertions.—Again, when the expression of Identity is found in the saying that Identity is essential Identity as the separation from Variety, or in the separation from Variety, then immediately its expressed truth just consists in the fact that it is separation as such, or that it is essentially in separation, that is, that it is nothing for itself, but only a moment of separation.

With regard to the further confirmation of the absolute truth of the Law of Identity, this is based on experience, in so far as every consciousness can appeal to experience; since when the proposition *A is A, a tree is a tree*, is rehearsed to it, it immediately admits the proposition, and rests content in its immediate self-evidence, which needs no other confirmation or proof.

This appeal to experience, which states that every consciousness acknowledges the proposition, is partly a mere manner of speaking. It is not meant that the experiment with the

abstract proposition $A = A$ has been made upon every consciousness. So that, further, the appeal to an experience which has actually been reached is not serious; it is only an assurance that, if the experience were to be reached, the result would be general acknowledgment.—But if it is not the abstract proposition as such which is meant, but the proposition in its concrete application (from which the former is to be developed), then the assertion of its universality and immediacy would consist in the fact that every consciousness makes it the basis of its every manifestation, or that it lies implicitly in every one. But the concrete and the application are, precisely, the relation of the simple identical to a manifold which is different from it. Expressed as a proposition, the concrete would first be a synthetic proposition. It is true that abstraction might succeed in extracting by analysis the Law of Identity from the concrete itself or from its synthetic proposition; but then it would not have left experience as it is, but would have changed it; for experience contained Identity in unity with Variety, and is the immediate refutation of the assertion that abstract Identity as such is true; for the exact opposite—namely, Identity never separated from Variety—occurs in every experience.

On the other side, the pure Law of Identity is met only too frequently in experience, where it is seen clearly enough what respect is paid to the truth which it contains. When the question “What is a plant?” (for example) is met by the answer “A plant is—a plant,” the truth of this proposition is straightway admitted by the entire company upon which it is tested; and it will be said with equal unanimity that this answer says nothing. If one opens his mouth and promises to tell what God is, namely, that God is—God, expectation is cheated, for it anticipated a different determination; and if this proposition is absolute truth, such absolute verbiage is held in exceedingly small esteem; nothing will be considered more boring and tedious than a conversation which still chews the same cud, or such speeches which yet are supposed to be truth.

If we consider more closely this tedious effect of such truths, we find that the beginning, “A plant is—,” sets out to say something, to produce a further determination. But only a repetition is made, and the opposite has happened—nothing has been produced. Such idiology is therefore self-contradictory.

Identity is not truth and absolute truth in itself, but quite the opposite; it is not a rigid simplicity, but a passing beyond self into self-dissolution.

The *form of the proposition* which expresses Identity contains more, then, than Identity simple and abstract: it contains this pure movement of Reflection, in which the Other figures only as Show and as immediate disappearance. *A is* is a beginning which imagines a different term that is to be reached; but this term never is reached; *A is—A*; the difference is only a disappearance, and the movement withdraws into itself.—The propositional form can be regarded as the hidden necessity of adding to abstract Identity a plus in the shape of that movement.—Similarly an *A*, a plant or some other substratum, is added, which is a useless content and as such of no significance; but it constitutes Variety, which thus appears to come into the association accidentally. If Identity itself—“Identity is Identity”—is taken instead of the *A* and of any other substratum, then it is also admitted that any other substratum could be taken in place of it. So that if the appeal is made to what appearance shows us, then what it shows us is this, that in the expression of Identity Variety too immediately occurs,—or rather, more definitely (as was seen above), that this Identity is Nothing, negativity, or absolute Self-Difference.

The alternative expression of the Law of Identity, *A cannot be both A and not-A*, has a negative form: it is called the Law of Contradiction. The negative form (by which this Law is distinguished from the former), and its occurrence in Identity, are not usually explicitly justified.—This form is due to the fact that Identity, as the pure movement of Reflection, is simple negativity, which is contained in a more developed form in the second expression of the Law just quoted. *A* and a *not-A* (the pure Other of *A*) are pronounced; but the latter shows itself only in order to vanish. Identity is thus expressed in this proposition—as negation of negation. *A* and *not-A* are different, and these two different terms are related to one and the same *A*. Identity therefore is here represented as this *Difference in one relation*, or as the simple Difference in the terms themselves.

From this it is clear that the Law of Identity, and still more the Law of Contradiction, is not merely analytic, but synthetic.

For in its expression the latter contains not only empty, simple self-identity, but also the Other of identity in general, and, further, absolute non-identity or self-contradiction. And the Law of Identity itself contains (as was shown of it) the movement of Reflection—Identity as the disappearance of otherness.

The result then of this consideration is, first, that the Laws of Identity and Contradiction, when they are intended to express as the truth only abstract Identity in opposition to Difference, are not Laws of Thought, but quite the opposite; secondly, that these Laws contain more than is meant by them, namely this opposite—Absolute Difference itself.

B

DIFFERENCE

(a) ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE

Difference is negativity which contains Reflection, the Nothing which is proclaimed in tautology, the essential moment of Identity itself, which is both determined as being its own negativity and also is different from Difference.

1. This Difference is Difference in and for itself, Absolute Difference, the Difference of Essence.—It is Difference in and for itself, and not Difference effected by an external entity: self-relating and therefore simple Difference.—It is essential that Absolute Difference be taken as simple. In the Absolute Difference between *A* and *Not-A*, it is the simple “not” which as such constitutes the Difference. Difference itself is a simple concept. Two things are different, it is said, “in that” they *etc.*—“In that,” that is, in one and the same respect, in the same basis of determination. And this basis is the Difference of Reflection, and not the otherness of Determinate Being. One Determinate Being and another are posited as falling apart; each of these existents, which are determinate as against each other, has an immediate Being for itself. On the other hand, the Other of Essence is the Other in and for itself, and not the Other of another Other which is external to it, simple determinateness in itself. In the sphere of Determinate Being, too, otherness and determinateness turned out to be of this nature, that each is simple determinateness and identical

opposition; but this identity showed itself to be only the transition of one determinateness into the other. Here, in the sphere of Reflection, Difference emerges as a reflected Difference, which is posited as that which it is in itself.

2. Difference in itself is self-relating Difference: it is thus its own negativity—Difference not from an Other, but from its own self: it is not itself, but its Other. But that which is different from Difference is Identity. Difference is therefore both itself and Identity. The two together constitute Difference: it is the whole and its moment.—It may equally be said that Difference, as simple Difference, is no Difference, and is Difference only in relation to Identity; but, much rather, as Difference, it contains both Identity and this relation itself.—Difference is the whole and its own moment, just as Identity too is its whole and its moment.—This may be considered the essential nature of Reflection and the definite fundamental basis of every activity and self-motion.—Difference and also Identity both constitute themselves moment or positedness, because, as Reflection, they are negative self-relation.

This Difference, which is the unity of itself and Identity, is Difference determinate in itself. It is not transition nor relation to an external Other; its Other—Identity—is within itself; and similarly Identity, when it has entered into the determination of Difference, has not lost itself in it as in its Other, but preserves itself in it and is its intro-Reflection and moment.

3. Difference has the two moments of Identity and Difference; thus each is a positedness and determinateness. But in this positedness each is relation to itself. One—Identity—is, immediately, the moment of intro-Reflection; but the other equally is difference—Difference in itself, reflected Difference. Since Difference has two such moments, which are themselves intro-Reflections, it is Variety.

(b) VARIETY

1. Identity is in itself cleft into Variety, because it is Absolute Difference in itself, and as such posits itself as its own negative, and because further these its moments—itsself and its negative (intro-Reflections)—are identical with themselves; or again, because it itself immediately transcends its negation, and in

its determination is intro-reflected. The distinct parts subsist as different from and indifferent to one another, for each part is self-identical, having Identity for its bottom and element; or again, what is different is what it is only in its opposite, namely Identity.

Difference constitutes the other-being, as such, of Reflection. The Other of Determinate Being has immediate Being for ground: therein the negative consists. In Reflection, on the other hand, Self-identity (reflected immediacy) constitutes the subsistence of the negative and its indifference.

The moments of Difference are Identity and Difference itself. They are different because they are intro-reflected or self-relating: thus in the determination of Identity they are self-relations; Identity is not related to Difference, nor is Difference to Identity; each moment is thus related only to itself, and they are therefore not determinate as against each other.—Now in this manner they are not different in themselves, and therefore Difference is external to them. The different entities are not then related to each other as Identity and Difference, but only as different in general, indifferent to each other and to their determinateness.

2. In Variety as the indifference of Difference, Reflection has altogether become external to itself: Difference is only a positedness, it is only in so far as it is transcended, but also it is itself the whole of Reflection.—If this is considered more closely, then both Identity and Difference, as they have just been determined, are Reflections, each being the unity of itself and its Other—in other words, the whole. But now the determinateness, which makes them *only* Identity or *only* Difference, has become transcended. They are not Qualities for the reason that their determinateness, by virtue of intro-Reflection, exists only as negation. We have therefore a twofold fact—intro-Reflection as such and determinateness as negation, or positedness. Positedness is Reflection which is external to itself; it is negation as negation, and accordingly it is, *in itself*, self-relating negation and intro-Reflection, but only in itself; and it is related to it as to an external term.

Reflection in itself and External Reflection are accordingly the two determinations in which the moments of Difference—Identity and Difference—posited themselves. They are these

moments themselves, in so far as they have now determined themselves.—Reflection in itself is Identity; but it is determined as indifferent to Difference, not as quite without it but as maintaining towards it an attitude of self-identity: it is Variety. It is Identity which has reflected itself into itself in such a manner that it is really the One Reflection of the two moments in itself: both are intro-Reflections. Identity is this one Reflection of both, which contains Difference only as indifference, and is Variety in general.—External Reflection, on the other hand, is their determinate Difference, not as absolute intro-Reflection, but as a determination to which self-existent Reflection is indifferent: its two moments—Identity and Difference itself—are thus externally posited determinations which are not in and for themselves.

Now this external Identity is Likeness, and external Difference, Unlikeness.—Likeness is Identity, but only as a positedness, an Identity which is not in and for itself.—And similarly Unlikeness is Difference, but only as external Difference which is not in and for itself the Difference of the unlike. Whether something is or is not like another something concerns neither term: each is referred only to itself, and is what it is, in and for itself. Identity or Non-identity, as Likeness and Unlikeness, relates only to their aspect from a third view-point, which falls without their sphere.

3. External Reflection refers the different to Likeness and Unlikeness. This process of referring, this comparison, passes backwards and forwards between Likeness and Unlikeness. But this oscillating process of relation between Likeness and Unlikeness is quite external to these determinations; and also they are not related to each other, but each is related separately to a third term. In this alternation each immediately manifests itself for itself.—External Reflection as such is external to itself; determinate Difference is negated Absolute Difference, and accordingly it is not simple and is not intro-Reflection; the latter is external to it. Consequently its moments fall apart, and are related to intro-Reflection (which stands over against them) as external to each other.

Reflection is thus estranged from itself, and Likeness and Unlikeness come to view in it as unrelated to each other: it separates them by relating them to one and the same term,

by means of "in so far," of sides and respects. The different terms, which are one and the same thing, and have both Likeness and Unlikeness related to them, are thus like each other from the one side, but unlike from the other, and in so far as they are like they are not unlike. Likeness is related only to itself, and in the same manner Unlikeness is just Unlikeness.

But in this their separation they only cancel each other. It was intended that contradiction and dissolution should be kept off from them by the fact that some thing is like another in one respect but unlike in another; but precisely this severance of Likeness and Unlikeness is their destruction. For both are determinations of Difference; they are relations to each other (one is what the other is not); like is not unlike, and unlike not like; and both have this relation essentially, and, apart from it, no significance. As determination of Difference each is what it is as being different from its other. But, by virtue of their mutual indifference, Likeness is related only to itself, and similarly Unlikeness is only its own respect and Reflection for itself. Each accordingly is like itself, and Difference, since they have no determinateness one against the other, has vanished: in other words, each now is Likeness and no more.

This indifferent respect or external Difference thus transcends itself and is its own negativity in itself. It is that negativity which, in comparison, belongs to the comparing term. This term passes from Likeness to Unlikeness and back; it thus allows one to vanish in the other, and is indeed the negative unity of both. At first it is beyond the compared term and also beyond the moments of comparison, being a subjective activity which falls without them. But in fact this negative unity is the nature itself of Likeness and Unlikeness, as was seen. It is, precisely, independent respect (and each one is independent respect) which is that self-relation which transcends their difference and therefore themselves.

In this aspect, as moments of External Reflection, and as external to themselves, Likeness and Unlikeness vanish together in their likeness. But, further, this their negative unity is also posited in them; for Reflection which is in itself is external to them, or they are the Likeness and Unlikeness of a third

term which is other than they. What is Like is thus not like itself; and what is Unlike is unlike, not itself, but another (which is unlike it), and it is therefore itself Like. The Like, and the Unlike, is, therefore, its own Unlike. Each accordingly is this Reflection which makes Likeness to be both itself and Unlikeness, and Unlikeness to be both itself and Likeness.

Likeness and Unlikeness constituted the side of positedness as against the compared term (the Various), which had determined itself against them as self-existent Reflection. But this term has hereby likewise lost its determinateness as against them. Precisely Likeness and Unlikeness, the determinations of External Reflection, are Reflection which is only in itself: the Various as such was to have been this; they are its merely indeterminate Difference. Self-existent Reflection is self-relation without negation, abstract self-identity, and therefore positedness itself.—The merely Various passes then through positedness into negative Reflection. The Various is merely posited Difference, Difference therefore which is not Difference, and therefore is its own negation in itself. Thus Likeness and Unlikeness itself (or positedness) passes back through indifference or self-existent Reflection into negative self-unity, into Reflection which is in itself the Difference between Likeness and Unlikeness. That Variety, whose indifferent sides also are just moments, since they constitute one negative unity, is Opposition.

Observation

Variety, like Identity, is formulated in its own Law. And these two Laws are kept in a relation of indifferent Variety relatively to each other, so that each is valid without respect to the other.

“All things are different,” or, “There are no two things which are alike.”—This proposition is indeed the opposite of the Law of Identity, for it states that *A* has Variety, that is, *A* is also not *A*; or *A* is unlike another, and then it is not *A* in general, but rather a determinate *A*. In the Law of Identity any substratum may be put in place of *A*; but *A* as Unlike can no longer be interchanged with any other. It is not indeed to be various from itself, but only from an other; but this Variety is its proper determination. As self-identical *A* it is

the indeterminate; but as determinate, it is the opposite of this; it has no longer only self-identity, but also a negation, that is, a Variety of itself from itself.

It is a quite superfluous proposition which states that all things are different from one another, for the plural of things immediately contains multiplicity and quite indeterminate Variety.—But the proposition “there are no two things which are entirely alike” expresses more, namely, determinate Variety. Two things are not only two—numerical plurality is but indifference—but they are made various by a determination. Imagination is struck by the proposition that there are no two things which are alike,—as in that courtly anecdote which tells how Leibniz brought it up among the ladies, and induced them to look among the leaves of trees, to see if they should find two which were alike.—Happy times for metaphysics, when it was the occupation of courtiers, and no greater effort was needed in testing its propositions than that of comparing leaves of trees!—The reason why this proposition is striking is contained in what was said, namely, that duality (or numerical plurality) contains no determinate Variety, and that Variety as such, in its abstraction, so far is indifferent to Likeness and Unlikeness. Imagination, when it further passes over to determination, accepts these moments themselves as indifferent to each other, believing that either the one or the other, mere Likeness of things—without Unlikeness—suffices to afford determination; or that things are various even when they are only numerically many—that is, when they are various in general—and not unlike. But the Law of Variety expresses this—that things are differentiated by Unlikeness, and that the determination of Unlikeness is as proper to them as that of Likeness; for determinate Difference is constituted only by the two together.

Now surely this proposition, that the determination of Unlikeness belongs to all things, requires proof: it cannot be set up as an immediate proposition, for the common method of cognition itself demands for the connection of different determinations in a synthetic proposition a proof, or the production of a third term in which they are mediated. This proof would have to demonstrate the transition of Identity into Variety, and next the transition of Variety into determinate Variety, or Unlikeness. This is not usually done; but it results from

the fact that Variety or external Difference is in truth intro-reflected Difference (or Difference in itself), and that hence the indifferent subsistence of the Various is mere positedness, and therefore not external and indifferent Difference, but *one* relation of the two moments.

And this also contains the dissolution and nullity of the Law of Variety. No two things are perfectly alike; if so, they are like and also unlike: like, in that they are things, or, generally, are two,—for each is a thing and a One as much as the other, and each therefore the same thing as the other;—and they are unlike *ex hypothesi*. We have then this determination, that both moments—Likeness and Unlikeness—are different in one and the same thing, or that the Difference while falling apart is one and the same relation. It has thus passed over into Opposition.

It is true that the coextensiveness of the two predicates is kept disjunct by the “in-so-far,” when it is true of two things that “in so far as” they are alike, “in so far” they are not unlike; or that in one side or respect they are alike, but in the other side or respect unlike. This removes the unity of Likeness and Unlikeness from the thing; and that which would be its own Reflection and the Reflection of Likeness and Unlikeness in itself, is held fast as a Reflection external to the thing. It is this Reflection, accordingly, which in one and the same activity distinguishes the two sides of Likeness and Unlikeness; it consequently contains both in one activity, and reflects and allows the one to show in the other.—But the customary tenderness for *things*, whose only care is that they shall not contradict one another, forgets here as elsewhere that this is no solution of the contradiction, which is merely planted elsewhere, namely, into subjective or external reflection; and that the latter does in fact contain the two moments—which this removal and transplantation proclaim to be a mere positedness—in one unity as transcended and related to each other.

(c) OPPOSITION

In Opposition, determinate Reflection, or Difference, is perfected. It is the unity of Identity and Variety; its moments are various in one Identity, and thus are *opposite*.

Identity and Difference are the moments of Difference as confined within the latter; they are reflected moments of its unity. But Likeness and Unlikeness are externalized Reflection; their self-identity is not only the indifference of each to that which is different from it, but also to Being-in-and-for-Self as such; it is self-identity as opposed to intro-reflected Identity; and therefore it is immediacy which is not intro-reflected. The positedness of the sides of External Reflection is consequently a Being, and their not-positedness, a Not-being.

If the moments of Opposition are more closely considered, they are seen to be intro-reflected positedness or determination in general. Positedness is Likeness and Unlikeness; these two, each being reflected into itself, constitute the determinations of Opposition. Their intro-Reflection consists in the fact that each in itself is the unity of Likeness and Unlikeness. Likeness is only in Reflection which uses Unlikeness as its standard of comparison and consequently mediates by means of its other and indifferent moment; similarly Unlikeness is only in the same reflecting relation in which Likeness is.—Each then of these moments is, in its determinateness, the whole. It is the whole in so far as it also contains its other moment; but this its other is, and is indifferently; each thus contains the relation to its Not-being, and is only intro-Reflection, or the whole which essentially relates itself to its Not-being.

This intro-reflected Self-likeness which contains in itself the relation to Unlikeness, is the Positive: Unlikeness, which contains the relation to its Not-being (or Likeness), is the Negative.—Or again both are Positedness; and now, in so far as the differentiated determinateness is taken as differentiated determinate self-relation of Positedness, so far Opposition is (a) Positedness reflected into its Self-likeness, and (b) the same reflected into its Unlikeness to self: it is Positive and Negative.—The Positive is Positedness as reflected into Self-likeness; but that which is reflected is Positedness, that is, negation as negation; and therefore this intro-Reflection has for determination relation to Other. The negative is Positedness as reflected into Unlikeness; but Positedness is Unlikeness itself; and therefore this Reflection is the self-identity of Unlikeness and absolute self-relation.—Thus we can say of both that Positedness reflected into Self-likeness has Unlikeness in it,

and Positedness reflected into Unlikeness to self also has Likeness.

Thus Positive and Negative are the sides, now independent, of Opposition. They are independent because they are in themselves the intro-Reflection of the whole, and they appertain to Opposition in so far as it is determinateness which is intro-reflected as a whole. Their independence allows them to constitute Opposition determinate *in itself*. Each is itself and its Other; and for this reason each has its determinateness not in an Other but in itself.—Each is self-related only as relating itself to its Other. This has a twofold aspect: each is relation to its Not-being as cancellation of this otherness in itself; its Not-being is only a moment within each itself. But on the other hand Positedness has here become a Being, an indifferent persistence; and consequently, while each contains its Other, this latter is also the Not-being of that in which it is supposed to be contained only as moment. Each therefore *is* only in so far as its Not-being is, and *is* only in an identical relation.

The determinations which constitute Positive and Negative consist then in this, that Positive and Negative are, first, absolute moments of Opposition: their subsistence is, inseparably, one Reflection; and it is one mediation in which each is by virtue of the Not-being of its Other, and therefore by virtue of its Other and its own Not-being.—Thus they are opposed one to the other; that is, each stands to the other in this relation only; it is not true that one is positive and the other negative, but both are negative to each other. Thus in general each is, first, only in so far as the other is; it is what it is through the other, or through its own Not-being; it is only Positedness. Secondly, it is in so far as the other is not; it is what it is through the Not-being of the other; it is intro-Reflection.—But both these systems together are only one mediation of Opposition in general, in which they in general are only posited terms.

But, further, this mere Positedness is, generally, intro-reflected; and according to this moment of External Reflection, Positive and Negative are indifferent to that first Identity, in which they are only moments; in other words, that first Reflection is the peculiar intro-Reflection of Positive and

Negative, and each is its own Positedness in itself, and thus each is indifferent to this its Reflection into its Not-being, or indifferent to its own Positedness. Here the two sides are merely various; and in so far as their determinateness, which makes them positive and negative, constitutes their Positedness as against each other, so far each is not thus determinate in itself, but is only determinateness in general; thus to each side belongs the determinateness either of Positive or Negative; but they are interchangeable, and each side is of such a kind that it can be taken equally well as positive or as negative.

But, thirdly, Positive and Negative are not only a posited term, nor yet merely indifferent; but their Positedness or the relation to Other in a unity which they are not themselves, is retracted into each. Each is in itself positive and negative; Positive and Negative are the Determination of Reflection in and for itself; and it is positive and negative only in this intro-Reflection of the Opposite. The Positive has in itself the relation to Other, which contains its determinateness; similarly the Negative is not negative as against an Other, but also contains the determinateness which makes it negative.

Thus each—Positive as well as Negative—is independent and self-subsistent self-unity. It is true that the Positive is a Positedness, but in such a manner that for it Positedness is such only as transcended. It is the Not-opposite, Opposition transcended, but as side of Opposition itself.—Something may be determined as being positive in relation to an other-being, but only in such a manner that it is its nature not to be something posited: it is intro-Reflection, which negates other-being. But its Other, the Negative, is itself no longer Positedness nor moment, but an independent Being; and hence negating intro-Reflection of the Positive is determined as excluding from itself this its Not-being.

This Negative which is taken as absolute Reflection is not the immediate Negative, but is Negative as transcended Positedness, the Negative in and for itself which is based upon itself positively. As intro-Reflection it negates its relation to Other; its Other is the Positive, which is an independent Being;—and consequently its negative relation to it is, to exclude it from itself. The Negative is the self-subsistent Opposite, as against the Positive, which is the determination of transcended

Opposition,—in other words, the self-based and complete Opposition, which is opposed to self-identical Positedness.

Here then Positive and Negative are positive and negative not only *in themselves*, but in and for themselves. They are these in themselves in so far as abstraction is made from their exclusive relation to Other and they are taken only according to their determination. Something is positive or negative *in itself* when it is supposed to be so determined not only against other. But when Positive and Negative are not Positedness and therefore not Opposite, then each is the immediate, Being and Not-being. But Positive and Negative are the moments of Opposition, and their Being-in-Self constitutes only the form of their intro-reflectedness. Something is positive *in itself*, apart from relation to the Negative; and something is negative *in itself*, apart from relation to the Negative: in this determination merely the abstract moment of this reflectedness is held fast. The self-existent Positive or Negative, on the other hand, means essentially that to be opposed is not mere moment nor belongs to comparison, but is the peculiar determination of the sides of Opposition. So that they are not positive or negative *in themselves* apart from the relation to other, but this relation (being exclusive) constitutes their determination or Being-in-Self; here then they are this also in and for themselves.

Observation

The concept of Positive and Negative as used in arithmetic must here be noticed. It is there assumed to be known; but since it is not taken in its determinate difference, it does not escape insoluble difficulties and complications. We have just reached the two *real* determinations of Positive and Negative—apart from the simple concept of their opposition,—namely, first that a merely different and immediate Determinate Being is the base, whose simple intro-Reflection is distinguished from its Positedness, which is Opposition itself. The latter therefore is counted only as not being in and for itself, and although it belongs to the Various, so that each in general is a term of opposition, yet it also persists indifferently for itself; it does not matter which of the two opposed *Varia* is considered as positive or as negative.—But, secondly, the Positive is that

which is Positive in itself, and the Negative that which is Negative in itself, so that the Various is not indifferent to it, but has here its determination in and for itself.—These two forms of Positive and Negative occur in the very first determinations in which they are used in arithmetic.

At this point $+a$ and $-a$ are opposite magnitudes in general; a is the unit, which is in itself and is their common foundation, indifferent itself to opposition, and here forming a dead base without further concept. $-a$ is designated as negative and $+a$ as positive, but one is an opposed term as much as the other.

Further, a is not only simple basic unity, but as $+a$ and $-a$ it is the intro-Reflection of these opposites; there are two different a 's, and it is indifferent which of the two is to be designated as positive or negative: both have separate persistence, and are positive.

According to the first aspect $+y - y = 0$; or, in $-8 + 3$, the units which are positive in 3 are negative in 8. Opposite units cancel each other when combined. An hour's journey to the east followed by a similar journey west ends in the cancellation of the first journey; the greater the liabilities, by so much less are the assets, and an amount of assets cancels a similar amount of liabilities. At the same time the hour's journey east is not the positive journey in itself, nor is the journey west the negative journey: these directions are indifferent to this determinateness of the Opposition; it is a third respect, which falls without them, that makes the one positive and the other negative. So too liabilities are not in and for themselves the Negative; they are so only in relation to the debtor: for the creditor they are a positive asset, a sum of money or anything having a definite value, which becomes liability or asset according to an external respect.

The opposites cancel each other in their relation, so that the result is zero; however, they also contain their identical relation, which is indifferent to the Opposition itself; and now they constitute One. It has just been said that the sum of money is one sum, and the a only one a in $+a$ and $-a$; and the journey is one journey only and not two, one eastwards and the other westwards. Similarly an ordinate y is the same on whichever side of the axis it is taken, and in so far $+y - y = y$;

the ordinate is only *the* ordinate, and has only one determination and one law.

But, further, the opposites are not only one indifferent, but two indifferents. For, being opposite, they are also intro-reflected, and thus persist as various.

Thus $-8 + 3$ contains altogether eleven units; $+y$ and $-y$ are ordinates on the opposite side of the axis, where each one is a Determinate Being indifferent to this limit, and to its opposite; and thus $+y - y = 2y$.—Also the journey made eastwards and westwards is the sum of a double effort, or the sum of two periods of time. Similarly in economics a quantum of money or of wealth is not only this one quantum as a means of subsistence, but is double: it is a means of subsistence for the creditor as well as for the debtor. The wealth of a nation is not computed as merely the sum-total of ready money and of the value of property movable and immovable which it contains; still less is it the difference which remains after liabilities have been deducted from assets. Capital—even if its respective determinations of asset and liability nullify each other—remains, first, positive capital ($+a - a = a$); and, secondly, since it is a manifold liability, being lent and re-lent, it becomes an extremely manifold instrument.

But it is not only the case that opposite magnitudes are, first, merely and in general opposite, and, secondly, real or indifferent. For, further, although Quantum itself is indifferently limited Being, yet that which is Positive in itself and that which is Negative in itself occurs in it too. For instance, a , if not preceded by a sign, is counted as being meant for positive if it has to be designated. If it were to become merely an opposite in general, it might equally well be taken as $-a$. But the positive sign is given it immediately, because the Positive for itself has the peculiar meaning of immediate—the self-identical—in contrast with Opposition.

Further, when positive and negative magnitudes are added or subtracted, they are counted as magnitudes which are positive or negative in themselves and do not become positive and negative externally, merely through the relation of addition and subtraction. In $8 - (-3)$ the first minus means opposition to 8, but the second, (-3) , counts as a term opposite *in itself*, apart from this relation.

This becomes more clearly evident in multiplication and division. Here the Positive must essentially be taken as the not-opposite, the Negative on the contrary as the opposite, and not both determinations equally as opposite terms in general. The textbooks do not pass beyond the concept of opposite magnitudes in general in their proofs of the behaviour of the signs in these two species of calculation; these proofs are therefore incomplete and involved in contradictions.—In fact Plus and Minus in multiplication and division receive the more determinate meaning respectively of Positive and Negative in itself, because the relation of factors—they are as Unit and Amount to each other—is not a mere relation of increase and decrease as in addition and subtraction, but is qualitative; whence also Plus and Minus acquire the qualitative meaning of Positive and Negative.—Without this determination, and merely out of the concept of opposed magnitudes, the false conclusion may easily be drawn that if $-a \times +a = -a^2$, conversely $+a \times -a = +a^2$. One factor denotes Amount and the other Unit, and, in general, the first factor denotes the former, so that the difference between the two expressions $-a \times +a$ and $+a \times -a$ is that in the first $+a$ is Unit and $-a$ is Amount, while in the second the reverse is the case. Now in the first case it is commonly said that if I am to take $+a - a$ times, I take $+a$, not simply a times, but also, in the opposite manner, $+a$ times $-a$; and since it is plus I have to take it negatively, and the product is $-a^2$.—But if, in the second case, $-a$ is to be taken $+a$ times, then likewise $-a$ is not to be taken $-a$ times, but in the opposite determination, that is, $+a$ times. It follows from the reasoning applied in the first case that the product must be $+a^2$. And the same holds good for division.

This is a necessary conclusion so long as Plus and Minus are taken only as opposite magnitudes in general. In the first case the Minus is credited with the power of changing the Plus; but in the second case Plus was not supposed to have a similar power over Minus, although it is an opposite magnitudinal determination as much as Minus. But in fact Plus has not this power, since it must here be taken in its qualitative determination as against Minus, the factors having a qualitative relation to each other. In this regard then the Negative here

is the Opposite in itself as such, and the Positive is the indeterminate and indifferent in general; it is indeed also the Negative, but the Negative of an Other and not in itself.—Accordingly a determination as negation is introduced only through the Negative, and not through the Positive.

So then $-a \times -a = +a^2$ because the negative a is to be taken not only in the opposite manner (in that case it would have to be taken as multiplied by $-a$), but because it is to be taken as negative. But the negation of negation is the Positive.

C

CONTRADICTION

1. Difference in general contains its two sides as moments; in Variety these fall apart indifferent; in Opposition as such they are sides of Difference,—one is determined only by the other and they are therefore only moments; but also they are determinate each in itself, indifferent to each other, and mutually exclusive: independent Determinations of Reflection.

Of these one is the Positive and the other the Negative, but the former as that which is positive in itself and the latter as that which is negative in itself. Each has indifferent independence for itself by virtue of the fact that it contains the relation to its other moment: each is therefore complete and self-contained opposition.—As this Whole, each is self-mediated by its Other and contains it. But it is also self-mediated by the Not-being of its Other: it is therefore self-existent unity and excludes the Other.

The independent Determination of Reflection excludes the other in that same respect in which it includes it, wherein resides its independence: being independent it thus excludes its own independence, which consists, first, in the fact that it contains the determination which is other to it and for this reason only is not a relation to something external, but also and with equal immediacy in the fact that it is itself and excludes the determination which is negative to it. Thus it is *Contradiction*.

Already Difference in general is *Contradiction in itself*; for it is the *unity* of terms which are only in so far as they are *not*

one, and the separation of terms which are only as separated in the same relation. But Positive and Negative are *posited* Contradiction, because they are negative unities which posit themselves, while each is its own self-transcendence and the positing of its opposite.—They constitute Determining Reflection in its *excluding* aspect: excluding is *one* distinction, and each of the distinguished terms, as exclusive, is itself the whole exclusion; consequently each in itself excludes itself.

If we consider the two independent Determinations of Reflection for themselves, we see that the Positive is positedness as reflected into self-equality; positedness which is not relation to an other, and thus persistence in so far as positedness is transcended and excluded. But hereby the Positive converts itself into the relation of a Not-being,—into a positedness.—It is thus Contradiction: it is the positing of self-identity, and, by excluding the Negative, it makes itself into the Negative of something, that is, into that Other which it excludes from itself. This, as excluded, is posited as free from the excluding term, and consequently as intro-reflected and itself excluding. Thus exclusive Reflection is the positing of the Positive as excluding the Other in such a manner that this positing is immediately the positing of its Other, which excludes it.

This is the absolute Contradiction of the Positive; but it is immediately the absolute Contradiction of the Negative: the positing of both is one single Reflection.—The Negative considered by itself, as against the Positive, is positedness as reflected into self-inequality, the Negative as Negative. But the Negative itself is the unequal or Not-being of an Other: accordingly the Reflection into its inequality is rather its self-relation.—Negation in general is the Negative as Quality, or immediate determinateness; but the Negative as such is the Negative as related to its own Negative or Other. Now if this Negative is taken simply as identical with the first, then it—as well as the first—is merely immediate; they are then not taken as Other to each other, not, therefore, as Negative: the Negative in general is not immediate.—But, since further each is just as much that which the other is, this relation of unequal terms is just as much their identical relation.

This, then, is that same Contradiction which the Positive is, namely positedness or negation as self-relation. But the

Positive is this Contradiction only *in itself*, while the Negative is *posited* Contradiction; for in its intro-Reflection, which makes it to be Negative in and for itself or to be self-identical as being Negative, it has the determination of being not-identical, the exclusion of Identity. The Negative is and means to be self-identical as opposed to Identity, and consequently, by virtue of its exclusive Reflection, to exclude itself from itself.

The Negative then is the totality of Opposition, resting upon itself as Opposition, Absolute Difference not relating itself to other; as Opposition it excludes Identity from itself,—but also thus excludes itself; for as *self-relation* it determines itself to be that very Identity which it excludes.

2. Contradiction resolves itself.

In self-exclusive Reflection, which has just been under consideration, Positive and Negative each in its independence transcends itself; each is simply the passing over, or rather the self-transference, into its opposite. This restless disappearance of opposites in themselves is the closest unity which is evolved from Contradiction; it is the Nought.

But Contradiction contains not only the Negative but also the Positive; or, self-exclusive Reflection is also Positing Reflection: the result of Contradiction is not only Nought.—The Positive and Negative constitute the positedness of independence; their self-negation transcends the positedness of independence. It is this which in truth perishes in Contradiction.

Intro-Reflection, through which the sides of Opposition make themselves into independent self-relations, is at this point their independence as distinguished moments: they thus are *this* independence only *in themselves*, for as yet they are still opposites, and the fact that they are so *in themselves* constitutes their positedness. But their exclusive Reflection transcends this positedness and makes them into independent terms which are for themselves, which are independent not only *in themselves* but also through the negative relation of each to its Other; in this manner their independence is also posited. But further through this their positing they make themselves into a positedness. They destroy themselves in determining themselves as the self-identical, but therein rather as the Negative, as a self-identical something which is relation to other.

But, more closely considered, this exclusive Reflection is not only this formal determination. It is independence which is *in itself*, and is the transcendence of this positedness; only by this transcendence is it unity which is for itself and is in truth independent. By the transcendence of otherness or positedness it is true that positedness, the Negative of an Other, is reintroduced. But in fact this negation is not only first and immediate relation to other, not positedness as transcended immediacy, but also it exists as transcended positedness. Exclusive Reflection of independence, since it is exclusive, becomes positedness, but is equally transcendence of its positedness. It is transcending self-relation: first it here transcends the Negative, and secondly it posits itself as Negative, and this is just the same Negative which it transcends: in transcending the Negative it posits the Negative and simultaneously transcends it. In this manner the exclusive determination is Other to itself and is the negation of this Other; and consequently the transcendence of this positedness does not again become positedness as the Negative of an Other, but is that collapse into self which is positive self-unity. Thus independence is unity which returns into itself through its own negation, since it returns into itself through the negation of its own positedness. It is the unity of Essence, which makes it self-identical through the negation not of an Other but of itself.

3. On this its positive side, where independence in Opposition as exclusive Reflection makes itself into positedness and equally transcends the point where it is positedness, Opposition not only has perished, but has gone back into its Ground.—The exclusive Reflection of independent Opposition makes it a negative and merely posited entity; and thereby it reduces its determinations, Positive and Negative, which hitherto have been independent, to terms which are only determinations. Positedness is thus made into positedness, and has therefore returned generally into its self-unity: it is simple Essence, but Essence as Ground. By the transcendence of its self-contradictory determinations Essence has been restored, with this determination, however, that it is exclusive unity of Reflection,—simple unity which determines itself as Negative, but in this positedness is immediately self-equal and has coincided with itself.

First, then, independent Opposition passes back into Ground through its Contradiction; Opposition is the first or immediate term from which a beginning is made, and the transcended Opposition or the transcended positedness is itself a positedness. Thus Essence as Ground is a positedness—something which has become. But, conversely, the only positing which has taken place is this, that Opposition or positedness is here transcended only as positedness. Therefore Essence as Ground is exclusive Reflection only in so far as it turns itself into positedness, or in so far as Opposition (which before was the starting-point and was immediate) is the merely posited and determinate independence of Essence,—Opposition being merely the self-transcendent in itself, but Essence that which, in its determinateness, is intro-reflected. Essence as Ground excludes *itself* from itself, it posits *itself*; its positedness—which is the excluded element—exists only as positedness, as self-identity of the Negative. This independent element is the Negative *posited* as such; and it is self-contradictory, and therefore remains immediately in Essence as in its Ground.

Resolved Contradiction is, then, Ground, that is, Essence as unity of Positive and Negative. In Opposition, the determination has developed into independence; but Ground is this perfected independence; in it the Negative is independent Essence, but *as* Negative; and thus it is Positive just as much as it is that which in this negativity is self-identical. Opposition and its Contradiction are therefore transcended as much as preserved in Ground. Ground is Essence as positive self-identity, which, however, simultaneously relates itself to itself as negativity; it thus determines itself and becomes excluded positedness; now this positedness is the totality of independent Essence, and Essence is Ground, since in this its negation it is self-identical and positive. Self-contradictory and independent Opposition was then already itself Ground; now only the determination of self-unity has been added; and the latter emerges when the independent opposite terms transcend each itself, become each its Other, and so perish, but perishing merely coincide with self; so that while perishing—that is, in its positedness or negation—each now in truth becomes intro-reflected and self-identical Essence.

Observation I

Positive and Negative are the same. This expression belongs to external reflection when it institutes a comparison between these two determinations. But no external comparison should be made between these any more than between any other categories; they should be considered in themselves, that is, their own Reflection should be considered. But here it appeared that each essentially is the showing of itself in the Other, and is the positing of itself as of the Other.

Imagination, in so far as it does not consider Positive and Negative as they are in and for themselves, may indeed be referred to comparison, so that it may learn how baseless are these distinguished terms which it assumes to be quite rigidly opposed to each other. Even a slight experience in reflective thought will perceive that, if anything has just been determined as Positive, it straightway turns into Negative if any progress is made from that base, and conversely that a Negative determination turns into Positive; that reflecting thought becomes confused in these determinations and contradicts itself. Insufficient acquaintance with the nature of these determinations thinks that this confusion is a fault which should not occur, and attributes it to a subjective error. And in fact this transition does remain mere confusion in so far as the necessity for this metamorphosis is not present to consciousness.—But it is a simple consideration, even for external reflection, that, anyhow, Positive is not an immediate identity, but is partly a term opposite to Negative, having significance only in this relation and therefore containing the Negative in its concept, and partly that in itself it is the self-relating negation of bare positedness or of the Negative, and therefore is absolute negation in itself.—Similarly the Negative, which is opposed to Positive, has meaning only with reference to this its Other: it therefore contains it in its concept. But the Negative has its own persistence also apart from any relation to the Positive; it is self-identical; thus it is that which the Positive was supposed to be.

The opposition of Positive and Negative is especially taken in the meaning that the former (although etymologically it expresses being posited or positedness) is to be an objective

entity, and the latter a subjective, belonging only to external reflection and in no way concerned with the objective sphere, which is in and for itself and quite ignores it. And indeed if the Negative expresses nothing but the abstraction of subjective caprice or the determination of an external comparison, then of course it is not present for the objective Positive, that is, the latter is not in itself related to any such empty abstraction; but then its determination as Positive is also only external to it.—To quote an example of the fixed opposition of these Determinations of Reflection, light in general is reckoned as the purely Positive and darkness as the purely Negative. But light, in its infinite expansion and in the force of its maturing and life-giving activity, has essentially the nature of absolute negativity. On the other hand darkness, which is simple, or the not self-differentiating womb of generation, is simple self-identity—the Positive. Darkness is taken as the merely Negative in this meaning, that it is mere absence of light and therefore just is not present for it,—so that light, when relating itself to darkness, is supposed to relate itself not to an Other but purely to itself, and thus darkness must simply disappear before it. But of course light is dimmed into grey by darkness; and apart from this merely quantitative change, it also undergoes the qualitative change that by this relation it is determined as a colour.—And so, too, virtue, for example, does not exist without struggle; it is indeed the highest and perfect struggle, and consequently is not merely the Positive, but is absolute negativity; and it is virtue not only as compared with vice, but is resistance and struggle in itself. Or again, vice is not deficiency of virtue (for innocence, too, is this deficiency), and it differs from virtue not only for external reflection, but is opposed to virtue in itself,—it is evil. Evil persists in being founded in itself as against good: it is positive negativity. But innocence, which is lack both of good and of evil, is indifferent to both determinations, and is neither positive nor negative. But this lack, too, must be taken as determinateness: it must be considered on the one hand as the positive nature of something, and on the other as relating itself to an opposite,—every nature leaves its innocence, its indifferent self-identity, relating itself through itself to its Other and thereby destroying itself, or, in the positive sense, passing back into its Ground.—And

truth, too, is the Positive, as knowledge corresponding with its object; but it is this self-equality only in so far as knowledge has already taken up a negative attitude to the Other, has penetrated the object, and transcended that negation which the object is. Error is a Positive as an opinion affirming that which is not in and for itself, an opinion which knows itself and asserts itself. But ignorance is either indifference to truth and error, and thus determined neither as positive nor as negative,—and if it is determined as a deficiency, this determination belongs to external reflection; or else, objectively and as proper determination of a nature, it is the impulse which is directed against itself, a negative which contains a positive direction.—It is of the greatest importance to recognize this quality of the Determinations of Reflection which have been considered here, that their truth consists only in their relation to each other, and therefore in the fact that each contains the other in its own concept. This must be understood and remembered, for without this understanding not a step can really be taken in philosophy.

Observation 2

The determination of Opposition too has been made into a law, the so-called Law of the Excluded Middle.

Something is either A or not-A: there is no third.

This law implies first that everything is a term of an Opposition, is determined either as positive or negative.—It is an important proposition, which follows from the fact that Identity passes over into Variety and Variety into Opposition. But it is not generally understood in this meaning; usually it is intended to signify that, of all predicates, either some particular predicate itself, or its not-being, can be predicated of a thing. The opposite here means only deficiency, or rather indeterminateness; and the proposition is so insignificant that it is not worth enunciating. If the determinations of sweet, green, square, are taken—and all predicates are supposed to be taken—and it is said of Spirit that it is either sweet or not sweet, green or not green, and so forth, then this is a triviality which leads to nothing. The determinateness or predicate is referred to something; the law states that the something is

determinate; now the law is supposed essentially to contain this, that the determinateness determines itself more closely, becoming determinateness *in itself*, or Opposition. But instead of this it only passes in this trivial sense from determinateness to its not-being in general, that is, back to indeterminateness.

The law of the excluded middle differs also from the laws of identity and contradiction which were considered above: the latter of these states that there is nothing which is at once A and not- A . It implies that there is nothing which is neither A nor not- A , that there is no third term which is indifferent to this opposition. In fact, however, this third term, which is indifferent to the opposition, is contained in the law itself—namely A . This A is neither $+A$ nor $-A$, and also it is $+A$ as well as $-A$.—The something which was to be either $+A$ or not- A is here related both to $+A$ and to not- A ; and again, since it is related to A it is supposed not to be related to not- A , and also not to A , since it is related to not- A . The something thus is itself the third term which was supposed to be excluded. The opposite determinations are posited in the something as much as (in this positing) they are transcended, and therefore the third (which here has the form of a dead something), taken more profoundly, is the unity of Reflection into which Opposition passes back as into Ground.

Observation 3

The primary Determinations of Reflection—Identity, Variety, and Opposition—are established in a proposition; therefore the determination into which they pass over as into their truth (namely Contradiction) should much more be comprehended in a law; it should be enunciated that *all things are contradictory in themselves*, in this meaning, that this proposition as opposed to the others expresses the truth and essence of things.—Contradiction, which emerges in Opposition, is no more than developed Nothing; and this is already contained in Identity, and occurred in the expression that the law of identity states nothing. This negation further determines itself into Variety and into Opposition, which now is posited Contradiction.

But it has been a fundamental prejudice of hitherto existing logic and of ordinary imagination that Contradiction is a

determination having less essence and immanence than Identity; but indeed, if there were any question of rank, and the two determinations had to be fixed as separate, Contradiction would have to be taken as the profounder and more fully essential. For as opposed to it Identity is only the determination of the simple immediate, or of dead Being, while Contradiction is the root of all movement and life, and it is only in so far as it contains a Contradiction that anything moves and has impulse and activity.

Ordinarily Contradiction is removed, first of all from things, from the existent and the true in general; and it is asserted *that there is nothing contradictory*. Next it is shifted into subjective reflection, which alone is said to posit it when it relates and compares. But really—it is said—it does not exist even in this reflection, for it is impossible to imagine or to think anything contradictory. Indeed, Contradiction, both in actuality and in thinking reflection, is considered an accident, a kind of abnormality or paroxysm of sickness which will soon pass away.

With regard to the assertion that Contradiction does not exist, that it is non-existent, we may disregard this statement. In every experience there must be an absolute determination of Essence—in every actuality as well as in every concept. The same remark has already been made above, under Infinity, which is Contradiction as it appears in the sphere of Being. But ordinary experience itself declares that at least there are a number of contradictory things about, contradictory arrangements and so forth, the contradiction being present in them and not merely in an external reflection. But it must further not be taken only as an abnormality which occurs just here and there: it is the Negative in its essential determination, the principle of all self-movement, which consists of nothing else but an exhibition of Contradiction. External, sensible motion is itself its immediate existence. Something moves, not because it is here at one point of time and there at another, but because at one and the same point of time it is here and not here, and in this here both is and is not. We must grant the old dialecticians the contradictions which they prove in motion; but what follows is not that there is no motion, but rather that motion is existent Contradiction itself.

And similarly internal or self-movement, or impulse in

general (the appetitive force or *nisus* of the monad, the entelechy of absolutely simple Essence), is nothing else than the fact that something is itself and is also deficiency or the negative of itself, in one and the same respect. Abstract self-identity has no life; but the fact that Positive in itself is negativity causes it to pass outside itself and to change. Something therefore has life only in so far as it contains Contradiction, and is that force which can both comprehend and endure Contradiction. But if an existent something cannot in its positive determination also encroach on its negative, cannot hold fast the one in the other and contain Contradiction within itself, then it is not living unity, or Ground, but perishes in Contradiction.—Speculative thought consists only in this, that thought holds fast Contradiction, and, in Contradiction, itself, and not in that it allows itself to be dominated by it—as happens to imagination—or suffers its determinations to be resolved into others, or into Nothing.

In movement, impulse, and the like, the simplicity of these determinations hides the contradiction from imagination; but this contradiction immediately stands revealed in the determinations of relations. The most trivial examples—above and below, right and left, father and son, and so on without end—all contain Contradiction in one term. That *is* above which is *not* below; “above” is determined only as not being “below,” and *is* only in so far as there is a “below,” and conversely: one determination implies its opposite. Father is the Other of son, and son of father, and each exists only as this Other of the other; and also the one determination exists only in relation to the other: their Being is *one* persistence. Father is something for himself apart from the relation to son, but then he is not father, but a man in general; and similarly above and below, right and left are intro-reflected and are something apart from the relation, but only as places in general.—Opposite terms contain Contradiction in so far as they are negatively related to each other in the same respect, or cancel out and remain indifferent to each other. Imagination passes over to the moment of indifference of the determinations, and so forgets their negative unity, remembering them only as merely different; and in this determination right is no longer right, nor left left, and so forth. But in fact imagination still keeps

right and left before itself, and therefore has these determinations before itself as negating each other, one in the other, and also as not negating each other in this unity but existing each indifferently for itself.

Thus although imagination everywhere has Contradiction for content, it never becomes aware of it; it remains an external reflection, which passes from Likeness to Unlikeness, or from negative relation to intro-reflectedness of the different terms. It keeps these two determinations external to each other, and has in mind only these and not their transition, which is the essential matter and contains the Contradiction.—On the other hand intelligent reflection, if we may mention this here, consists in the understanding and enunciating of Contradiction. It does not express the concept of things and their relations, and has only determinations of imagination for material and content; but still it relates them, and the relation contains their contradiction, allowing their concept to show through the contradiction.—Thinking Reason, on the other hand, sharpens (so to speak) the blunt difference of Variety, the mere manifold of imagination, into essential difference, that is, Opposition. The manifold entities acquire activity and liveliness in relation to one another only when driven on the sharp point of Contradiction; thence they draw negativity, which is the inherent pulsation of self-movement and liveliness.

It has already been remarked of the ontological proof of the existence of God that the fundamental determination there is the sum-total of all realities. It is usually proved of this determination, first, that it is possible because it contains no Contradiction, since reality is taken only as reality without barriers. It was remarked that this sum-total thus becomes simple indeterminate Being, or, if the realities are indeed taken as a plurality of determinate entities, becomes the sum-total of all negations. And if the differentiation of Reality is taken more closely, it changes from Variety into Opposition and so into Contradiction; and the sum-total of all realities ends as absolute self-contradiction. This conclusion is rejected by that common abhorrence which Contradiction rouses in imaginative (not in speculative) thought, as the vacuum does in nature; for such thought does not pass beyond the one-sided consideration of the resolution of Contradiction into nothing, and

does not perceive its positive side, where it becomes absolute activity and Absolute Ground.

Altogether it has appeared from the consideration of the nature of Contradiction that in itself it is not, so to speak, a blemish, deficiency, or fault in a thing if a contradiction can be shown in it. On the contrary, every determination, every concrete, every concept is essentially a union of distinguished and distinguishable moments, which pass over through determinate and essential difference into contradictory moments. It is true that this contradictory concretion resolves itself into nothing—it passes back into its negative unity. Now the thing, the subject, or the concept is itself just this negative unity: it is contradictory in itself, but also it is resolved Contradiction; it is the Ground which contains and supports its determinations. The thing, subject, or concept, as intro-reflected in its sphere, is its resolved Contradiction; but its whole sphere again is determinate and various; it is therefore finite, and this means contradictory. Itself it is not the resolution of this higher Contradiction; but it has a higher sphere for its negative unity or Ground. Accordingly, finite things in their indifferent multiplicity are simply this fact, that, contradictory in themselves, they are intro-refracted and pass back into their Ground. —The nature of the true inference of an absolutely necessary Essence from a finite and contingent entity will be considered below. Such an essence is not inferred from the finite and contingent as from a Being which both is and remains Ground, but, as is also implied immediately in contingency, this absolute necessity is inferred from a merely collapsing and self-contradicting Being; or rather it is demonstrated that contingent Being passes automatically back into its Ground, where it transcends itself,—and, further, in this retrogression it posits Ground in such a manner only that it makes itself into the posited element. In an ordinary inference the Being of the finite appears as the Ground of the absolute: the absolute is because the finite *is*. The truth, however, is that the absolute is just because the finite is self-contradictory opposition—just because it *is not*. In the former meaning an inference runs thus: The Being of the finite is the Being of the absolute;—but in the latter: The Not-being of the finite is the Being of the absolute.

CHAPTER III

GROUND

ESSENCE determines itself as Ground.

In the beginning Nothing was in simple immediate unity with Being; similarly here too the simple identity of Essence is in immediate unity with its absolute negativity. Essence is no more than this its negativity, which is pure Reflection. It is this pure negativity because it is the return of Being into itself; and accordingly it is *determined in itself* or for us, as Ground in which Being dissolves itself. But this determinateness is not posited through Essence itself; in other words, it is not Ground except in so far as it has itself posited this its determinateness. But its Reflection consists in this, that it posits and determines itself as that which it is *in itself*—as Negative. Positive and Negative constitute the essential determination in which, as in its negation, it lies lost. These independent Determinations of Reflection cancel themselves, and the determination which has perished is the true determination of Essence.

Consequently Ground is itself one of the Determinations of Reflection of Essence; but it is the last of these, or rather it is that determination which determines that it is transcended determination. As it perishes, the Determination of Reflection attains its true significance—namely, that it is in itself its own absolute repulsion: that positedness which is proper to Essence is only transcended positedness, and, conversely, only self-transcending positedness is the positedness of Essence. Essence in determining itself as Ground determines itself as the non-determinate, and only the transcendence of its determinateness is its determining.—In this determinateness, which is here self-transcendent, it is Essence which does not come from elsewhere but in its negativity is self-identical.

From this determination, which is supposed to be the first or immediate entity, the movement goes to Ground (through the nature of the determination itself, which perishes through

itself); and thus at this point Ground is something which is determined by this first entity. But this determining, as transcendence of determining, is firstly just restored, purified or manifested identity of Essence, which is the Determination of Reflection in itself;—and further this negating movement, as process of determination, is only the positing of that determinateness of Reflection which appeared as immediate, but which in fact was posited by the self-exclusive Reflection of Ground, and here is posited only as posited or transcended entity.—Thus Essence, when it determines itself as Ground, merely arrives from out of itself. As Ground, then, it posits itself as Essence, and its determining consists in the fact that it posits itself as Essence. This positing is the Reflection of Essence, and this Reflection transcends itself in its determining: in its former aspect it is *positing*, and in its latter the *positing of Essence*,—and consequently it is both in one single activity.

Reflection is pure mediation in general, Ground is the real self-mediation of Essence. The former—the movement of Nothing through nothing back to itself—is the showing of itself in an Other; but, in this Reflection, Opposition as yet has no independence, and therefore it is neither that first, showing entity—which is a Positive, nor that other in which it shows—which is a Negative. Both are substrata, and really only substrata of imaginative force: they are not yet self-relating entities. Pure mediation is only pure relation without related terms. It is true that Determining Reflection posits such terms, which are self-identical, but also are only determinate relations. On the other hand, Ground is real mediation because it contains Reflection as transcended Reflection: it is Essence which returns upon itself through its Not-being, and posits itself. According to this moment of transcended Reflection, that which is posited acquires the determination of immediacy—an entity which, apart from its relation or Show, is self-identical. This immediate is Being which has been restored through Essence, the Not-being of Reflection through which Essence mediates itself. Essence returns into itself as negating Essence: thus it gives itself determinateness in its return to itself; and this determinateness for that very reason is the self-identical Negative, tran-

scended positedness, which therefore is *existent* just as much as it is the self-identity of Essence as Ground.

Ground is, first, *Absolute Ground*, in which here Essence is the foundation in general for the relation of Ground; but more closely it determines itself as Form and Matter and gives itself a Content.

Secondly, it is *Determined Ground* as Ground of a determinate Content; and since the Ground-relation becomes external to itself in its realization, it passes over into *Conditioning* Mediation.

Thirdly, Ground presupposes a Condition; but equally the Condition presupposes Ground. That which is Unconditioned is their unity—the *Fact in itself*, which, through the mediation of the conditioning relation, passes over into Existence.

Observation

Ground, like the other Determinations of Reflection, was expressed in a proposition: *Everything has its sufficient Ground* (reason).—Ordinarily this just means that what is must be considered not as an *existent immediate*, but as a *posited* entity. We must not remain at immediate Determinate Being or at determinateness in general, but must pass back to its Ground, in which Reflection it exists as transcended and in its Being-in-and-for-Self. Thus the Law of Ground asserts the essentiality of intro-Reflection as against bare Being.—It is really quite superfluous to add that the Ground is sufficient, because it is self-evident: that for which the Ground is insufficient would have no Ground; but everything is supposed to have a Ground. But Leibniz—who was especially devoted to the principle of sufficient reason (or Ground), and in fact made it the foundation of his whole philosophy—connected with it a profounder meaning and a more important concept than is generally connected with it when no step is taken beyond the immediate expression; although the law must be regarded as important even in this meaning, where Being as such in its immediacy is declared to be invalid and essentially to be something posited, and Ground to be the true immediate. But Leibniz especially opposed the sufficiency of Ground to causality in its strict meaning of mechanical efficacy. The latter is an external activity, restricted in content to one determinateness, and consequently the

determinations which it posits become connected externally and contingently; partial determinations are comprehended by their causes, but their relation—and this it is which constitutes the essential part of an existence—is not contained among the causes with which mechanism operates. This relation—the whole as essential unity—is found only in the Notion, in End. Mechanical causes are not sufficient for this unity, because the End as the unity of the determinations is not their basis. Accordingly Leibniz understood by “sufficient reason” a Ground which was sufficient for this unity too, and therefore comprehended not only causes, but final causes. But this is not yet the place for this determination of Ground; Teleological Ground is peculiar to the Notion and to that mediation by means of it which is Reason.

A

ABSOLUTE GROUND

(a) FORM AND ESSENCE

Determination of Reflection, in so far as it passes back into Ground, is a primary and immediate Determinate Being in general, from which a beginning is made. But now Determinate Being has the significance only of positedness, and essentially *presupposes* a Ground,—in this meaning, that it really does not *posit* it, that this positing is a self-transcendence, and the immediate rather is what is posited and Ground that which is not posited. It was seen that this presupposing is positing which recoils upon that which posits; Ground, as transcended determinateness, is not the indeterminate,—it is self-determined Essence, but determined as indeterminate or as transcended positedness. It is Essence which, in its negativity, is self-identical.

Here then the determinateness of Essence as Ground becomes twofold—it is determined both as Ground and as Grounded. It is, first, Essence as Ground, determined as Essence (or not-positedness) against positedness. Secondly, it is that which is Grounded—the immediate which, however, is not in and for itself, or positedness as such. Consequently this too is self-identical; but it is the self-identity of the Negative. The self-

identical Negative and the self-identical Positive are now one and the same identity. For Ground is self-identity of Positive or even of positedness, while that which is Grounded is positedness as positedness; now, this its intro-Reflection is the identity of Ground.—Thus this simple identity is not itself Ground, for Ground is Essence posited as the not-positing in opposition to positedness. As the unity of this determinate identity (Ground) and of negative identity (the Grounded), it is Essence in general as distinguished from its mediation.

If this mediation is compared with the Reflections which precede it and are its origins, it is found, first, not to be Pure Reflection, since it is not distinguished from Essence and does not yet contain the Negative, which alone could give stability to its determinations; whereas in Ground, which is Reflection transcended, these determinations have persistence.—Nor is it Determining Reflection, the determinations of which have essential stability; for this has perished in Ground, and in its unity they are only posited entities.—This mediation of Ground is, consequently, the unity of Pure and of Determining Reflection; its determinations (or, the posited) have persistence, and, conversely, their persistence is something posited. And, because this their persistence is itself something posited or has determinateness, they are in so far distinguished from their simple identity, and constitute Form as against Essence.

Essence *has* a Form and determinations of this Form. It has a fixed immediacy, or is *substratum*, only as Ground. Essence as such is one with its Reflection, and the movement of these two itself is not differentiated. That which passes through Reflection therefore is not Essence; nor is Essence that first element from which Reflection begins. This circumstance makes the exposition of Reflection in general more difficult; for really it is impossible to say that *Essence* passes back into itself, or that *Essence* shows in itself, because it is neither before nor in its movement, and the latter has no basis upon which it takes its course. A related term emerges only in Ground after the moment of transcended Reflection. But Essence as related substratum is determinate Essence; it is by virtue of this positedness that Form essentially belongs to it.—The determinations of Form on the other hand are now determinations as applied to Essence: Essence is their foundation, as being

that indeterminate which in its determination is indifferent to them; and in it they have their intro-Reflection. The Determinations of Reflection were supposed to contain their own persistence and to be independent; but their independence is their dissolution, and therefore they have their independence in an Other; but this dissolution itself is this self-identity, or the Ground of persistence which they give to themselves.

Everything determinate belongs to Form, and is a determination of Form in so far as it is posited and therefore distinct from an entity of which it is the Form; determinateness as Quality is one with its substratum, Being; Being is the immediately determinate which is not yet distinct from its determinateness, or is not yet intro-reflected in the latter; and the determinateness consequently is an existent but not yet a posited entity. Further, the Form-determinations of Essence, as determinatenesses of Reflection, are, according to their closer determinateness, the moments of Reflection considered above, Identity and Difference,—the latter partly as Variety and partly as Opposition. But further the Ground-relation belongs to Form, in so far as it is transcended Determination of Reflection, but also and at the same time Essence is taken as posited. On the other hand, the identity which Ground contains does not belong to Form, for here positedness as transcended and positedness as such (or Ground and Grounded) are one Reflection constituting Essence as *simple foundation*, which is the persistence of Form. But this persistence is *posited* in Ground, or again essentially this Essence itself exists as determinate; and now it has once more become the moment of Ground-relation and Form.—This is the absolute reciprocal relation of Form and Essence: the latter is simple unity of Ground and Grounded, and here precisely it is determinate, or Negative, and is distinct from Form because it is foundation; but at the same time it thus becomes Ground and moment of Form.

Form therefore is the perfected whole of Reflection; it also contains the determination of Reflection whereby it is transcended; and consequently it is related to its transcendedness, or to an Other, as much as it is a unity of its determining. This Other is not itself Form, but Form is applied to it. As essential self-relating negativity in contrast with this simple

Negative, it is the positing and determining element, while simple Essence is the indeterminate and inactive foundation on which the determinations of Form have persistence or intro-Reflection.—External reflection usually does not pass beyond this distinction between Essence and Form; the distinction is necessary, but this distinguishing itself is their unity, as also Essence, self-repellent and making itself into positedness, is this fundamental unity. Form is absolute negativity itself or negative absolute self-identity, by virtue of which precisely Essence is not Being but Essence. This identity, taken abstractly, is Essence as against Form; just as negativity, taken abstractly as positedness, is the individual determination of Form. But the determination, as it has shown itself, is in its truth total and self-relating negativity, which, consequently, as being this identity, is, in itself, simple Essence. Form therefore has Essence in its own identity, and Essence in its negative nature has absolute Form. The question cannot therefore be asked, how Form is added to Essence; for Form is only the showing of Essence in itself—it is its own immanent Reflection. Similarly Form in itself is Reflection returning to itself, or identical Essence; in its determining it makes determination to be positedness as such.—Form then does not determine Essence as though it were in truth presupposed and separate from Essence, for in this view it is the unessential Determination of Reflection, which presses to destruction without stop; rather it is thus itself the Ground of its transcendence or the identical relation of its determinations. The assertion that Form determines Essence means, then, that Form in its distinguishing itself transcends this distinguishing and is self-identity, which is Essence as the persistence of determination; it is Contradiction in that in its positedness it is transcended and in this transcendedness has its persistence; accordingly it is Ground as Essence which is self-identical in determinateness or negatedness.

These different terms, Form and Essence, are, therefore, only moments of the simple Form-relation itself. But they must be more closely considered and fixed. Determining Form relates itself to itself as transcended positedness, and therefore it is related to its identity as to an Other. It posits itself as transcended, and therefore presupposes its identity; according to

this moment Essence is the indeterminate to which Form is an Other. Thus it is not Essence—which is absolute Reflection, in itself—but it is determined as formless identity: it is Matter.

(b) FORM AND MATTER

Essence becomes Matter when its Reflection determines itself to be related to Essence as to the formless indeterminate. Matter then is the simple undifferentiated identity—which Essence also is—with this determination, that it is Other to Form. Consequently it is the real foundation or substratum of Form because it constitutes the intro-Reflection of the determinations of Form, or that stability to which they are related as to their positive persistence.

1. If abstraction is made from every determination and Form of a Something, indeterminate Matter remains. Matter is a pure *abstract*. (—Matter cannot be seen or felt—what is seen or felt is a *determinate Matter*, that is, a unity of Matter and Form.) But this abstraction, out of which Matter proceeds, is not a mere *external* subtraction or cancellation of Form; but Form by itself reduces itself, as was seen, to this simple identity.

Further, Form *presupposes* a Matter to which it relates itself. But the two do not just happen to be face to face externally and contingently; neither Matter nor Form has arisen out of itself, or—in another terminology—is eternal. Matter is that which is indifferent to Form, but this indifference is the determinateness of self-identity, into which, as into its foundation, Form passes back. Form presupposes Matter in the very fact that it posits itself as transcended and thereby relates itself to this its identity as to an Other. Conversely, Matter presupposes Form; for the former is not simple Essence which is immediately itself absolute Reflection: it is Essence determined as the Positive—that is, as that which is only as transcended negation. —But, from the other aspect, Form posits itself as Matter only in so far as it transcends itself and therefore *presupposes* Matter; hence Matter is determined also as *groundless* persistence. Similarly Matter is not determined as Ground of Form; but, since Matter posits itself as abstract identity of the transcended determination of Form, it is not identity as Ground; and in

so far, Form is groundless as against it. Form and Matter are thus determined, the one as much as the other, not to be mutually posited and not to be Ground each of the other. Rather, Matter is the identity of Ground and Grounded, as foundation which stands opposed to this Form-relation. This their common determination of indifference is the determination of Matter as such, and also constitutes the mutual relation of the two. And similarly the determination of Form—to be the relation of the two as distinct terms—is the other moment of their attitude to each other.—Matter is determined as indifferent: it is the *passive* as against Form as active. Form is the self-relating Negative; it is therefore Contradiction in itself, self-resolvent, self-repellent, and self-determining. It relates itself to Matter, and it is *posited* as relating itself to this its persistence as to an Other. Matter on the other hand is posited as relating itself only to itself and as being indifferent to Other; but it relates itself *in itself* to Form; for it contains transcended negativity, and is Matter only by virtue of this determination. And it relates itself to Form as to an Other only because Form is not posited in it, and because it is Form only *in itself*. It contains Form locked in itself, and is absolute susceptibility to Form only because it absolutely holds it and because this is its self-existent determination. Therefore, *Matter must be formed*, and Form must *materialize* itself—must in Matter give itself self-identity or persistence.

2. Hence Form determines Matter, and Matter is determined by Form.—Form itself is absolute self-identity, and thus contains Matter: Matter in its pure abstraction or absolute negativity has in itself Form: and thus the operation of Form upon Matter and the passive determination of Matter by Form, are really only the cancellation of the Show of their indifference and distinctness. Thus this relation of determining is the mediation of each with itself through its own Not-being;—but these two mediations are one movement and the reconstruction of their original identity—the internalization of their externalization.

First, Matter and Form presuppose one the other. This means, as was seen, that the one essential unity is negative self-relation; it then splits asunder into essential Identity, determined as indifferent foundation, and essential Difference

or negativity, as determining Form. The unity of Essence and Form, which stand opposed as Form and Matter, is *Absolute Ground* which *determines* itself. The unity becomes a Various, and consequently the relation, by virtue of the fundamental identity of the Various terms, becomes reciprocal presupposition.

Secondly, Form, as independent, is in any case self-transcending contradiction; but it is also posited as such, for it is at one and the same time independent and essentially related to an Other;—and thus it transcends itself. It is itself two-sided, and therefore this transcendence has its double side: first, it transcends its independence and becomes a posited entity, something which is in an Other; and this its Other is Matter. Secondly, it transcends its determinateness against Matter, its relation to it, and therewith its positedness, and thus gives itself persistence. As it transcends its positedness, this its Reflection is its own identity, into which it passes; but, since at the same time it casts off this identity and opposes it to itself as Matter, this Reflection of positedness in itself exists as union with a Matter in which it achieves persistence. Accordingly, in the union it coalesces with Matter as with an Other—according to that first aspect in which it makes itself into something posited—and also with its own identity.

The activity of Form, then, by which Matter is determined, consists in a negative attitude of Form towards itself. But conversely it thereby is in a negative attitude to Matter too. However, this process of determination of Matter is also the proper movement of Form itself. Form is free from Matter, but it transcends this its independence; but its independence is Matter itself, for in this it has its essential identity. When in this manner Form makes itself a posited entity, this is identical with the fact that it makes Matter determinate.—But, considered from the other side, the proper identity of Form is also externalized, and Matter is its Other; and in so far Matter is not determined, since Form transcends its own independence. But Matter is independent only as against Form: the Positive transcends itself in the same measure as the Negative. Thus, as Form transcends itself, the determinateness of Matter, which it has as against Form, vanishes; and this determinateness was indeterminate persistence.

Now this, which appears as the *activity of Form*, is equally

the *proper movement of Matter* itself. The self-existent determination of Matter, or its Ought, is its absolute negativity. By virtue of this, Matter relates itself absolutely not only to Form as to an Other, but this external something is that Form which it contains locked within itself. Matter is that same inner contradiction which Form contains, and this contradiction, like its solution, is *one* only. But Matter is contradictory in itself, for as indeterminate self-identity it is also absolute negativity; it therefore transcends itself in itself, and its identity disintegrates in its negativity; the latter achieves its persistence in the former. Thus, when Matter is determined by Form as by something external, it reaches its determination; and externality of attitude both for Form and for Matter consists in this, that each unity, or rather their original unity, in its positing also presupposes; and hereby self-relation becomes relation to self as transcended, or relation to Other.

Thirdly, their original unity is on the one side restored by this movement of Form and Matter, and on the other it has now become posited. Matter determines itself, and equally this determining is, for it, only an external activity of Form. Conversely Form determines only itself, or has in itself that Matter which it determines, just as much as it is related to an Other in its determining; and both—the activity of Form and the movement of Matter—are the same; only the former is an activity, that is, negativity as posited determination, and the latter is movement or becoming, negativity as *self-existent* determination. Consequently the result is the unity of Being-in-Self and of positedness. Matter is determined as such or necessarily has a Form; and Form is simply material, or persistent, Form.

Form, in so far as it presupposes a Matter as its Other, is *finite*. It is not Ground, but only the active principle. Similarly Matter, in so far as it presupposes Form as its Not-being, is *finite* Matter; nor is it the Ground of its unity with Form, but only the foundation for Form. But this finite Matter as well as this finite Form has no truth; each relates itself to the other, or only their unity is their truth. These two determinations pass back into this unity and there transcend their independence: the unity thus proves itself their Ground. Consequently Matter is Ground of its determination of Form only in so far

as it is not Matter as Matter, but the absolute unity of Essence and Form; and similarly Form is Ground of the persistence of its determinations only in so far as it is such a unity. But this one unity as absolute negativity, or, more closely determined, as exclusive unity, is in its Reflection a presupposing principle; in other words, it is one activity, in positing to preserve itself in unity as posited, and also to repel itself from itself,—to relate itself to itself as itself and also to itself as to an Other. Or again, the process of determination of Matter by Form is the mediation of Essence as Ground with itself in a unity, through itself and through the negation of itself.

Formed Matter, or persisting Form, is now not only this absolute self-unity of Ground, but is also *posited* unity. It is that movement which has been considered, in which Absolute Ground has exhibited its moments simultaneously as self-transcending and hence as posited. Or again, restored unity in its coincidence with itself has equally repelled itself from itself and determined itself; for its unity, since negation created it, is also negative unity. It is therefore the unity of Form and Matter as their foundation, which however is determinate; and this is Formed Matter, which nevertheless is indifferent to both Form and Matter, since they are transcended and unessential. It is *Content*.

(c) FORM AND CONTENT

Form at first stands opposed to Essence, and is then Ground-relation in general; its determinations are Ground and Grounded. It further stands opposed to Matter, and then is Determining Reflection; and its determinations are Determination of Reflection itself and its persistence. Finally it stands opposed to Content, where its determinations again are itself and Matter. What before was the self-identical—first Ground, then persistence in general, and lastly Matter—passes beneath the domination of Form, and is once more one of its determinations.

Content, first, has one Form and one Matter which belong to it and are essential to it; it is their unity. But this unity also is *determinate* or *posited* unity, and thus it stands opposed to Form; Form constitutes *positedness*, and, as against Content,

is the unessential. Content is therefore indifferent to it; Form includes both Form as such and Matter; and thus Content has a Form and a Matter of which it constitutes the foundation, while they are to it mere positedness.

Secondly, Content is that which is identical in Form and Matter, which would make these into merely indifferent external determinations. They are positedness in general, which however in Content has passed back into its unity or Ground. Thus the self-identity of Content is, in the one instance, that identity which is indifferent to Form; but in the other it is the identity *of Ground*. At first Ground has vanished in Content; but at the same time Content is the negative intro-Reflection of the determinations of Form; its unity—which so far is that unity only which is indifferent to Form—hence is also formal unity or the *Ground-relation* as such. Content therefore has this for essential Form, and conversely Ground has a Content.

The Content of Ground then is Ground which has returned into its unity with itself; Ground first is Essence, which is self-identical in its positedness; in so far as it is various and indifferent to its positedness, it is indeterminate Matter; but being Content it is also Formed identity, and this Form becomes Ground-relation because the determinations of its opposite are posited as also negated in Content.—Further, Content is determinate in itself; not only—as is Matter—as the indifferent in general, but as Formed Matter, so that the determinations of Form have a material and indifferent persistence. Content is on the one hand the essential self-identity of Ground in its positedness; on the other it is posited identity as against the Ground-relation. This positedness, which is in this identity in the shape of determination of Form, is opposed to free positedness, that is, to Form as complete relation of Ground and Grounded; this Form is total positedness, which returns into itself, and therefore the former is only positedness as immediate, or determinateness as such.

Hereby Ground has constituted itself Determined Ground, and the determinateness it has here is twofold: determinateness first of Form and secondly of Content. The former is that determinateness whereby it is altogether external to Content, which is indifferent to this relation. The latter is the determinateness of the Content which is Content of Ground.

DETERMINED GROUND

(a) FORMAL GROUND

Ground has a determinate Content. It appeared that the determinateness of Content was the foundation of Form, the simple immediate as against the mediation of Form. Ground is identity which is negatively related to itself, and thus constitutes itself as positedness. It is negatively related to itself in that it is self-identical in this its negativity; this identity is foundation or Content, which in this manner constitutes the indifferent or positive unity of the Ground-relation and is its mediator.

At this point the determinateness of Ground and Grounded against each other is not present in this Content. But, further, mediation is negative unity. In this indifferent foundation the Negative is its immediate determinateness, by virtue of which Ground has a determinate Content. But also the Negative is the negative self-relation of Form. On the one hand what is posited cancels itself and passes back into its Ground; but Ground—which is essential independence—relates itself negatively to itself and makes itself a posited entity. This negative mediation of Ground and Grounded is the peculiar mediation of Form as such, or *formal mediation*. Now the two sides of Form, since one passes over into the other, jointly posit themselves in one identity as transcended, and this identity therefore they also presuppose. It is determinate Content, and formal mediation relates itself thus to it as to the positive mediator, and through itself. Content is the element of identity in both; they are distinct, but each in its distinctness is the relation to the other, and so Content is their persistence, and the persistence of each as of the whole itself.

From this it results that Determined Ground contains what follows. First, a determinate Content is considered from two sides, in so far as it is posited (a) as Ground or (b) as Grounded. Content itself is indifferent to this Form: in both it is one determination only. Secondly, Ground itself is moment of Form quite as much as is that which it posits: this is their

formal identity. It is indifferent which of the two determinations is given priority; whether the transition is made from Posited to Other (as to Ground) or from Ground to Other (as to Posited). Grounded, considered by itself, is its own transcendence, and thereby it makes itself on the one hand Posited and also is positing of Ground. Ground as such is the same movement: it makes itself Posited, and thus becomes Ground of something, and so is present in this something both as Posited and also only as Ground. Posited is the ground why there is Ground, and conversely Ground hence is Posited. Mediation begins interchangeably with either term; each side is Ground as much as Posited, and each is the whole mediation or the whole Form.—This whole Form further is self-identical, and thus is itself the foundation of the determinations which are these two sides of Ground and Grounded; and so Form and Content are one and the same identity.

This identity of Ground and Grounded, with respect to both Content and Form, makes Ground *sufficient* (sufficiency being restricted to this relation): there is nothing in Ground which is not in Grounded, and nothing in Grounded which is not in Ground. If a Ground is asked for, it is desired to see in duplicate the same determination (namely Content), first in the form of Posited, and next in the form of intro-reflected Determinate Being, or Essentiality.

Now in Determined Ground, Ground and Grounded are the whole Form, and their Content, though determinate, is one and the same; and, in so far, Ground is not determined really in its two sides: as yet, the Content of each is the same. Determinateness here is simple, and has not yet passed into the sides; and Determined Ground is here present only in its pure Form as Formal Ground.—Content is only this simple determinateness, which does not contain in itself the Form of Ground-relation; the latter therefore is self-identical Content, and indifferent to Form as Form is external to it. It is Other than Form.

Observation

If in reflecting upon definite grounds no departure is made from that form of Ground which has here appeared, then the indication of a ground remains mere formalism and empty

tautology, which expresses in the form of intro-Reflection or Essentiality the same content that is present already in the form of immediate Determinate Being considered as posited. Hence such a statement of grounds is attended with the same emptiness as speech in the terms of the Law of Identity. Every science, and especially physical science, is full of tautologies of this kind, which in a manner constitute a prerogative of science.—For instance, the ground of the planets' motion round the sun is sometimes declared to be the attractive force between earth and sun. Nothing is here stated with regard to Content except what the phenomenon contains, namely the relation of these bodies to one another in their movement; only it is expressed in the form of intro-reflected determination, or force. If it is asked what kind of force attractive force is, then it is replied that it is the force which causes the earth to revolve around the sun; that is, it has precisely the same Content as that Determinate Being of which it is supposed to be the Ground; the relation of earth and sun with respect to movement is the identical foundation of Ground and Grounded.—If a certain form of crystallization is explained as having its ground in the particular arrangement with regard to one another into which the molecules enter, then the existing crystallization is this arrangement itself which is given as the ground. In ordinary life these aetiologies, which are the privilege of the sciences, are reckoned to be what they are—empty and tautological talk. If the question why somebody goes to town is answered by the ground that there is an attractive force in the town which draws him there, this style of answer, sanctioned in the sciences, is counted absurd.—Leibniz charged Newton's attractive force with being just such a hidden quality as was used by the schoolmen for purposes of explanation. But it ought rather to be charged with the opposite, namely that it is a quality known too well; for it has no other content than the phenomenon itself.—This manner of explaining is favoured because it is easy to see and understand; nothing is easier to see and understand, for instance, than that a plant has its ground in vegetative—that is, in plant-productive—force.—It could be called an *occult* quality only in this meaning, that the ground is supposed to have a content different from that which is to be explained; but no such

content is given. In so far as a ground, such as is demanded, is not given, this force which is used in the explanation is indeed an occult ground. But this formalism serves to furnish an explanation no more than the nature of a plant is understood when I say that it is a plant or that it has its ground in a plant-productive force; and, clear as this proposition is, it may yet for this reason be called an exceedingly occult manner of explanation.

Secondly, and formally, this mode of explanation contains the two opposite directions of the Ground-relation, but their determinate relation is not understood. Ground on the one hand is Ground as being the intro-reflected Content-determination of the existence which it grounds; on the other hand it is that which is posited. It is meant to make this existence intelligible; but conversely it is deduced from the existence and understood by its help. For the main business of this reflection is, beginning from the existent, to discover grounds; that is, to transform immediate existence into the form of reflectedness; and Ground, instead of being in and for itself and independent, thus becomes posited and derivative. This procedure fits it to the phenomenon and its determinations rest upon the latter, so that this naturally flows from its ground smoothly and with a fair wind. But knowledge has not been advanced; it drifts in a distinction of form which this very procedure reverses and cancels. One of the greatest difficulties in becoming familiar with the sciences in which this method prevails is due, therefore, to this perversion of premising as ground what is in fact derived, of passing to the consequences and calling them in fact only the ground of those other so-called grounds. The exposition begins with grounds, and they are suspended in mid-air as principles and primary concepts; they are simple determinations, having no necessary existence in and for themselves; and what follows is supposed to be grounded on them. Who would therefore penetrate into this sort of science must begin by acquiring these grounds,—a grievous task for Reason, which is asked to count what is groundless as ground-work. Those fare best who, without much thought, accept these principles as given, and thenceforward use them as fundamental rules of their understanding. Without this method the point of departure cannot be reached, nor can any progress be made

without it. But this progress soon checks itself; for the obstruction in the method becomes apparent when in its course it attempts to exhibit the derivative, which in fact contains the grounds of the primary assumptions. It is seen that the deductions are that existence from which the ground was derived; and therefore this relation in which the phenomenon is represented leads to suspicions of the manner of its exposition; for it does not show itself as expressed in its immediacy, but as a voucher for the ground. But the ground is again derived from it, and therefore one requires to see it in its immediacy, in order that it may be made the standard for judging the ground. Hence, in such an exposition, where what really is fundamental appears as derivative, one cannot tell how to take either ground or phenomenon. This uncertainty is increased—especially if the exposition is not rigorously consistent, but rather honest—by the fact that traces and emanations of the phenomenon everywhere betray themselves, suggesting that the phenomenon contains more and quite other things than the principles do. Confusion becomes still greater when reflected and merely hypothetical determinations are mingled with immediate determinations of the phenomenon itself, and the former are enunciated as though they belonged to immediate experience. Many who approach these sciences with honest credulity may believe that molecules, void interstices, centrifugal force, aether, the single ray of light, electrical and magnetic matter, and many other such things, are things or relations which in fact are present in perception in the manner in which they are spoken of—as immediate determinations of existence. They serve as first grounds for other matter, they are pronounced as actualities and are applied with all confidence; and they are allowed to count as such on trust before it is realized that in truth they are determinations deduced from that of which they are meant to be the grounds—hypotheses and figments derived by an uncritical reflection. And indeed we are here in a kind of witches' circle, where determinations of existence and of reflection, Ground and Grounded, phenomena and phantoms, form a pullulating and indiscriminate mass and enjoy equality of rank.

In the course of this formal business of explaining from grounds, we also hear it repeated (in spite of all explanations

based on well-known forces and classes of matter) that we do not know the inner nature itself of these agents. Clearly this is no more than a confession that this process of finding grounds is in itself quite inadequate, and that something quite different from such grounds is required. But then it does not appear why all this explanatory trouble has been taken, and why this different something has not been sought for; or why at least such explanations were not left on one side and no more departures made from the simple facts.

(b) REAL GROUND

It appeared that the determinateness of Ground is (a) determinateness of foundation or Content-determination, and (b) otherness in the Ground-relation itself—namely, the distinctness between its Content and Form; the relation between Ground and Grounded exhausts itself as an external Form upon Content, which is indifferent to these determinations.—But in fact these two are not external to each other; for Content is this, to be the self-identity of Ground in Grounded and of Grounded in Ground. The side of Ground has turned out to be itself posited, and the side of Grounded, to be Ground: each in itself is this identity which is the whole. But they also belong to Form, and constitute its determinate distinctness; and therefore each in its determinateness is the self-identity of the whole. Thus each has a Content different as against the other.—Or, considered from the side of Content, and because Content is self-identity as of the Ground-relation, it essentially has this difference of Form in itself, and is different as Ground from what it is as Grounded.

Ground and Grounded have a different Content: and herein the Ground-relation has ceased to be formal; the regress into Ground, and the progress out of Ground to the Posited, are no longer tautology: Ground is realized. Accordingly, when a ground is asked for, some other determination of Content is really required for Ground than that the ground of which is demanded.

This relation now determines itself further. For in so far as its two sides are different Content, they are indifferent to each other; each is an immediate and self-identical determination.

Further, when they are related to each other as Ground and Grounded, Ground is that which is reflected into itself in the Other as in its positedness; that Content, accordingly, which belongs to the side of Ground, is also in Grounded; and this, as Posited, has its self-identity and persistence only in Ground. But apart from this Content of Ground, Grounded now also has its peculiar Content, and is therefore the unity of a twofold Content. This unity, being a unity of distincts, is their negative unity; but these are determinations of Content indifferent to each other, and therefore it is an empty relation lacking Content in itself, and not their mediation,—a One or Something which is their external link.

The Real Ground-relation, then, has this double implication. (a) The determination of Content, which is Ground, is continued with itself in positedness, so that it constitutes the simple identical element in Ground and Grounded; Grounded thus contains Ground completely in itself; their relation is undifferentiated and essential solidity. Hence what in Grounded is added to this simple Essence is only an unessential Form or external determinations of Content; and these, as such, are free from Ground and are an immediate manifold. Therefore the former Essential is not the Ground of this latter Unessential, nor is it Ground of the relation of the two in Grounded. It is a positively identical entity which is immanent in Grounded, but does not there posit itself in the shape of formal difference; but, as self-relating Content, it is indifferent positive foundation. (b) That which is connected with this foundation in the Something is an indifferent Content; but it is so as the unessential side. The main matter is the relation between foundation and unessential manifold. But this relation too is not Ground, since the related determinations are indifferent Content; one of these is, indeed, determined as essential, and the other only as unessential or posited Content; but as self-relating Content this Form is external to both. The One of the Something, which constitutes their relation, is therefore not Form-relation, but only an external nexus which does not contain unessential manifold Content as posited; it too consequently is only foundation.

Ground now, determining itself, as it does, as Real Ground, falls apart into external determinations by reason of the variety

of Content which constitutes its reality. The two relations, (a) essential Content as the simple immediate identity of Ground and Grounded, and (b) the Something as the relation of differentiated Content, are two different foundations; the self-identical form of Ground, which makes the same entity first essential and then posited, has vanished: the Ground-relation has thus become external to itself.

It is therefore now an external Ground which connects differentiated Content and determines what is Ground and what that which is posited by it: this determination is not included in the Content itself of either term. Real Ground consequently is relation to other,—(a) of Content to other Content, and (b) of the Ground-relation itself (Form) to other, namely to an immediate entity not posited by it.

Observation

The formal Ground-relation contains only one Content for Ground and Grounded; in this identity consists its necessity, but also its tautology. Real Ground contains a differentiated Content; but here the contingent and external nature of the Ground-relation enters in. On the one hand, that which is considered as essential, and hence as Ground-determination, is not Ground of the other determinations which are connected with it. On the other hand, it is also undetermined which of several Content-determinations of a concrete thing is to be taken as essential and as Ground; hence the choice between them is free. In the first respect, for instance, the ground of a house is its foundation; and this is ground by reason of the weight inherent in sensible matter; and this weight is simply identical in the ground and in the grounded house. Now it is quite indifferent to the heavy itself that there is such a distinction in heavy matter as that between a foundation and a modification which is to be distinguished from it and makes it into a dwelling; its relation to the other content-determinations—purpose, furnishing of house, and so on—is external to it; thus although it is foundation, it is not ground of these. Weight is the ground for a house standing and also the ground for a stone falling; the stone has in itself this ground—weight; but it is external to weight that the stone has a further content-

determination, which makes it stone and not merely heavy. And further it is posited through something Other that the stone has first been removed from the body upon which it falls; and time and space and their relation, movement, are also a content different from weight, and can be imagined (as the saying is) without it, whence it follows that they are not essentially posited by it.—Weight is equally the ground which makes a projectile describe the trajectory opposite to falling.—This variety of determinations of which it is the ground makes it clear that an Other is also demanded which shall make it ground of this or of some other determination.—

If it is said of Nature that it is the ground of the world, then what is called Nature is, first, identical with the world, and the world is nothing but Nature itself. But secondly they are distinct, so that Nature is rather the indeterminate, or at least is determinate only in those general distinctions which are laws, or is the self-identical essence of the world; and if Nature is to be the world, a manifold of determinations is added externally. But these are not grounded in Nature as such; Nature indeed is indifferent to them, for they are contingent.—The same relation subsists when God is determined as the ground of Nature. As ground he is its essence; Nature contains this essence and is identical with it; but it has a further manifold, which is distinct from the ground itself, and is that third term in which these two distinct terms are connected; while the ground is ground neither of the manifold which is distinct from it, nor of its connexion with this manifold. Nature is therefore not understood through God as ground, for then God would be only its general essence, which does not contain it as it is, as determinate essence and Nature.

Thus it is a formalism, as much as is Formal Ground itself, to assign Real Grounds: this is due to the difference of content in Ground (or properly foundation) and in that which is connected with it in Grounded. In Formal Ground the self-identical Content is indifferent to Form; and this is also the case in Real Ground. It results from this that it does not contain in itself which of the manifold determinations is to be taken as essential. A Something is a concretion of such a manifold of determinations, each of which manifests itself in

it in equal permanence and persistence. Each, therefore, as much as any other, can be determined as Ground, that is, as essential, the other consequently in comparison with it being merely posited. Connected with this is what was mentioned before, that if there is a determination which in one case is regarded as Ground of another, it does not follow that this other will also be posited with it in another case or at all.—Punishment for example has manifold determinations—it is retributive, a deterrent example, a threat used by the law as a deterrent, and also it brings the criminal to himself and to a better frame of mind. Each of these different determinations has been considered the Ground of punishment, because each is an essential determination, and consequently the others in distinction from it are determined as merely contingent in contrast with it. But that determination which is taken as Ground is not yet the whole of punishment; for this concretion also contains those others, which are only attached to it here, but do not find their Ground in it.—Again, an official has a certain aptitude for his office, has certain relationships as an individual, has such and such acquaintances, and a particular character; he could show himself in such and such circumstances and occasions, and so on. Each of these characteristics may be, or be regarded as, the Ground of his holding his office; they are a various Content connected in a third term; the Form (namely the fact that they are determined as essential and as posited relatively to one another) is external to it. Each of these characteristics is essential to the official because he is the determinate individual that he is, by virtue of them; in so far as the office can be considered as an external and posited determination, each may be determined as Ground against it; but also and conversely they may be regarded as posited, and the office as their Ground. Their actual relation—that is, their relation in the individual instance—is a determination external to the Ground-relation and to the Content itself; that which imparts to them the form of Ground and Grounded is a third factor.

And indeed any Determinate Being may have a variety of Grounds; each of its content-determinations penetrates the concrete whole in its self-identity and therefore allows itself to be considered as essential; and there are infinite oppor-

tunities for admitting the many *respects*—that is, determinations which lie outside the matter itself—in the contingent nature of the connexion.—For this reason it is also contingent whether a Ground has this or that consequence. Moral motives, for example, are essential determinations of the ethical being; but that which follows from them is also an externality foreign to them, which both follows and does not follow from them; it is added to them only through a third term. More exactly this must be taken in the following manner: it is not contingent to the moral determination, if it is Ground, that it has a consequence (or Grounded); but it is contingent whether it is made Ground or not. But again the content which is its consequence, if it has been made Ground, is of external nature, and consequently it can be cancelled immediately by some other externality. Hence an action may, or may not, proceed from a moral motive. Conversely an action may have more Grounds than one; as a concrete, it contains manifold essential determinations, each of which for this reason may be called Ground. Accordingly argumentation—which chiefly consists in the search for and indication of Grounds—is an endless meandering, which contains no ultimate determination. For any and every thing one and more good Grounds can be given, and they can also be given for its opposite; and there may be present any number of Grounds from which nothing follows. What Sokrates and Plato call sophistry is just argumentation from Grounds, to which Plato opposes the contemplation of the Idea, that is, the Thing in and for itself or in its Notion. Grounds are taken only of *essential* content-determinations, relations, and respects, and of these each thing, as well as its opposite, contains several; and in their form of essentiality one is as valid as another; it does not contain the whole volume of the thing, and therefore is a one-sided Ground, and each of the other particular sides has again its group of Grounds; but not one exhausts the thing itself, which constitutes their connexion and contains them all. Not one is *sufficient* Ground, that is, the Notion.

(c) COMPLETE GROUND

1. In Real Ground, Ground as content and Ground as relation are only foundations. The former is only *posited* as

essential and as Ground; the relation is the Something of Grounded as the indeterminate substratum of a varied content, a connexion of it which is not its own Reflection but a Reflection external and therefore only posited. Hence the Real Ground-relation is rather Ground as transcended; consequently this relation constitutes rather the side of Grounded or of positedness. But as positedness Ground itself has now passed back into its Ground; it is now a Grounded, and has another Ground. Hereby the latter determines itself in such a manner that, first, it is that which is identical with Real Ground as its Grounded; in this determination both sides have one and the same content; and the two content-determinations and their connexion in the Something are also within the new Ground. But, secondly, the new Ground into which that merely posited external connexion has transcended itself is, as its intro-Reflection, the absolute relation of the two content-determinations.

Real Ground itself has passed back into its Ground; hence in it the identity of Ground and Grounded, or Formal Ground, is restored. The resulting Ground-relation is therefore *complete*, containing both Formal and Real Ground, and mediating the content-determinations, which in the latter were immediate to each other.

2. The Ground-relation has now determined itself more closely, in the following manner. First, something has a Ground; it contains the content-determination (which is Ground) and a second content-determination which is posited by Ground. But each is an indifferent content, and therefore the one is not in itself Ground, nor is the other grounded by the first: this relation exists as transcended or posited in the immediacy of content, and as such it has its Ground in an other. This second relation is distinct only formally and has the same content as the first (namely, the two determinations of content), but it is their immediate connexion. But the connected terms are various content in general, and therefore determinations indifferent to each other; the relation therefore is not their truly absolute relation, where one of the determinations would be that which is self-identical in its positedness, and the other the positedness of this same identity. In fact, however, they are supported by a Something which

constitutes their merely immediate (and not reflected) relation; hence this relation is only relative Ground as against the connexion in the other Something. The two Somethings are, accordingly, the two distinct relations of content which have resulted. They stand in the identical Ground-relation of Form; they are one and the same whole Content, namely, the two content-determinations and their relation; they are distinguished only by the manner of this relation, which is immediate in the one and posited in the other, so that one is distinguished from the other only formally, as Ground and Grounded.—Secondly, this Ground-relation is not only formal, but also real. It was seen above that Formal Ground passes over into Real Ground; the moments of Form reflect themselves into themselves; they are an independent Content, and the Ground-relation also contains one peculiar Content as Ground and one as Grounded. The Content first constitutes the *immediate* identity of the two sides of Formal Ground: they thus have one and the same Content. But it also has Form in itself, and is thus a twofold Content, having terms in the relation of Ground and Grounded. Consequently one of the two content-determinations of the two Somethings is determined to be not only common to them in an external comparison, but also to be their identical substratum and the foundation of their relation. As against the other content-determination this one is the essential one, and is its Ground while the other is posited—namely in the Something of which the grounded content-determination is the relation. In the first Something, which is the Ground-relation, this second content-determination too exists immediately, and is connected *in itself* with the first. The other Something on the other hand contains only the one *in itself* as that in which it is immediately identical with the first Something; and it contains the other content-determination as posited in it. The former content-determination is its Ground by virtue of the fact that, *originally*, it is connected with the other content-determination in the first Something.

The Ground-relation of the content-determinations in the second Something is thus mediated by the self-existent relation of the first Something. The argument is this: in one Something determination *B* is in itself connected with determination *A*; therefore in the second Something, to which immediately only

the determination *A* belongs, *B* too is connected with *A*. In the second Something it is not only the case that this second determination is mediate, but also that its immediate determination is Ground; the mediation takes place through its original relation to *B* in the first Something. This relation accordingly is the Ground of Ground *A*, and the whole Ground-relation in the second Something is posited, or Grounded.

3. Real Ground appears as the self-external Reflection of Ground; and the complete mediation of the latter is the restoration of its self-identity. But hereby this has also acquired the externality of Real Ground, and the formal Ground-relation in this unity of itself and of Real Ground is self-positing as much as it is self-transcending Ground; the Ground-relation mediates itself with itself through its negation. First, Ground, as the original relation, is a relation of immediate content-determinations. As essential Form the Ground-relation has for sides such entities as are transcended or are moments. Consequently, as Form of immediate determinations, it is self-identical relation, and also relation of its negation; accordingly it is Ground, not in and for itself, but as relation to transcended Ground-relation.—Secondly, the transcended relation or the immediate, which in the original and posited relation is the identical foundation, is Real Ground, but also not in and for itself; but it is posited by that original connexion, that it is Ground.—

The Ground-relation in its totality is thus essentially presupposing Reflection; Formal Ground presupposes the immediate content-determination, and this, as Real Ground, presupposes Form. Ground is then Form as immediate connexion; but in such a manner that it repels itself from itself and rather presupposes immediacy, and therein relates itself to itself as to an Other. This immediate is the content-determination, or simple Ground; but as such—as Ground—it too is repelled from itself, and also relates itself to itself as to an Other.—Thus the total Ground-relation has determined itself to be *conditioning mediation*.

C

CONDITION

(a) THE RELATIVELY UNCONDITIONED

1. Ground is the immediate and Grounded the mediate. But Ground is Positing Reflection; as such it turns itself into positedness, and is Presupposing Reflection; it thus relates itself to itself as to a transcended term, to an immediate through which it is mediated itself. This mediation, as the progress from the immediate to Ground, is not an External Reflection, but, as was seen, the immanent activity of Ground, or, what is the same thing, the Ground-relation as Reflection into self-identity is equally essentially self-externalizing Reflection. The immediate to which Ground relates itself as to its essential presupposition is *Condition*; Real Ground is therefore essentially conditioned. The determinateness which it contains is the other-being of itself.

Condition then, is, first, an immediate and manifold Determinate Being. Secondly, this Determinate Being is related to another, to something which is Ground, not of this Being, but in another respect; for the Determinate Being itself is immediate and without Ground. According to the former relation it is a posited term; the immediate Determinate Being is to be as Condition not for itself, but for something else. But at the same time this fact, that it is thus for an other, is only a positedness; the fact that it is posited is transcended in its immediacy, and a Determinate Being is indifferent to the fact that it is Condition. Thirdly, the Condition is an immediate in such a manner that it constitutes the presupposition of Ground. In this determination it is the Form-relation of Ground, which has passed back into self-identity, and hence it is its Content. But Content as such is but the indifferent unity of Ground as its Form; without Form there is no Content. And it further sets itself free from Form when in Complete Ground the Ground-relation becomes a relation external to its identity, whereby Content acquires immediacy. Accordingly, in so far as Condition is that in which the Ground-relation has its self-identity, it constitutes the Content of Ground; but

Content is that which is indifferent to this Form, and therefore it is its Content only *in itself*, or such an entity as, so far, *ought* only to become Content, and accordingly constitutes material for Ground. Posited as Condition, Determinate Being has the determination (according to the second moment) of losing its indifferent immediacy and becoming the moment of an Other. It is indifferent to this relation by virtue of its immediacy; but, in so far as it enters into the relation, it constitutes the Being-in-Self of Ground, and is for it the Unconditioned. In order to be Condition, it has its presupposition in Ground and is itself conditioned; but this determination is external to it.

2. Something does not exist by virtue of its Condition; its Condition is not its Ground. Condition is the moment of unconditioned immediacy for Ground, but it is not itself that movement and positing which relates itself negatively to itself and turns itself into positedness. Condition therefore is opposed by the Ground-relation. Apart from its Condition, Something also has a Ground.—Ground is the empty movement of Reflection because the presupposition of Reflection is immediacy, which is, accordingly, external to it. But Reflection is the whole Form and is independent mediation; for Condition is not its Ground. This mediation, in so far as it is positing, is self-related, and from this side therefore it too is an immediate and an Unconditioned: it presupposes itself, but only as an externalized or transcended positing, while it is in and for itself what it is according to its determination.—Thus the Ground-relation has a peculiar Content as against the Content of Condition in so far as it is independent self-relation and has the identity of Reflection in itself. The former Content is Content of Ground, and therefore essentially has Form; but the latter is only immediate material, and its relation to Ground is also external to it, while at the same time it constitutes Ground's Being-in-Self. It is, therefore, a mixture of independent Content, which has no relation to the Content of the Ground-determination, and of such content as is absorbed in the latter and, as its material, is designed to become its moment.

3. The two sides of the whole—Condition and Ground—are, then, indifferent and unconditioned one against the other; the one since it is the unrelated term to which the relation in which it is Condition is external, and the other as the relation

or Form for which the determinate existence of Condition is only a kind of material or passive substratum, whose Form (which it has in it for itself) is an unessential one. And further, both are mediate. Condition is the Being-in-Self of Ground; it is so much essential moment of the Ground-relation that it is the simple identity of this with itself. But this is also transcended; this Being-in-Self is only posited; immediate Determinate Being is indifferent to the fact that it is Condition. Thus the fact that Condition is Being-in-Self for Ground constitutes that side of it which makes it mediate. And in the same manner the Ground-relation in its independence has a presupposition, and its Being-in-Self is external to it.—Thus each of the two sides is the contradiction of indifferent immediacy and of essential mediation, both in one relation,—or the contradiction of independent persistence and the determination of being only moment.

(b) THE ABSOLUTELY UNCONDITIONED

The two Relatively Unconditioned terms at first show each into the other; the Condition, as immediate, into the Form-relation of Ground, and the Form-relation into immediate Determinate Being as its positedness; but while its Other shows in each, each is also independent and has its peculiar content.

Condition at first is immediate Determinate Being; its Form has two moments,—positedness, where as Condition it is the material and moment of Ground, and Being-in-Self, where it constitutes the essentiality of Ground or its simple intro-Reflection. Both sides of Form are external to immediate Determinate Being, since that is transcended Ground-relation.—But, first, Determinate Being in itself is no more than the fact that it transcends itself in its immediacy and perishes. And indeed Being is only the Becoming of Essence; it is its essential nature to become Posited and Identity, which latter becomes immediate by negation of itself. Accordingly the Form-determinations of Positedness and of self-identical Being-in-Self—the Form by virtue of which immediate Determinate Being is Condition—are therefore not external to it: it is this Reflection itself. Secondly, as Condition, Being is now posited as that which it is essentially, that is, as moment, and necessarily

as moment of an Other, and also as the Being-in-Self likewise of an Other; but *in itself* it exists only by virtue of its own negation, that is, of Ground and of its self-transcendent and consequently self-presupposing Reflection; the Being-in-Self of Being is, accordingly, only posited. This Being-in-Self of Condition has two sides: it is, first, its essentiality, as essentiality of Ground, and, secondly, the immediacy of its Determinate Being. Or, rather, both are the same. Determinate Being is an immediate, but the immediacy is essentially what is mediated—mediated by self-transcending Ground. It is immediacy mediated by self-transcending mediation; but, as such, it is also the Being-in-Self of Ground and its Unconditioned; while this Being-in-Self in turn is equally only moment or positedness, for it is mediated.—Condition therefore is the whole Form of the Ground-relation; it is its presupposed Being-in-Self, but for this reason it is itself a positedness; and its immediacy is this, that it becomes positedness, and so repels itself from itself in such a manner that it perishes but is also Ground, which Ground becomes positedness and hence also Grounded; these two are one and the same.

Similarly, in Conditioned Ground, Being-in-Self is not only the showing in it of an Other. This Ground is the independent, that is, the self-relating, Reflection of positing, and accordingly it is self-identical; in other words it is in itself its Being-in-Self and its Content. But also it is presupposing Reflection: it relates itself negatively to itself, and opposes its Being-in-Self to itself as Other to it; and Condition, according to its moment of Being-in-Self and also according to its moment of immediate Determinate Being, is the proper moment of the Ground-relation; immediate Determinate Being exists essentially only by virtue of its Ground, and is its own moment in so far as it is presupposition. Ground therefore is equally the whole.

Accordingly there is here only one whole of Form, and, equally, only one whole of Content. For the peculiar Content of Condition is essential Content only in so far as it is the self-identity of Reflection in Form, or in so far as it is Ground-relation as being this immediate Determinate Being in itself. This latter further is Condition only by virtue of the presupposing Reflection of Ground; it is the self-identity of Ground, or it is its Content, to which it opposes itself. Hence

Determinate Being is not merely formless material for the Ground-relation: it has this Form in itself, and therefore it is Formed Matter; and also, since in its identity with it it is indifferent to it, it is Content. Finally, it is the same Content which Ground has; for, precisely, it is Content, and Content is that which is self-identical in the Form-relation.

The two sides of the whole, Condition and Ground, are, then, one essential unity, equally as Content and as Form. Each passes into the other through itself, or, being a Reflection, each posits itself as transcended, relates itself to this its negation, and thus presupposes the other. But at the same time this is only one Reflection of both, and therefore their presupposing also is only one; and the reciprocity of this rather passes over into that state where they presuppose their one identity as their persistence and their foundation. It is this identity—their common Content and unity of Form—which is the truly Unconditioned; it is the *Fact in itself*.—Condition, as resulted above, is only the Relatively Unconditioned. Generally, therefore, it is itself looked upon as a Conditioned; a new condition is asked for, and thus the familiar infinite progress from condition to condition is initiated. The question now is why a new condition to any one condition is asked for, that is, why this condition is taken as conditioned. The answer is, because it is indifferently any finite Determinate Being. But this is a further determination of Condition, which is not contained in its concept. Condition as such is a Conditioned because it is posited Being-in-Self; it is therefore transcended in the Absolutely Unconditioned.

Now this contains in itself the two sides—Condition and Ground—as its moments; it is the unity into which these have returned. They together constitute its Form or positedness. The Unconditioned Fact is Condition of both; but it is Absolute Condition, that is, Condition which is itself Ground.—Now as Ground it is that negative identity which has repelled itself into these two moments;—first, into the shape of transcended Ground-relation, an immediate, self-external multiplicity which is without unity, which relates itself to Ground as an Other to it and at the same time constitutes its Being-in-Self; and secondly into the shape of an internal and simple Form, which is Ground, but relates itself to the self-identical immediate as

to an Other and determines it as Condition,—that is, it determines this its In-itself as its own moment.—These two sides presuppose the totality in such a manner that the totality is that which posits them. Conversely, because they presuppose the totality, the totality in turn appears to be conditioned by them; and the Fact appears to arise from its Condition and from its Ground. But these two sides have shown themselves to be identity, and therefore the relation between Condition and Ground has vanished; they have been reduced to a Show; the Absolutely Unconditioned in its movement of positing and presupposing is only that movement in which this Show cancels itself. The activity of the Fact is, to condition itself and to oppose itself as Ground to its Conditions; but its relation as relation between Conditions and Ground is a Showing within itself, and its attitude to them is its collapse into itself.

(c) TRANSITION OF THE FACT INTO EXISTENCE

The Absolutely Unconditioned is Absolute Ground which is identical with its Condition: the immediate Fact, as being of truly essential nature. As Ground it is in a negative relation to itself; it makes itself positedness, but a positedness which is Reflection perfected in its sides and Form-relation self-identical in them; for such is the concept of it which was reached. Accordingly this positedness is, first, transcended Ground, or the Fact as the reflectionless immediate; this is the side of Conditions. This side is the totality of the determinations of the Fact—or the Fact itself, but cast out into the externality of Being; it is the re-established sphere of Being. In Condition, Essence dismisses the unity of its intro-Reflection as an immediacy, which immediacy now, however, has the determination that it is *conditioning* presupposition and essentially constitutes one only of the sides of Essence. The Conditions are the whole content of the Fact because they are the Unconditioned in the form of formless Being. But by reason of this form they have another shape besides that of determinations of the content as it is in the Fact as such. They appear as a manifold lacking unity and mixed with non-essentials and other elements which do not belong to the sphere of Determinate Being in so far as this constitutes the

Conditions of this particular Fact.—The sphere of Being itself is Condition for the absolute and unrestricted Fact. Ground, which passes back into itself, posits it as the first immediacy, and relates itself to it as to its Unconditioned. This immediacy, as transcended Reflection, is Reflection within the element of Being, which thus, as such, develops into a whole; Form continues to grow rank as determinateness of Being, and thus appears as a Content which is manifold and both distinct from and indifferent to the Determination of Reflection. The Unessential, which belongs to the sphere of Being, and is cast off by it in so far as it is Condition, is the determinateness of immediacy, in which the unity of Form is submerged. This unity of Form as the relation of Being is, in Being, first, Becoming—the transition of one determinateness of Being into another. But further the Becoming of Being is its Becoming of Essence and the regress into Ground. In truth, therefore, that Determinate Being which constitutes the Conditions is not determined to be Condition by an Other, nor used as material by an Other; but by itself it makes itself the moment of an Other.—Further, in its Becoming it does not begin with itself as the true first term and immediate: its immediacy is only that which is presupposed, and the movement of its Becoming is the activity of Reflection itself. Consequently the truth of Determinate Being is that it is Condition; its immediacy is due only to the Reflection of the Ground-relation, which posits itself as transcended. Like immediacy, therefore, Becoming is only the Show of the Unconditioned, when this latter presupposes itself and therein has its Form; and consequently the immediacy of Being essentially is only *moment* of Form.

The Ground-relation as such is the other side of this Showing of the Unconditioned; this relation is determined as Form against the immediacy of the Conditions and of Content. But it is the Form of the absolute Fact, which has in itself the self-unity of its Form (or, its Content), and, determining it as Condition, transcends its variety in this positing and makes it a moment; and, conversely, as essenceless Form it achieves the immediacy of persistence in this self-identity. The Reflection of Ground transcends the immediacy of the Conditions and relates them so that they become moments in the unity of the

Fact. But the Conditions themselves are presupposed by the unconditioned Fact, which thus transcends its own positing; in other words, its own positing equally and immediately constitutes itself Becoming.—The two are therefore one unity; the proper movement of the Conditions is Becoming, regress into Ground to the positing of Ground; but Ground as posited—that is, as transcended—is the immediate. Ground relates itself negatively to itself, constitutes itself positedness, and grounds the Conditions. It is thus that immediate Determinate Being is determined as a posited, and in this very fact Ground transcends it and only now constitutes itself Ground.—This Reflection then is the mediation with itself of the unconditioned Fact through its negation. Or rather, the Reflection of the Unconditioned at first is presupposition (but this self-transcendence is an immediately determining positing); secondly it is here immediately transcendence of what is presupposed, and is determination out of itself; and thus this determining has again become transcendence of positing and is in itself Becoming. Here mediation—the return to self through negation—has vanished; it is simple Reflection showing in itself, and groundless absolute Becoming. The movement of the Fact, when it is posited (*a*) by its Conditions and (*b*) by its Ground, is nothing more than the disappearance of the show of mediation. Accordingly, when the Fact is posited, this process is an emergence, the simple entry into Existence, pure movement of the Fact to itself.

When all the Conditions of a Fact are present, it enters into Existence. The Fact *is* before it *exists*: it *is*, first, as Essence or as Unconditioned; secondly, it has Determinate Being, or is determinate in the twofold manner already considered—in its Conditions and in its Ground respectively. In the former it gave itself the form of external and groundless Being, since, being absolute Reflection, it is negative relation to itself and makes itself its own presupposition. This presupposed Unconditioned is, therefore, the groundless immediate, whose Being is nothing except the mere fact of its existence as groundless. When all the Conditions of the Fact are present, then, that is, when the totality of the Fact is posited as the groundless immediate, this scattered manifold internalizes itself in itself.—The whole Fact must be there in its Conditions; or, all Con-

ditions belong to its Existence, for all constitute its Reflection; in other words, Determinate Being, since it is Condition, is determined by Form; its determinations are consequently determinations of Reflection, and the positing of one essentially involves the positing of the others.—The internalization of the Conditions is, so far, the destruction of immediate Determinate Being, and the Becoming of Ground. But thus Ground becomes posited Ground,—that is, by as much as it is Ground, by so much it is transcended as Ground and is immediate Being. Therefore, when all the Conditions of the Fact are present, they transcend themselves as immediate Determinate Being and presupposition; and equally Ground transcends itself. Ground manifests itself merely as a Show which immediately vanishes; accordingly this emergence is the tautological movement of the Fact towards itself, and its mediation by the Conditions and by Ground is the disappearance of both. The emergence into Existence is therefore immediate, but immediate in such a manner that it is mediated only by the disappearance of mediation.

The Fact emerges out of Ground. It is not grounded in or posited by Ground in such a manner that Ground remains as substratum: the process of positing is the egress of Ground towards itself and its simple disappearance. The union with the Conditions gives to Ground external immediacy and the moment of Being. But Ground does not obtain these as something external, nor by means of an external relation: but as Ground it turns itself into positedness; in positedness its simple essentiality coincides with itself, and in this self-transcendence is the disappearance of its difference from its positedness; that is, it is simple essential immediacy. Ground therefore does not remain over as different from Grounded, but the truth of Grounding is that Ground there unites itself with itself and that therefore its Reflection into other is its intro-Reflection. Hence the Fact, as it is the *Unconditioned*, so also is the *Groundless*, and emerges from Ground only in so far as Ground has perished and is no Ground: it emerges from the Groundless, that is, from its proper essential negativity or pure Form.

This immediacy mediated by Ground and Condition, and self-identical by the transcendence of mediation, is *Existence*.

SECTION TWO

APPEARANCE

ESSENCE must appear.

Being is absolute abstraction ; and this negativity is not external to it : it is Being and nothing but Being only as being this absolute negativity. It is this which causes Being to be only as self-transcending Being, so that it is Essence. Conversely, however, Essence, as simple self-identity, is also Being. The Doctrine of Being contains the primary proposition that *Being is Essence*. The second proposition—*Essence is Being*—constitutes the content of the first section of the Doctrine of Essence. Now this Being, which Essence constitutes itself to be, is Essential Being, or Existence ; it is a perfected egress from negativity and internality.

Thus Essence *appears*. Reflection is the *showing* of Essence *into self*. The Determinations of Reflection are included in unity simply as posited or transcended ; in other words, Reflection is Essence immediately self-identical in its positedness. But this Essence is Ground, and as such really determines itself through its self-transcending or self-reverting Reflection. Further, this determination, or the otherness of the Ground-relation, transcends itself in the Reflection of Ground and becomes Existence ; and herein the determinations of Form obtain an element of independent persistence. Their Show perfects itself so as to be Appearance.

Essentiality which has progressed to immediacy is, so far, *Existence*, and existing entity or *Thing*,—as undistinguished unity of Essence with its immediacy. The Thing contains Reflection, but at this point the negativity of Reflection has become extinguished in the immediacy of the Thing ; however, the Ground of the Thing essentially is Reflection, and therefore its immediacy transcends itself : the Thing becomes a positedness.

Thus the Thing, secondly, is *Appearance*. Appearance is what the Thing is in itself, or its truth. But this Existence, which is merely posited and reflected into otherness, is equally a

passing beyond itself in its infinity: the intro-reflected self-existent world stands opposed to the world of Appearance.

Apparent and Essential Being are, however, absolutely related to each other. Thus, thirdly, Existence is essential *relation*: the Apparent demonstrates the Essential, and this latter is in its Appearance.—The relation is the union—imperfect as yet—of Reflection into otherness and intro-Reflection: their perfect interpenetration is *Actuality*.

CHAPTER I

EXISTENCE

THE proposition of Ground states that whatever is has a Ground, or is posited or mediated; similarly a proposition of Existence should be formulated and expressed in these terms: *Whatever is, exists*. The truth of Being is, not that it is a primary immediate, but that it is Essence which has emerged into immediacy.

It was further said, *Whatever exists has a Ground and is conditioned*; but it must also be added that *it has no Ground and is unconditioned*. For Existence is that immediacy which emerged from the transcendence of the mediation whose relating activity operates by means of Ground and Condition, and in emerging it transcends this emergence.

In so far as this is the proper place to mention the proofs of the existence of God, it must first be recalled that besides (a) immediate Being and (b) Existence (Being which emerges from Essence) there is a third Being which emerges from the Notion—Objectivity.—Demonstration in general is mediated cognition. The various kinds of Being demand or contain each its own kind of mediation; consequently the nature of demonstration too is different for each. The ontological proof attempts to begin from the concept; its basis is the sum-total of all realities, and it proceeds to subsume existence under reality. It is therefore that kind of mediation which is Syllogism: this as yet need not here be considered. Kant's objections to this have already been considered above, and it was remarked that by Existence Kant understands determinate existence, whereby something enters into the fabric of the totality of experience, that is, into the determination of an *otherness* and into the relation to *other*. As existing, something is mediated through an other; and existence in general is the side of its mediation. Now what Kant calls concept—namely something taken as related simply to itself, or image as such—does not contain its mediation; in abstract self-identity opposition is omitted.

It would be the business of the ontological proof to demonstrate that the absolute concept—namely the concept of God—reaches determinate existence, or mediation, or how simple Essence mediates itself with mediation. This is effected, as was pointed out, by the subsumption of existence under its universal, namely reality, which is taken as the mean between (a) God in his concept and (b) existence.—This kind of mediation, in so far as it is cast in the form of a syllogism, is not here in question, as was stated. And our exposition up to this point has shown what is the true nature of this mediation of Essence with Existence. The nature of demonstration itself is to be considered under the doctrine of Cognition. Here we have only to indicate what is relevant to the nature of mediation in general.

The proofs of the existence of God indicate a *ground* for this existence. This ground is not supposed to be an objective ground of the existence of God; for this existence is in and for itself. It is therefore a ground merely for cognition. It thus announces itself as an entity which vanishes in the object which *prima facie* appears as grounded by it. Now the Ground which is derived from the contingent nature of the world contains the regress of the world into absolute Essence; for the contingent is that which is groundless in itself and transcends itself. In this manner then it is true that absolute Essence emerges from the groundless: Ground transcends itself, and immediately the illusion vanishes of the relation which was attributed to God, of being something grounded in an Other. It is thus seen that this mediation is true mediation. But this nature of its mediation is not known to this kind of demonstrative reflection: on the one hand it takes itself as being merely subjective, and thus removes its mediation from God himself, but on the other it for that reason does not recognize the mediating movement, nor that it is in Essence and how it is in Essence itself. Its true relation consists in this, that it is both in one; it is mediation as such, but it is also of course a mediation which is subjective and external—external to itself—and which in itself again transcends itself. But in the proof just discussed Existence is in the false relation of appearing only as mediated or posited.

Thus on the other side Existence cannot be considered as

merely immediate. Taken in the determination of an immediacy, the comprehension of the existence of God has been expressed as something undemonstrable, and the knowledge of it as a merely immediate consciousness, as an act of faith. Knowledge is to come to the conclusion that it knows nothing, that is, that it again renounces its mediating movement and the determinations which occur in it. This has already appeared above; but it must be added that reflection, when it thus ends with its own cancellation, does not have Nothing for result; (if this were true, positive knowledge about Essence, being an immediate relation to it, would be severed from this result and would be an independent emergence, an act beginning with itself;) on the contrary, this end itself, this perishing of mediation, is at the same time the Ground out of which the immediate emerges. Language, as was observed above, combines the signification of this perishing and of Ground; the essence of God, it is said, is the abyss (*der Abgrund*) for finite reason. And this it is indeed, in so far as reason here surrenders its finitude and sinks its mediating movement; but this abyss, or negative Ground, is also the positive Ground of the emergence of the Existent, of Essence immediate in itself; mediation is *essential moment*. Mediation by means of Ground transcends itself, but does not make of Ground a substratum, in which case that which emerges from Ground would be something posited, having its Essence elsewhere, namely in Ground; but in fact this Ground, as abyss, is vanished mediation. Conversely only vanished mediation is also Ground, and is the self-identical and immediate only by virtue of this negation.

Existence here then must not be taken as a predicate or as determination of Essence, so that a proposition about Essence would be: *Essence exists*, or *has existence*.—On the contrary, Essence has passed over into Existence; Existence is its absolute externalization, nor has it remained on the further side of it. The proposition would be: *Essence is existence*; it is not distinct from its existence.—Essence has *passed over* into Existence in so far as Essence, as Ground, is no longer distinct from itself as Grounded, or in so far as this Ground has transcended itself. But this negation is equally its *position*, or absolute positive self-continuity; Existence is the intro-Reflection of Ground,

its self-identity which came into being in its negation; it is thus mediation which has posited itself as self-identical and thereby is immediacy.

Now Existence essentially is self-identical mediation, and therefore the determinations of mediation belong to it; but they belong to it in such a manner that at the same time they are intro-reflected entities and have essential and immediate persistence. Existence, as immediacy which posits itself through transcendence, is negative unity and Being-in-Self; it therefore immediately determines itself as an Existent and as *Thing*.

A

THE THING AND ITS PROPERTIES

Existence as *existing entity* is posited in the form of negative unity, and it is this essentially. But as yet this negative unity is only *immediate* determination—it is the One of the Something in general. But the existing Something is different from the Something which is. The former is essentially that kind of immediacy which arose through the Reflection of mediation in itself. Thus the existing Something is a Thing.

The Thing is distinct from its Existence as the Something can be distinguished from its Being. Immediately, the Thing and the Existent are one and the same. But Existence is not the first immediacy of Being; the moment of mediation is part of it; and therefore its determination as Thing, and the distinction of the two, is not a transition but, properly, an analysis; and Existence as such contains this distinction itself in the moment of its mediation: the distinction, then, is between Thing-in-itself and External Existence.

(a) THING-IN-ITSELF AND EXISTENCE

1. The Thing-in-itself is the existing entity as the essential immediate which is given as the result of the transcendence of mediation. To the Thing-in-itself here mediation is equally essential; but this distinction, in this first or immediate Existence, falls apart into indifferent determinations. One side, namely the mediation of the Thing, is its non-reflected

immediacy, and so its Being in general; and this—since it is also determined as mediation—is a Determinate Being which is other to itself and in itself manifold and external. But it is not only Determinate Being; it stands in relation to transcended mediation and essential immediacy; and consequently it is Determinate Being as unessential, or as positedness.—(If the Thing is distinguished from its Existence, then it is the *possible*, the Thing of imagination or thought, which as such is supposed not to exist at the same time. But the determination of Possibility and the opposition of the Thing and its Existence come later.)—But the Thing-in-itself and its mediated Being are both contained in Existence, and each is an Existence; the Thing-in-itself exists and is the essential Existence of the Thing, while mediated Being is its unessential Existence.

The Thing-in-itself, as the simple reflectedness of Existence in itself, is not the Ground of unessential Determinate Being; it is motionless, indeterminate unity, because it has precisely this determination, that it is transcended mediation, and therefore it is only foundation of Determinate Being. And for this reason too, Reflection, as Determinate Being which mediates itself through other, falls outside the Thing-in-itself. The latter is not supposed to contain in itself any determinate multiplicity, and consequently obtains this only when brought under external reflection, but remains indifferent to it. (—The Thing-in-itself has colour only in relation to the eye, smell in relation to the nose, and so forth.) Its variety is a collection of respects taken by an Other, certain relations to the Thing-in-itself in which this Other places itself; and these are not its own determinations.

2. Now this Other is Reflection, which, determined as external, is, first, external to itself, and is determinate variety. Next it is external to the essentially existing, and relates itself to it as to its absolute presupposition. But these two moments of External Reflection—its own multiplicity and its relation to the Thing-in-itself which is other to it—are one and the same. For this Existence is external only in so far as it relates itself to essential identity as *to an Other*. Multiplicity therefore has not its own independent persistence beyond the Thing-in-itself, but exists only as Show in opposition to it, in its necessary relation to it of reflex refracting itself against it. We have, then,

variety as the relation of an Other to the Thing-in-itself; but this Other is nothing persisting for itself, but is only as relation to the Thing-in-itself; but also it is only as the repulsion from this; thus it is the unsupported recoil of itself on itself.

Now the Thing-in-itself is essential identity of Existence, and so this unessential Reflection does not apply to it, but remains external to it and collapses into itself. It perishes, and thus itself becomes essential identity or Thing-in-itself.—This may also be considered in the following manner: unessential Existence has its intro-Reflection in the Thing-in-itself; it is primarily related to it as to its Other; but as being Other to that which is in itself, it is nothing but its own transcendence and the becoming of Being-in-self. Thus the Thing-in-itself is identical with External Existence.

In the Thing-in-itself this appears in the following manner. The Thing-in-itself is self-relating essential Existence; it is self-identity only in so far as it contains the negativity of intro-Reflection; therefore, that which appeared as Existence external to it is a moment which it contains. For this reason too it is self-repellent Thing-in-itself, which stands in the attitude of an Other to itself. There is thus now a plurality of Things-in-themselves, which stand in the relation of External Reflection to one another. This unessential Existence is their relation to one another as to other; but, further, it is essential to them,—in other words, this unessential Existence, collapsing into itself, is Thing-in-itself, but another Thing-in-itself than the first; for this first is immediate essentiality, while the latter is that which emerges from unessential Existence. But this other Thing-in-itself is only an other in general; for, being a self-identical Thing, it has no further determinateness as against the first; and like the first it is the intro-Reflection of unessential Existence. Hence the determinateness of the various Things-in-themselves against one another falls within External Reflection.

3. At this point this External Reflection is an attitude of the Things-in-themselves to one another: as Others, they mediate one another. The Things-in-themselves are thus the extreme terms of a syllogism, the middle term of which is constituted by their external Existence—that Existence through which they are Others to one another and distinct entities.

This their distinctness falls only within their relation: they depute, as it were, determinations into the relation from their surface only, themselves remaining indifferent to it, since they are absolutely intro-reflected.—Now this relation constitutes the totality of Existence. The Thing-in-itself stands in relation to a Reflection which is external to it; in this Reflection it has manifold determinations. This is its self-repulsion into another Thing-in-itself,—a repulsion which is the recoil of itself on itself, each being an Other only because it shows over against itself out of the Other; it has its positedness not in itself but in the Other, and is determinate only through the determinateness of the Other; and equally this Other is determinate only through the determinateness of the first. Accordingly the two Things-in-themselves do not contain variety in themselves; each has it only in the other; they are therefore not distinct entities. The Thing-in-itself is supposed to be related to the other extreme as to another Thing-in-itself; but in fact it is related to it as to something not distinct from it, and External Reflection, which was supposed to constitute the mediating relation between extremes, is an attitude of the Thing-in-itself only to itself: it is essentially its intro-Reflection. It is thus self-existent determinateness, or the determinateness of the Thing-in-itself. Accordingly the Thing-in-itself has determinateness not in a reciprocated relation, external to it, to another Thing-in-itself; determinateness is not merely a surface of the Thing-in-itself, but is its essential self-mediation with itself as with an Other.—The two Things-in-themselves, which are supposed to constitute the extremes of the relation because they are supposed to have in themselves no determinateness against each other, coincide, in fact, and are one: it is only one Thing-in-itself which in External Reflection has an attitude to itself, and it is its own relation to itself as to an other which constitutes its determinateness.

This determinateness of the Thing-in-itself is the *Property* of the Thing.

(b) PROPERTY

Quality is the immediate determinateness of the Something—that very negative by virtue of which Being is Something. Similarly the Property of the Thing is the negativity of

Reflection, whereby Existence succeeds in becoming existing entity and—as simple self-identity—Thing-in-itself. But the negativity of Reflection, or transcended mediation, is itself essentially mediation and relation, not to an Other in general (as is Quality, since it is non-reflected determinateness), but to itself as to an Other, or mediation which immediately is equally self-identity. The abstract Thing-in-itself is itself this attitude which returns out of other to itself; hence it is determinate in itself. But its determinateness is Modification, which, as such, is itself determination, and, as attitude to Other, does not pass over into otherness and is removed beyond change.

A Thing has Properties. These are, first, its determinate relations to Other; Property is given only as a mode of attitude of one towards an Other; it is therefore External Reflection and the side of positedness of the Thing. But, secondly, in this positedness the Thing is in itself; it preserves itself in relation to Other. Thus it is admittedly only a surface, and now Existence exposes itself to the becoming of Being and to change; but Property is not lost in it. A Thing has the Property of effecting this or that in an Other, and of disclosing itself in a peculiar manner in its relation. It manifests this Property only under one condition,—the other Thing must have a corresponding nature; but also it is peculiar to the first Thing and is its *own* self-identical foundation;—for this reason this reflected quality is called *Property*. The Thing here passes over into an externality, but the Property preserves itself. Through its Properties the Thing becomes cause; and cause is this, that it preserves itself as effect. At this point, however, the Thing is only the stable Thing of many Properties, and it is not yet determined as actual cause; it is Reflection of its determinations, but Reflection which is in itself, and is not yet Positing Reflection.

It has resulted, then, that the Thing-in-itself is essentially not only Thing-in-itself in such a manner that its Properties are the positedness of an External Reflection: they are its own determinations, which give it a particular attitude. It is not an indeterminate foundation lying beyond its external Existence, but is found in its Properties as Ground; that is, it is self-identity in its positedness. But it is also found as Conditioned Ground, that is, its positedness is equally self-external Reflec-

tion; it is intro-reflected, and is in itself, only in so far as it is external.—The Thing-in-itself enters into external relations through Existence, and Existence consists in this externality; it is the immediacy of Being, and through it the Thing is subjected to change; but it is also the reflected immediacy of Ground, and the Thing is thus *in itself* in its change.—But this mention of the Ground-relation must not be taken as meaning that the Thing is in general determined as Ground of its Properties; its Thinghood itself is as such the Ground-determination, and Property is not distinct from its Ground, nor does it merely constitute positedness: it is Ground which has passed over into its externality and has thus become veritably intro-reflected Ground; the Property itself as such is Ground, self-existent positedness, in other words Ground constitutes the Form of its self-identity; its determinateness is the self-external Reflection of Ground; and the whole is Ground which, in its repulsion and determination and its external immediacy, relates itself to itself.—The Thing-in-itself thus exists essentially, and the fact that it exists means, conversely, that Existence, as external immediacy, is also Being-in-Self.

Observation

Mention has already been made above (Vol. I, p. 133) (under the moment of Determinate Being, Being-in-Self) of the Thing-in-itself, and it was observed that the Thing-in-itself as such is no more than the empty abstraction from all determinateness, of which it is admitted that nothing can be known just because it is meant to be the abstraction from all determination.—The Thing-in-itself being thus presupposed as the indeterminate, all determination falls outside it into a Reflection which is foreign to it, while it is indifferent to the Reflection. In transcendental idealism this External Reflection is consciousness. This philosophical system places all determinateness of things (both with regard to form and to content) in consciousness; and accordingly, from this point of view, it falls within me, the subject, that I see the leaves of a tree not as black but as green, the sun as round and not as square, and taste sugar as sweet and not as bitter; that I determine the first and second strokes of a clock as successive and not as

simultaneous, and determine the first to be neither the cause nor the effect of the second, and so forth.—This crude presentation of subjective idealism is in immediate contradiction to the consciousness of freedom, according to which the ego knows itself to be the universal and indeterminate, and casts off these manifold and necessary determinations, recognizing them to be external to itself and applicable only to things.—In this consciousness of its freedom the ego is that true and intro-reflected identity which the Thing-in-itself was supposed to be.—I have shown elsewhere that this transcendental idealism does not emancipate itself from the limitation of the ego by the object, or, generally, from the finite world; it only changes the form of the barrier (which remains absolute for it), translating it from the objective to the subjective shape, and making into determinatenesses of the ego and into a wild change raging within it (the ego being treated as a Thing) that which ordinary consciousness knows as a multiplicity and change belonging to Things which are merely external to it.—At the point here reached only the Thing-in-itself and Reflection (which is as yet external to it) are opposed to each other; the latter has not yet determined itself as consciousness, nor the former as ego. It has resulted from the nature of the Thing-in-itself and from External Reflection that this very externality determines itself as Thing-in-itself, or, conversely, becomes the peculiar determination of that primary Thing-in-itself. The essential inadequacy of the standpoint at which this philosophy halts consists in this, that it clings to the abstract Thing-in-itself as to an ultimate determination; it opposes Reflection, or the determinateness and multiplicity of the Properties, to the Thing-in-itself; while in fact the Thing-in-itself essentially has this External Reflection in itself, and determines itself as an entity endowed with its proper determinations, or Properties; whence it is seen that the abstraction of the Thing, which makes it pure Thing-in-itself, is an untrue determination.

(c) THE RECIPROCAL ACTION OF THINGS

The Thing-in-itself exists essentially; external immediacy and determinateness belong to its Being-in-Self or intro-Reflection. Hence the Thing-in-itself is a Thing which has Properties; hence there are several Things, which are distinguished from

one another not through some foreign respect but through themselves. These many different Things are in essential Reciprocal Action by virtue of their Properties; Property is this very reciprocal relation, and apart from it the Thing is nothing; the mutual determination, the middle term of the Things-in-themselves, which, as extremes, were supposed to remain indifferent as against this their relation, is itself that self-identical Reflection and Thing-in-itself which these extremes were supposed to be. Thinghood is thus degraded to the form of indeterminate self-identity which has its essentiality only in its Property. If therefore a Thing, or Things in general, be spoken of without determinate Property, then their distinction is merely indifferent and quantitative. What is considered as one Thing can equally be made into or considered as several Things: separation or union is here external.—A book is a Thing, and each of its pages is also a Thing, and so is each particle of its pages, and so to infinity. The determinateness by virtue of which one Thing is *this* Thing only, lies in its Properties alone. By means of them it distinguishes itself from other Things, because Property is negative Reflection and the very act of distinguishing; the Thing therefore contains its distinction from others only in its Property. Property is intro-reflected distinction by virtue of which the Thing in its positedness—that is, in its relation to other entities—becomes indifferent both to Other and to its relation. Consequently without its Properties the Thing retains nothing but abstract Being-in-Self, an unessential capacity and external holding-together. Veritable Being-in-Self is Being-in-Self in its positedness: and this is Property. Thus Thinghood has now passed over into Property.

The Thing was to have occupied the position of self-existent extreme as against Property, and Property was to have constituted the middle term between the related Things. But it is in this relation that the Things meet each other as self-repellent Reflection, and here they are distinguished and related. This their distinction and relation is one Reflection and one continuity of them. Accordingly the Things themselves fall only within this continuity, which is Property; and, considered as persistent extremes having existence apart from this Property, they vanish.

Consequently Property, which was meant to constitute the relation of independent extremes, is the Independent itself. Against it the Things are the unessential. They are an essential only as that Reflection which distinguishes itself and thus relates itself to itself; but this is Property. Property therefore is not that which is transcended in the Thing, nor is it a mere moment in it: in truth the Thing is only that unessential capacity, which is negative unity, but resembles only the One of the Something, that is, an immediate One. The Thing was determined above as unessential capacity in so far as it was made such by an external abstraction which detaches Property from it: now this abstraction has taken place by means of the transition of the Thing-in-itself into Property itself. But in this process the values have been inverted; in the first abstraction the abstract Thing without its Property was imagined as the essential, and Property as an external determination: here the Thing as such determines itself through itself as an indifferent external form of Property.—Property is now freed from the indeterminate and brittle connexion which is the One of the Thing: it is Property which constitutes the consistence of the Thing, an independent Matter.—This is simple self-continuity, and therefore contains form only as variety; there are consequently many independent Matters of this kind, and the Thing *consists of them*.

B

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE THING OUT OF MATTERS

The transition of Property into a Matter or independent material is the well-known transition which chemistry operates upon sensible matter when it attempts to represent the properties of colour, smell, taste, and so forth, as *material* of light, of colour, of smell, sour or bitter material, and so forth, while it simply postulates others like that of heat, or electrical and magnetic matter, under the conviction that now it is handling Properties in their very truth.—The expression that Things *consist* of various Matters or materials has equal currency. Good care is taken not to call these Matters or materials Things, though it would probably be admitted that a pigment, for instance, is a Thing; but I do not know whether, for example,

the materials of light, heat, electricity, and so on, are called Things. Things and their constituents are distinguished, but it is not stated exactly whether and to what degree the latter are also Things, or perhaps only half-things; but certainly they are at least Existents.

The necessity of passing from Properties to Matters, or the fact that Properties in truth are Matters, resulted from the truth that they are the essential and therefore the veritably independent element of Things.—But at the same time the intro-Reflection of Property constitutes only one side of the whole Reflection, namely the transcendence of distinction and the self-continuity of Property, which was meant to be an existence for other. Hereby Thinghood, as negative intro-Reflection and as act of distinguishing which repels itself from other, is degraded to an unessential moment; but at the same time it has further determined itself in the degradation. First, this negative moment has preserved itself; for Property has become self-continuous, and independent Matter, only in so far as the distinction of Things has transcended itself; accordingly the continuity of Property into otherness contains itself the moment of the negative, and at the same time its independence, as being this negative unity, is the re-established Something of Thinghood: negative independence as against the positive independence of material. Secondly, the Thing has now advanced from its indeterminateness into perfect determinateness. As Thing-in-itself it is abstract identity, simply negative Existence, or Existence determined as the indeterminate. Next it is determined by its Properties, by means of which it is supposed to distinguish itself from others. But in fact it is by means of Property continuous with others, and thus this incomplete distinction transcends itself; through it the Thing has passed back into itself and is now determined as determinate. It is determinate in itself: it is *this* Thing.—

But, thirdly, although this return upon self is self-relating determination, it is also unessential; self-continuous existence constitutes independent Matter, in which the distinction of Things—their determinateness which is in and for itself—is transcended and has become external. The Thing as “this” is thus perfect determinateness, but this determinateness is determinateness in the element of unessentiality.

This results in the following manner, if considered from the side of the movement of Property. Property is not only external determination but also self-being Existence. This unity of externality and essentiality contains intro-Reflection and Reflection into other, and therefore repels itself from itself; it is determination as a simple, identically self-related independent, in which negative unity (the One of the Thing) has been transcended, and, on the other hand, it is also this determination as against Other; and here too it is intro-reflected and self-determined One. We have, then, Matters, and "this" Thing. These are the two moments of self-identical externality or intro-reflected Property.—Property was that by means of which Things were to be distinct from one another; now Property has rid itself of this its negative side (namely inherence in an Other), and simultaneously the Thing too has been freed from its determination by other Things, and has passed back from relation to other upon itself. But at the same time it is only *Thing-in-itself which has become Other to itself*, since the manifold Properties for their part have become independent, and thereby their negative relation has become a merely transcended relation in the One of the Thing. For this reason the Thing is self-identical negation only as against the positive continuity of the material.

The "this" therefore constitutes the perfected determinateness of the Thing: the determinateness is now also external. The Thing consists of independent Matters which are indifferent to their relation in the Thing. Hence this relation is only an unessential collocation of these, and the distinction of one Thing from another depends upon the selection of the particular Matters, and their individual quantities, which it contains. These pass beyond "this" Thing and continue themselves into other Things; the fact that they belong to "this" Thing is not a barrier for them. And equally they are no barrier to one another, since their negative relation is no more than the impotent "this." When therefore they are connected in this latter they do not cancel one another; they are independent and, as such, impenetrable to one another; each in its determinateness relates itself only to itself, and is a member of a multiplicity of consistence indifferent to the other members; they admit only quantitative limitation.—The Thing as "this"

is this their merely quantitative relation ; it is a mere collection, their "also." It consists of any quantum of a material, and *also* of any quantum of another, and *also* of others ; the Thing alone constitutes this connexion of having no connexion.

C

THE DISSOLUTION OF THE THING

"This" Thing has determined itself as the merely quantitative coherence of free materials, and as such is the absolutely variable Thing. Its variation consists in this, that one or more Matters are withdrawn from the collection or else are added to this "also," or that their quantitative ratio is changed. The arising and passing away of "this" Thing is the external dissolution of this kind of external connexion, or the connexion of such terms as are indifferent to connexion. Materials circulate into and out of "this" Thing without hindrance ; the Thing is absolute porosity having no measure nor form of its own.

The Thing then in its absolute determinateness, whereby it is "this," is the absolutely soluble Thing. This dissolution, as well as its Being, is an external becoming-determinate ; but the dissolution of the Thing and the externality of its Being is what is essential in this Being ; it is "also" and no more, and consists only in this externality. But also it consists of its Matters ; and not only the abstract "this" as such, but the whole "this" Thing is its own dissolution. For the Thing is determined as an external collection of independent Matters ; these Matters are not Things, and have no negative independence : they are Properties as the independent, namely as determinateness which is intro-reflected as such. Accordingly the Matters are simple and relate only to themselves ; but their content is a determinateness ; intro-Reflection is only the *form* of this content, which is not intro-reflected as such, but relates itself to Other according to its determinateness. The Thing is therefore not only the "also" of the Matters (which is the relation of these as indifferent to one another), but is equally their negative relation ; and the Matters, by virtue of their determinateness, are themselves this their negative Reflection, which is the *puncticity* of the Thing. One Matter is not *what* another is, according to their determinateness of content as against one

another; and one is not in so far as another is, according to their independence.

The Thing therefore is the mutual relation of Matters out of which it is constituted in such a manner that in it one Matter and another "also" have persistence while at the same time one does *not* persist in it in so far as another does. Hence one Matter is cancelled in a Thing in the same measure in which another is in it; but simultaneously the Thing is the "also" or the persistence of that other. Hence in the persistence of one Matter the other does *not* persist, and equally it *also* does persist in the former; and so with all these different Matters reciprocally. In the same respect, then, in which one persists the others also persist, and this unified persistence is the *puncticity* or negative unity of the Thing; and in this regard they simply interpenetrate one another. Again, the Thing at the same time is only their "also," and the Matters are reflected into their determinateness; and in this regard they are indifferent to one another and while interpenetrating one another are not in contact. The Matters therefore are essentially *porous*, so that one persists in the pores (or non-persistence) of the others; but those others are porous themselves; in their pores, or non-persistence, the first and all the others persist; their persistence is also their cancellation and the persistence of others; and equally this persistence of others is their own cancellation and the persistence of the first, and similarly of all the rest. Consequently the Thing is the self-contradictory mediation of independent persistence with itself through its opposite (namely, through its negation), or of one independent Matter through the persistence and non-persistence of another.—In "this" Thing Existence has reached its completion; that is, in one entity it is self-being Being or independent persistence, and unessential Existence; hence the truth of Existence is that it has its Being-in-Self in unessentiality or its persistence in an Other (and indeed in the absolutely Other), or that it has its own nullity for foundation. It is therefore *Appearance*.

Observation

It is one of the commonest determinations of imagination that a Thing consists of many independent Matters. The Thing on the one hand is considered as having Properties, the Thing

being their persistence. But on the other hand these different determinations are taken as Matters the persistence of which is not the Thing: the Thing, conversely, consists of them, and is itself no more than their external connexion and quantitative limit. Both Properties and Matters are the same content-determinations; but the former are moments, that is, entities reflected into their negative unity as into a foundation distinct from themselves (namely Thinghood); the latter are independent distinct entities each of which is reflected into its own self-unity. These Matters now further determine themselves as independent persistence; also, however, they are gathered together in one Thing. This Thing has the two determinations of being first "this" and secondly "also." The "also" is that which occurs in external intuition as spatial extension; while "this," or negative unity, is the *puncticity* of the Thing. The Matters are collected in the puncticity, and their "also," or extension, is everywhere this puncticity; for the "also" as Thinghood is essentially also determined as negative unity. Therefore, where one of these Matters is, there, at one and the same point, is every other; the Thing has not its colour at one place, its material of heat at another and of smell at a third, and so on, but, at the point where it is warm, it is also coloured, acid, electric, and so on. Now these materials are not external to one another, but are in one single "this"; and therefore they are assumed to be porous, so that one Matter exists in the interstices between the others. But that Matter which is in the interstices between the others is porous itself; conversely, therefore, in its pores exists the other Matter; and not it alone, but also the third, the tenth, and so forth. They all are porous, and all the others are in the interstices of each, just as each, with all the rest, is in the pores of every other. Accordingly they form a mass which reciprocally interpenetrates itself in such a manner that the penetrating elements are equally penetrated by the others, whence each penetrates again its own penetratedness. Each is posited as its own negation, and this negation is the persistence of another; but this persistence is equally the negation of this other and the persistence of the first.

The contradiction of the independent persistence of several Matters in one whole, or of their indifference to one another in their interpenetration, is, as a rule, warded off by imagination

by means of an excuse based on the smallness of the parts and of the pores. Here distinction in itself, contradiction, and the negation of negation come into play, and, in general, a *notion* is required to be formed; and here imagination allows itself to relapse into external or quantitative distinction; in respect of arising and passing away it has recourse to graduality, and in respect of Being, to smallness, where the vanishing term is degraded to the imperceptible, and contradiction to a confusion, and the true relation is shifted into a vague sensuous representation which saves the self-transcendent by its obscurity.

But if further light is thrown upon this obscurity it reveals itself as contradiction, partly subjective and springing from sensuous representation, and partly objective and springing from the object; sensuous representation itself completely contains its elements. For the action of this latter is, first, the contradiction of clinging to perception (wherein it has before it things of existence), and yet of ascribing sensuous existence to the imperceptible, which is determined only by reflection. The minute parts, and pores, are at the same time said to be a sensuous existence, and their positedness is spoken of in the same manner as is that mode of reality which belongs to colour, heat, and so forth. If, further, imagination were to consider this objectival mist (the pores and minute parts) more closely, it would there recognize one Matter and *also* its negation, since Matter would be found at one point, and by its side its negation, the pore, and by its side again Matter, and so forth; and besides this it would further perceive that in "this" Thing it has (1) independent Matter, and (2) its negation (or porosity) and the other independent Matter, at one and the same point, and that this porosity and the independent persistence of Matters in one another as in one entity are a reciprocal negation and penetration of penetration.—In physics, modern expositions of the expansion of steam in atmospheric air, and of various gases in one another, elaborate more exactly one side of the concept of the nature of the Thing which has here resulted. For they show that a certain volume, for instance, has a capacity for the same amount of steam whether it is empty or full of atmospheric air; and also that the various gases spread themselves in one another in such a manner that each is as good as a vacuum for the other, or

at least that they are in no kind of chemical combination with one another, each remaining uninterrupted by the other and self-continuous, and preserving itself indifferent to, while penetrating, the others.—But in the concept of the Thing the further moment is this, that here one Matter is at the same point where the other is also; that at this point one Matter both penetrates and is penetrated, or that the independent immediately is also the independence of an Other. This is self-contradictory; but the Thing is this very contradiction, and for this reason it is Appearance.

In the sphere of spirit the idea of *forces* or *faculties* of the soul is of the same kind as that of these Matters. Spirit is “this” in a far deeper sense—the negative unity in which its determinations interpenetrate one another. But when imagined as soul it is frequently taken as a Thing. Man in general is allowed to consist of soul and body, and each of these is counted as independent by itself; and similarly the soul is allowed to consist of so-called soul-forces, each of which has an independence persisting by itself, or is an immediate activity operating for itself according to its determinateness. It is imagined that at one point understanding and at another fantasy is operating by itself, and that understanding, memory, and so on, are cultivated each by itself, while the other forces are left inactive on one side until their turn comes or does not come. The faculties are transposed into the materially-simple soul-thing (supposed to be immaterial because simple), and, though in this process they are not imagined as separate Matters, yet, as forces, they are assumed to be as indifferent to one another as these Matters. But spirit is not that contradiction which the Thing is, which dissolves and passes over into Appearance: it is already in itself contradiction which has passed back into its absolute unity—namely, the Notion, where distinctions must now be thought of no longer as independent, but only as separate moments in the subject, which is simple individuality.

CHAPTER II

APPEARANCE

EXISTENCE is the immediacy of Being as which Essence has reconstituted itself. This immediacy is *in itself* the intro-Reflection of Essence. Essence as Existence emerged out of its Ground, and the Ground itself has passed over into it. Existence is this reflected immediacy in so far as it is in itself absolute negativity. And now it is also *posited* as this, since it has determined itself as Appearance.

Consequently Appearance at this point is Essence in its Existence; Essence is present therein immediately. The fact that it is not immediate but reflected Existence constitutes the moment of Essence in it; in other words, Existence as *essential* Existence is Appearance.

Something is *only* Appearance in this meaning, that Existence as such is only a posited entity and not one which is in and for itself. This constitutes its essentiality, which causes it to have in itself the negativity of Reflection, which is the nature of Essence. This Reflection is not foreign or external, with Essence belonging to it, nor does it declare Existence to be Appearance after comparison made between Essence and Existence; but (as was seen) this essentiality of Existence, which makes it Appearance, is the proper truth of Existence. The Reflection, by virtue of which it is this, is its own.

But if it is said that something is *only* Appearance, as though immediate Existence on the contrary were the truth, then, in fact, Appearance is the higher truth; for Appearance is Existence as essential Appearance, whereas immediate Existence is Appearance which as yet is essenceless because it has one moment only of Appearance, namely Existence as immediate, and has not yet its negative Reflection. If Appearance is called essenceless, then the moment of its negativity is thought of as though the immediate, as opposed to it, were the positive and true; but in fact this immediate does not yet

contain essential truth. Indeed, Existence ceases to be essenceless by the fact that it passes over into Appearance.

Essence at first *shows* in itself, in its simple identity; it is thus abstract Reflection, or the pure movement from nothing through nothing back to itself. Essence *appears*, and now is *real* Show, where the moments of Show have Existence. It has already resulted that Appearance is the negative self-mediation of the Thing; the distinctions that the Thing contains are independent Matters, which are this contradiction, that they are an immediate persistence and also have their persistence only in a foreign independence, that is, in the negation of their own, and, again, for this very reason have their persistence only in the negation of this foreign independence, or in the negation of their own negation. Show is this same mediation; but its unstable moments take in Appearance the shape of immediate independence. On the other hand the immediate independence which belongs to Existence is, for its part, reduced to the rank of moment. Appearance consequently is the unity of Show and Existence.

Appearance now determines itself more closely. It is essential Existence; the essentiality of the latter distinguishes itself from Appearance in so far as this is unessential, and these two sides enter into relation with each other.—At first therefore Appearance is simple self-identity, containing at the same time various content-determinations; and it itself as well as their relation is that which remains constant to itself in the changes of Appearance; this is the Law of Appearance.

Now secondly Law, which is simple in its variety, passes over into the opposite; the essential part of Appearance is opposed to Appearance, and the World which is-in-itself takes its stand against the World of Appearance.

Thirdly this opposition passes back into its Ground; that which is-in-itself is in Appearance, and conversely that which appears is determined as absorbed into its Being-in-Self; Appearance becomes Relation.

A

THE LAW OF APPEARANCE

1. Appearance is the Existent mediated through its negation, which constitutes its persistence. Though this its negation is another independent entity, it is equally essentially a transcended entity. Consequently the Existent is the return of itself into itself through its negation and through the negation of this its negation; it has therefore essential independence, as also it is likewise immediately just positedness, which has a Ground and an Other for its consistence.—First, then, Appearance is Existence together with its essentiality, positedness with its Ground; but this Ground is negation, and the other independent entity which is the Ground of the first is also no more than a positedness. Or again, the Existent, as Appearing, is reflected into an Other and has this for Ground, and this means only this, that it is reflected into an Other. The essential independence which belongs to it because it is return into self is the return of Nothing through Nothing to itself, on account of the negativity of the moments; hence the independence of the Existent is only essential Show. For this reason the coherence of the Existent which reciprocally grounds itself consists in this reciprocal negation, namely, that the persistence of the one is not the persistence of the other but its positedness, which relation of positedness alone constitutes its persistence. Ground is here as it is in its truth: it is a first term which is only a presupposition.

This then constitutes the negative side of Appearance. But in this negative mediation is contained immediately the positive self-identity of the Existent. For it is not positedness as against an essential Ground, or, again, it is not Show as in an independent entity; but it is positedness which refers itself to a positedness, or it is Show only in a Show. In this its negation or in its Other (which is itself transcended) it relates itself to itself, and accordingly is self-identical or positive essentiality.—This identity is not immediacy, which belongs to Existence as such, and is only that unessential part of it by which it has its persistence in an Other. On the contrary, it is the essential content of Appearance, which has two sides: first

it is in the form of positedness or external immediacy, and secondly it is positedness as self-identity. According to the first side the content is as a Determinate Being, which however is contingent and unessential, subject in its immediacy to transition, arising, and passing away. According to the other side the content is simple content-determination exempt from this change; it is the enduring part of it.

This content in general is the simple element of perishableness; but apart from this it is also determinate content various within itself. It is the intro-Reflection of Appearance, of negative Determinate Being, and thus essentially contains determinateness. But Appearance is *existent* multiple variety which disports itself in unessential multifariousness; while its reflected content is its multifariousness reduced to simple difference. For (considered more precisely) determinate essential content is not only determinate in general, but, as the essential part of Appearance, it is complete determinateness: One and its Other. In Appearance each of these has its persistence in the other in such a manner that it is also only in the other's non-persistence. This contradiction cancels itself, and its intro-Reflection is the identity of the persistence of each: the positedness of the one is the positedness of the other also. They constitute *one* persistence, and at the same time are a various and mutually indifferent content. Thus in the essential side of Appearance the negative part of the unessential content (self-transcendence) has passed back into identity; it is an indifferent persistence, which is not transcendedness but rather the persistence of the Other.

This unity is the Law of Appearance.

2. Law therefore is the positive element in the mediation of the Apparent. Appearance at this stage is Existence as negative self-mediation, so that the Existent is mediated with itself through its own non-persistence, through an Other, and again through the non-persistence of this Other. Herein is contained firstly the mere showing and vanishing of both (unessential Appearance), and secondly also endurance or Law; for each of the two exists in the transcendence of the other, and their positedness as their negativity is also the identical, positive positedness of both.

This enduring persistence which belongs to Appearance in

Law is accordingly, as it has determined itself, opposed firstly to the immediacy of Being which belongs to Existence. In itself this immediacy is reflected immediacy, that is, Ground which has passed back into itself; but now, in Appearance, this simple immediacy is distinct from reflected immediacy, whereas in the Thing their separation was but commencing. In its dissolution the existing Thing has become this opposition; the positive element of its dissolution is the self-identity of the Apparent, as positedness, in its other positedness.—Secondly this reflected immediacy is itself determined as positedness as against the immediacy, which has being, of Existence. This positedness (*Gesetzsein*) is now the essential and truly positive. The German expression *Gesetz* (Law) contains this determination likewise. In this positedness lies the essential relation of the two sides of the distinction which is contained in Law; they are a various and mutually immediate content, and they are this as the Reflection of the vanishing content which belongs to Appearance. As essential variety the various terms are simple self-relating content-determinations. But equally none of them is immediate for itself, but each essentially is positedness, or is only in so far as the other is.

Thirdly, Appearance and Law have one and the same content. Law is the Reflection of Appearance into identity with itself; thus Appearance stands opposed as void immediacy to the intro-reflected, and, according to this form, they are distinct. But the Reflection of Appearance by virtue of which this distinction has being is also the essential identity of Appearance itself and of its Reflection, and indeed this is the nature of Reflection: it is that which in positedness is self-identical and indifferent to that distinction which is form or positedness; it is a content which continues itself out of Appearance into Law: the content of Law and of Appearance.

This content accordingly constitutes the foundation of Appearance; Law is this foundation itself, and Appearance is the same content, but it contains more too, namely the unessential content of its immediate being. For the form-determination also, by virtue of which Appearance as such is distinct from Law, is a content, and is likewise distinct from the content of Law. For Existence, too, as immediacy in general, is a self-identity of matter and form which is indifferent

to its form-determinations and therefore is content: it is Thinghood with its Properties and Matters. But it is that content whose independent immediacy also has being only as a non-persistence. But its self-identity in this its non-persistence is the other or essential content. This identity, the foundation of Appearance, which constitutes Law, is the peculiar moment of Appearance; it is the positive side of essentiality, by virtue of which Existence is Appearance.

Consequently Law is not beyond Appearance, but is immediately present in it: the realm of Laws is the quiescent counterfeit of the existing or appearing world. Or rather both are one totality, and the existing world is itself the realm of Laws, which, as the simple identical, is at the same time identical with itself in positedness or in the self-dissolving independence of Existence. Existence passes back into Law as into its Ground; Appearance contains them both—simple Ground and the dissolving movement of the appearing universe, of which movement Ground is the essentiality.

3. Law, then, is essential Appearance; it is the intro-Reflection of Appearance in its positedness, the identical content of itself and of unessential Existence. Now first this identity of Law with its Existence is just immediate and simple identity, and Law is indifferent to its Existence: Appearance has a further content as against the content of Law. The former, indeed, is unessential and is the regress into the latter content; but for Law it is a *prius* which is not posited by it; as content therefore it is *externally connected* with Law. Appearance is a multitude of closer determinations which belong to the "this" or the concrete, and are not contained in Law, but are determined by something else.—Secondly, that which Appearance contains apart from Law determined itself as positive or as another content; but essentially it is negative; it is Form and its movement as such, which belongs to Appearance. The realm of Laws is the quiescent content of Appearance; Appearance is this same content, but presents itself in unquiet change and as Reflection into other. It is Law as negative and just changing Existence, the movement of transition into opposite, of self-transcendence and regress into unity. Law does not contain this side of unquiet Form, or of negativity; Appearance, therefore, as against Law is the totality, for it

contains Law but also more, namely the moment of self-moving Form.—Thirdly, this deficiency is found in Law in this shape, that its content is as yet merely various and therefore indifferent to itself, so that the identity of its sides with each other is just immediate and so internal, or not, as yet, necessary. In Law two content-determinations are connected as essential (for instance, in the Law of Gravitation, spatial and temporal magnitude: spaces passed through vary as the squares of the times elapsed); they *are*, in a connected state; as yet this relation is merely immediate. Consequently the relation itself is merely posited, and indeed in Appearance the immediate in general has obtained the significance of positedness. The essential unity of the two sides of Law would be their negativity—the one, that is, containing the other in itself; but this essential unity has not yet emerged in Law. (—It is not contained in the concept of the space which is passed through when a body falls that time is to correspond to it as a square. A fall is a sensible movement, and therefore it is the relation between time and space; but, first, it is not implied in the determination of time itself—that is, time as taken by imagination—that it is related to space, and conversely. It is said that time can quite well be imagined without space, and space without time; one is therefore added to the other externally, and this external relation is movement. Secondly, the further determination—namely, what are the magnitudes in accordance with which time and space are related in movement—is indifferent. The law governing this is known empirically, and in so far it is merely immediate; and a proof is still required, that is, a mediation for cognition, that the law not only operates but is necessary. The law as such does not contain this proof and its objective necessity.—) Consequently Law is only the positive and not the negative essentiality of Appearance. In the latter the content-determinations are moments of Form, as such pass over into their Other, and in themselves are just as much not themselves but their Other. In Law then the positedness of one side is the positedness of the other; but yet their content is indifferent to this relation and, in itself, does not contain this positedness. Consequently, although Law is essential Form, it is not yet Real Form, reflected into its sides as Content.

B

THE WORLD OF APPEARANCE AND THE WORLD IN ITSELF

1. The existing world rises peacefully into a realm of Laws; the void content of its manifold Determinate Being has its persistence in an Other; and accordingly its persistence is its dissolution. But in this Other the Apparent also coincides with itself; thus Appearance in its mutation is also an enduring, and its positedness is Law. Law is this simple self-identity of Appearance, and therefore is its foundation and not its Ground; for it is not the negative unity of Appearance, but, as its simple identity, it is immediate because abstract unity; consequently its other content also has its place beside it. The content is "this"; it coheres in itself, or has its negative Reflection within itself. It is reflected into an Other; this Other is itself an Existence of Appearance; appearing things have their Grounds and conditions in other appearing things.

But in truth Law is also the Other of Appearance as such, and is its negative Reflection as into its Other. The content of Appearance, which is different from the content of Law, is the Existent, which has its negativity for its Ground, or is reflected into its not-being. But this Other, which is also an Existent, is likewise an entity reflected in this manner into its not-being; it is therefore the same, and the Apparent in it is in fact not reflected into an Other but into itself: and precisely this intro-Reflection of positedness is Law. But, as Apparent, it is essentially reflected into its not-being; or, its identity is itself, essentially, also its negativity and its Other. The intro-Reflection of Appearance, that is, Law, is, then, not only its identical foundation, but Appearance also has its opposite in Law, and Law is its negative unity.

The determination of Law has thus changed in Law itself. At first Law is only a differentiated content and the formal intro-Reflection of positedness, so that the positedness of one of its sides is the positedness of the other. But Law is also negative intro-Reflection, and therefore its sides are related not merely as different but as negative to each other.—Or, if Law is considered merely for itself, then the sides of its content are indifferent to each other; but equally they are

transcended in virtue of their identity; the positedness of the one is the positedness of the other; and accordingly the persistence of one is also its own non-persistence. This positedness of the one in the other is their negative unity, and each is not only the positedness of itself but also of the other; in other words, each is itself this negative unity. The positive identity which they have in Law as such is only their internal unity, which requires demonstration and mediation, since this negative unity is not yet posited in them. But the different sides of Law are now determined as being different in their negative unity, or as being such terms as contain each its Other in itself and at the same time, being independent, repel each this its otherness from itself; and therefore the identity of Law now is a posited and a real identity.

So now Law has likewise attained the moment of negative form of its sides, hitherto lacking,—the moment which before still belonged to Appearance; Existence now has returned completely into itself, and has reflected itself into its absolute otherness which is in and for itself. That which formerly was Law is in consequence no longer only one side of that whole whose other side was Appearance as such; it is the whole itself. It is the essential totality of Appearance, so that Appearance now contains also the moment of unessentiality, which formerly belonged to the latter; but it contains it as reflected, self-existent unessentiality, that is, as essential negativity.—As immediate content Law is determinate in general, and is distinct from other laws, of which there is an indeterminable number. But it now has in itself essential negativity, and for this reason it no longer contains such a merely indifferent and contingent content-determination; its content is the sum of determinateness in an essential relation which constitutes itself as totality. Thus intro-reflected Appearance now is a World, which reveals itself as a World that is in and for itself above the World of Appearance.

The realm of Laws contains only the simple, immutable, but various content of the Existing World. But this realm is the total Reflection of the latter, and therefore also contains the moment of its essenceless multiplicity. This moment of variability and variation, as intro-reflected and essential, is absolute negativity or Form in general as such; but the moments

of this Form have the reality proper to independent but reflected Existence in the World which is in and for itself. Conversely, this reflected independence now also has Form, and its content therefore is not merely manifold, but essentially self-coherent.

—This World which is in and for itself is also called the *supersensuous* World, in so far as the Existing World is determined as sensuous, that is, as of a kind that is for intuition, for the immediate attitude of consciousness.—The supersensuous World, too, has immediacy, or Existence, but reflected, essential Existence. Essence as yet has no Determinate Being; but it is, and is in a profounder sense than Being; the Thing is the beginning of reflected Existence, it is an immediacy which is not yet posited as essential or reflected; but in truth it is not an immediate which *is*. Only Things—as Things of an other, supersensuous World—are posited, first as veritable existences and secondly as the truth as opposed to that which has being;—in them it is recognized that there is a Being different from immediate Being, and that this is veritable Existence. In this determination the sensuous imagination has been overcome which ascribes Existence only to the immediate Being of sensation and of intuition; but also the unconscious reflection is overcome, which has the imagination of Things, Forces, Interiority, and so forth, but does not know that such determinations are not sensuous or *being* immediacies, but reflected Existences.

2. The World which is in and for itself is the totality of Existence; outside it there is nothing. But since in itself it is absolute negativity or Form, its intro-Reflection is negative self-relation. It contains opposition, and repels itself into itself as the Essential World and into itself as the World of Otherness or the World of Appearance. Therefore, because it is the totality, it is also as one side thereof only, and in this determination constitutes a different independence over against the World of Appearance. The Appearing World has its negative unity in the Essential World; it perishes in it, and passes back into it as into its Ground. Further, the Essential World is also the positing Ground of the Appearing World; for it contains absolute Form in its essentiality, and hence its self-identity transcends itself, constitutes itself positedness, and, as this posited immediacy, is the Appearing World.

Further, it is not only Ground in general of the Appearing World, but its determinate Ground. Already as the realm of Laws it is manifold content—the essential content of the Appearing World; and as Ground having content, it is the determinate Ground of the other World, but only according to this content; for the Appearing World had manifold other content beside this realm, since the negative moment was its peculiar characteristic. But now the realm of Laws, too, has in itself this moment, and consequently it is the totality of the content of the Appearing World, and the Ground of all its multifariousness. At the same time, however, that World is also the negative of this latter, and therefore is the World which is opposed to it.—For in the identity of the two Worlds one is formally determined as essential, and the other as the same, but as posited and unessential; and thus the Ground-relation has restored itself, but is now at the same time the Ground-relation of Appearance; it is the relation not of an identical content, nor of one which is merely different (as is Law), but is total relation or negative identity and essential relation of content as opposed.—The realm of Laws is not only this, that the positedness of one content is the positedness of an other, but this identity is essentially—as was established—negative unity too; each of the two sides of Law is, in negative unity, in itself its other content; the Other therefore is not an indeterminate Other in general; it is *its* Other, that is, it too draws its content-determination from the first; thus the two sides are opposites. The realm of Laws now has in itself this negative moment and opposition; it is totality, and accordingly repels itself from itself into a World which is in and for itself and an Appearing World; and thus the identity of the two is essential relation of opposition.—The Ground-relation as such is opposition which has perished in its contradiction, and Existence is Ground which coincides with itself. But Existence becomes Appearance; Ground is transcended in Existence; it restores itself as return of Appearance into itself; but at the same time it does so as transcended Ground, namely as Ground-relation of opposite determinations. But the identity of such terms is essentially becoming and transition, no longer Ground-relation as such.

Accordingly the World which is in and for itself is itself a

World differentiated in itself, in the totality of manifold content; it is identical with the Appearing or Posited World, and, in so far, it is the Ground thereof; but its identical coherence is also determined as opposition, because the Form of the Appearing World is the Reflection into its otherness, so that it has truly passed back into itself in the World which is in and for itself in so far as this is its opposite. Having been determined, therefore, the relation is this, that the World which is in and for itself is the *inversion* of the Appearing World.

C

DISSOLUTION OF APPEARANCE

The World which is in and for itself is the determinate Ground of the Appearing World, and it is this only in so far as it is in itself the negative moment and hence the totality of content-determinations and their changes, corresponding to the Appearing World but at the same time constituting that side of it which is absolutely opposite. The relation of the two Worlds to each other is, then, such that what is positive in the Appearing World is negative in the World which is in and for itself and conversely what is negative in that is positive in this. The North Pole of the Appearing World is in and for itself the South Pole, and conversely; positive electricity in itself is negative, and so forth. What in Apparent Determinate Being is evil, misfortune, and so on, is in and for itself good or happiness.

Indeed in this very opposition of the two Worlds their difference has vanished, and what was to have been World which is in and for itself, is itself Appearing World, while this conversely is in itself Essential World.—The Appearing World at first is determined as the Reflection into otherness, so that its determinations and Existences have their Ground and persistence in an Other; but this Other is likewise reflected into an Other, and therefore in being related to it they are related merely to a self-transcending Other, and hence to themselves; the Appearing World thus is, in itself, self-equal Law.—Conversely the World which is in and for itself is at first self-identical content, removed from otherness and change; but

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this content, as complete intro-Reflection of the Appearing World, or because its variety is intro-reflected and absolute difference, contains the negative moment and the relation to self as to otherness. This makes it self-opposed, self-inverting, essenceless content. Further this content of the World which is in and for itself has now obtained thereby the form of immediate Existence. For at the outset this World is Ground of the Appearing World; but, since it contains opposition, it is equally transcended Ground and immediate Existence.

Thus both the Appearing and the Essential World are each in itself the totality of self-identical Reflection and of Reflection into Other, or of Being-in-and-for-Self and of Appearing. Each is the independent whole of Existence. One was to have been only reflected Existence, and the other only immediate Existence; but each continues itself in its other, and consequently in itself is the identity of these two moments. We have, therefore, this totality which repels itself from itself into two totalities—one reflected, and the other immediate, totality. Both in the first instance are independent, but they are independent only as totalities, and they are this in so far as each essentially has in itself the moment of the other. The distinct independence of each—of that which is determined as immediate, and that which is reflected—is consequently now posited in this manner, that each is only as essential relation to the other and has its independence in this unity of both.

The beginning was made from the Law of Appearance; this is the identity of a differentiated content with another content in such a manner that the positedness of the one is the positedness of the other. In Law this difference is still present, that the identity of its sides is no more than an internal identity: the sides have not yet identity in themselves. Thus (a) this identity is not realized; the content of Law is not as identical, but an indifferent, various content;—and (b) the content is determined only *in itself* in such a manner that the positedness of the one is the positedness of the other; this is not yet manifest in Law. But now *Law is realized*; its inner identity also has determinate being, and conversely the content of Law is raised into ideality; for it is a content in itself transcended and intro-reflected, each side having its other in itself, and therefore being veritably identical with it and with itself.

Thus Law is Essential Relation. The truth of the unessential World is, at first, an other World, which is in and for itself; but this World is the totality, for it is both itself and also that first World. Both thus are immediate Existences and hence Reflections into their otherness; and also, for this reason, they are truly intro-reflected. Indeed, the term *world* expresses the formless totality of multifariousness: this World, both as Essential and as Appearing, has perished, since multifariousness has ceased to be merely various; it still is totality or universe, but it is so as Essential Relation. Two totalities of content arose in Appearance. They are at first determined as mutually indifferent independent entities: they have Form, each in itself, but they have not Form each as against the other. But Form has also shown itself to be their relation, and Essential Relation is the completion of their formal unity.

CHAPTER III

ESSENTIAL RELATION

THE truth of Appearance is Essential Relation. Its content has immediate independence: immediacy which *is*, and *reflected* immediacy or self-identical Reflection. At the same time the content in this independence is a relative content, which is only as Reflection into its Other or as unity of the relation to its Other. In this unity the independent content is something posited, transcended; but this very unity constitutes its essentiality and independence: this Reflection into other is intro-Reflection. The Relation has sides because it is Reflection into other; it thus contains self-difference, and the sides are independent persistence, since in their indifferent variety as against each other they are inwardly refracted, so that equally the persistence of each has its significance only in the relation to the other or in their negative unity.

Essential Relation therefore is not the true third term for Essence and Existence; but it does already contain the definite union of the two. Essence in it is realized in such a manner that it has for its persistence entities having independent Existence; and these have passed back out of their indifference into their essential unity, so that they have only this for their consistence. The Reflection-determinations of positive and negative likewise are intro-reflected only as reflected each into its opposite; but they have no other determination except this their negative unity, whereas Essential Relation has for its sides terms that are posited as independent totalities. It is the same opposition as that of positive and negative, but at the same time as an inverted World. The side of Essential Relation is a totality, which however essentially has an opposite or Beyond; it is only Appearance; its own Existence is rather that not of itself but of its Other. It is therefore inwardly refracted; but this its transcendedness consists in this, that it is the unity of itself and of its Other, that is, a Whole; and for this very reason it has independent Existence and is essential intro-Reflection.

This is the *concept* of the Relation. But at this stage the identity which it contains is not yet complete; as yet the totality, which everything relative is in itself, is only internal; and the side of the Relation is posited in *one* of the determinations of the negative unity: the proper independence of each of the two sides is that which constitutes the form of the Relation. Its identity therefore is only a *relation*, and its independence falls outside this relation, namely in the sides; the reflected unity of this identity and of the independent Existences has not yet arisen: there is not yet Substance.—Thus the concept of Relation has resulted, in the shape of unity of reflected and immediate independence. But, at first, this concept itself is still immediate; its moments consequently are immediate as against each other, and unity is their essential relation—a unity which then only is true, and corresponds to the concept, when and in so far as it realizes itself, that is, has posited itself as this unity through its movement.

Essential Relation is, therefore, immediately the Relation of Whole and Parts,—the relation of reflected and of immediate independence, where the two terms coexist only as reciprocally conditioning and presupposing.

In this Relation as yet neither of the sides is posited as moment of the other, and therefore their identity itself is one side; in other words, their identity is not their negative unity. Secondly, therefore, the Relation passes over into the state where one is moment of the other and is in it as in its Ground—the truly independent of the two terms:—the Relation of Force and its Manifestation.

There still remains an asymmetry in this relation. This, thirdly, transcends itself; and the last Relation is that of Inner and Outer.—This distinction has become wholly formal, and in it Relation itself perishes, and *Substance* or the *Actual* emerges, as the *absolute* unity of immediate and of reflected Existence.

A

THE RELATION OF WHOLE AND PARTS

1. Essential Relation contains, first, the intro-reflected independence of Existence; it is thus simple From, whose determinations are also Existences, but at the same time are posited

—moments preserved in unity. This intro-reflected independence is also Reflection into its opposite, namely *immediate* independence, and its persistence is essentially its own independence no more than it is this identity with its opposite.—But precisely hereby—secondly—the other side too is immediately posited: immediate independence which, determined as the Other, is a multiple manifold within itself, but in such a manner that this manifold essentially also contains the relation to the other side, the unity of reflected independence. That one side—the Whole—is the independence which constituted the World which is in and for itself; the other side—the Parts—is that immediate Existence which was the Appearing World. In the Relation of Whole and Parts the two sides are these independences, but in such a manner that in each the other shows and each also is only as this identity of the two. Essential Relation is only first and immediate, and therefore negative unity and positive independence are connected by the “also”; although both sides are posited as moments, they are equally posited as existing independences.—The fact that both are posited as moments has hence the following components: first, the Whole, or reflected independence, is as Existent, and the other or immediate independence is in it as moment;—here the Whole constitutes the unity of the two sides or their foundation, and immediate Existence is as positedness.—Conversely on the other side—the side of the Parts—immediate Existence which is manifold in itself is the independent foundation; while the reflected unity, or the Whole, is only external relation.

2. Accordingly this relation contains the independence of the sides and equally their transcendedness, and it contains both in one relation. The Whole is the independent, and the Parts are only moments of this unity; but equally they too are the independent, and their reflected unity is only a moment; and each in its independence is just something *relative* to an Other. Thus this Relation is in itself immediate contradiction and cancels itself.

If this is more closely considered, the Whole is the reflected unity which has independent persistence for itself; but this its persistence is equally repelled from it; as negative unity, the Whole is negative relation to itself. It has thus externalized

itself; it has its consistence in its opposite—manifold immediacy, or the Parts. Hence the Whole consists of the Parts, so that it is not something without them. Thus it is the whole Relation and the independent totality; but for this very reason it is only a relative term, for that which makes it a totality is precisely its Other, the Parts; and it has its consistence not in itself but in its Other.

Thus the Parts are also the whole Relation. They are immediate, as against reflected, independence, and they do not consist in the Whole, but are for themselves. Further, they have this Whole in themselves as their moment: it constitutes their relation, there being no Parts without a Whole. But, since they are the independent element, this relation is only an external moment, and against it they, in and for themselves, are indifferent. But at the same time the Parts as manifold Existence collapse into themselves, for such Existence is Reflection-less Being; they have their independence only in reflected unity, which is this unity and also is existent multiplicity; that is, they have independence only in the Whole, but the Whole is at the same time an *other* independence to the Parts.

The Whole and the Parts therefore *condition* each other; but the Relation here considered is at the same time higher than the relation between Condition and Conditioned as it had determined itself above. This relation here is realized; that is, it is *posited* that the Condition is the essential independence of the Conditioned in such a manner that it is presupposed by the latter. Condition as such is only the immediate, and is presupposed only in itself; whereas the Whole is the Condition of the Parts, but also itself immediately contains this, that it too is only in so far as it has the parts for presupposition. Thus the two sides of the Relation are posited as conditioning each other, and each therefore is an immediate independence in itself; but equally its independence is mediated or posited by the other. By virtue of this reciprocity the whole Relation is the return of Conditioning into itself: it is the non-relative, the Unconditioned.

Each side of the Relation now has its independence not in itself but in the other, and thus there is only one identity of both, in which both are only moments; but each is independent

in itself, and thus they are two independent Existences which are indifferent to each other.

According to the first respect—that of the essential identity of these sides—the Whole is equal to the Parts and the Parts to the Whole. There is nothing in the Whole which is not in the Parts, and nothing in the Parts which is not in the Whole. The Whole is not abstract unity, but the unity as of a various multiplicity; this unity, however, as that in which the manifold relates itself internally to itself, is the determinateness of the latter, by virtue of which it is Part. The Relation therefore has an inseparable identity and one independence only.

But further, although the Whole is equal to the Parts, it is not equal *to them* as Parts; the Whole is reflected unity, but the Parts constitute the determinate moment or otherness of the unity, and are the various manifold. The Whole is equal to them not as this independent various, but to them *jointly*. But this “jointly” is just their unity, or the Whole as such. The Whole therefore is equal only to itself in the Parts, and the equality of itself and the Parts expresses only the tautology that the Whole as Whole is equal not to the Parts but to the Whole.

Conversely the Parts are equal to the Whole. But, since they are the moment of otherness in themselves, they are not equal to it as the unity, but in such a manner that one of its manifold determinations is appropriated to the Part, or that they are equal to it as being a manifold; that is, they are equal to it as a *partitioned* Whole, that is, as the Parts. Thus we have here the same tautology: the Parts as Parts are equal not to the Whole as such, but, in it, to themselves, the Parts.

In this manner the Whole and the Parts fall apart indifferent; each of these sides relates itself only to itself. But being thus held apart they destroy themselves. The whole which is indifferent to the Parts is abstract undifferentiated identity; the identity in question here is a Whole only as differentiated in itself, and differentiated in such a manner that these manifold determinations are reflected into themselves and have immediate independence. And the identity of Reflection has shown in its movement that it has for its truth this Reflection into its Other.—In the same manner the Parts, as indifferent to the unity of the Whole, are only the unrelated manifold, or

that which is Other in itself, which, as such, is its own Other, cancelling itself and no more.—This self-relation of each of the two sides is their independence; but this their independence, which each has for itself, is rather self-negation. Accordingly each has its independence not in itself but in the other; this other, which constitutes the consistence, is its presupposed immediate, which is supposed to be First and its beginning; but this First of each is itself only such an entity as is not a First but has its beginning in the Other.

The truth of the Relation consists, then, in mediation; its Essence is negative unity, in which both reflected and *being* immediacy are transcended. The Relation is contradiction which passes back into its Ground, into unity which, as returning, is reflected unity; but, since this latter has equally posited itself as transcended, it is in a negative relation to itself, transcends itself, and constitutes itself *being* immediacy. But this its negative relation, in so far as it is a First and an immediate, is mediated only through its Other, and is equally posited. And equally this Other—*being* immediacy—is only as transcended; its independence is a First, but forthwith it vanishes, and has a Determinate Being which is posited and mediated.

In this determination the Relation is no longer one of Whole and Parts; the immediacy which belonged to its sides has passed over into positedness and mediation. Each is posited, in so far as it is immediate, as transcending itself and passing over into the other, and also, in so far as it is itself negative relation, as being conditioned by the other as by its positive term; and indeed its immediate transition equally is mediated, for it is a transcendence which is posited by the other.—Thus the Relation of Whole and Parts has passed over into the Relation of Force and its Manifestation.

Observation

The antinomy of the infinite divisibility of matter was considered above (Vol. I, pp. 204 *sqq.*), under the concept of Quantity. Quantity is the unity of continuity and discreteness; in the independent One it contains the completed fact of its amalgamation with others, and, in this uninterruptedly con-

tinuous self-identity, it also contains its negation. The immediate relation of these moments of Quantity is expressed as the Essential Relation of Whole and Parts (the One of Quantity being Part, and its continuity, Whole, which is composed of Parts), and the antinomy then consists in the contradiction which has been presented and resolved in the Relation of Whole and Parts.—For Whole and Parts are indifferent to each other and have independent persistence, but also they are essentially related and constitute only one identity. The Relation therefore is the antinomy that the one moment, in freeing itself from the other, immediately introduces the other.

The Existent, then, being determined as Whole, has Parts, and the Parts constitute its consistence; the unity of the Whole is only a posited relation, an external composition which does not concern the independent Existent. Now in so far as this Existent is Part, it is not Whole, nor composite, but simple. But the relation to a Whole is external to it, and therefore does not concern it; thus the independent entity is not Part even in itself, for it is Part only through this relation. But now, since it is not Part, it is Whole; for the only relation which is given is this Relation of Whole and Parts, and the independent entity is one of the two. But when it is Whole it is again composite; it again consists of Parts, and so to infinity.—This infinity consists just in the perpetual alternation of the two determinations of the Relation, in each of which the other immediately arises, so that the positedness of each is its own disappearance. Matter determined as Whole consists of Parts, and in these the Whole becomes an unessential relation and vanishes. But the Part too, thus isolated, is also not Part, but the Whole.—The antinomy of this conclusion being closely compressed is properly this: the Whole is not the independent entity, and therefore the Part is; but since the Part is independent only without the Whole, it is independent not as Part but rather as Whole. The infinity of the progress which results is the impossibility of combining the two ideas which the mediation contains, namely, that each of the two determinations passes over through its independence and separation from the other into dependence and into the other.

B

THE RELATION OF FORCE AND ITS MANIFESTATION

Force is the negative unity into which the contradiction of Whole and Parts has resolved itself; it is the truth of that first Relation. The Whole and Parts is the first Relation to which imagination has recourse, and it is without meaning for thought; objectively it is a dead and mechanical aggregation having form-determinations by which the multiplicity of its independent matter is related in one unity; but this unity is external to such matter.—But the Relation of Force is the higher return upon self, where the unity of the Whole, which constituted the relation of independent otherness, ceases to be external and indifferent to this multiplicity.

Essential Relation has now determined itself to be such that immediate and reflected independence are posited in it as transcended, or as moments—whereas in the preceding Relation they were sides persisting for themselves, or extremes. In this there is contained, first, that reflected unity and its immediate Determinate Being, in so far as both are first and immediate, transcend themselves and pass over each into its Other: the former—Force—passes over into its Manifestation, and the Manifest is something which disappears, and passes back into Force as into its Ground: it is only as supported and posited by Force. Secondly, this transition is not only a Becoming and disappearance, but also negative self-relation; or, that which changes its determination is here also intro-reflected and preserves itself: the movement of Force is not so much a transition as a self-transposition, where it remains what it is in this change which it posited itself.—Thirdly, this reflected and self-relating unity is itself also transcended and is moment; it is mediated by its Other and has it for Condition; its negative self-relation, which is First and begins the movement of its transition out of itself, has equally a pre-supposition by which it is *solicited*, and an Other from which it begins.

(a) THE CONDITIONEDNESS OF FORCE

Considered in its closer determinations Force is seen, first, to contain the moment of existent immediacy; it itself on

the other hand is determined as negative unity. But this unity in the determination of immediate Being is an existing Something. This Something is negative unity as immediate entity, and therefore appears as First; Force on the other hand, because it is reflected, appears as positedness, and, in this respect, as belonging to the existing Thing or to a Matter. This does not mean that Force is the Form of this Thing, or that the Thing is determined by Force; the Thing as immediate is, rather, indifferent to it.—In this determination the Thing contains no Ground for possessing a Force; but Force, as the side of positedness, essentially has the Thing for its presupposition. When therefore it is asked how the Thing or Matter comes to *have* a Force, then the Force appears as connected with it externally, and *impressed* on the Thing by an alien power.

As this immediate persistence Force is a quiescent determinateness of the Thing in general; it is not self-manifesting, but is immediately manifest. Thus Force is also designated as Matter, and, instead of magnetic, electrical, and other Forces, magnetic, electrical, and other Matters are assumed, or, instead of the famous attractive Force, a subtle aether which holds together all things.—These are the Matters into which the inactive, forceless, and negative unity of the Thing resolves itself, and which were considered above.

But Force contains immediate Existence for moment—as moment which, though it is Condition, passes over and transcends itself, and not therefore as an existing Thing. It is not, further, negation as determinateness, but negative intro-reflective unity. The Thing in which Force was supposed to reside has therefore no significance here; rather, Force itself is the positing of the Manifestation which appears as Existence. It is therefore not merely a determinate Matter: such independence long ago passed over into positedness and Appearance.

Secondly, Force is the unity of reflected and immediate persistence; or, of formal unity and external independence. It is both in one; it is the contact of terms of which one is in so far as the other is not—self-identical positive, and negated, Reflection. Thus Force is self-repellent contradiction; it is active, or it is self-relating negative unity, in which reflected immediacy or essential Being-in-Self is posited as being

only as transcended or as moment, that is, in so far as it distinguishes itself from immediate Existence, as passing over into this. Force, then, as the determination of the reflected unity of the Whole, is posited as becoming existent external multiplicity *from out of itself*.

But, thirdly, Force is as yet only self-existent and immediate activity; it is reflected unity and, equally essentially, it is its negation; in so far as it is different from this, and is only as the identity of itself and of its negation, it is essentially related to the latter as to an immediacy external to it, and has it for presupposition and Condition.

Now this presupposition is not a Thing which stands over against it; this indifferent independence is transcended in Force; as a Condition of Force the Thing is an independent entity which is other to it. Here, however, it is not Thing, but independent immediacy has here also determined itself as self-relating negative unity; and thus it too is Force.—The activity of Force is conditioned through itself as through that which is Other to itself, through a Force.

In this manner Force is Relation in which each side is that which the other is. There are Forces which stand in Relation and are, in fact, essentially related to each other.—Further, they are, at first, merely different in general; the unity of their Relation is at this stage only inner, self-existent unity. Thus Conditionedness by another Force is, *in itself*, the action of Force itself; or, Force is in this regard only presupposing, merely negatively self-relating, action; this other Force as yet lies beyond its positing activity, namely Reflection which, as it determines, immediately returns to itself.

(b) THE SOLICITATION OF FORCE

Force is Conditioned because it contains a moment of immediate Existence which is only as something *posited*, but—since it is also immediate—is something *presupposed*, in which Force negates itself. Therefore the externality which is given in Force is its own presupposing activity, which, at first, is posited as another Force.

Further, this act of presupposing is reciprocal. Each of the two Forces contains intro-reflected unity as transcended, and

therefore it presupposes ; it posits itself as external ; this moment of externality is its own. But equally it is intro-reflected unity, and therefore it posits this its externality not in itself but as another Force.

But the external as such is the self-transcending. Further, the self-intro-reflective activity is essentially related to this external as to its Other, but equally as to that which in itself is null and identical with it. Presupposing activity is equally intro-Reflection, and hence it is the transcendence of this its negation ; it posits the latter as its own self or as that which is external to it. Thus Force, as conditioning, is, reciprocally, an Impulse for the other Force, against which it is active. Its attitude is not the passivity of being determined, which would introduce something foreign into it ; the Impulse only *solicits* it. It is in itself its own negativity : its self-repulsion is its self-positing. Its activity then consists in the transcendence of the external nature of this Impulse ; it makes it into a mere Impulse, and posits it as its own self-repulsion, as its own Manifestation.

Force which manifests itself is, therefore, that same entity which before was only presupposing activity,—that is, it externalizes itself ; but Force, as manifesting itself, is, at the same time, an activity which negates externality and posits it as its own. Now in so far as in this consideration a beginning is made from Force as negative unity of itself, and, consequently, as presupposing Reflection, in so far this is the same as when a beginning is made, in the Manifestation of Force, from the soliciting Impulse. Thus in its concept Force is, first, determined as self-transcending identity ; and, in its reality, one of the Forces is determined as soliciting and the other as being solicited. But the concept of Force in general is the identity of positing and presupposing Reflection, or of reflected and immediate unity ; and each of these determinations is just a moment, in unity, and therefore is mediated through the other. But also there is nothing in either of the two reciprocally related Forces to determine which is to be soliciting and which solicited ; or rather both form-determinations belong in the same manner to each. But this identity is not only an external identity of comparison, but is an essential unity of the two.

For one Force is here determined as soliciting and the other

as being solicited; in this manner these form-determinations appear as immediate distinctions, given in themselves, between the two Forces. But they are essentially mediated. One of the Forces is solicited; this Impulse is a determination which is inserted into it from without. But Force itself is that which presupposes; essentially it reflects itself into itself and transcends the fact that the Impulse is external. Hence the fact that it is solicited is its own doing, or, it is determined through itself that the other Force *is* other and is the soliciting Force. The soliciting Force is negatively related to its other, and thus transcends its externality, and in this respect it posits; but it does so only by virtue of the presupposition that it has another Force opposite to it; that is, it itself solicits only in so far as it has in it an externality, and hence in so far as it is solicited. In other words, it solicits only in so far as it is solicited to solicit. Thus conversely the first Force is solicited only in so far as it itself solicits the other to solicit it (the first Force). Each of the two thus obtains its Impulse from the other; but the Impulse which it gives as active Force consists in receiving an Impulse from the other, while the Impulse which it receives was solicited by itself. Both the Impulse given and that received (or active manifestation and passive externality) are consequently not immediate, but mediated; and each of the two Forces is the determinateness which the other Force has as against it; it is mediated through the other; and this mediating other is, again, its own determinative positing.

When therefore an Impulse is exerted upon Force by another Force, and, in so far, Force is passive, but once more passes over from this passivity into activity,—then this is the regress of Force into itself. It manifests *itself*. The Manifestation is reaction in the sense that it posits externality as its own moment and thus transcends the fact that it was supposed to be solicited by another Force. Both therefore are one—the Manifestation of Force, by means of which it gives itself a Determinate Being-for-Other through its negative activity exerted upon itself,—and the infinite return upon self in this externality, so that in it it only relates itself to itself. Pre-supposing Reflection, to which belong both Conditionedness and Impulse, is therefore immediately also self-returning Reflection, and the activity is essentially reactive, directed

against itself. The positing of the Impulse or of the external is itself the transcendence of this, and conversely the transcendence of the Impulse is the positing of externality.

(c) THE INFINITY OF FORCE

Force is finite in so far as its moments still retain the form of immediacy; its presupposing and its self-relating Reflection are distinct in this determination; the former appears as a self-persisting external Force, and the other, in its relation to it, as passive. Force thus is conditioned with regard to form, and likewise restricted with regard to content; for a formal determinateness also contains a restrictedness of content. But the activity of Force consists in this, that it manifests itself; that is—as was seen—that it transcends externality and determines it as that in which it is identical with itself. Thus what Force in truth manifests is this, that its relation to other is its self-relation, and that its passivity consists in its own activity. The Impulse by which it is solicited into activity is its own soliciting, and the externality which affects it is not immediate, but mediated by it. Similarly its own essential self-identity is not immediate, but mediated by its negation; in other words, Force manifests *the identity of its externality with its internality*.

C

THE RELATION OF OUTER AND INNER

1. The Relation of Whole and Parts is an immediate relation; consequently both reflected and existent immediacy have in it each its own independence; but, since they are in Essential Relation, their independence is no more than their negative unity. Now this is posited in the Manifestation of Force; reflected unity is, essentially, other-becoming as translation of itself into externality; but the latter equally is immediately withdrawn into the former; the distinction between the independent Forces cancels itself; the Manifestation of Force is only a self-mediation of reflected unity. All that is given is an empty and transparent distinction—Show—, but this Show is the mediation which is independent persistence itself. Not only are these opposite determinations, which together cancel

each other, and not only is their movement a transition; but partly the immediacy from which the beginning was made and the transition took place into otherness is itself only as posited, and partly for this reason each of the determinations in its immediacy is already the unity with its other, whence the transition is equally just self-positing return to self.

Inner, as the Form of reflected immediacy or of Essence, is determined, in opposition to Outer, as the Form of Being; but both are but one identity.—This identity is, first, the solid unity of both; it is a foundation full of content; or it is the absolute Fact, wherein both determinations are indifferent and external moments. In this respect it is content and that totality which is the Inner that equally becomes external, but in spite of this remains self-equal and has completed no process either of Becoming or of transition. According to this determination Outer is not only *equal* to Inner in content, but both are but one Fact.—But this Fact as simple self-identity is distinct from its form-determinations: these are external to it; and in so far it is itself an Inner which is distinct from their externality. Now this externality consists in this, that it is constituted out of the two determinations themselves of Inner and Outer. But the Fact is itself nothing but the unity of these two. Thus the two sides are again the same with respect to content. In the Fact however they are as interpenetrating identity, or foundation full of content. But in externality, as Forms of the Fact, they are indifferent to this identity and therefore to each other.

2. In this manner they are the different form-determinations which have an identical foundation not in themselves but in an Other,—Reflection-determinations which are for themselves, Inner as the form of intro-Reflection or essentiality, and Outer as the form of immediacy reflected into other, or unessentiality. But the nature of the Relation has shown that these determinations simply constitute one identity. Force in its Manifestation is this, that the acts of presupposing and of self-returning determining are one and the same. In so far therefore as Inner and Outer are considered as form-determinations, they are, first, only simple Form itself; and, secondly, (since here they are also determined as opposites) their unity is pure abstract mediation, in which one is, immediately, the other, and is this

because it is itself. Thus Inner is immediately *only* Outer, and it is the determinateness of externality because it is Inner; conversely Outer is *only* Inner because it is *only* Outer.—For this unity of form contains the determinations of both as opposite, and therefore their identity is no more than this transition, and in this act is only the Other of both and not their identity full of content. Or, this retention of form is, in general, the side of determinateness. According to this it is not the real totality of the whole which is posited; what is posited is the totality or the Fact itself only in the determinateness of form; form is the unity of the two opposite determinations as a mere bundle; consequently when one of these is taken first—and it is indifferent which is taken—we may say of the foundation or Fact that it is essentially in the other determinateness, but also *only* in it, for this very reason, just as it was said before that it is *only* in the first.—

Thus something which is *only* Inner as yet, is for this reason *only* Outer. Or, conversely, what is *only* Outer is therefore *only* Inner. Or again, if Inner is determined as Essence and Outer as Being, then a Fact, in so far as it is only in its Essence, is for this very reason only an immediate Being; or, a Fact which only *is* is for that reason still only in the stage of Essence.—Outer and Inner are determinateness posited in such a manner that each of these two determinations not only presupposes the other and passes over into it as into its truth, but also remains posited as determinateness (in so far as it is this truth of the other), and points towards the totality of both.—Inner then is the formal completion of Essence. Essence—that is, in so far as it is determined as Inner—implies its own defectiveness and the fact that it is only as relation to its Other, namely, Outer; and similarly Outer is not only Being, nor even Existence, but is only as related to Essence or Inner. But there is not only given the relation of the two to each other, but also (1) this determinate relation of absolute form, in which each *is*, immediately, its own opposite, and (2) their common relation to a third term, or, rather, to their unity. But as yet their mediation lacks this identical foundation which contains both; hence their relation is the immediate conversion of one into the other, and this negative unity which connects them is the simple and empty Point.

Observation

The general movement of Essence is a Becoming towards the Notion. In the Relation of Inner and Outer its essential moment emerges—namely, that its determinations are posited as being in negative unity in such a manner that each immediately is not only its other but also the totality of the whole. But in the Notion as such this totality is the universal,—a foundation which is not yet present in the Relation of Inner and Outer.—In the negative identity of Inner and Outer, which is the immediate conversion of one of ~~these~~ determinations into the other, that foundation, too, is lacking which above was called the Fact.—

The unmediated identity of form, posited as it here is without the movement—full of content—of the Fact itself, should be very carefully noticed. It occurs in the Fact as this is in its beginning. Thus Pure Being immediately is Nothing. And, generally, all that is real is, in its beginning, such a merely immediate identity; for in its beginning its moments are not yet developed nor in opposition; it has not yet internalized itself out of externality, nor, on the other hand, has it externalized and elicited itself by means of its activity out of internality. Consequently it is Inner only as determinateness against Outer, and Outer only as determinateness against Inner. Thus partly it is *only* an immediate Being; partly (in so far as it equally is negativity, which is to become the activity of development) it is, as such, essentially *only* Inner.—This is apparent in every natural, scientific, and, generally, intellectual development; and it is essential to understand that the *First*, when as yet Something is internal, or in its concept, is, for this reason, only its immediate and passive existence. Thus—to take the nearest example—the Essential Relation here considered is only Relation *in itself*—it is its concept, or is internal—before it has moved through mediation, the Relation of Force, and has realized itself. Hence it is only external and immediate Relation, the Relation of Whole and Parts, in which the sides have an indifferent persistence against each other. Their identity is not yet in themselves; as yet it is only internal, and hence they fall apart and have an immediate, external persistence.—Similarly the sphere of Being in general is only simple Inner,

and hence it is the sphere of existent immediacy, or externality. —Essence (*Wesen*) is no more than Inner, and is therefore taken as a wholly external common element without system; we speak of *Schulwesen* and *Zeitungswesen*, and mean something common which is produced when existing objects are grouped together externally and in so far as they are without essential connexion or organization.—Or, in concrete objects, the germ of a plant is *inner* plant, and a child, *internal* man. But for this reason plant or man as germ is an immediate, an Outer which has not yet given itself negative self-relation, but is passive and lies exposed to otherness.—Similarly God in his immediate concept is not Spirit: Spirit is not the immediate entity, the opposite of mediation, but rather Essence which eternally posits its immediacy, whence it eternally returns to itself. *Immediately* therefore God is *only* Nature. In other words, Nature is only the inner God who is not actual as Spirit and consequently not veritable God.—Or again in thought—in first thought—God is only Pure Being, or else Essence or the abstract Absolute, but not God as Absolute Spirit, which alone is the veritable nature of God.

3. The first of the identities of Inner and Outer which we considered is the foundation, indifferent to the distinction of these determinations as to a form external to it,—the identity as Content. The second is the unmediated identity of their distinction, the immediate conversion of each into its opposite,—the identity as pure Form. But these two identities are only the sides of one totality; or, the totality itself is but the conversion of one into the other. The totality, as foundation and content, is this intro-reflected immediacy only by virtue of the presupposing Reflection of form which transcends their distinction and posits itself, as against it, as indifferent identity or reflected unity. Or, content is form itself in so far as the latter determines itself as variety and constitutes itself one of its sides as externality, but constitutes itself the other (Inner) as intro-reflected immediacy.

Conversely, the distinctions of form, Inner and Outer, are hereby posited each in itself as the totality of itself and its Other. Inner, as simple intro-reflected identity, is the immediate, and consequently is as much Being and externality as

Essence; and Outer, as manifold and determinate Being, is only Outer, that is, it is posited as unessential and as having passed back into its Ground,—in other words, as Inner. This transition of each into the other is their immediate identity as foundation; but also it is their mediated identity; for each is through its Other what it is in itself, the totality of the Relation. Or conversely the determinateness of each side is mediated with the other determinateness through the fact that in itself it is the totality; thus the totality mediates itself with itself through form or determinateness, and the determinateness mediates itself through its simple self-identity.

That, therefore, which Something is, it is wholly in its externality; its externality is its totality—it is equally its intro-reflected unity. Its Appearance is not only Reflection into other, but into self, and consequently its externality is the manifestation of that which it is in itself. Thus its content and its form are utterly identical, and therefore in and for itself it is just the fact of its self-manifestation. It is the revelation of its Essence in such a manner that this Essence simply consists in this, that it is that which reveals itself.

Essential Relation, in this identity of Appearance with Inner or Essence, has determined itself as *Actuality*.

SECTION THREE

ACTUALITY

ACTUALITY is the *unity of Essence and Existence*; shapeless Essence and unstable Appearance, or indeterminate persistence and non-persistent multiplicity, in it have their truth. Although *Existence* is immediacy which has emerged out of Ground, form is not yet posited in it. It determines and forms itself, and in this process is *Appearance*; this persistence is determined only as Reflection-into-other, and, as it develops itself into intro-Reflection it becomes two worlds, two totalities of content, one of which is determined as reflected into itself, and the other as reflected into other. Essential Relation represents their form-relation, the perfection of which is the Relation of Inner and Outer, where the content of both is one identical foundation and equally one identity of form.—The form-determination of their distinctness is transcended because this identity with respect to form has resulted; and it is *posited* that they are *one* absolute totality.

This unity of Inner and Outer is *Absolute Actuality*. At this point this Actuality is the Absolute as such—in so far as it is posited as unity in which form is transcended and has become the empty or external distinction of an Outer and an Inner. Reflection is related to this Absolute as external, for it rather contemplates the Absolute than is its proper movement. But since it is this essentially, it exists as the negative return into itself of the Absolute.

Secondly, we have *Actuality proper*. *Actuality*, *Possibility*, and *Necessity* constitute the *formal moments* of the Absolute, or its Reflection.

Thirdly, the unity of the Absolute and its Reflection is the *Absolute Relation*, or, rather, the Absolute as relation to itself,—*Substance*.

CHAPTER I

THE ABSOLUTE

THE simple and solid identity of the Absolute is indeterminate; or rather, in it all determinateness of Essence and Existence, or of Being in general as well as of Reflection, has dissolved itself. To this extent the process of determining what the Absolute is becomes negative—the Absolute appears only as the negation of all predicates, and as the void. But equally it must be declared to be the positing of all predicates, and therefore it appears as a contradiction of the most formal nature. In so far as these two—the negating and the positing—belong to external reflection, this is a formal and unsystematic dialectic, which has no difficulty in picking up here and there determinations of many kinds, or in demonstrating with equal ease, on the one hand, their finitude and mere relativity, while, on the other hand, it asserts the immanence of all determinations in it—for it imagines it vaguely as the totality; but it does not succeed in raising these positings and negations to a veritable unity.—But the problem is, to demonstrate what is the Absolute; but this demonstration cannot be a determining or an external reflection, which would make only determinations of the Absolute: it is the Exposition and indeed the self-Exposition of the Absolute, and only points out what it is.

A

THE EXPOSITION OF THE ABSOLUTE

The Absolute is not only Being, nor yet Essence. The former is first unreflected immediacy, the latter reflected immediacy. Further, each in itself is totality, but a determinate totality. In Essence, Being emerges as Existence; and the relation of Being and Essence has developed to the Relation of Inner and Outer. Inner is Essence—Essence as that totality which essentially has the determination to be related to Being and immediately to be Being. Outer is Being, with this essential

determination, that it is related to Reflection and is, immediately, equally relationless identity with Essence. The Absolute itself is the absolute unity of both; it is that which constitutes the Ground of Essential Relation,—which, as relation, merely has not yet passed back into this its identity, and whose Ground is not yet posited.

From this it results that the determination of the Absolute is, to be *Absolute Form*, but, at the same time, not as that identity of which each moment is a simple determinateness, but as that whose moments are each in itself the totality and therefore (as indifferent to form) the complete *content* of the whole. But conversely the Absolute is Absolute Content in such a manner that the content, which, as such, is indifferent multiplicity, possesses negative form-relation, by virtue of which its multiplicity is only *one* solid identity.

Accordingly the identity of the Absolute is absolute by virtue of this, that each of its parts is itself the whole, or that each determinateness is the totality, that is, that determinateness in general has become an utterly transparent Show, a distinction which has vanished in its positedness. Essence, Existence, World which is in itself, Whole, Parts, Force,—these reflected determinations appear to imagination as true Being valid in and for itself; while the Absolute as against them is the Ground in which they have been swallowed up.—Now, in the Absolute, form is just simple self-identity, and hence the Absolute does not determine itself; for determination is a form-distinction which, at first, counts as such. But at the same time the Absolute contains every distinction and form-determination whatever, or is itself Absolute Form and Reflection, and therefore variety of content too must emerge in it. But the Absolute itself is Absolute Identity; this is its determination, since all multiplicity of the World in Itself and the World of Appearance—or of internal and external totality—is transcended in it.—There is no Becoming in it, for it is not Being; nor is it self-reflecting determining, for it is not Essence determining itself only in itself; nor yet is it a self-manifestation, for it is as the identity of Inner and Outer.—But now the movement of Reflection stands opposed to its absolute identity. This movement is cancelled in the identity, and thus is only the Inner thereof; but hereby the movement is external to the identity.—

At first therefore the movement only consists in this, that it cancels its activity in the Absolute. It is the Beyond of the manifold distinctions and determinations and of their movement, a Beyond which lies at the back of the Absolute; and accordingly, although it is the acceptance of these, it is also their perishing; it is thus the negative Exposition of the Absolute, which was mentioned before.—In its veritable presentation this Exposition is the whole of the logical movement of the sphere of Being and of Essence which has been traced up to this point; the content of this sphere is not given from without and picked up contingently, nor plunged into the abyss of the Absolute by means of a reflection external to it, but has determined itself in it through its own necessity, and, as the peculiar *Becoming* of Being and as *Reflection* of Essence, has passed back into the Absolute as into its Ground.

But at the same time this Exposition has also a positive side, namely, in that the finite when it perishes exhibits this fixed characteristic of being related to the Absolute, or of itself containing the Absolute. But this side is not so much the positive Exposition of the Absolute itself as the exposition of the determinations, showing that they have the Absolute for Abyss (*Abgrund*) but also for Ground, or that that which gives to them (that is, to Show) a persistence, is the Absolute itself.—The Show is not Nothing, but Reflection, or relation to the Absolute; it is Show, in so far as the Absolute shows in it. Thus this positive Exposition arrests the finite before it vanishes, and looks upon it as an expression and copy of the Absolute. But the transparency of the finite, which is opaque to all but the Absolute, ends in total disappearance; for there is nothing in the finite which could preserve for it a distinction against the Absolute; it is a medium which is absorbed by that which shows through it.

Consequently this positive Exposition of the Absolute is itself only a showing; for the truly positive which it and the expounded content contain is the Absolute itself. Such further determinations as occur, or the form in which the Absolute shows, is a thing of no account; they are taken up by the Exposition from without, and it makes them the starting-point of its activity. Such a determination has in the Absolute not its beginning but only its end. The process of expounding is therefore

absolute activity by its *relation* to the Absolute (into which it *passes back*), but not as regards its *starting-point*, which is a determination external to the Absolute.

But in fact the expounding of the Absolute is its own activity, which begins with itself as it arrives at itself. The Absolute as mere absolute identity is determinate—it is determined as identical; it is posited as such by Reflection as against opposition and multiplicity; or, it is only the negative of Reflection and of determining in general.—Hence not only this expounding of the Absolute is incomplete, but so is this Absolute itself, which is merely a point *reached*. In other words, that Absolute which is only as absolute identity is only the Absolute of an external reflection. It is therefore not the absolute-Absolute, but the Absolute in a determinateness; that is, it is Attribute.

But the Absolute is not only Attribute, because it is *object* of an external reflection, and therefore is an entity determined by the latter.—Or, reflection is not only external to it; but immediately, because it is external to it, it is internal. The Absolute is the Absolute only because it is not abstract identity, but the identity of Being and Essence, or of Inner and Outer. It is thus itself that Absolute Form which causes it to show in itself and determines it as Attribute.

B

THE ABSOLUTE ATTRIBUTE

The expression of absolute-Absolute which was employed denotes the Absolute which in its form has returned to itself, or that whose form is equal to its content. The Attribute is the merely relative Absolute, which nexus just means the Absolute in a form-determination. For at first, and before its completed Exposition, form is only internal as yet, or—which is the same thing—only external; it is here *determinate* form, or negation in general. But it is also as form of the Absolute, and consequently the Attribute is the whole content of the Absolute; it is that totality which before appeared as a World, or as one of the sides of the Essential Relation, each of which is itself the whole. But the two Worlds—that which appears and that which is in and for itself—were supposed to be opposed to each other in their Essence. One side indeed of the Essential Relation

was equal to the other—the Whole was equal to the Parts, Manifestation of Force the same content as Force, and Outer in general the same as Inner; but still, each of these sides was also supposed to have its own immediate persistence—one as existent, and the other as reflected, immediacy. In the Absolute on the other hand these distinct immediacies are reduced to Show, and the totality, which is the Attribute, is posited as its true and only persistence; and the determination in which it is, as the unessential.

The Absolute is Attribute because as simple absolute identity it is in the determination of identity. Other determinations may be attached to determination in general,—among them this, that there are more attributes than one. But absolute identity means this only—not merely that all determinations have been transcended, but that it is itself Reflection which has transcended itself, and consequently all determinations are posited in it as transcended. Or again, totality is posited as absolute, or the Attribute has the Absolute for content and for persistence; and accordingly its form-determination, whereby it is Attribute, is also posited, immediately as mere Show,—the negative as negative. The positive Show which the Exposition acquires by means of the Attribute, when it does not take the finite in its barrier as being in and for itself, but dissolves its persistence into the Absolute and extends it until it becomes Attribute, transcends the fact that it is Attribute; it submerges both it and its distinguishing activity in the simple Absolute.

Thus Reflection, while it distinguishes, only returns therefrom to the *identity* of the Absolute, and for this reason it has not left externality nor arrived at the veritable Absolute. It has reached only determinate and abstract identity, that is, that identity which is in the *determinateness* of identity.—In other words, when Reflection, as *inner* form, determines the Absolute as Attribute, this determining remains distinct from externality; the inner determination does not penetrate the Absolute; its manifestation is, to vanish in the Absolute as merely posited.

Therefore the form, whether taken as outer or inner, by means of which the Absolute might be Attribute, is at the same time posited as null in itself, as an external Show, or mere way and manner.

C

THE MODUS OF THE ABSOLUTE

The Attribute is, first, the Absolute as in simple self-identity. Secondly, it is negation, and this *as* negation is formal intro-Reflection. These two sides constitute, to begin with, the two extremes of the Attribute, of which itself is the mean, since it is as well Absolute as determinateness.—The second of these extremes is the negative as negative, or Reflection external to the Absolute.—Or, in so far as it is taken as Inner of the Absolute, and in so far as it is its proper determination to posit itself as Modus, so far Modus is the self-externality of the Absolute where it loses itself in the instability and contingency of Being, or its accomplished transition into the opposite without return to self; it is the multiplicity of form and content-determinations subsumed under no totality.—But the Modus—the externality of the Absolute—is not this only; it is also externality *posited* as externality, a mere way and manner, and hence Show as Show or the intro-Reflection of form,—hence that self-identity which is the Absolute. Thus in fact the Absolute is posited as absolute identity only in the Modus; it is what it is—namely self-identity—only as self-relating negativity, as Showing which is posited as Showing.

In so far, then, as the Exposition of the Absolute begins with its absolute identity and thence passes over to the Attribute and from that to the Modus, it has now passed completely through its moments. But herein, first, it is not a merely negative attitude to these determinations; this its activity is the reflecting movement itself, and it is only as this that the Absolute is veritably absolute identity.—Secondly, it is here not merely engaged upon the external, and the Modus is not only extremest externality; but, because it is Show as Show, it is return to self, self-dissolving Reflection, as being which the Absolute is absolute Being.—Thirdly, expounding Reflection appears to begin from its own determinations and from externality, and to take up the Modi, and also the determinations of the Attribute, as found contingently outside the Absolute; and its activity seems to consist in merely reducing them into indifferent identity. But in fact it has in the Absolute itself that

determinateness from which it begins. For the Absolute, as first indifferent identity, is itself only determinate Absolute or Attribute, because it is the Absolute unmoved and as yet unreflected. This determinateness, because it is determinateness, belongs to the reflecting movement; the Absolute is determined as first identical entity only by it, and likewise by it alone has absolute form and is, not that which *is*, but that which *posits itself* equal to itself.

Consequently the true meaning of the Modus is that it is the proper reflecting movement of the Absolute,—a determining, though not one by which it would become an Other, but a determining only of that which it already is,—transparent externality which is a self-display, a movement from out of itself in such a manner that this outward-Being is equally internality itself, and therefore is equally a positing which is not merely positedness but absolute Being.

When therefore the *content* of the Exposition is asked for (*what is it that the Absolute expounds?*), the answer is that the distinction between form and content is anyhow dissolved in the Absolute. In other words, it is precisely the content of the Absolute to manifest itself. The Absolute is absolute form which as its own dichotomy is utterly self-identical—the negative, as negative or as coinciding with itself; it is absolute self-identity only in this manner, and the self-identity is also indifferent to its differentiations, or is absolute content; consequently the content is only this Exposition itself.

As this self-supporting movement of Exposition, as a way and manner which is its absolute self-identity, the Absolute is not manifestation of an Inner, nor against an Other; it is only as absolute self-manifestation for itself. It is thus *Actuality*.

Observation

The concept of Substance in Spinoza corresponds to the concept of the Absolute and the relation of reflection to it, as it has here exhibited itself. Spinoza's philosophy has this fault, that in it reflection and its manifold determining activity are an external thinking.—The Substance of this system is One Substance, one inseparable totality; there is no determinateness which is not contained and dissolved in this Absolute;

and it is of sufficient importance that everything which to natural imagination or determining understanding appears, distinctly or vaguely, as independent, is wholly reduced in this necessary concept to a mere positedness.—*Determinateness is negation*—this is the absolute principle of Spinoza's philosophy, and this true and simple insight is the foundation of the absolute unity of Substance. But Spinoza does not pass on beyond negation as determinateness or quality to a recognition of it as absolute, that is, self-negating, negation. Accordingly his Substance does not itself contain absolute form, and when it is cognized, this is no immanent cognition. Certainly Substance is absolute unity of *Thought* and of *Being* (or *Extension*); it therefore contains *Thought* itself, but only in its unity with *Extension*, that is, as not separating itself from *Extension*: it is hence in general not determining and forming activity, nor movement which returns and begins out of itself. Therefore, (a) Substance lacks the principle of personality—a defect which more than any other has aroused revolt against Spinoza's system; and (b) cognition is external reflection, which does not comprehend and deduce from Substance that which appears as finite—the determinateness of the Attribute, and the Mode, and indeed itself: it is active as an external understanding, and takes up the determinations as given, reducing them into the Absolute, and not beginning from it.

The concepts of Substance which Spinoza offers are concepts of an entity which is its own cause: it is that whose essence includes existence; the concept of the Absolute for him does not require the concept of an Other as a necessary factor in its formation. These concepts are profound and correct, but they are definitions which are assumed immediately at the opening of the system. Mathematics and other subordinate sciences must begin with something presupposed which constitutes their element and positive foundation. But the Absolute cannot be a first or immediate entity: the Absolute essentially is the result of such an entity.

After the definition of the Absolute, the definition of Attribute next emerges with Spinoza; it is determined as a manner in which understanding comprehends the essence of the Absolute. Understanding is taken to be posterior in its nature to Attribute, for Spinoza determines it as Mode; but at the same time

Attribute—determination as determination of the Absolute—is made dependent upon an Other, namely understanding, which emerges externally and immediately over against Substance.

Spinoza further determines the Attributes as infinite, and this in the sense of an infinite plurality. In the sequel, however, only two occur—Thought and Extension, and it is not shown by what necessity the infinite plurality reduces itself to an opposition, namely this definite opposition of Thought and Extension.—These two Attributes are, then, accepted empirically. Thought and Being represent the Absolute in a determinate aspect; the Absolute itself is their absolute unity, so that they are only unessential forms; the order of things is the same as that of ideas or thoughts; and the one Absolute is contemplated only by external reflection (which is a Mode) under these two determinations, (a) as a totality of ideas and (b) as a totality of things and their mutations. It is this external reflection which both makes this distinction, and brings it back to absolute identity and there submerges it. But this whole movement takes place outside the Absolute. Certainly the Absolute itself too is Thought, and, so far, this movement is only in the Absolute; but, as was observed, it is in the Absolute only as unity with Extension, and hence not as this movement, which is essentially also the moment of opposition.—Spinoza makes the sublime demand of thought that it is to consider everything under the form of eternity, *sub specie aeterni*, that is, as it is in the Absolute. But in this Absolute, which is only unmoved identity, both Attribute and Mode exist only as vanishing and not as becoming, so that this vanishing too now takes its positive beginning only from without.

The third term—the Mode—is with Spinoza an *affection* of Substance, determinate determinateness, or that which is in an Other and is apprehended through this Other. Really the Attributes have only indeterminate variety for their determination: each is *supposed* to express the totality of Substance, and to be understood out of itself; but, in so far as it is the Absolute as determinate, it contains otherness and therefore cannot be understood only out of itself. Consequently the determination of the Attribute is really posited only in the Mode. Further, this third term remains mere Mode: on the one hand it is

immediately given, on the other its nullity is not recognized as intro-Reflection.—Consequently Spinoza's exposition of the Absolute is complete in so far as it begins with the Absolute, follows up with the Attribute, and ends with the Mode; but these three are only enumerated one after the other without any inner sequence of development, and the third term is not negation *as* negation, not negatively self-relating negation,—if it were, it would of itself be return to the first identity, and this identity would be veritable identity. Hence the necessity of the progress of the Absolute to unessentiality is lacking, as well as its dissolution in and for itself into identity; or, the becoming both of identity and of its determinations is wanting.

In a similar manner in the Oriental idea of *emanation* the Absolute is self-illuminating light. But it does not only illumine itself: it also emanates. Its emanations are distances from its unclouded purity; and the subsequent products are less perfect than the preceding ones out of which they arise. Emanation is taken only as a happening, and becoming only as a progressive loss. Thus Being increasingly obscures itself, and night, the negative, is the last term of the line and does not return to the primal light.

The lack of intro-Reflection which is common to Spinoza's exposition of the Absolute and to the theory of emanation is made good in the concept of the *monad* in Leibniz.—The one-sidedness of one philosophic principle is generally faced by its opposite one-sidedness, and, as everywhere, totality at least is found as a sundered completeness.—The monad is only One, an intro-reflected negative; it is the totality of the content of the world; in it the various manifold has not only vanished, but is in a negative manner stowed away. (Spinoza's Substance is the unity of all content; but this manifold content of the world *is* not in it as such, but in reflection which is external to it.) Essentially therefore the monad exists as ideating; but although it is finite it has no passivity: mutations and determinations within it are manifestations of itself in itself. It is an entelechy, and revelation is its proper activity.—At the same time the monad is also determinate, it is distinct from others; and the determinateness belongs to the particular content and the way and manner of the manifestation. Consequently the

monad is *in itself* (or according to its substance) the totality,—not in its manifestation. This restriction of the monad necessarily is not part of the self-positing or ideating monad, but of its Being-in-Self; in other words it is absolute limit, a predestination which is posited by some other essence than itself. Further, limited entities exist only as related to other limited entities, but the monad is at the same time a self-contained absolute entity; and consequently the harmony of these limitations—that is, the relation of the monads to one another—falls outside them, and is likewise pre-established by some other essence or *in itself*.

Clearly, by means of the principle of intro-Reflection, which constitutes the fundamental determination of the monad, otherness and external influence in general are certainly removed, and the changes of the monad are its own positing;—but, on the other hand, passive subjection to other has been transformed into an absolute barrier, into a barrier of Being-in-Self. Leibniz ascribes to the monads a certain self-completeness, a kind of independence; they are created essences.—If their barrier is considered more closely, it is seen from this presentation of the case that the self-manifestation which is theirs is the totality of form. It is an extremely important concept that the changes of the monad are imagined as actions having no passivity, or as self-manifestations, and that the principle of intro-Reflection or *individuation* clearly emerges as essential. Further it is necessary to allow finitude to consist in this, that content or Substance is distinct from form, and that, further, the former is restricted but the latter infinite. But now the task would be to find in the concept of the absolute monad not only this absolute unity of form and content, but also the nature of Reflection as self-relating negativity which is self-repulsion, by means of which it exists as positing and creating. It is true that in Leibniz's system the further feature is present that God is the source of the existence and of the essence of the monads, that is, that those absolute barriers in the Being-in-Self of the monads are not existent in and for themselves, but vanish in the Absolute. But in these determinations only those vulgar ideas appear which are left without philosophic development and are not raised to the rank of speculative concepts. Thus the principle of individuation does not receive its profounder elaboration;

the concepts which concern the distinctions of the various finite monads and their relation to their Absolute do not originate in this essence itself nor in an absolute manner, but belong to argumentative and dogmatic reflection and have therefore achieved no inner coherence.

CHAPTER II

ACTUALITY

THE Absolute is the unity of Inner and Outer as *first* unity, which is in itself. The Exposition appeared as external Reflection which has the immediate on its side as something found contingently, but at the same time is the movement of this towards, and its relation to, the Absolute, and as such leads it back to the Absolute and determines it as a mere way and manner. This way and manner, however, is the determination of the Absolute itself, namely its first identity or its unity which merely is in itself. And this Reflection not only posits that first Being-in-Self as essenceless determination, but, since it is negative self-relation, this Modus arises through it alone. This Reflection, as cancelling itself in its determinations, and, generally, as self-returning movement, is alone veritably absolute identity; and, at the same time, it is the determining of the Absolute or its modality. Consequently the Modus is the externality of the Absolute, but is this only as its intro-Reflection;—or it is the Absolute's own manifestation, so that this manifesting is its intro-Reflection and therefore its Being-in-and-for-Self.

The Absolute taken as manifestation in this manner, in which it is nothing else and has no content except that of being self-manifestation, is Absolute Form. Actuality must be taken as this reflected absoluteness. Being is not yet actual: it is the first immediacy; consequently its Reflection is Becoming and transition into other; in other words its immediacy is not Being-in-and-for-Self. Actuality also stands higher than Existence. Existence is, indeed, immediacy which has arisen out of Ground and Conditions, or out of Essence and its Reflection. It therefore is *in itself* what Actuality is, namely real Reflection; but it is not yet the *posited* unity of Reflection and immediacy. Hence Existence passes over into Appearance, since it develops the Reflection which it contains. It is Ground which has perished; its determination is the restoration of this Ground;

it thus becomes Essential Relation, and its last Reflection is this, that its immediacy is posited as intro-Reflection, and conversely. Now this unity, where Existence or immediacy, and Being-in-Self, Ground, or the reflected entity, are simply moments, is Actuality. For this reason the Actual is Manifestation; its externality does not draw it into the sphere of change; it is not its own Showing in an Other, but it manifests itself; that is, in its externality it is *itself*, and is *itself* in that alone, or only as self-distinguishing and determining movement.

Now Actuality is this absolute form, and in it, as such, the moments are only as transcended or formal and not yet realized; thus here its variety belongs to external Reflection and is not yet determined as content.

Actuality, as being, itself, immediate formal unity of Inner and Outer, is thus in the determination of immediacy as against the determination of intro-Reflection; or, it is an Actuality as against a *Possibility*. Their relation to each other is the third term—the Actual determined equally as intro-reflected Being and this at the same time as immediately existing. This third term is *Necessity*.

But at this point, Actual and Possible being formal distinctions, their relation too is only formal, and consists in this only, that the one as well as the other is a positedness,—that is, in *Contingency*.

Since, in Contingency, Actual as well as Possible is positedness, they have hereby obtained determination in themselves; thus, secondly, through this Real Actuality arises, and with it also emerge Real Possibility and *Relative Necessity*.

Thirdly, the intro-Reflection of Relative Necessity produces *Absolute Necessity*, which is Absolute Possibility and Actuality.

A

CONTINGENCY, OR FORMAL ACTUALITY, POSSIBILITY, AND NECESSITY

1. Actuality is formal in so far as, being first Actuality, it is only immediate, unreflected Actuality, and hence is only in this form-determination, but not as totality of form. Thus it is no more than a Being, or Existence in general. But essentially

it is not mere immediate existence; it is as formal unity of Being-in-Self or internality and of externality, and therefore it immediately contains Being-in-Self or Possibility. *What is actual, is possible.*

2. This Possibility is intro-reflected Actuality. But this very first reflectedness is likewise formality, and therefore, generally, only the determination of self-identity or of Being-in-Self in general.

But the determination here is totality of form, and consequently this Being-in-Self is determined as transcended or as essentially only in relation to Actuality, that is, as the negative of Actuality, it is *posited* as negative. Possibility therefore contains two moments. The *first* is the positive moment, that it is an intro-reflectedness. But in Absolute Form it is reduced to a moment, and thus intro-reflectedness no longer counts as Essence, but, *secondly*, has the negative meaning that Possibility is incomplete, refers on to an Other (namely Actuality), and perfects itself in it.

According to the first or merely positive side, then, Possibility is the mere form-determination of self-identity, or the form of essentiality. It is thus the relation-less and indeterminate container for everything in general.—In this sense of Formal Possibility, everything is possible which is not self-contradictory; hence the realm of Possibility is limitless multiplicity. But every manifold is determinate in itself and as against other, and contains negation; and, generally, indifferent variety passes over into opposition; but opposition is contradiction. Everything therefore equally is contradictory and therefore impossible.

—This merely formal predication of something—that it is *possible*—is as flat and empty as the law of contradiction and every content which is taken up into it. *A is possible* has as much significance as *A is A*. In so far as no steps are taken to develop the content, this content has the form of simplicity; difference arises in it only through the resolution of the content into its determinations. So long as this simple form is retained, the content remains self-identical and therefore possible. But this statement states nothing—just as in the formal law of identity.

The Possible, however, contains more than does the bare law of identity. The Possible is reflected intro-reflectedness, or the

identical simply as moment of totality, and thus is also determined as not being in itself; it has therefore the second determination of being *only* a Possible—the Ought of the totality of form. Possibility without this Ought is essentiality as such; but Absolute Form contains this, that Essence itself is only moment and has no truth without Being. Possibility is this bare essentiality, posited in such a manner that it is only moment, and is not adequate to Absolute Form. It is Being-in-Self, determined as only posited, or, equally, as not being in itself.—Consequently Possibility in itself is also Contradiction or Impossibility.

This next expresses itself in this manner, that Possibility—as form-determination posited as transcended—possesses a *content* in general. As possible, this is a Being-in-Self, which at the same time is transcended or is an otherness. And because it thus is merely possible, an other, and its contrary, is equally possible. A is A ; and, equally, $-A$ is $-A$. Each of these propositions expresses the possibility of its content-determination. But as these two statements of identity they are indifferent to each other; it is not posited in the one that the other shall be added. Possibility is the comparing relation of both; in its determination as a Reflection of the totality it contains this, that the contrary too is possible. It is therefore the relating Ground of the connexion that, because $A = A$, therefore $-A = -A$. The possible A contains also the possible not- A ; and it is this very relation which determines both as possible.

But the relation, as being one where in the one Possible its Other is contained, is a contradiction which cancels itself. According to its determination it is the Reflected, and, as was seen, the self-cancelling Reflected; and thus it is also the immediate, and becomes Actuality.

3. This Actuality is not first Actuality, but is reflected: it is posited as unity of itself and Possibility. The Actual as such is possible, and is in immediate positive identity with Possibility; but the latter has determined itself as *only* Possibility; and accordingly the Actual too is determined as *only* a Possible. And immediately because Possibility is *immediately* contained in Actuality, it is contained in Actuality as transcended, as *only* Possibility. Conversely Actuality which is in unity with Possibility is only transcended immediacy;—or, because Formal

Actuality is only immediate and first Actuality, it is only moment, only transcended Actuality, or only Possibility.

Here at the same time there is a closer expression of the determination, how far Possibility is Actuality. For Possibility is not yet *all* Actuality,—no question has yet arisen of real and absolute Actuality;—it is only that Possibility which first occurred—Formal Possibility, which determined itself to be *only* Possibility; and thus it is Formal Actuality, which is only Being or Existence in general. Whatever is possible therefore has a Being or an Existence.

This unity of Possibility and Actuality is *Contingency*.—The Contingent is an Actual which at the same time is determined only as possible—whose Other or opposite equally is. This Actuality therefore is mere Being or Existence, but is posited in its truth, as being equivalent to a positedness or to Possibility. Conversely Possibility as intro-Reflection or Being-in-Self is posited as positedness; in this sense of Actuality, what is possible is an Actual; it is worth only as much as contingent Actuality: it is itself a Contingent.

The Contingent therefore offers two sides. First, in so far as it immediately contains Possibility, or (which is the same thing) in so far as Possibility is in a transcended state in it, it is neither positedness nor is it mediated, but is immediate Actuality; it has no Ground.—This immediate Actuality belongs to the Possible too, and therefore it is determined equally as the Actual and as contingent, and thus is groundless as well.

But, secondly, the Contingent is the Actual as a *merely* Possible or as a positedness; and similarly the Possible as formal Being-in-Self is merely positedness. Thus neither is in and for itself, but each has its veritable intro-Reflection in an Other: or, it has a Ground.

The Contingent, then, has no Ground because it is contingent; and, equally, because it is contingent it has a Ground.

It is the posited and unmediated conversion of Inner and Outer, or of intro-reflectedness and Being, into each other,—posited, because Possibility and Actuality each has this determination in itself, since both are moments of Absolute Form.—Thus Actuality in its immediate unity with Possibility is only Existence, and is determined as groundless and as being *only* posited and *only* possible;—or, as reflected and determinate as

against Possibility, it is severed from Possibility, from intro-reflectedness, and thus equally and immediately is *only* a Possible.—Similarly Possibility, as *simple* Being-in-Self, is an immediate having merely bare Being in general;—or, in opposition to Actuality, it is equally a non-actual Being-in-Self, it is *only* a Possible, and for this very reason is again only a non-intro-reflected Existence in general.

This absolute unrest of the Becoming of these two determinations is Contingency. But, since each immediately converts itself into its opposite, it simply coincides with itself in this its opposite; and this identity of both—of each with the other—is *Necessity*.

The Necessary is an Actual; it thus exists as immediate or groundless; but equally it has its Actuality through an Other, or in its Ground, but is at the same time the positedness of this Ground, and its intro-Reflection; the Possibility of the Necessary is a transcended Possibility. The Contingent therefore is necessary because the Actual is determined as Possible, whereby its immediacy is transcended and cast off into Ground (or Being-in-Self) and Grounded, and also because this its Possibility—the Ground-relation—is simply transcended and posited as Being. The Necessary *is*, and this existent is itself the Necessary. It is also *in itself*; this intro-Reflection is an Other than that immediacy of Being, and the Necessity of the existent is an Other. Thus the existent itself is not the Necessary; but this Being-in-Self is itself only positedness; it is transcended and itself immediate. Thus Actuality in the term which is distinct from it, namely Possibility, is self-identical. As this identity it is Necessity.

B

RELATIVE NECESSITY, OR REAL ACTUALITY, POSSIBILITY, AND NECESSITY

1. The Necessity which has been reached is formal because its moments are formal; they are simple determinations which are a totality only as immediate unity or as immediate conversion of one into the other, and thus are without the form of independence.—Hence, in this Formal Necessity, the unity at first is simple and indifferent to its distinctions. As immediate

unity of the form-determinations this Necessity is *Actuality*; but its unity now is determined as indifferent to the distinction between the form-determinations, that is, between itself and Possibility; and so this Actuality is one which has a content. This content, as indifferent identity, contains form too as indifferent, that is, as merely a variety of determinations, and is manifold content in general. This Actuality is *Real Actuality*.

At this point Real Actuality as such is the Thing of many properties, the existing world; but it is not the Existence which resolves itself into Appearance, but, as Actuality, it is also Being-in-Self and intro-Reflection; it preserves itself in the multiplicity of bare Existence; its externality is an internal attitude to itself alone. What is actual *can act*; and something manifests its actuality through that which it produces. Its attitude to other is the manifestation of itself; it is neither a transition—where the existent Something relates itself to other,—nor an appearing—where the Thing stands merely in a relation to others and, though independent, has its intro-Reflection and determinate essentiality in another independent entity.

Real Actuality likewise now immediately possesses Possibility. It contains the moment of Being-in-Self; but since as yet it is only *immediate* unity, it is in *one* of the determinations of form, and consequently is distinct, as the existent, from Being-in-Self or Possibility.

2. This Possibility, as the Being-in-Self of Real Actuality, is itself *Real Possibility*; and, at first, it is Being-in-Self which is full of content.—Formal Possibility is intro-Reflection only as the abstract identity in which a Something is not self-contradictory. But in so far as the determinations, circumstances, and conditions of a case are explored in order to deduce its possibility, Formal Possibility is left behind, and what is now under consideration is its Real Possibility.

This Real Possibility is itself *immediate Existence*, but no longer because Possibility as such, as formal moment, is immediately its opposite and a non-reflected Actuality; but, because it is *Real Possibility*, this determination forthwith belongs to it. Consequently the Real Possibility of a case is the existing multiplicity of circumstances which are related to it.

This multiplicity of existence then is, indeed, as much

Possibility as Actuality, but as yet their identity is only the content, which is indifferent to these form-determinations; they therefore constitute form, *determined* as against their identity.—Or, immediate Real Actuality, because it is immediate, is determined as against its Possibility; and, as this determinate and therefore reflected Possibility, it is Real Possibility. Now this Possibility is the posited *whole* of form, but of form in its determinateness,—namely Actuality as formal or immediate Actuality and also Possibility as abstract Being-in-Self. Consequently this Actuality which constitutes the Possibility of a case is not its own Possibility, but the Being-in-Self of some other Actual; it in itself is that Actuality which is to be transcended, or Possibility as Possibility only.—Thus Real Possibility constitutes the *totality of conditions*; an Actuality which is not intro-reflected or scattered, but is determined to be Being-in-Self—the Being-in-Self of some Other, which ought to pass back into itself.

That therefore which is really possible is in its Being-in-Self a formal identity which in its simple content-determination is not self-contradictory; but, as self-identical, it must also not be contradictory in all its developed and distinct circumstances and in everything with which it is connected. But secondly, because it is manifold in itself and has manifold connexions with other, and because, further, variety of itself passes over into opposition, it is contradictory. If any possibility is under discussion and it is desired to demonstrate its contradiction, it is only necessary to concentrate upon the multiplicity which it contains as content or as its conditioned existence, and thence its contradiction is easily discovered.—But this is not a contradiction of comparison: manifold existence *in itself* is its own self-transcendence and destruction, and for this reason essentially implies within itself the determination of being *merely* possible.—When all the conditions of a fact are completely assembled, it enters into Actuality;—the completeness of the conditions is the totality as of content, and the fact itself is this content, determined to be both actual and possible. In the sphere of Conditioned Ground the conditions have form—namely, Ground or Reflection which is for itself—outside themselves; and this Ground or Reflection relates them for moments of the fact, and evokes existence in them. Here, on the other

hand, immediate Actuality is not determined by a presupposing Reflection as being condition: it is posited that it itself is Possibility.

Now self-transcending Real Possibility contains a duality, which is transcended; for Possibility is itself a duality, since it is Actuality and Possibility. 1. The Actuality is formal—an Existence which appeared as independent and immediate and by its transcendence becomes reflected Being or moment of an Other, and thus receives Being-in-Self. 2. This Existence was also determined as Possibility, or as the Being-in-Self, but of an Other. As it transcends itself, this Being-in-Self also is transcended and passes over into Actuality.—Thus this movement of self-transcending Real Possibility produces the same moments which are already there, but now each grows out of the other; consequently in this negation it is also not a transcendence but a coincidence with itself.—In Formal Possibility, if and because something was possible, then also not itself but its Other was possible. Real Possibility is no longer faced with such an Other, for it is real in so far as it itself is also Actuality. Its immediate existence, then (that is, the ring of conditions), transcends itself, and it thus constitutes itself that Being-in-Self which it already is, namely as the Being-in-Self of an Other. Since conversely its moment of Being-in-Self at the same time hereby transcends itself, it becomes Actuality—that is, that moment which also it already is.—What vanishes thus is this, that Actuality was determined as the Possibility or Being-in-Self of an Other, and conversely Possibility as an Actuality which is not that of which it is the Possibility.

3. Thus the negation of Real Possibility is its self-identity; in this its transcendence it is the recoil of this transcendence into itself, and thus is *Real Necessity*.

What is necessary cannot be otherwise: what is possible in general, can; for Possibility is that Being-in-Self which is only positedness and therefore essentially otherness. Formal Possibility is this identity as transition into the utterly other: Real Possibility, since it possesses the other moment, Actuality, is already itself Necessity. What therefore is really possible can no longer be otherwise: under such and such conditions and circumstances something else cannot result. Real Possibility and Necessity are therefore only *apparently* different; this is an

identity which does not *become* but is already presupposed and forms a basis. Consequently Real Necessity is a relation which is full of content; for the content is that self-existent identity which is indifferent to distinctions of form.

But this Necessity at the same time is *relative*.—For it has a presupposition from which it begins; it has its point of departure in the contingent. For the Real Actual as such is the determinate Actual, and, at first, has its determinateness as immediate Being in the fact that it is a multiplicity of existing circumstances. But, as this immediate Being as determinateness, it is also its own negative, it is Being-in-Self or Possibility; and thus it is Real Possibility. As this unity of the two moments it is the totality of form—a totality, however, which as yet is external to itself; it is unity of Possibility and Actuality in such a manner that (1) manifold Existence is Possibility immediately or positively—a Possible which is self-identical in general because it is an Actual; and (2) in so far as this Possibility of Existence is posited, it is determined as Possibility *only*, as immediate conversion of Actuality into its opposite,—or as Contingency. Hence this Possibility which immediate Actuality possesses in so far as it is condition, is only Being-in-Self as Possibility of an Other. It has been shown that this otherness transcends itself and that this positedness is itself posited, and hereby Real Possibility indeed becomes Necessity; but still, the latter thus begins from the former unity—which is not yet intro-reflected—of Possible and Actual;—as yet this presupposing and the self-returning movement are separate;—or, Necessity has not yet determined itself as Contingency *out of itself*.

In the content, the relativity of Real Necessity exhibits itself in such a manner that the content so far is only identity indifferent to form; it is therefore distinct from it and is a determinate content in general. The really Necessary is consequently any restricted Actuality, which for the sake of this restrictedness is also merely contingent in some other respect.

Thus in fact Real Necessity in itself is also Contingency.—This now appears in the following manner: the really Necessary is necessary indeed in form, but in content is restricted and has its Contingency through that. But Contingency is contained also in the form of Real Necessity; for, as was seen, Real

Possibility is only *in itself* the Necessary, while it is posited as the otherness of Actuality and Possibility to each other. Real Necessity therefore contains Contingency; it is the return to self out of that restless otherness of Actuality and Possibility to each other, but not out of itself to itself.

In itself, then, the unity of Necessity and Contingency is found here; this unity must be called *Absolute Actuality*.

C

ABSOLUTE NECESSITY

Real Necessity is determinate Necessity: Formal Necessity has not yet either content or determinateness. The determinateness of Necessity consists in this, that it possesses in itself its own negation, namely Contingency. This is the result about it which has been reached.

But this determinateness in its first simplicity is Actuality; consequently determinate Necessity is, immediately, actual Necessity. This Actuality, which itself is necessary as such (in that it contains Necessity as its Being-in-Self), is *Absolute Actuality*;—Actuality which no longer can be otherwise, for its Being-in-Self is not Possibility but Necessity itself.

But now this Actuality, because it is posited as absolute, that is, as being itself the unity of itself and Possibility, is only an empty determination, or, it is Contingency.—This emptiness of its determination makes it a mere Possibility, something which might equally well be otherwise and may be determined as Possible. But this Possibility itself is Absolute Possibility; for it is just this Possibility, of being determined equally as Possibility or as Actuality. Since it is this indifference to itself, it is posited as empty or contingent determination.

Thus Real Necessity not only *in itself* contains Contingency; Contingency also *becomes* in it; but this Becoming, as externality, is itself only the Being-in-Self of such Necessity, since this Becoming is only an immediate determinedness. But it is not only this, but also the very Becoming of Necessity,—or, the presupposition which the latter had is its own positing. For, as Real Necessity, it is the suspension of Actuality in Possibility, and conversely;—it is the simple conversion of one of these

moments into the other, and thus it is also their simple positive unity, each—as was seen—coinciding in the other only with itself. But thus it is Actuality; of such a kind, however, that it is only as this simple self-coincidence of form. Hence its negative positing of these moments is itself the presupposing or positing of itself as transcended, or of immediacy.

But at this very point this Actuality is determined as something negative; it is a self-coincidence out of Actuality, which was Real Possibility; thus this new Actuality arises only out of its Being-in-Self, out of its own negation.—Hereby it is also immediately determined as Possibility, or as something mediated through its negation. But thus this Possibility is now immediately nothing but this mediating, in which Being-in-Self, or Possibility and immediacy, both in the same manner are positedness.—Thus it is Necessity which is equally transcending of this positedness or positing of immediacy and of Being-in-Self, and also by that very fact determining of this transcending as positedness. It therefore itself determines itself as Contingency,—repels itself from itself in its Being, in this repulsion has but returned to itself, and in this return (as its Being) has but repelled itself from itself.

Thus Form in its realization has penetrated all its distinctions; it has made itself transparent, and, as Absolute Necessity, is only this simple self-identity of Being in its negation, or in Essence.—The distinction between content and form itself has vanished equally; for this unity of Possibility in Actuality, and conversely, is form which is indifferent to itself in its determinateness, or in positedness; it is the fact filled with content, against which the form of Necessity broke and remained external. But in this manner it is this reflected identity of the two determinations as indifferent to them, and thus it is the form-determination of Being-in-Self as opposed to positedness; and this Possibility constitutes the restrictedness of the content which belonged to Real Necessity. But the dissolution of this distinction is Absolute Necessity, the content of which is this distinction which in it penetrates itself.

Absolute Necessity then is the truth into which Actuality and Possibility in general pass back, as well as Formal and Real Necessity.—The truth was reached that Absolute Necessity is Being which in its negation—in Essence—relates itself to

itself and is Being. It is simple immediacy or pure Being as much as simple intro-Reflection or pure Essence: it is the fact of the identity of these two.—The absolutely Necessary is only because it *is*, and has otherwise neither condition nor Ground.—But equally it is pure Essence; its Being is simple intro-Reflection; it is, *because* it is. As Reflection it has Ground and condition, but it has for Ground and condition only itself. It is Being-in-Self, but its Being-in-Self is its immediacy; its Possibility is its Actuality.—It is, then, because it is; as coincidence of Being with itself it is Essence; but since this simpleness is also immediate simplicity, it is Being.

In this manner Absolute Necessity is the *Reflection or Form of the Absolute*; unity of Being and Essence, simple immediacy, which is absolute negativity. Consequently on the one hand its distinctions do not exist as Determinations of Reflection, but as existing multiplicity or differentiated Actuality, which has the shape of Others independent against one another. On the other hand, since its relation is absolute identity, it is the absolute conversion of its Actuality into its Possibility and of its Possibility into Actuality.—Absolute Necessity is therefore blind. On the one hand, the distinct terms which are determined as Actuality and Possibility have the shape of intro-Reflection as of Being; they therefore both exist as free Actualities, of which neither shows in the other nor will allow any trace of its relation to the other to appear in itself; being founded on itself each is the Necessary in itself. Necessity as Essence is locked up in this Being, and consequently the mutual contact of these Actualities appears as an empty externality; the Actuality of one in the other is bare Possibility or Contingency. For Being is posited as absolutely necessary, as self-mediation which is absolute negation of mediation by other, or as Being which is identical only with Being; consequently an Other having Actuality in Being is just determined as a bare Possible, as empty positedness.

But this Contingency is rather Absolute Necessity; it is the Essence of these free Actualities which are necessary in themselves. This Essence is that which *shuns the light*, because in these Actualities there is no Showing nor reflex, because they are founded purely on themselves, are fashioned only for themselves, and manifest only themselves,—because they are only

Being.—Their Essence however will burst out in them, and reveal both what it is and what they are. The simplicity of their Being and repose upon themselves is absolute negativity; it is the freedom of their show-less immediacy. This negative element breaks out in them because Being through this its Essence is self-contradiction; it is this contradiction as against this Being in the form of Being, as the negation therefore of those Actualities, which is absolutely different from their Being, or as their Nothing, which is an otherness over against them as free as is their Being.—Yet its existence in them could not but be recognized. In their self-based fashioning they are indifferent to form; they are a content and, therefore, distinct Actualities and a determinate content; and this content is the mark which Necessity impressed upon them when it, which in its determination is absolute return upon itself, let them go free as absolutely actual. To this mark Necessity appeals as to the witness of its cause, and, touched by it, the Actualities now perish. This manifestation of that which determinateness is in truth—namely negative self-relation—is blind submersion in otherness; the Showing or Reflection which breaks out is, in the existent entities, as Becoming or transition of Being into Nothing. But conversely Being is equally Essence, and Becoming is Reflection or Showing. Thus externality is their internality; their relation is absolute identity; and the transition of Actual into Possible, of Being into Nothing, is a self-coincidence; Contingency is Absolute Necessity, and itself is the presupposing of that first Absolute Actuality.

This self-identity of Being in its negation is *Substance*. Substance is this unity as in its negation, or as in Contingency: it is thus Substance as self-relation. The blind transition of Necessity is rather the proper Exposition of the Absolute, its movement in itself which, in its alienation, rather exhibits itself.

CHAPTER III

THE ABSOLUTE RELATION

ABSOLUTE Necessity is not *the Necessary*, and still less *a Necessary*: it is Necessity—Being simply as Reflection. It is Relation because it is distinguishing, the moments of which process are themselves its whole totality; these therefore absolutely persist, but there is only *one* persistence,—distinction is only the Show of Exposition, and Show is the Absolute itself.—Essence as such is Reflection or showing; but Essence as Absolute Relation is Show posited as Show, which, as this self-relating, is Absolute Actuality.—The Absolute, first expounded by external reflection, now, as Absolute Form or as Necessity, expounds itself; this self-expounding is its self-positing, and it is only this self-positing.—Natural light is not Something, nor Thing, but its being is just its showing; and similarly manifestation is self-equal Absolute Actuality.

Consequently the sides of the Absolute Relation are not Attributes. In the Attribute, the Absolute shows only in one of its moments, which is taken as presupposed and picked up by external reflection. That, however, which expounds the Absolute is Absolute Necessity which is self-identical as being self-determining. Since this is showing which is posited as Show, the sides of this Relation are totalities because they are as Show; for, as Show, the distinctions are each itself and its opposite, or they are each the whole;—and conversely they are Show in this manner because they are totalities. Thus this distinguishing or showing of the Absolute is only the identical positing of itself.

This Relation in its immediate concept is the Relation of Substance and Accidents, the immediate vanishing and becoming in itself of Absolute Show. Substance determines itself as Being-for-Self as against an Other; or, the Absolute Relation determines itself as real; and thus the relation is the Relation of Causality. This as self-relating finally passes over into Reciprocity, and thus the Absolute Relation hereby is also

posited according to the determinations which it contains; and next this posited unity of itself in its determinations (which are themselves posited as the Whole and therefore equally as determinations) is the *Notion*.

A

THE RELATION OF SUBSTANTIALITY

Absolute Necessity is Absolute Relation because it is not Being as such, but Being which is *because* it is—Being as absolute self-mediation. This Being is Substance; as ultimate unity of Essence and Being it is the Being in *all* Being; it is not the unreflected immediate nor an abstract something which stands behind existence and appearance—it is immediate Actuality itself, and this as absolute intro-reflectedness, as a persistence which is in and for itself.—Substance, as this unity of Being and Reflection, is essentially the showing and positedness of these. Showing is self-related showing, and thus it *is*; this Being is Substance as such. Conversely this Being is only self-identical positedness: it is thus showing totality, or Accidentality.

This showing is identity as formal identity—the unity of Possibility and Actuality. It is, first, Becoming, contingency as the sphere of arising and passing away; for, according to the determination of immediacy, the relation of Possibility and Actuality is immediate conversion of one into the other (as existents), or of each into that which is only Other to it.—But Being is Show, and therefore their mutual relation is one of identical or showing terms; it is Reflection. Consequently the movement of Accidentality represents in each of its moments the showing of the categories of Being and the Reflection-determinations of Essence into one another.—The immediate Something has a content; its immediacy at the same time is reflected indifference to form. This content is determinate; and, since this is determinateness of Being, the Something passes over into an Other. But Quality is also determinateness of Reflection; it is thus indifferent Variety. This however animates itself into opposition and passes back into Ground, which is Nothing and also intro-Reflection. The latter transcends itself; but it is itself reflected Being-in-Self; it is thus Possibility, and

this Being-in-Self in its transition (which is equally intro-Reflection) is the *necessary Actual*.

This movement of Accidentality is the Actuality of Substance as quiet emergence of itself. It is not active against Something, but only against itself as simple unresisting element. The transcendence of a presupposed term is vanishing Show; and only in the process which transcends the immediate does this immediate itself become, or that showing achieve being; the beginning from self is only the positing of that self from which the beginning takes place.

Substance as this identity of showing is the totality of the whole and comprehends Accidentality; and Accidentality is the whole of Substance. Its distinction into simple identity of Being and the alternation of Accidents in it is a form of its Show. The former is the formless Substance of imagination for which Show has not determined itself as Show; it clings to such an indeterminate identity as though it were an Absolute, although this identity has no truth; it is only the determinateness of immediate Actuality or, equally, of Being-in-Self or Possibility—form-determinations which fall within Accidentality.—

The other determination, the alternation of Accidents, is the absolute formal unity of Accidentality, Substance as absolute power.—When the Accident passes away, this is the retrogression of itself as Actuality into itself as into its Being-in-Self or into its Possibility; but this its Being-in-Self is itself only a positedness, and is therefore also Actuality; and, since these form-determinations are, equally, content-determinations, this possible is an actual (otherwise determined) even according to content. Through Actuality with its content (into which it translates the possible) Substance manifests itself as creative, and through Possibility (into which it leads back the actual) as destructive, power. But both are identical: creation is destructive and destruction creative; for negative and positive—that is, Possibility and Actuality—are absolutely united in substantial Necessity.

The Accidents as such—and there are more than one, since plurality is one of the determinations of Being—have no power over one another. They are the Something which is or is for itself, existing things with manifold properties, or wholes which

consist of parts; independent parts, forces which require solicitation by one another and have one another for condition. In so far as such an Accidental seems to exercise power over an Other, it is the power of Substance which comprehends both within itself: as negativity it posits an unequal value, determining the one as passing away and the other (with a different content) as arising, or the former as passing over into its Possibility and the latter as passing over therein into Actuality,—ever sundering itself into the distinctions of form and content and ever purifying itself of this one-sidedness, though in this purification itself it has fallen back into determination and division.—Thus one Accident only extrudes another because its own subsisting is itself this totality of form and content, in which it perishes as much as its other.

Because of this immediate identity and this presence of Substance in the Accidents no *real* distinction yet exists. In this first determination Substance is not yet manifested according to its full concept. When Substance as self-identical Being-in-and-for-Self is distinguished from itself as totality of Accidents, then, as power, it is the mediator. This is Necessity—its positive endurance in the negativity of the Accidents and its mere positedness in their persistence: accordingly this mean is unity of Substantiality and Accidentality itself, and its extremes have no peculiar persistence. Substantiality therefore is only the Relation as immediately vanishing; it is not related to itself as negative, and, as immediate self-unity of power, is only in the form of its identity and not of its negative Essence: one moment only, namely the negative, or distinction, is that which utterly vanishes, but not the other, the identical.—This can also be considered in the following manner. Show or Accidentality *in itself* is, indeed, Substance through power, but it is not thus *posited* as this self-identical Show; and thus Substance has only Accidentality for its shape or positedness, and not itself; it is not Substance *as* Substance. Here then it is the Relation of Substantiality only in this, that it discloses itself as formal power the distinctions of which are not substantial: in fact it exists only as Inner of the Accidents, and these are only *in* Substance. In other words, this Relation is only Showing Totality as Becoming; but equally it is Reflection. Accidentality, which *in itself* is Substance, is for this very reason also

posited as such; it is thus determined as self-relating negativity as against itself; it is determined as self-relating simple self-identity, and thus is Substance which is for itself and has power. Thus the Relation of Substantiality passes over into *the Relation of Causality*.

B

THE RELATION OF CAUSALITY

Substance is power—power which is intro-reflected and not merely transitory, but posits determinations and distinguishes them from itself. In its determining it relates itself to itself, and therefore is itself that which it posits as a negative, or makes into positedness. Hence this in general is transcended Substantiality, the merely posited entity, or Effect, while Substance which is for itself is Cause.

Here this Relation of Causality is only this relation of Cause and Effect; it is thus *Formal Relation of Causality*.

(a) FORMAL CAUSALITY

1. Cause stands against Effect as the *original*.—Substance, as power, *is* Showing, or *has* Accidentality. But as power it is equally intro-Reflection in its Show; it thus expounds its transition, and this Showing is determined as Show, or the Accident is posited as just this—that it is only something posited.—But, while it determines, Substance does not proceed from Accidentality as though Accidentality were previously an Other and were now first posited as determinateness; on the contrary both are one Actuality. Substance as power determines itself; but this determining is itself immediately the transcendence of determining and is the return. It determines itself,—and it, the determinant, is thus the immediate and the already determinate;—and since it determines *itself*, it posits this already determinate entity as determinate: it has thus transcended positedness and has returned to itself.—Conversely this return, because it is the *negative* self-relation of Substance, is itself a determining or self-repulsion; by virtue of this return the determinate entity, from which Substance seems to begin and seems now to posit it simply as a determinate already

given, *becomes*.—Thus absolute Actuality is Cause,—the power of Substance in its truth as manifestation, which immediately also expounds in its Becoming that which is *in itself*, the Accident (which is positedness), and posits it as positedness, or Effect.—Effect, then, first is that which the Accidentality of the Relation of Substantiality is, namely Substance as positedness; but secondly the Accident exists as such substantially only through its disappearance, as transitory. As Effect, however, it is positedness as self-identical; Cause is manifested in Effect as whole Substance, namely as reflected into itself in positedness itself as such.

2. This intro-reflected positedness (the determinate as determinate) stands opposed by Substance as non-posed Original. As absolute power Substance is return to itself, but this return is itself a determining; hence it is no longer merely the *in-itself* of its Accident, but is also *posited* as this Being-in-Self. Consequently Substance attains Actuality only when it has become Cause. But this Actuality, in that its Being-in-Self (its determinateness in the Relation of Substantiality) is now posited as determinateness, is Effect; hence Substance has the Actuality which it has as Cause only in its Effect.—This is the *Necessity* which is Cause.—It is *actual* Substance because Substance as power determines itself, but it is also Cause because it expounds this determinateness or posits it as positedness: thus it posits its actuality as positedness, or as Effect. This is the Other of Cause—positedness as against Original and mediated by it. But Cause as Necessity equally cancels this its mediation, and in the process of determining itself it is—as the originally self-relating *as against* the mediated.—the return to self; for positedness is determined *as* positedness and is therefore self-identical; consequently Cause is veritably actual and self-identical only in its Effect.—Effect therefore is necessary just because it is manifestation of Cause, or because it is that Necessity which is Cause.—Cause is self-moving only as this Necessity and only as this begins from itself without solicitation from an Other, and is independent source of production out of itself;—it must act; its originality is this, that its intro-Reflection is determinant positing, and that conversely both are one unity.

Hence Effect contains nothing whatever which Cause does not contain. Conversely Cause contains nothing which is not

in its Effect. Cause is Cause only in so far as it brings about an Effect; and Cause is nothing but this determination, that it has an Effect, while Effect is nothing but that it has a Cause. Cause as such implies its Effect, and Effect Cause; in so far as Cause does not yet act or has ceased to act, it is not Cause,—and Effect, in so far as its Cause has vanished, is no longer Effect, but an indifferent actuality.—

3. In this identity of Cause and Effect, the form in which they are distinguished as the self-existent and as positedness is transcended. Cause is extinguished in its Effect; and simultaneously Effect has been extinguished, for it is no more than the determinateness of Cause. This Causality which has been extinguished in Effect is thus an immediacy which is indifferent to the relation of Cause and Effect and is connected to it externally.

(b) THE DETERMINATE RELATION OF CAUSALITY

1. The self-identity of Cause in its Effect is the transcendence of its power and negativity; consequently it is unity which is indifferent to form-distinctions, or *content*.—It is therefore related to form (that is, here, Causality) only in itself. They are thus posited as various, and form itself is, as against content, a Causality which is only immediately actual, or a contingent Causality.

Further, content thus determinate is a content various in itself; and Cause is determined according to its content, and so therefore equally is Effect.—Content (since reflectedness here is also immediate Actuality) is to this extent actual but also finite Substance.

This now is the Relation of Causality in *its reality and finitude*. As formal, it is the infinite relation of absolute power, whose content is pure manifestation or Necessity. As finite Causality on the contrary it has a *given* content, and exhausts itself as an external distinction upon that identity which in its determinations is one and the same Substance.

By virtue of this identity of content this Causality is an analytic proposition. It is the same fact which displays itself first as Cause and then as Effect,—here as peculiar persistence and there as positedness or determination in an Other. These

determinations of form are an external reflection, and consequently it is in the circumstances a tautological consideration, made by a subjective understanding, when a phenomenon is determined as effect and the ascent is thence made to its cause, in order that the fact may be understood and explained: one and the same content is repeated, and the cause is no richer than the effect.—For example, rain is the cause of dampness, and dampness is its effect. “Rain moistens”; this is an analytic proposition: the same water which is rain is dampness; only as rain this water has the form of a fact by itself, while as wateriness or dampness it is adjectival, something posited, which is no longer supposed to have its persistence in itself; and both determinations are equally external to it.—Similarly the cause of a given colour is a colouring agent, a pigment which is one and the same actuality (1) in the form (which is external to it) of an active principle—that is, as externally connected with an agent which is different from it—and (2) in the determination of effect, which is equally external to it.—The cause of a deed is the inner disposition of an active subject, and this remains the same content and value in the shape of the external existence which it acquires through performance. If the movement of a body is considered as effect, then a propulsive force is its cause; but the same quantum of movement is there before and after the impulse—the same existence which the propelling body contained and communicated to the impelled body; and itself it loses as much as it communicates.

It is true that the cause—the painter or the propelling body, for example—has a further content, besides the colours and their form which combines them into a picture (in the case of the former), and besides a movement of definite strength and direction (in the case of the latter). But this further content is a contingent accessory which does not concern the cause: the qualities of the painter, apart from this quality that he is the painter of the given picture, are irrelevant to the picture; only those of his properties which are displayed in the effect are present in him *as cause*; he is not cause in his *remaining* properties. Similarly, whether the propelling body is of stone or wood, is green or yellow, and so on, is irrelevant to the impulse which it communicates; and to this extent it is not *cause*.

With respect to this tautology of the Relation of Causality, the observation must be made that it does not seem to contain the tautology if the remote and not the proximate cause of an effect is adduced. The change of form which the fundamental fact undergoes in this passage through a series of intermediate members disguises the identity which it therein retains. At the same time, in this multiplication of causes which have entered between it and the ultimate effect, it connects itself with other things and circumstances, so that the complete effect is contained not in that first term which is pronounced to be the cause, but only in this plurality of causes together.—If, for example, a man came into circumstances where his talent developed because he lost his father who was hit by a bullet in battle, then this shot (or, further back, the war, or a cause of the war, and so on to infinity) might be assigned as the cause of the man's skill. But it is clear that the shot (for example) is not by itself the cause, but only the connexion of the shot with other effective determinations. Or rather, it is not cause at all, but only an individual moment which belonged to the circumstances of the possibility.

Further, and above all, we must consider the inadmissible application of the Relation of Causality to relations of physico-organic and of spiritual life. Here that which is called cause does, indeed, show itself as having a different content from the effect; but the reason is that that which acts upon living matter is independently determined, changed, and transmuted by such matter, because whatever has life does not allow the cause to reach its effect, that is, cancels it as cause. Thus it is inadmissible to say that food is the cause of blood, or certain dishes or cold or damp the cause of fever, and so on; and it is equally inadmissible to find in the Ionic climate the cause of the works of Homer, or in the ambition of Caesar the cause of the downfall of the republican constitution of Rome. In history in general intellectual quanta, and individuals, are in play and in reciprocal determination with one another; but it is the nature of spirit, in a sense far higher than it is the character of living matter in general, not to absorb another original entity, or not to allow a cause to continue into itself, but to break it off and to transmute it.—These relations however belong to the Idea, and are not to be considered till that

has been reached.—But we may here and now observe that, in so far as the relation of cause and effect is admitted (although in an improper sense), effect cannot be greater than cause; for effect is nothing further than the manifestation of cause. It has become a popular jest in history to allow great effects to spring from small causes, and to quote for first cause of a comprehensive and profound event an anecdote. Such a so-called cause is to be looked upon as nothing more than an occasion or external stimulus; the inner spirit of the event would not have required it, or might have used an indefinite number of other such in order to begin from them in appearance, to unfold and to manifest itself. Much rather such an essentially petty and contingent matter is, conversely, only determined by the event itself as its occasion. Consequently these arabesques of history, where a huge shape is depicted as growing from a slender stalk, are a sprightly but a most superficial treatment. In this growth of great out of small, the conversion certainly is present which spirit applies to the external; but for this very reason the small is not cause in itself, or this conversion itself transcends the relation of causality.

2. But this determinateness of the Relation of Causality which makes content and form various and indifferent, extends further. Form-determination is also content-determination: cause and effect (the two sides of the relation) are also, therefore, another content. Or, the content, because it is only as content of a form, has the latter's difference in itself and is essentially various. But, since this its form is the Relation of Causality, which is a content identical in cause and effect, therefore the various content is connected externally with the cause on the one hand and with the effect on the other hand; it does not therefore itself enter into the activity and into the relation.

This external content, then, is without relation,—an immediate existence;—or, because as content it is also the self-existent identity of cause and effect, it is also immediate, existent identity. Consequently this is any thing which has manifold determinations of its existence, and, among others, this, that it is cause or else effect in some respect or another. In it the form-determinations of cause and effect have their substratum, that is, their essential persistence, and each has

a separate persistence,—for their identity is their persistence;—but at the same time it is their immediate persistence, and not their persistence as form-unity or as relation.

But this thing is not only substratum but also substance, for it is identical persistence only as persistence of the relation. It is, further, finite substance, for it is determined as immediate as against its causal nature. But at the same time it has causality, since it equally is identical only as the identical element of this relation.—Now as cause this substratum is negative self-relation. But it itself, to which it relates itself, is, first, a positedness, because it is determined as immediately actual; this positedness as content is any determination in general.—Secondly, causality is external to it: causality itself thus constitutes its positedness. Now since it is causal substance, its causality consists in this—that it relates itself negatively to itself, that is, to its positedness and external causality. Consequently the activity of this substance begins from an external term, and frees itself from this external determination; and its return to itself is the preservation of its immediate existence and the transcendence of its posited causality, and therefore of its causality in general.

Thus a stone in motion is cause; its movement is a determination which it has, while besides this it contains many other determinations of colour, shape, and so on, which do not enter into its causal nature. Its immediate existence is apart from its form-relation (causality), and therefore this is external; the movement of the stone and the causality which belongs to it in movement are only positedness in it.—But the causality is also peculiar to it; this is given in the fact that its substantial persistence is its identical self-relation; the latter however is now determined as positedness; it is therefore also negative self-relation.—Consequently its causality, which directs itself upon itself as upon positedness or as something external, consists in transcending it and, by its removal, returning to itself: therefore to this extent it is not self-identical in its positedness, but only reconstructs its abstract originality.—Or again, rain is the cause of dampness, which is the same water as the rain. This water has the determination of being rain and cause by virtue of the fact that the latter is posited in it by an Other;—some other force (or whatever else it may be) has raised it in

the air and collected it into a mass, the gravity of which causes it to fall. Its distance from the earth is a determination foreign to its original self-identity (or, gravity); its causal nature consists in removing this determination and in reconstructing this identity; but in doing so it also cancels its causality.

The second determinateness of Causality which we have just considered concerns form; this relation is Causality as external to itself, as that originality which is equally in itself positedness or effect. This union of the opposite determinations as in the existent substratum constitutes the infinite regress from causes to causes.—We begin from the effect; as such it has a cause, which has a cause in turn, and so forth. Why has the cause a cause in turn? that is, why is the side which before was determined as cause now determined as effect, which involves the search for a new cause?—The reason is that cause is finite and determinate in general, determined as one moment of form as against effect; thus it has its determinateness or negation outside it; but for that very reason it is itself finite, has its determinateness in itself, and is thus positedness or effect. This its identity is also posited, but it is a third term, the immediate substratum; causality is therefore external to itself, since here its originality is an immediacy. The form-distinction is consequently first determinateness, it is not yet determinateness *posited as* determinateness; it is existent otherness. On the one hand finite reflection halts at this immediate, removes the form-unity from it, and allows it to be cause in one respect and effect in another; on the other hand it transfers the form-unity to the infinite, and by never-ending progress expresses its impotence to catch and to hold it.

With Effect the case is immediately the same; or rather, the infinite progress from effect to effect is entirely the same as the regress from cause to cause. In the latter, cause became effect, which in turn has another cause; similarly effect conversely becomes cause, which in turn has another effect.—The determinate cause which has been considered begins from an externality, and in its effect does not return *as cause* into itself, but rather loses causality in the effect. But conversely effect comes into contact with a substratum, which is substance or originally self-relating persistence; consequently this positedness becomes positedness in it; that is, this substance, when an effect is

posited in it, behaves as cause. But that first effect—positedness, which comes to it externally, is other than the second, which is *produced* by it; for this second is determined as its intro-Reflection, but the former as an externality in it.—But here Causality is self-external causativeness, and, therefore, equally it does not return to itself in its effect, and does become external to itself in the effect: *its* effect in turn becomes positedness in a substratum—in another substance, which, however, equally makes it a positedness or manifests itself as cause, again repels its effect from itself, and so on into bad infinity.

3. It remains to see what has arisen through the movement of the Determinate Relation of Causality.—Formal Causality is extinguished in the effect; and hereby the identical element of these two moments has become, but at the same time has become only as *in itself* the unity of cause and effect, in which the form-relation is external.—By virtue of this, the identical term is also immediate, according to the two determinations of immediacy, first as Being-in-Self, a content at which causality expires externally, and secondly as an existing substratum in which cause and effect inhere as distinct form-determinations. In it the latter are, *in themselves*, one; but each by reason of this Being-in-Self or externality of form is external to itself, and hence in its unity with the other is also determined as other against it. Consequently, although cause has, and also is itself, an effect, and effect not only has but also itself is a cause, yet the effect which the cause has and that which it is are different;—and so with the cause which the effect has, and the cause which it is.

But the movement of the Determinate Relation of Causality has now resulted in this, that the cause is not merely *extinguished* in the effect—and with it the effect too (as happens in Formal Causality), but the cause in its extinction, in the effect, *becomes* again; that effect vanishes into cause, but equally becomes again in it. Each of these determinations cancels itself in its positing and posits itself in its cancellation: what takes place is not an external transition of causality from one substratum to another, but this its becoming other is at the same time its own positing. Causality, then, presupposes or conditions itself. The identity which before was only *in itself* (the substratum) is hence now determined as presupposition or as

posited against effective causality; and the reflection which before was only external to the identical now stands in a relation to it.

(c) ACTION AND REACTION

Causality is a presupposing activity. The cause is conditioned; it is negative self-relation as being presupposed, as an external Other which in itself (but only in itself) is causality itself. It is (as has already resulted) substantial identity into which Formal Causality passes over; and now it has determined itself as against the latter as its negative. Or it is the same as the Substance of the Relation of Causality, only the power of Accidentality stands opposed to it as being itself a substantial activity.—It is *passive* substance.—That which is immediate, or in-itself, and is not also for-itself, is passive,—pure Being or Essence which is only in this determinateness of abstract self-identity.—*Active* substance, as negatively self-relating, stands opposed to passive substance. It is cause in so far as it has reconstructed itself in Determinate Causality through the negation of itself and out of effect; a reflected entity which in its otherness or as immediate essentially has a positing attitude and mediates itself with itself through its negation. For this reason Causality here no longer has a substratum in which it might inhere; and as against this identity it is not form-determination, but is itself substance; or, that which is original is only Causality.—The substratum is passive substance which has presupposed itself.

This cause now acts, for it is negative power exerted upon itself. At the same time it is its own presupposition; it thus acts upon itself as upon an Other—upon passive substance.—Accordingly, it transcends, first, the otherness of the latter, and in it returns to itself; secondly it determines it, positing this transcendence of its otherness (or the return to itself) as a determinateness. This positedness is at the same time its return to itself, and therefore is, at this point, its effect; but conversely, because, as presupposing, it determines itself as its Other, it posits effect in the other (or passive) substance.—In other words, passive substance itself is twofold (it is an independent Other, and also it is presupposed and in itself already identical with the active cause), and therefore the activity of

substance is twofold. Two are here in one; the transcendence of its determinateness (that is, of its condition, or the transcendence of the independence of passive substance)—and the transcending of its identity with it, so that it presupposes itself or posits itself as Other.—Passive substance is preserved by the latter moment: its first transcendence appears, in reference to this, in this manner, that only some out of more determinations are transcended in it, and it becomes identical with the first substance in the effect, and in an external manner.

To this extent it is subjected to force.—Force is the appearance of power, or power as something external. But power is external only in so far as the causal substance in its activity (that is, in positing itself) at the same time presupposes itself, that is, posits itself as transcended. Conversely therefore the activity of force is an activity of power. The forceful cause acts only upon an Other presupposed by itself; its effect upon it is negative self-relation or the manifestation of itself. The passive is the independent which is only a posited entity, it is intro-refracted,—an actuality which is condition, and moreover condition in its truth: an actuality which is only a possibility, or, conversely, a Being-in-Self which is only the determinateness of Being-in-Self, or merely passive. Consequently that upon which force is exerted is not only capable of suffering force, but force *must* be applied to it; that which has force over the Other has it only because it is the latter's power which therein manifests both itself and the Other. Passive substance is only *posited* by force as that which in truth it is: because it is the simple positive or immediate substance, for that very reason it is only something posited; as condition it is a *prius* which is the show of immediacy, and of this show active causality strips it.

Thus the influence of another force upon passive substance is no more than its due. What it loses is that immediacy, or substantiality which is foreign to it. And what comes to it as foreign—namely, to be determined as a positedness—is its proper determination.—But when now it is posited in its own positedness or in its proper determination, it is not transcended thereby, but merely coincides with itself, and thus, when subject to determination, is originality.—Thus passive substance on the one hand is preserved or posited by active substance,

in so far, namely, as the latter constitutes itself transcended substance;—on the other hand it is the very activity of the passive to coincide with itself, and thereby to make itself original and cause. For it, to be posited by an Other, and to become, are one and the same thing.

Passive substance has now been converted into cause, and hereby, first, effect is transcended in it: in this consists its Reaction in general. In itself it is positedness, as passive substance; and also positedness has been posited in it through the other substance—that is, in so far as it received in itself the effect of the latter. Consequently its Reaction also contains this twofold fact, namely, first, that that which it is *in itself* is *posited*, and secondly that that as which it is *posited* presents itself as its Being-in-Self. In itself it is positedness; and therefore it achieves for itself an effect through the other: but conversely this positedness is its own Being-in-Self; this is thus its own effect, and it itself presents itself as cause.

Secondly, Reaction is directed against the first acting cause. For that effect which substance (which before was passive) transcends within itself is precisely the effect of the first. But cause has its substantial actuality only in its effect, which being transcended, its causal substantiality is transcended. This happens, first, in itself through itself when it constitutes itself as effect; in this identity its negative determination vanishes and it becomes passive: secondly, this happens through substance which before was passive and now reacts and transcends its effect.—In Determinate Causality, too, the substance upon which action is exercised becomes cause again, and thus reacts to the fact that an effect was posited in it. But it did not react upon the cause, but in turn placed its effect in another substance,—which produced the infinite progress of effects; for here cause in its effect is only *in itself* self-identical, and, therefore, (1) vanishes in an immediate identity in its state of rest, and (2) resuscitates itself in another substance.—In conditioned causality, on the other hand, cause relates itself to itself in the effect, for it is its Other as condition (or presupposed term), so that its activity is *becoming* as much as positing and transcendence of the Other.

Further, it is thus in the attitude of passive substance; but (as already resulted) this arises through the activity which has

been exercised upon it as causal substance. That first cause, which acts first and receives back into itself its Action in the shape of Reaction, thus reappears as cause; and hereby the activity, which in finite causality runs into a progress that is infinite in the bad sense, is bent round and becomes an activity which returns upon itself, an infinite *Reciprocity*.

C

RECIPROCITY

In finite causality substances stand in a relation of activity to one another. The *mechanism* consists in this externality of causality, where the intro-Reflection of cause in its effect is, at the same time, a repellent Being, or where, in the self-identity which the causal substance has in its effect, it remains equally immediately external to itself, and effect has passed over into another substance. Now in Reciprocity this mechanism is transcended; for it contains, firstly, the disappearance of that original survival of immediate substantiality, and secondly the arising of cause, and thus also originality, as mediating itself with itself through its negation.

At this point Reciprocity presents itself as a reciprocal causality of presupposed and self-conditioning substances; each is, in relation to the other, at once active and passive substance. Both being thus as well passive as active, every distinction between them is already transcended: it is a perfectly transparent Show: they are substances only inasmuch as they are the identity of active and passive. Consequently Reciprocity itself is still only an empty *way and manner*, and all that is yet required is an external comprehension of what already is as much *in itself as posited*. First, it is no longer substrata that are here in relation, but substances; in the movement of conditioned Causality, presupposed immediacy (which still remained) has transcended itself, and the conditioning element of causal activity is now only *influence* or proper passivity. But, further, this influence is not derived from some other original substance, but from some causal nature which is conditioned by influence, or is a mediated entity. Consequently this entity, which is as yet external, but belongs to cause and constitutes the side of

its passivity, is mediated through cause itself; it is produced by its own activity, and is thus passivity posited through its own activity.—Causality conditions and is conditioned; that which conditions is passive, but what is conditioned is passive equally. This conditioning (or passivity) is the self-negation of cause, when it essentially constitutes itself effect and for that very reason is cause. Thus Reciprocity is only Causality itself: cause not only has an effect, but in the effect stands related, as cause, to itself.

Hereby Causality has returned to its absolute notion, and at the same time has reached the Notion itself. At first it is Real Necessity, absolute self-identity, so that the differentiation of Necessity, and the determinations which in it are related to each other, are substances or free actualities as against each other. In this manner Necessity is inner identity; Causality is its manifestation, where its show of substantial otherness has transcended itself and Necessity is raised to the rank of Freedom.—In Reciprocity, original Causality presents itself as an arising out of its negation (or passivity) and as a passing away into it—as a Becoming, but in such a manner that this Becoming is equally only a showing; the transition into other is intro-Reflection; negation, which is the ground of cause, is its positive self-coincidence.

Necessity and Causality have, then, vanished in it; they contain both the immediate identity (as connexion and relation) and the absolute substantiality of distincts, and therefore their absolute contingency,—the original unity of substantial variety, in other words absolute contradiction. Necessity is Being, *because* it is,—the self-unity of Being, which has itself for ground; but, conversely, because it has a ground, it is not Being, it is nothing whatever but Show, relation or mediation. Causality is this posited transition of original Being, or cause, into Show or mere positedness, and conversely of positedness into originality; but the identity itself of Being and Show is, still, inner Necessity. This internality (or Being-in-Self) transcends the movement of Causality; and, concurrently, the substantiality of the sides which are in relation is lost—Necessity unveils itself. Necessity does not become Freedom because it vanishes, but only because its identity (as yet an inner identity) is manifested,—a manifestation which is the identical move-

ment into themselves of the distincts, the intro-Reflection of Show as Show.—Conversely Contingency at the same time becomes Freedom, in that the sides of Necessity, which have the shape of actualities that are free for themselves and do not show in each other, are now posited as identity; so that these totalities of intro-Reflection in their distinction now also show as identical, or are posited as only one and the same Reflection.

Absolute Substance distinguishes itself from itself as Absolute Form; but in doing so it no longer repels itself as Necessity from itself, nor falls apart as Contingency into indifferent substances external to one another: it distinguishes itself (1) into the totality—passive substance above—which is something original as intro-Reflection out of determinateness, as simple whole containing its own positedness in itself and posited in it as self-identical,—the Universal; and (2) into totality—causal substance above—as into intro-Reflection equally out of determinateness to negative determinateness, which thus as self-identical determinateness is likewise the whole, but is posited as self-identical negativity: the Individual. But, immediately, the Universal is self-identical only because it contains determinateness as transcended; it is the negative as negative; and therefore it is that same negativity which Individuality is;—and Individuality is similarly the determinate Determinate, the negative as negative, and therefore is, immediately, that same identity which Universality is. This their simple identity is Particularity, which receives from the Individual the moment of determinateness, and from the Universal the moment of intro-Reflection, in immediate unity. These three totalities are consequently one and the same Reflection, which as negative self-relation distinguishes itself into these two; but the distinction is a completely transparent one, for it is only a distinction into determinate simplicity and simple determinateness, which are just one and the same identity.—This is *the Notion*, the realm of Subjectivity or of Freedom.

VOLUME II

SUBJECTIVE LOGIC

OR

THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION

ADVERTISEMENT

THIS part of the Logic, which contains the Doctrine of the Notion and constitutes the third division of the whole, is published also under the separate title of *System of Subjective Logic* for the convenience of those friends of this science who generally are more interested in the matters here treated, and comprised in logic commonly so-called, than in the further logical subjects which were dealt with in the first two divisions.—For those earlier divisions I could claim the indulgence of a fair judge on the score of the scanty work done in this field which could have afforded me either starting-point, matter, or line of direction. Here I may appeal to such indulgence from the opposite ground; for the Logic of the Notion finds ready a perfectly finished and compact or, so to say, ossified material, and the task is to render it fluid and to rekindle the life-spark of the Notion in such dead matter. It is difficult to build a new city in a waste land: on the other part, there is material enough at hand, but there are also all the more obstacles of another kind, when it is desired to give a new plan to an old city, firmly built and never without owners and inhabitants. It is necessary to make this resolve among others—that no use at all shall be made of a great deal of the stock which elsewhere is held in value.—

But chiefly the greatness of the subject itself may be urged as an excuse for the imperfect execution. For what subject is more sublime for cognition than truth itself?—And the doubt whether perhaps it is not this subject itself which requires excuse is not impertinent if it is remembered in what sense Pilate put his question “What is truth?”:—as the poet says, “with the air of the courtier, which, short-sighted and smiling, damns the cause of gravity.”¹ This question implies the meaning (which may be regarded as a component part of courtliness), and a reminder thereof, that the goal—to know the truth—has of course long been abandoned and dropped, and that the unattainable nature of truth is recognized even among

¹ Klopstock, *Der Messias*, 7th canto.

professional philosophers and logicians.—And if the enquiry of religion about the value of things, sentiments, and acts—an enquiry which has substantially the same meaning—lays claim to its rights more and more in our days, then philosophy too may hope that it may no longer be held surprising if once more it asserts its real aim (in its immediate field at first), and, having sunk to the methods of other sciences and to their renunciation of truth, now once more endeavours to rise to its goal. It cannot really be permitted to advance any excuse for this attempt; but, with regard to its execution, I may plead this for myself, that the conditions of my office and other personal circumstances allowed me only a distracted labour upon this science, which demands, and is worthy of, an effort undistracted and undivided.

NÜRNBERG,
21st *July* 1816.

ON THE NOTION IN GENERAL

THE nature of the Notion can no more be indicated immediately than the notion of any other object can be established immediately. It might seem that, in order to indicate the notion of an object, the logical element were presupposed, and that this in turn could have nothing for antecedent, and could not be derived; as in geometry logical propositions (as they appear in application to magnitude and are used in that science) are premised in the form of axioms, underived and underivable determinations of cognition. Now the Notion must be looked upon not merely as a subjective presupposition, but as absolute foundation; but still it cannot *be*, except in so far as it has *made* itself, foundation. It is true that the abstract immediate is a *prius*; but as abstract it is, rather, mediated, so that its foundation must first be sought if it is to be seized in its truth. Consequently the foundation must be immediate, but in such a manner that it has made itself immediate, mediation having been transcended.

From this side, and in general, the Notion must be looked upon as the third term (where Being and Essence, or the Immediate and Reflection, are the other two). In this regard, Being and Essence are the moments of its becoming; but the Notion is their foundation and truth, as that identity in which they have been submerged and are contained. They are contained in it because it is their result, but no longer as Being and as Essence: they have this latter determination only in so far as they have not yet passed back into this their unity.

Accordingly Objective Logic, which considers Being and Essence, really constitutes the genetic exposition of the Notion. And (to come to details) Substance already is real Essence, or Essence in so far as it is united to Being and has entered into actuality. Consequently the Notion has Substance for immediate presupposition; Substance is that *in itself* which the Notion is as *manifested* entity. Hence the dialectic movement of Substance through Causality and Reciprocity is the immediate genesis of the Notion, and represents its becoming. But

its becoming (like Becoming everywhere) has the meaning that it is the Reflection into its Ground of that which passes over, and that which first appears as Other into which the former has passed over, constitutes its truth. Thus the Notion is the truth of Substance; and, since Necessity is the specific mode of relation of Substance, Freedom shows itself to be the truth of Necessity and the specific relation of the Notion.

The peculiar and necessary process of determination of Substance is the positing of that which is in and for itself; the Notion is this absolute unity of Being and Reflection,—that Being-in-and-for-Self is only because it is also Reflection or positedness, and that positedness is Being-in-and-for-Self.—This abstract result explains itself through the presentation of its concrete genesis: this latter contains the nature of the Notion, but must precede its treatment. The chief moments of this exposition (which has been treated in detail in Book Two of Objective Logic) can therefore here be briefly summarized.

Substance is the Absolute, the Actual which is in and for itself:—*in itself*, as simple identity of Possibility and Actuality, absolute Essence which contains in *itself* all Actuality and Possibility; and *for itself* as being this identity as absolute power or simply self-relating negativity.—The movement of Substantiality which is posited through these moments has the following structure.

1. Substance as absolute power or self-relating negativity divides itself and becomes a relation wherein those moments, which at first are only simple, exist as substances and as original presuppositions.—The definite relation between them is that between a passive and an active substance; between the originality of simple Being-in-Self which is powerless, does not, therefore, posit itself, and is only original positedness,—and self-relating negativity, which as such has posited itself as Other and relates itself to this Other. This Other is passive substance, which the active, in the originality of its power, has presupposed for itself as condition.—This presupposing must be conceived in this manner, that the movement of Substance is at first under the form of one moment of its notion, of Being-in-Self; that the determinateness of one of the related substances is also the determinateness of this relation itself.

2. The other moment is Being-for-Self, where power posits itself as self-relating negativity, whereby it cancels again the term which had been presupposed.—Active substance is Cause; it acts; that is, it now posits what it presupposed before, namely that (a) power has now also the show of power, and positedness the show of positedness. What in presupposition was original becomes in causality, through relation to Other, what it is in itself. Cause produces an effect, and produces it in another substance; it is now power in relation to Other, and thus appears as cause, but *is* this only by virtue of this appearance.—(b) Effect is achieved on passive substance, and thus it now appears also as positedness, but *is* passive substance only in this appearance.

3. But there is more here than only this appearance. (a) Cause acts upon passive substance and changes its determination. But Substance is positedness, apart from which there is nothing in it susceptible of change, while the other determination which it receives is causal nature; passive substance thus becomes cause, power, and activity. (b) Effect is posited in it by cause; but that which cause posits is cause itself which, in action, is self-identical; it is cause which substitutes itself for passive substance.—In regard to active substance similarly (a) action is the translation of cause into effect (its Other), or positedness; and (b) in effect cause shows itself for what it is: effect is identical with cause and is not an Other; cause in action thus shows positedness as that which essentially it is.—Each thus becomes its own opposite, and that from both sides, from the identical as well as the negative relating of the other to it; but each side becomes this opposite in such a manner that the other (and therefore also each) remains identical with itself.—But both—negative and positive relating—are one and the same thing; Substance is self-identical only in its opposite, and this constitutes the absolute identity of the substances which are posited as being two. Active substance is manifested in *action* as cause or original substantiality; and action means that it posits itself as its own opposite, which is also the transcendence of its presupposed otherness, of passive substance. Conversely, through this operation positedness is manifested as positedness, the negative as negative, and consequently passive substance as self-relating negativity; and cause, in this its absolute Other,

simply coincides with itself. Through this positing, then, presupposed or *self-existent* originality becomes *for itself*; but this Being-in-and-for-Self is only because this positing is equally a transcendence of that which is presupposed, or, because absolute Substance has returned to itself only from and in its positedness, and thereby is absolute. This Reciprocity is thus the self-transcending appearance, the revelation of the show of causality, where cause is *as* cause of show being show. This infinite intro-Reflection where Being-in-and-for-Self is only because it is positedness, is the consummation of Substance. But this consummation is no longer Substance itself, but something higher—the Notion, the Subject. The transition of the Relation of Substantiality takes place by virtue of its own immanent necessity, and is no more than the manifestation of this itself,—of the fact that the Notion is its truth, and Freedom the truth of Necessity.

It has been mentioned already in Book Two of Objective Logic (p. 167, Observation) that the philosophy which takes up the standpoint of Substance, and there halts, is the system of Spinoza. At that place the deficiency of this system both in form and matter was demonstrated. But to refute it is another matter. With respect to the refutation of a philosophic system, the general observation was made in another place that it must be purged of the erroneous idea that the system is to be presented as false throughout, and that the true system is just opposed to the false. The connexion in which Spinoza's system here occurs shows of itself its true standpoint, and that of the question whether it is true or false. The Relation of Substantiality evolved itself out of the nature of Essence; therefore this relation, and its representation extended into the comprehensiveness of a system, is a necessary standpoint which the Absolute occupies. Such a standpoint must not then be regarded as an opinion, a subjective and arbitrary manner of imagining or thinking peculiar to an individual, nor as an aberration of speculation; rather, speculation in its course necessarily is promoted to this point, and in so far the system is perfectly true.—But it is not the highest standpoint. The system, however, cannot for this reason be regarded as false, as needing and capable of refutation: only its claim to be the highest standpoint is to be considered as false in it. And hence

the true system cannot have the relation to it of being merely its opposite; for then this opposite would itself be one-sided. Much rather, being superior, it must contain the subordinate.

Further, the refutation must not come from outside; that is, it must not proceed from assumptions which lie beyond that system and do not correspond with it. It only requires not to acknowledge those assumptions; a flaw is a flaw only for those who proceed from requirements and needs which are based upon it. In this sense it has been said that no refutation of Spinoza's system can be made for those who do not presuppose for themselves as decided the freedom and independence of the self-conscious subject. In any case, a standpoint so high and already in itself so rich as is the Relation of Substantiality does not ignore those assumptions, but also contains them: *Thought* is one of the attributes of Spinoza's Substance. This standpoint rather succeeds in resolving and absorbing the determinations in which those assumptions conflict with it, so that (but with the modifications appropriate to it) they appear in this standpoint. The sinew of external refutation is this alone—firmly and rigidly on their side to uphold the opposite forms of the given assumptions,—for example, the absolute self-persistence of the thinking individual as against the form of Thought as the latter is posited in absolute Substance—namely, as identical with Extension. True refutation must engage the force of the opponent and must place itself within the compass of his strength; the task is not advanced if he is attacked outside himself and the case is carried in his absence. Hence the refutation of Spinoza's system can consist solely in this, that his standpoint be first recognized as essential and as necessary, but that secondly this standpoint be raised *out of itself* to a higher. The Relation of Substantiality, considered solely *in and for itself*, leads over to its opposite, the Notion. Consequently the exposition of Substance contained in the last book, which leads over to the Notion, is the only and veritable refutation of Spinoza's system. It is the *revelation* of Substance, and the latter is the *genesis of the Notion*, of which the chief moments were summarized above.—The oneness of Substance is its relation of Necessity; but thus it is only inner Necessity; and, positing itself through the moment of absolute negativity, it becomes manifested or posited identity and consequently Freedom,

which is the identity of the Notion. The Notion is the totality which results from Reciprocity, and is the unity of the two substances of Reciprocity, but is so in such a manner that now they belong to Freedom; for the identity which they have is no longer blind nor *inner*, and their essential determination is that they are Show or moments of Reflection, where each has immediately coincided with its Other or its positedness, and each contains its positedness in itself and thus is simply posited as self-identical in its Other.

In the Notion, accordingly, the realm of Freedom has opened. The Notion is the free because it is the identity which is in and for itself and which constitutes the necessity of Substance; simultaneously it exists as transcended or as positedness, and this positedness, as self-relating, is precisely that identity. The darkness in which each of the substances which are in the Relation of Causality stands to the other, has vanished, for the originality of their individual persistence has passed over into positedness, and has thereby become self-transparent clarity. The *original* fact is this in being only its own cause, and this is Substance which, having achieved Freedom, has become Notion.

From this the following and closer determination for the Notion immediately results. Being-in-and-for-Self is immediately as positedness, and therefore the Notion in its simple self-relation is absolute determinateness; which, however, equally as merely self-relating is immediately simple identity. But this self-relation of determinateness, as its own self-coincidence, is equally the negation of determinateness, and as this self-equality the Notion is the Universal. But this identity has just as much the determination of negativity; it is negation or determinateness which relates itself to itself: and thus the Notion is Individual. Each of the two is the totality, and each contains the determination of the other; and for this reason these totalities are one, as much as this unity is its own schism into the free Show of this duality,—a duality which in the distinction between individual and universal appears as complete opposition, but is Show so much that as soon as one is conceived and enunciated the other is therein immediately conceived and enunciated.

What has just been submitted should be considered as the

notion of the Notion. If this notion seems to deviate from what is asserted to be the common view of Notion, it might be asked that a demonstration be furnished how that which here has yielded itself as the Notion is contained in any other conceptions or explanations. But on the one hand there can be no question here of a confirmation founded upon the authority of ordinary understanding: in the science of the Notion its content and determination can be vouched for only by the immanent deduction which is contained in its genesis, and which we have already left behind. On the other hand surely the Notion which has here been deduced must be recognizable in what is elsewhere offered as the notion of Notion. But it is not so easy to discover what others have said about the nature of the Notion. For, generally, they do not concern themselves at all with this quest, and presuppose that everyone understands automatically when the Notion is discussed. Recently men might have considered themselves superior to all trouble about the Notion,—the more so because it was the fashion for some time to speak ill in every way of imagination and also of memory; and because for long it has been and still is in part a practice in philosophy to heap every calumny upon the Notion, to ridicule that which is the summit of thought, and to regard as the highest peak both in the scientific and in the moral sphere the renunciation of Notion both as objective and as method.

I here restrict myself to an observation which may serve to render intelligible the concepts here developed and to make them more easily acceptable. The Notion, in so far as it has advanced into such an existence as is free itself, is just the Ego, or pure self-consciousness. It is true that I have notions—that is, determinate notions; but Ego is the pure Notion itself, which as Notion has reached Existence. If therefore the fundamental determinations which constitute the nature of the Ego are recalled, it may be assumed that mention is being made of something which is known, that is, which is familiar to imagination. Now Ego is this unity which, first, is pure and self-relating, and is so not immediately, but abstracting from every determinateness and content and passing back into the freedom of boundless self-equality. It is thus *universality*: unity which is self-unity only by virtue of this negative attitude which

appears as abstraction, and therefore contains dissolved within itself all determinateness. Secondly, and equally immediately, Ego as self-relating negativity is *individuality*, or absolute determinedness which opposes itself to and excludes Other: it is individual personality. That absolute universality which equally immediately is absolute individualization, and a Being-in-and-for-Self which is simply positedness and is this Being-in-and-for-Self only by virtue of the unity with positedness, constitutes equally the nature of Ego and of the Notion; no notion can be formed about either unless the two moments mentioned are taken at once in their abstraction and at once in their complete unity.

If the understanding, which I have, is spoken of in the ordinary manner, a capacity or property is understood thereby which is related to the Ego as the property of the thing to the *thing* itself—to an indeterminate substratum which is not the true ground and determining element of its property. According to this idea I have notions and the Notion as I have a coat, colour, and other external properties.—Kant has passed beyond this external relation of the understanding (taken as the capacity of notions and of the Notion itself) to the Ego. Among the profoundest and most correct discoveries of the Critique of Reason is this, that the unity which constitutes the essence of the Notion is recognized to be the original and synthetic unity of apperception, as unity of the “I think” or of self-consciousness.—This proposition constitutes the so-called transcendental deduction of the category; but it has always been counted for one of the hardest parts of Kant’s philosophy—probably for no other reason than because it demands that the bare image of the relation in which the Ego and the understanding (or the notions) stand to a thing with its properties and accidents, must be superseded by thought proper. The *object*, says Kant (*Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 137, 2nd edition), is that in whose notion the manifold of a given intuition is unified. But every unification of ideas requires unity of consciousness in their synthesis. Consequently this unity of consciousness alone is that which constitutes the relation of the ideas to an object, that is, their objective validity: upon it alone even the possibility of understanding rests. Kant distinguishes from this the *subjective unity* of consciousness, the unity of

ideation: I may be conscious of a manifold as simultaneous or as a sequence, and this is stated to depend upon empirical conditions. On the contrary, the principles of the objective determination of ideas must be derived wholly from the law of the transcendental unity of apperception. The categories (which are these objective determinations) so determine the manifold of given ideas that it is reduced to the unity of consciousness.—According to this representation, the unity of the Notion is that by virtue of which something is *object* and not merely determination of sensation, intuition, or mere idea; and this objective unity is the self-unity of the Ego.—And indeed to form a notion of an object consists just in this, that the Ego appropriates it, penetrates it, and reduces it into its own form, that is, universality which is immediately determinateness, or determinateness which is immediately universality. In intuition and also in ideation the object still is external and foreign. When a notion is formed of it, the Being-in-and-for-Self which it has in intuition and ideation is changed into a positedness: Ego penetrates it in and by *thinking*. But the object is truly *in and for itself* only as it is in thought; as it is in intuition or ideation it is *appearance*; thought transcends its immediacy, with which at first it meets us, and thus makes it a positedness; but this its positedness is its Being-in-and-for-Self or its objectivity. Hence the object has this objectivity in the Notion, and the Notion is the unity of self-consciousness into which the object has been taken up. Consequently its objectivity (or the Notion) is nothing else than the nature of self-consciousness, and has no other moments or determinations than the Ego itself.

Thus a capital proposition of Kant's philosophy furnishes the justification of the method, when the nature of the Ego is recalled in order that the Notion may be understood. But conversely it is necessary for this that the *notion* of the Ego (as cited above) shall have been grasped. If a halt is made at the mere idea [*Vorstellung*] of the Ego as it is present to our ordinary consciousness, then Ego is only that simple *thing*, which is also called soul, in which the notion inheres as a possession or property. This idea, which does not attempt to form a notion of either Ego or the Notion, cannot serve to make it an easier or readier matter to form a notion of the Notion.

Kant's account of this matter, which has been quoted, contains two further sides which concern the Notion and necessitate some further observations. First, the stages of sensation and intuition are made to precede the stage of understanding, and it is an essential proposition of Kant's transcendental philosophy that notions without intuition are empty, and have validity only as relations of the manifold which is given by intuition. Secondly, the Notion has been indicated as the *objective* element of cognition, and consequently as the truth. But on the other side it is taken as something merely subjective, out of which reality (by which objectivity must be understood, since it is contrasted with subjectivity) cannot be extracted; and, in general, both the Notion and the logical element are declared to be something merely formal which abstracts from content and therefore does not contain truth.

Now, first, with regard to this relation of the understanding or the Notion to the stages which are supposed to precede it, it is of importance what science it is that is being treated, in order to determine the form of these stages. In our science, since it is pure logic, these stages are Being and Essence. In psychology, sensation and intuition and also ideation [*Vorstellung*] in general precede understanding. In the Phenomenology of Spirit, since it is the doctrine of consciousness, the ascent was made through the stages of sensuous consciousness and, next, perception, to understanding. Kant places only sensation and intuition before this: and he himself allows us to recognize how incomplete this scale is by adding as appendix to the Transcendental Logic (or doctrine of the understanding) a treatise on the Notions of Reflection—a sphere which lies between intuition and understanding, or between Being and the Notion.

Concerning this matter itself, we may first observe that these forms of intuition, ideation, and the like belong to self-conscious spirit, which is not considered as such in the science of logic. It is true that the pure determinations of Being, Essence, and Notion also constitute the foundation and the inner simple framework of the forms of spirit: spirit as intuitive and also as sensuous consciousness is in the determinateness of immediate Being; while spirit as ideating as well as perceiving consciousness has risen from Being to the stage of

Essence or of Reflection. But these concrete shapes concern the science of logic no more than the concrete forms which the logical determinations assume in nature, which forms would be space and time, and, further, filled space and time (as inorganic nature), and finally organic nature. And further the Notion must not here be considered as an act of self-conscious understanding, or as subjective understanding: what we have to do with is the Notion in and for itself, which constitutes a stage as well of Nature as of Spirit. Life, or organic nature, is that stage of nature at which the Notion emerges, but as blind, not self-comprehending, and therefore not thinking, Notion: as thinking it belongs only to Spirit. But the logical form of the Notion does not depend upon either its non-spiritual or its spiritual shape, and what was necessary has already been premised about this in the Introduction. This is a significance which cannot be justified within the body of logic: there must be no doubt about it before logic is attempted.

But, secondly, whatever shape the forms which precede the Notion may be given, the relation is of importance in which the Notion is thought of as standing to them. Both in the common psychological representation and in Kant's transcendental philosophy this relation is assumed to be such that the empirical material, the manifold of intuition and of ideation, first exists *for itself*, and that next understanding addresses it, unifies it, and by abstraction raises it into the form of universality. Here understanding is an empty form, which partly achieves reality only by this content which is given it and partly abstracts from it, leaving it aside as useless, but useless only for the Notion. In both of these activities the Notion is not the independent, is not the essential and true part of the preceding material, but this latter rather is reality in and for itself, which cannot be extracted out of the Notion.

It must indeed be admitted that the Notion as such is not yet complete, but must rise into the Idea, which is the unity of Notion and Reality; this must result of itself below, out of the nature of the Notion. For the reality which it gives itself must not be taken up as external: science demands that it should be derived from the Notion itself. Certainly it is not the material given by intuition and ideation that may be claimed as real in opposition to the Notion. "It is only a

notion" is a thing commonly said; and not only the Idea, but sensuous, spatial, and temporal palpable existence is opposed to the Notion, as something which is more excellent than it. And the abstract is counted of less worth than the concrete, because from the former so much of that kind of material has been omitted. To those who hold this, the process of abstraction means that for our subjective needs one or another characteristic is taken out of the concrete in such a manner that, while so many other properties and modifications of the object are omitted, these lose nothing in value or dignity. They are the real and are reckoned as counting in full, only they are left on the other side; and it is only the incapacity of understanding to absorb such riches that forces it to rest content with meagre abstraction. But if the given material of intuition and the manifold of ideation are taken as the real in opposition to that which is thought and to the Notion, then this is a view the renunciation of which is not only a condition of philosophy, but is assumed even by religion; for how can these be needed and have significance if the fugitive and superficial appearance of the sensuous and the individual are taken for the truth? But philosophy furnishes an insight, in terms of the Notion, into the value of this reality of sensuous Being, and prefaces understanding with those stages of sensation and intuition, sensuous consciousness and so forth, so far as they are the conditions of its becoming: this they are only in such a manner that the Notion emerges out of their dialectic and nothingness as their Ground, but is in no way conditioned by their reality. Consequently abstracting thought must not be considered as a mere setting-aside of the sensuous material, whose reality is said not to be lowered thereby; but it is its transcendence, and the reduction of it (as from mere appearance) to the essential, which manifests itself in the Notion only. Of course, if what is to be taken up out of concrete appearance into the Notion is to serve only as a mark or symbol, then indeed it may be any merely sensuous and individual determination of the object, which is selected from the others for the sake of some external interest and is of the same kind and nature as the rest.

The principal misapprehension here is, that the natural principle or the *beginning* which is the starting-point in the natural development or in the history of the individual in its

formation, is taken as the true and as that which is *first* also in the Notion. It is true that in nature intuition or Being is *prius* or condition for the Notion, but neither is for that reason in and for itself unconditioned: indeed, in the Notion their reality is transcended, and with it the show which they had as conditioning realities. If, instead of the search for truth, the aim is to narrate what happens in ideation and appearing thought, then a halt may be made at the point where the story is told that we begin with sensations and intuitions, and that understanding extracts from their manifold a universality or an abstract, and, naturally, requires that foundation to remain present before imagination in this process of abstraction with all the reality in which it first showed itself. But philosophy is not meant to be a narrative of what happens, but a cognition of what is true in happenings, and, further, it has to form a Notion out of the body of truth about that which in the narrative appears as mere happening.

In the superficial idea about the nature of the Notion, all multiplicity stands outside it, and it has only the form of abstract universality or of empty identity of Reflection; but it may be recalled that elsewhere too, where a notion or a definition is given, a specific determinateness is explicitly required in addition to the species, which is itself not really purely abstract universality. If only some thoughtful consideration were applied to the meaning of this, it would be plain that *distinction* is implicitly regarded as an equally essential moment of the Notion. Kant led up to this idea by the extremely important reflection that there are synthetic judgments *a priori*. This original synthesis of apperception is one of the profoundest principles for speculative development; it contains the beginning of a correct understanding of the nature of the Notion, and is absolutely opposed to that empty identity or abstract universality which is no synthesis in itself.—But the further development little fulfils the promise of this beginning. The very term “synthesis” again leads easily to the image of an external unity and mere connexion of elements which in and for themselves are separate. Next, Kant’s philosophy made a halt at the psychological reflex of the Notion, and returned again to the assertion of the permanent conditionedness of the Notion by a manifold of intuition. It pronounced the discoveries of

understanding, and experience, to be an appearing content not because the categories themselves are only finite but by reason of a psychological idealism, because they are *only* determinations which are derived from self-consciousness. It also belongs to this place that the Notion, without the manifold of intuition, is again supposed to be void of content and empty, in spite of the fact that *a priori* it is supposed to be a synthesis; which if it is, it has determinateness and distinction within itself. The synthesis is the determinateness of the Notion, and, therefore, absolute determinateness or individuality, and consequently the Notion is ground and source of all finite determinateness and multiplicity.

The formal position which the Notion retains as understanding is completed in Kant's presentation of the nature of Reason. It might be expected that in Reason, which is the highest stage of thought, the Notion would lose that conditionedness in which it appears at the stage of understanding, and would reach perfected truth. But this expectation is cheated. Kant determines the attitude of Reason to the categories as being merely dialectic, and takes the result of this dialectic as being just infinite Nothing; and thereby the infinite unity of Reason loses even the synthesis, and, with it, the beginning of a speculative and truly infinite Notion: it becomes the well-known, quite formal, merely regulative unity of the systematic practice of understanding. It is declared to be an abuse if logic, which ought to be merely a canon of judgment, is regarded as an organ for the production of objective discoveries. The notions of Reason, in which a higher force and a deeper content were of necessity divined, are less *constitutive* than even the categories; they are mere ideas. Their use may certainly be permissible, but these intelligible essences, which should wholly unlock the truth, are to signify no more than hypotheses; and it would be completely arbitrary and reckless to ascribe any truth to them in and for themselves, since they *can occur in no kind of experience*.—Could it ever have been thought that philosophy would gainsay the validity of the intelligible essences because they are without the spatial and temporal material of sensuousness?

With this the point of view is immediately connected with respect to which the Notion and the determination of logic in

general must be considered: this in Kant's philosophy is taken in the same manner as it is taken commonly. This point of view is the relation of the Notion and its science to truth itself. We quoted above from Kant's deduction of the categories that, according to it, the object, in which the manifold of intuition is united, is this unity only by virtue of the unity of self-consciousness. Thus the objectivity of thought is here definitely asserted—an identity of the Notion and the thing, which is the truth. In a like manner it is generally admitted that when thought appropriates a given object, this undergoes a change, and having been an object of sense becomes an object of thought; but that this change not only does not alter its essentiality, but that it is in its truth only in its Notion, while in the immediacy in which it is given it is only appearance and contingency; and that cognition of the object which forms a Notion of it is a cognition of it as it is in and for itself, and the Notion is its very objectivity. But, on the other side, the assertion is made again that we surely cannot know things as they are in and for themselves, and that truth does not allow cognizing reason to approach it; that truth which consists in the unity of object and Notion is after all only appearance, and the reason now is that its content is only the manifold of intuition. Of this argument it has already been remarked that this manifoldness, in so far as it belongs to intuition as opposed to the Notion, is transcended precisely in the Notion, and that the object is led back by the Notion into its non-contingent essentiality; the latter enters into appearance, and for this very reason the appearance is not merely non-essential, but manifestation of Essence. But that manifestation of it which has become entirely free is the Notion.—The propositions which are here mentioned are not dogmatic assertions, for they are results produced through themselves in the course of the entire development of Essence. The standpoint to which this development has led is, now, that that form of the Absolute which is higher than Being and Essence is the Notion. From this side it has subordinated to itself Being and Essence (which, with other starting-points, include sensation, intuition, and ideation): these appeared as its precedent conditions, and it has now proved itself their unconditioned Ground. There now remains therefore the second side (to the treatment of which this third

book of the Logic is devoted)—which shows how the Notion forms in and out of itself that Reality which has vanished in it. It has here been admitted that cognition which has halted at the Notion purely as such, is incomplete as yet and has reached only abstract truth. But its incompleteness lies not in any lack of the “reality” which sensation and intuition are supposed to give, but in the fact that the Notion has not yet given itself its own self-generated Reality. The absoluteness of the Notion, which is proved upon and in empirical matter (and, more exactly, in its categories and determinations of reflection), consists in this, that the latter has truth not as it appears apart from and before the Notion, but only in its ideality, or in its identity with the Notion. The derivation (if that is to be its name) of the real from it here consists essentially in this, that the Notion in its formal abstraction shows itself to be incomplete, and passes over to reality by the dialectic which is founded upon itself; it does this by generating reality from within itself, and not by falling back again into a reality which it finds standing ready over against it, nor by taking refuge with something which had manifested itself as the unessential of appearance because, having looked for something better, it has failed to find it.—It will always remain a matter for astonishment how the Kantian philosophy knew that relation of thought to sensuous existence, where it halted, for a merely relative relation of bare appearance, and fully acknowledged and asserted a higher unity of the two in the Idea in general, and, particularly, in the idea of an intuitive understanding; but yet stopped dead at this relative relation and at the assertion that the Notion is and remains utterly separated from reality;—so that it affirmed as true what it pronounced to be finite knowledge, and declared to be superfluous and improper figments of thought that which it recognized as truth, and of which it established the definite notion.

Since it is logic, and not science in general, whose relation to the truth is here under discussion, it must further be admitted that the former, as formal science, cannot and ought not to contain that reality too which is the content of further parts of philosophy—the Sciences of Nature and of Spirit. These concrete sciences do indeed emerge into a more real form of the Idea than does logic,—but not in such a manner as to turn

back to that reality which consciousness has given up when rising beyond its appearance into science, or to revert to the use of forms (such as the categories or determinations of reflection) whose finitude and invalidity have proved themselves in the logic. Logic rather shows the elevation of the Idea to that stage from which it becomes the creator of Nature and passes over to the form of a concrete immediacy, the Notion of which, however, breaks this mould too when, as concrete Spirit, it becomes itself. These are concrete sciences; the logical element, or the Notion, is and remains that which moulded and still moulds them; and, as opposed to these, logic itself is the *formal* science: but it is the science of *absolute form*, which is totality in itself, and contains the pure idea of truth itself. This absolute form has its content, or reality, in itself: the Notion is not trivial empty identity, and thus, in the moment of its negativity or of absolute determining, it has a variety of determinations: the content is indeed nothing else than such determinations of absolute form—the content posited by it and therefore adequate to it.—And hence this form is quite different in nature from that which normally is taken as logical form. It is truth already for itself, since this content is adequate to its form, or this reality to its Notion; and it is pure truth, because the determinations of content have not yet the form of an absolute otherness or of absolute immediacy.—When Kant (in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 83) comes to speak of the old and famous question “what is truth?” in connexion with logic, he begins by granting (as something trivial) the description of truth as the correspondence of knowledge with its object—a definition which is of great and even of the highest value. If this is recalled in connexion with the fundamental assertion of transcendental idealism, namely, that cognition by means of reason is not capable of apprehending the things-in-themselves, and that reality lies utterly outside the Notion, then it is clear immediately that such a reason, which cannot establish a correspondence between itself and its object (the things-in-themselves), is an untrue idea; and equally untrue are things-in-themselves which do not correspond with the Notion of reason, a Notion which does not correspond with reality, and a reality which does not correspond with the Notion. If Kant had kept the idea of an intuitive understanding close to this

definition of truth, then he would not have treated this idea, which expresses the required correspondence, as a figment of thought, but as truth.

"What it is required to know," Kant proceeds, "is a universal and safe criterion of the truth of every cognition; this would be a criterion valid of every cognition without distinction of object; but, since here abstraction is made from every content of cognition (namely, relation to its object), and truth concerns itself precisely with this content, it would be quite impossible and absurd to ask for a token of the truth of this content of cognitions."—Here the common view of the formal function of logic is very definitely expressed, and the argument quoted appears very convincing. But it must first be observed that such a formal argument generally comes to forget, in the course of its utterance, the matter which it has made its foundation and is now discussing. It would be absurd, we are told, to ask for a criterion of the truth of the content of cognition;—but, according to the definition, it is not the content which constitutes truth, but its correspondence with the Notion. A content such as is spoken of here, that is, without Notion, is notionless and therefore essenceless; of course it is impossible to ask for the criterion of the truth of such an entity, but for the opposite reason, namely because, lacking notion, it is not the requisite correspondence and cannot be anything but what belongs to truthless opinion.—If we omit mention of the content, which here causes the confusion (in which formalism is involved every time, being caused to say the opposite of what it would submit whenever it attempts an explanation),—if we make a halt at the abstract view that the logical is merely formal and abstracts from all content,—we then obtain a one-sided cognition which is to contain no object, a form empty and without determination, which consequently is neither correspondence (since correspondence essentially demands two) nor truth.—In the synthesis *a priori* of the Notion Kant had a higher principle, where duality could be cognized in unity, which was what was demanded for truth; but the sense-material, the manifold of intuition, was too powerful to allow him to leave it for a consideration of the Notion and of the categories in and for themselves, or for a speculative method of philosophy.

Since logic is the science of absolute form, this formal

element, in order to be true, must in itself have a content which must be adequate to its form; and this the more because the formal element of logic is pure form, so that logical truth must be pure truth. This formal element must therefore be thought of as being in itself much richer in determinations and content, and as having infinitely more influence upon the concrete, than it is generally held to do. The laws of logic in themselves (aside from applied logic and the other psychological and anthropological material, which is in any case of a different kind) are generally restricted, apart from the law of contradiction, to some few poor propositions regarding the conversion of judgments and the forms of syllogisms. The forms themselves which here occur and their further determinations are taken up in a historical manner, so to say, and are not subjected to criticism to test their truth. Thus, for example, the form of positive judgment is counted as perfectly correct in itself, the truth of such a judgment depending entirely upon its content. And no thought is given to the investigation whether this form in and for itself is a form of truth, and whether the proposition which it enunciates ("the individual is a universal") is not dialectic in itself. It is simply held that this judgment in itself is capable of containing truth, and that the proposition which every positive judgment enunciates is valid, although it is immediately clear that what the definition of truth demands is lacking in it—namely, the correspondence of the notion and its object; if the predicate (which is here the universal) is taken as the notion, and the subject (which is the individual) is taken as the object, then the one does not correspond with the other. But if the abstract universal which the predicate is does not by itself constitute a notion, which certainly requires much more beside,—just as such a subject also is not yet much more than a grammatical subject,—then how can the judgment contain truth, when its notion and object do not correspond, and perhaps the notion, or even the object, is lacking?—Hence this procedure is rather the impossibility and absurdity of attempting to frame the truth in such forms as positive judgment or judgment in general. Kant's philosophy did not consider the categories for their own sake, but only for the mistaken reason that they were thought to be subjective forms of self-consciousness, and therefore it declared them to

be finite determinations incapable of containing the truth ; and, again, it has even less submitted to criticism the forms of the Notion which are the content of ordinary logic ; rather, it has taken up part of them (namely the functions of judgments in determining a category), and has allowed them to count as valid presuppositions. But, even if the logical forms are to be regarded as nothing more than formal functions of thought, yet this character would make them worthy of an investigation as to how far they correspond to the truth in themselves. A system of logic which neglects this can claim at most to have the value of a naturalistic description of the empirical phenomena of thought. It is of infinite merit in Aristotle, and must fill us with the highest admiration of his genius, that he first undertook this description. But it is necessary to go further, and to understand both the systematic connexion and the value of the forms.

DIVISION

As considered above, the Notion shows itself to be the unity of Being and Essence. Essence is the first negation of Being, and has turned it into Show ; the Notion is the second, or the negation of this negation, that is, it is reconstructed Being, but is this as its infinite mediation and negativity in itself.—Consequently in the Notion Being and Essence no longer have the determination in which they are as Being and Essence ; nor are they in such a unity that each only *shows* in the other. Hence the Notion does not diversify itself into these determinations. It is the truth of the Relation of Substantiality, in which Being and Essence reach their perfected independence and determination one through the other. Substantial identity proved itself to be the truth of Substantiality, and this equally, and only, exists as positedness. Positedness is Determinate Being and Distinction ; consequently Being-in-and-for-Self has reached a self-adequate and true Determinate Being in the Notion ; for that positedness is Being-in-and-for-Self itself. This positedness constitutes the internal distinction of the Notion : its distinctions are themselves the whole of the Notion because it is immediately Being-in-and-for-Self : they are universal in their determinateness and identical with their negation.

This is the very Notion of the Notion. But, so far, it is *only* its Notion;—or, it is *only* Notion itself. It is Being-in-and-for-Self in so far as that is positedness; or it is absolute Substance in so far as that reveals the necessity of distinct substances as identity; and therefore this identity must itself posit that which it is. The moments of the movement of the Relation of Substantiality, out of which the Notion *became*, and the reality which they represent, are only in a state of transition to the Notion; reality is not yet its peculiar determination which has emerged from it, but fell within the sphere of Necessity; the determination of the Notion must be a free determination, an existence in which it is as identical with itself, having for moments Notions which have been posited by itself.

First, then, the Notion is truth only *in itself*; because it is only inner, it is, equally, only outer. It is first an immediate in general, and in this shape its moments have the form of immediate and fixed determinations. It appears as the determinate Notion, as the sphere of mere understanding.—This form of immediacy is an existence which is not yet adequate to its nature, since the Notion is that free entity which relates itself to itself alone; and therefore it is an external form, in which the Notion cannot count as Being-in-and-for-Self, but as only posited, or subjective.—The shape of the immediate Notion constitutes that standpoint from which the Notion is a subjective process of thought, a reflection external to the object. This stage accordingly constitutes *Subjectivity* or the Formal Notion. Its externality appears in the fixed being of its determinations, by virtue of which each comes forward as isolated and qualitative for itself, existing only in external relation to its Other. But the identity of the Notion, which is their inner or subjective essence, sets them in dialectic movement, by means of which their isolation, and consequently the separation of the Notion from the object, transcends itself: totality emerges as their truth, and this is the Objective Notion.

Secondly, the Notion in its *Objectivity* is the object which is in and for itself. The Formal Notion, in the necessary process of its determination, itself becomes the object, and therefore loses the relationship of subjectivity and externality to the object. Or, conversely, Objectivity is the Real Notion which has emerged from its internality and has passed over into existence.

CHAPTER I

THE NOTION

THE capacity of forming Notions in general is usually expressed as Understanding; and in this respect Understanding is distinguished from the power of Judgment and the capacity of Syllogisms, which is formal Reason. But chiefly it is contrasted with Reason; but in so far it does not mean the capacity of the Notion in general, but of determinate Notions: it is here imagined that the Notion is *only* a determinate entity. If Understanding in this meaning is distinguished from formal power of Judgment and formal Reason, then it must be taken as the capacity of the *individual* determinate Notion. For Judgment and Syllogism (or Reason itself) are, even as formal, only of understanding nature, because they stand under the form of abstract Notion-determinateness. But here the Notion is not counted as merely abstractly determinate entity; consequently Understanding must be distinguished from Reason only by the definition that the former is only the capacity of the Notion in general.

Now this general Notion which is here to be considered contains the three moments of Universality, Particularity, and Individuality. The distinction, and the determinations which result in the process of distinguishing, constitute the side which before was called positedness. This is in the Notion identical with Being-in-and-for-Self, and therefore each of these moments is whole Notion as much as determinate Notion or as one determination of the Notion.

At first it is pure Notion or the determination of Universality. But the pure or Universal Notion is also only a determinate or Particular Notion, which places itself alongside of the others. The Notion is the totality, and thus in its universality or pure identical self-relation is essentially the fact of determining and distinguishing; and therefore it contains in itself the standard by means of which this form of its self-identity, penetrating and comprehending all the moments, equally immediately

determines itself to be *only* the Universal as against the distinctness of the moments.

Secondly, the Notion is hereby as this Particular Notion, or as the determinate Notion which is posited as distinct from others.

Thirdly, Individuality is the Notion which reflects itself out of distinction into absolute negativity. This at the same time is the moment in which it has passed out of its identity into its otherness, and becomes the Judgment.

A

THE UNIVERSAL NOTION

The pure Notion is the absolutely infinite, unconditioned, and free. At this point, where the treatment which has the Notion for content begins, its genesis must once more be reviewed. Essence grew out of Being, and the Notion out of Essence and, in consequence, out of Being too. But this process of becoming is equivalent to the recoil of itself, so that what has become is now rather unconditioned and original. Being in its transition to Essence has become a show or positedness, and Becoming (or the transition to other) has become a positing; and conversely positing, or the Reflection of Essence, has transcended itself and has reconstructed itself to be a non-posited and original Being. The Notion is the interpenetration of these moments:—the Qualitative which has original being is only as a positing and return upon itself, and this pure intro-Reflection is simply other-becoming, or determinateness which consequently is equally infinite and self-relating determinateness.

The Notion then is, first, absolute self-identity, in such a manner that the identity is self-identity only as negation of negation, or as the infinite self-unity of negativity. This pure self-relation of the Notion, which thus this relation is as positing itself through negativity, is the Universality of the Notion.

Universality is the most simple determination, and therefore seems incapable of explanation: for an explanation must enter upon determinations and distinctions and must predicate about its object; but what is simple is changed rather than explained

by such a process. But it is precisely the nature of the universal to be such a simple entity as contains in itself the highest degree of distinctness and determinateness by virtue of absolute negativity. Being is simple because it is immediate; consequently it is only *intended*, and it is impossible to say of it what it is; it is therefore immediately one with its Other, Not-being. Just this is its Notion, to be such a simple entity as vanishes immediately into its opposite; this Notion is Becoming. The universal on the other hand is that simple entity which also is richest within itself, because it is the Notion.

For this reason it is, first, simple self-relation: it is in itself only. But, secondly, this identity is in itself absolute mediation, though it is not a mediated entity. That universal which is a mediated universal, because abstract and opposed to the particular and the individual, will not be discussed until the Determinate Notion is reached.—But the abstract already contains this, that, in order that it may be preserved, it is required that other determinations of the concrete be omitted. These determinations, as determinations, are negations; and, further, their omission also is a negating. Thus in the abstract too the negation of negation occurs. But this double negation is imagined as external to it, and as though the further properties of the concrete, which are omitted, were different from that which is retained (which is the content of the abstract); and it is also imagined that this operation of omission of the remaining properties and retention of the one takes place externally to the latter. The universal has not yet determined itself to such an externality as against this movement: as yet, it is still in itself that absolute mediation which is precisely negation of negation, or absolute negativity.

According to this original unity the first negative, or determination, is, first, no barrier for the universal, which preserves itself within it and is positively self-identical. The categories of Being as Notions were essentially these self-identities of determinations in their barrier or their otherness: but this identity was Notion only *in itself*; it was not yet manifested. Hence the qualitative determination as such perished in its other, and had for its truth a determination different from it. The universal, on the other hand, even if it posits itself into a determination, remains in it what it is. It is the soul of the

concrete in which it dwells, unimpeded and self-equal in the latter's multiplicity and variety. It is not dragged into Becoming, but continues through it undisturbed, and has the force of unchangeable and immortal self-preservation.

But equally it does not only *show* into its Other, as does the Reflection-determination. The latter, as relative, relates itself not only to itself, but also is an attitude. In its Other it manifests itself, but only *shows* in it; and, because of their independence, the showing of each in the other (or their mutual determining) has the form of an external activity.—On the other hand the universal is posited as the Essence of its determination, as its peculiar positive nature. For the determination which constitutes its negative element is in the Notion simply as a positedness, or, essentially, only as the negative of the negative; and it is only as this self-identity of the negative, which the universal is. The latter to this extent too is the *substance* of its determinations, but in such a manner that what for Substance as such was contingent is the proper self-mediation of the Notion, its peculiar immanent Reflection. But this mediation which here raises the contingent to necessity, is the manifested relation; the Notion is not the abyss of formless Substance, or necessity as the inner identity of things and circumstances which are distinct from one another and self-restrictive: as absolute negativity it forms and creates; and, because the determination is not a barrier, but is transcended as much as it is positedness, therefore the show is appearance as appearance of the identical.

The universal consequently is free power. It is itself and it encroaches upon its Other, but not by force: in its Other it is quiescent and at home. It has been called free power, but it might also have been called free love or unbounded bliss, for it is an attitude of itself to what is distinct as though it were itself; in this it has returned to itself.

Mention has been made of determinateness, although the Notion, being universal as yet and only self-identical, has not yet advanced to it. But mention of the universal involves mention of determinateness, which more closely considered is Particularity and Individuality; for, in its absolute negativity, it contains these in and for itself; therefore if determinateness is mentioned with the universal, it is not imported from without. The universal, as negativity in general (or

according to first and immediate negation), has determinateness in general in the shape of Particularity; in its second quality, and as negation of negation, it is absolute determinateness, or Individuality and concretion.—Thus the universal is the totality of the Notion; it is concrete, not empty, but rather, by virtue of its Notion, has content—a content in which it not merely preserves itself, but which is peculiar and immanent to it. Abstraction can indeed be made from the content; but the result is not the Universal of the Notion, but the Abstract, which is an isolated and incomplete moment of the Notion and has no truth.

This, in detail, is how the universal turns out to be this totality. In so far as it contains determinateness, it is not only first negation but also its intro-Reflection. Taken by itself with this first negation, it is particular (and, as such, it will be discussed forthwith); but in this determinateness it is still essentially universal; and this side still remains to be appreciated here.—For, since this determinateness is in the Notion, it is total Reflection, double Show, namely (1) Show outwards or Reflection into other, and (2) Show inwards or intro-Reflection. The external showing constitutes a distinction against Other; and accordingly the universal has a Particularity which has its solution in a higher universal. It is now only relatively universal, but in so far it does not lose its character of universal; it preserves itself in its determinateness,—and not only in such a manner as it would if remaining indifferent to while connected with it (for then it would only be composite with it), but it is that which has just been called *showing inwards*. Determinateness as determinate Notion has been bent back into itself out of externality; it is peculiar and immanent *character*, which is essential because it has been taken up into universality and penetrated by it, and thus has a like scope, is identical with it, and equally penetrates it; it is the character which belongs to the *genus* as a determinateness not severed from the universal. It is in so far not a barrier acting outwards, but is positive, since this character by virtue of universality stands in a free relation to itself. And thus the determinate Notion too remains in itself infinitely free Notion.

But in regard to the other side, in which the genus is limited by its definitive character, it has been observed that, as lower

genus, it has its solution in a higher universal. This can in turn be taken as genus, but as a more abstract genus; but it always belongs to that side only of the determinate Notion which goes outwards. The truly higher universal is that in which this side which goes outwards is taken back inwards,—the second negation, in which determinateness is simply only *as* posited or *as* Show. Life, Ego, Spirit, and Absolute Notion are universals not only as higher genera: they are concrete entities whose determinatenesses are not only genera or inferior species, but, in their reality, they are altogether only in themselves and filled by themselves. In so far as Life, Ego, and finite Spirit must be admitted to be only determinate Notions, their absolute solution is found in that universal which must be taken as veritably Absolute Notion, as Idea of infinite Spirit, whose positedness is infinite and transparent Reality, in which it contemplates its creation and, in it, itself.

And now the veritable infinite universal, which, immediately, is in itself Particularity as much as Individuality, must be considered more closely as Particularity. It determines itself freely: when it becomes finite, this is not a transition, which takes place only within the sphere of Being: it is creative power as absolute negativity which relates itself to itself. As such it is a process of internal distinguishing, and this is a *determining* because distinguishing is at one with Universality. It is thus a positing of the distinctions themselves as universal and self-relating distinctions. Hereby they become fixed and isolated distinctions. The isolated persistence of the finite, which, before, determined itself as its Being-for-Self (or as Thinghood, or Substance), is, in its truth, the Universality with which form the infinite Notion clothes its distinctions—a form which, precisely, is one of its own distinctions. Herein consists the creative activity of the Notion, which can be conceived only in this innermost core of itself.

B

THE PARTICULAR NOTION

Determinateness as such belongs to Being and to the Qualitative; as determinateness of the Notion it is *Particularity*. It is not a limit: it is not related to any Other as its beyond; but,

as has just been seen, it is the peculiar immanent moment of the universal, which latter, therefore, in Particularity is not with an Other but just with itself.

The particular contains Universality, which constitutes its substance; the genus is unchanged in its species; and the species are not different from the universal, but only one from another. The particular has one and the same universality with the other particulars, with which it is related. At the same time their difference, because of their identity with the universal, is, as such, universal; it is totality.—Thus the particular not only contains the universal, but also exhibits it through its determinateness; and, in so far, the universal constitutes a sphere which the particular must exhaust. In so far as the determinateness of the particular is taken as mere variety, this totality appears as *completeness*. In this respect the species are complete, since there just are no more of them. For these there is no inner standard nor principle, because Variety is, precisely, Difference lacking unity, where Universality, which for itself is absolute unity, is merely external reflex and an unrestricted and contingent completeness. But Variety passes over into Opposition—into an *immanent* relation of the various entities. But Particularity is such immanent relation as Universality in and for itself, and not by transition; it is totality in itself and simple determinateness: essentially it is *principle*. It has no other determinateness than such as is posited by the universal itself and results from it in the following manner.

The particular is the universal itself, but it is its difference or relation to an Other, its *showing outwards*; but there is no Other from which the particular could be different, except the universal itself.—The universal determines *itself*, and so it is itself the particular: the determinateness is its *own* difference, and it is different only from itself. Its species therefore are only (a) the universal itself and (b) the particular. The universal as the Notion is both itself and its opposite, which again is itself as its posited determinateness; it thus extends beyond the latter and in it is with itself. It is thus the totality and principle of its variety, which is determined quite by itself alone.

There is therefore no other valid classification but this, that the Notion itself stands aside as immediate and indeterminate Universality; and this very indetermination makes its deter-

minateness, or makes it a particular. Both together are the particular and are therefore coordinated. Also both, as the particular, are the determinate as against the universal; and in so far the former ranks as subordinate to the latter. But this universal *against* which the particular is determined is itself thereby one only of the two opposed terms. And if we speak of two opposed terms, we must then also say again that they constitute the particular; and not only *together* (in which case they would be equal only for external reflection in the fact of their particularity), but their determinateness as against each other is essentially also one determinateness, or negativity which, in the universal, is simple.

Difference, as it shows itself here, is in its Notion and therefore in its truth. All former difference has this unity in the Notion. As immediate difference in Being, it is as the limit of an Other; in Reflection, it is relative and posited as essentially relating itself to its Other; here accordingly the unity of the Notion begins to be posited, but, at first, it is only Show in an Other.—The transition and solution of these determinations has only this true meaning, that they reach their Notion, their truth; Being, Determinate Being, Something, Whole and Parts, and so on, Substance and Accidents, Cause and Effect, are for themselves intellectual determinations: they are taken as determinate Notions in so far as each is recognized in unity with its Other or opposite.—Thus for example Whole and Parts, Cause and Effect, and the rest, are not yet various terms determined (as against each other) as particular; for although they constitute one Notion *in themselves*, their unity has not yet reached the form of universality; and similarly the difference which is in these relations has not yet the form of being one determinateness. For example, Cause and Effect are not two different Notions but only one determinate Notion, and Causality, like every Notion, is simple.

With regard to completeness, the result has been reached that the element of determinateness in Particularity lies completely in the difference between universal and particular, and that these two alone constitute the particular species. In Nature indeed a genus has more than two species, and also these many species cannot be related to one another in the manner demonstrated. This is the impotence of Nature to hold fast and to

represent the austerity of the Notion, so that it wastes away into this notionless and blind multiplicity. In the multiplicity of its genera and species and in the infinite variety of its formations we may admire Nature, for admiration is without Notion and its object is the irrational. Nature is the self-externality of the Notion, and therefore it is free to disport itself in this variety, like Spirit which, although it has the Notion in the shape of the Notion, enters upon sensuous representation and runs wild in the infinite multiplicity thereof. The various natural genera or species must rank as nothing higher than the arbitrary conceits of Spirit in its ideations. Both indeed show traces and premonitions everywhere of the Notion, but they do not represent it in its true image, because they are the side of its free self-externality; it is absolute power just because it can freely discharge its distinction into the shape of independent variety, external necessity, contingency, caprice, or opinion; but these must not be taken for anything more than the abstract side of nullity.

The determinateness of the particular is simple as principle (as was seen); but it is simple also as moment of totality—as determinateness against the other determinateness. The Notion, in so far as it determines or distinguishes itself, points negatively at its unity and takes the form of one of its moments (which is of ideal nature) of Being: as determinate Notion it has a Determinate Being in general. But this Being no longer signifies bare immediacy but Universality—immediacy which through absolute mediation is equal to itself and equally contains the other moment, Essence or intro-Reflection. This Universality which clothes the determinate is abstract Universality. The particular contains Universality as its Essence; but, in so far as the determinateness of the difference is posited, and thereby has Being, this Universality is related to the difference as form, and the determinateness as such is content. Universality becomes form in so far as the difference exists as the essential; whereas in the purely universal it exists only as absolute negativity, and not as difference which is posited as such.

Now although determinateness is the abstract as against the other determinateness, yet the other is only Universality itself. In so far this latter is also abstract, and the determinateness

of the Notion (that is, Particularity) is again no more than determinate Universality. In it the Notion is outside itself; and in so far as it is the *Notion* which here is outside itself, the abstract-universal contains all the moments of the Notion: it is (α) universality, (β) determinateness, and (γ) simple identity of the two; but this unity is immediate, and for this reason Particularity is not *as* totality. *In itself* it is this totality, and is mediation; it is, essentially, exclusive relation to other or transcendence of negation, that is, of the other determinateness,—which other however merely hovers before the imagination, for it vanishes immediately and shows itself as that which its other was to be. What therefore makes this Universality abstract is the fact that mediation is only condition, or is not posited of it itself. And because it is not posited, the unity of the abstract has the form of immediacy, and the content has the form of indifference to its Universality, because it is not as that totality which is the Universality of absolute negativity. Thus, although the abstractly universal is the Notion, it is Notion only as notionless, as Notion which is not posited as such.

If mention is made of the Determinate Notion, what is meant is generally only such a purely abstractly universal entity. And by “the Notion” in general only this notionless Notion as a rule is understood; and “Understanding” denotes the capacity of such Notions. Demonstration belongs to this understanding in so far as it is said to proceed along a chain of Notions, that is, along mere determinations. Such a process therefore does not pass beyond finitude and necessity; and its highest point is the negative infinite, the abstraction of the highest essence, which itself is the determinateness of indeterminateness. Absolute Substance too is, it is true, not this empty abstraction: according to its content it is, indeed, totality, but it is abstract because it is without absolute form; the Notion does not constitute its innermost truth; and although it is the identity of Universality and Particularity (or of thought and mutual externality), yet this identity is not the determinateness of the Notion; outside it there is an understanding (which, precisely because it is outside it, is contingent) in and for which it exists in various Attributes and Modes.

For the rest, abstraction is not rightly called empty, as is

commonly done: it is the Determinate Notion, and has some determinateness for content; and even the highest essence (pure abstraction) has, as was mentioned, the determinateness of indeterminateness; but a determinateness is indeterminateness, because it is supposed to stand opposite to the determinate. But, even while that which it is is being pronounced, this, which it is supposed to be, cancels itself; it is pronounced to be one with determinateness, and in this manner the Notion and the truth of indeterminateness are constructed out of abstraction.—But every determinate Notion is of course empty in so far as it does not contain the totality but only a one-sided determinateness. Even though it otherwise has a concrete content, like *man*, *state*, *animal*, and so forth, yet it remains an empty Notion in so far as its determinateness is not the *principle* of its distinctions: the principle contains the beginning and the essence of its development and realization, and any other determinateness of the Notion is barren. If therefore the Notion is ever denounced as empty, that absolute determinateness of it is misunderstood which is the differentia of the Notion and the sole true content in its element.

This is the proper place also to mention the circumstance which has caused Understanding latterly to be held in such small esteem and to be ranked after Reason,—namely the fixity which it imparts to the determinatenesses, and hence to the finitudes. This fixity consists in the form of abstract Universality which has just been considered: by virtue of it they become immutable. For qualitative determinateness, and Determination of Reflection, exist essentially as limited, and, in their barrier, have a relation to their Other; they thus contain the necessity of transition and passing away. But Universality (which they have in Understanding) gives them the form of intro-Reflection, which withdraws them from the relation to other and renders them imperishable. Now in the pure Notion this eternity belongs to its own nature, and so its abstract determinations would be eternal essentialities only according to their form; but their content is not adequate to this form, and consequently they are not truth and imperishability. Their content is not adequate to the form, because it is not determinateness itself as universal; that is, it is not as totality of the differentia of the Notion, or not itself the whole form; now the form of Under-

standing which is subject to a barrier is itself incomplete (that is, abstract) Universality.—But further, it must be counted as the infinite force of Understanding to divide the concrete into abstract determinatenesses, and to comprehend the depth of the distinction which at the same time is the power that effects its transition. The concrete of *intuition* is totality, but sensuous totality—an indifferent juxtaposition of real matters in space and time. Now surely this lack of unity in the manifold, in which it is the content of intuition, should not be counted to it for merit and for an advantage over the understandable. That mutability which it shows in intuition already points to the universal; that part of it which comes into intuition is only another and equally mutable entity—that is, the self-same thing; it is not the case that the universal takes its place and appears. But least of all should the intuitive element in a science (such as geometry or arithmetic), which its material brings with it, be counted as a merit, or its propositions be imagined as being thereby substantiated. On the contrary, the material of these sciences is for that very reason of a lower nature: to intuit figures or numbers does not lead to knowledge of them, which is only produced by thought on these matters.—But, in so far as *objective totality* is meant by intuition, and not only the merely sensuous, this intuition is intellectual, that is, it has for object Determinate Being not in its external existence, but that which in it is imperishable reality and truth;—reality only in so far as it is essentially in the Notion and is determined by it; the Idea, whose further nature must be reached at a later point. What is supposed to exalt intuition as such above the Notion is external reality—that notionless something which has value only through the Notion.

Understanding then represents the infinite force which determines the universal, or conversely imparts fixed persistence through the form of Universality to what in determinateness has in and for itself no stability; and it is not the fault of understanding if no further progress is made. It is a subjective impotence of reason which allows these determinatenesses to count in this manner, and is unable to lead them back to unity through the dialectic force which is opposed to this abstract Universality, that is, through the peculiar nature (in other words, the Notion) of these determinatenesses. It is true that

through the form of abstract Universality understanding gives them what may be called such a hardness of Being as they do not possess in the spheres of Quality and of Reflection; but by this simplification understanding also spiritualizes them and so sharpens them that they receive only at this extreme point the capacity of dissolving and passing over into their opposite. The highest maturity or stage which any Something can reach is that in which it begins to perish. That fixed element of determinateness upon which understanding seems to wreck itself (namely the form of the imperishable) is the form of self-relating Universality. But this is the peculiar property of the Notion; and consequently the dissolution of the finite lies expressed in it itself, and in infinite proximity. This Universality immediately argues the determinateness of the finite and expresses its inadequacy to itself.—Or rather, the adequacy of the finite is already given; the abstract determinate is posited as being one with Universality, and as not for itself alone, for then it would be *only* determinate, but only as unity of itself and of the universal,—that is, as Notion.

The ordinary practice of separating understanding and reason must therefore be condemned in every respect. If the Notion is considered as reasonless, this should rather be considered as an incapacity of reason to recognize itself in the Notion. The determinate and abstract Notion is the condition, or rather essential moment, of reason; it is the spiritualized form in which the finite, by virtue of the Universality in which it relates itself to itself, kindles itself in itself, is posited as dialectic, and thus is the *beginning* itself of the appearance of reason.

So far the Determinate Notion has been represented in its truth, and it only remains to indicate what has been implied about it in this positing.—Difference is an essential moment of the Notion, but is not yet posited as such in the purely universal; in the Determinate Notion it comes into its own. Determinateness in the form of Universality is compounded with it, and a simplicity results; this determinate universal is self-relating determinateness; determinate determinateness, or absolute negativity posited for itself. But self-relating determinateness is Individuality. Universality is immediately and in and for itself Particularity; but Particularity is also, equally immediately, and in and for itself, Individuality,—which now

must be considered as third moment of the Notion in so far as it is retained as against the first two, but also as the absolute return of the Notion to itself and, at the same time, as the posited loss of itself.

Observation

It follows from what has gone before that Universality, Particularity, and Individuality are the three determinate Notions,—if indeed it is desired to count them. It has already been shown that number is not a form fit to hold notional determinations, and is least of all fit to hold determinations of the Notion itself; for number, having One for principle, makes the numbered entities wholly separate and wholly indifferent to one another. It has already resulted from our survey that the various determinate Notions are in fact simply one and the same Notion, rather than that they fall apart into number.

In other ordinary treatises about logic many divisions and species of Notions occur. Here one is immediately struck by the inconsistency with which the species are introduced, when it is said that “according to Quantity, or Quality, and so on, *there are* the following Notions.” “There is” expresses no other kind of justification except that such species are found and that they show themselves in experience. In this manner an empirical logic is obtained;—a peculiar science, an irrational knowledge of the Rational. Herein logic affords a very poor example of how it follows its own precepts: for its own benefit it allows itself to do the opposite of what it prescribes as rule, namely, that Notions must be derived and that scientific propositions must be demonstrated (and among them the proposition which says that there are so-and-so many kinds of Notion).—In this matter Kant’s philosophy commits a further inconsistency: for Transcendental Logic it borrows the categories, as so-called root-notions, from Subjective Logic, into which they were admitted empirically. Since it confesses this last step, it is not clear why Transcendental Logic troubles to borrow from such a science, and does not immediately help itself empirically.

Some parts of this process may here be detailed. The Notions are chiefly classified according to their *clarity*, into clear and obscure, definite and indefinite, and adequate and inadequate. Complete and superfluous Notions and other irrelevancies may

also be mentioned in this place.—With regard to this classification according to clarity, it soon appears that this point of view and the distinctions which are related to it are derived from psychological and not from logical determinations. The so-called *clear* Notion is supposed to suffice to distinguish one object from another: but this cannot yet be called a Notion; it is nothing more than subjective mental representation. What an *obscure* Notion is must remain its own secret, otherwise it would be a definite and not an obscure Notion.—The *definite* Notion is supposed to be a Notion of which the criteria can be stated. Thus it is really the *Determinate* Notion. The criterion (that is, if that which is correct in it is taken up) is just the determinateness or simple content of the Notion in so far as it is distinguished from the form of Universality. But in the first instance the criterion has not this more precise significance; it is merely *any* determination which serves for the observer to note an object, or the Notion; it may therefore be some quite accidental circumstance. And altogether it does not express the immanence and essentiality of the determination so much as its relation to an external understanding. If this is really an understanding, then it has the Notion before itself and notes this Notion solely by virtue of its content. But if the criterion is distinct from it, then it is a token or some other determination which belongs to the image of the thing and not to its Notion.—As to the meaning of the *indefinite* Notion, this may be passed over as superfluous.

But the *adequate* Notion is a higher concept; the correspondence of the Notion with reality is really here before the mind, and this is not the Notion as such but the *Idea*.

If the criterion of the definite Notion really is the determination itself of the Notion, then logic would be in difficulties with the *simple* Notions, which according to another classification are opposed to *compound* Notions. For if a true, that is, an immanent, criterion were to be given of the simple Notion, then it would become undesirable to look upon it as simple; and in so far as no criterion were given, it would not be a definite Notion. Here only the clear Notion avails. Unity, reality, and similar determinations are supposed to be simple Notions, presumably because logicians did not succeed in finding their determination, and consequently were content

to have merely a clear Notion of them—that is, none at all. A definition, that is, a statement of the Notion, is commonly held to demand that the genus and the specific difference be indicated. Definition therefore gives the Notion, not as something simple, but in two distinct parts, of which it consists. But surely it must not be supposed that for this reason such a Notion must be looked upon as a compound.—In the simple Notion, abstract simplicity seems to be present before the imagination,—a unity which does not contain distinction and determinateness and therefore is not that unity which is proper to the Notion. In so far as an object exists in imagination, and especially in memory, or in so far as it is abstract thought-determination, it may be perfectly simple. Even objects which in themselves are of richest content, like Spirit, Nature, World, or God—if they are comprehended without any Notion in the simple image of the equally simple expressions *Spirit, Nature, World, God*—are something simple where consciousness can halt without elaborating the peculiar determination, or a criterion. But it is improper that the objects of consciousness should thus remain simple and be images or abstract thought-determinations: Notions ought to be formed about them, that is, their simplicity ought to be determined from their inner distinction.—As for the compound Notion, it would appear to be no better than wooden iron. It is possible to have a Notion about a compound; but a compound Notion would be something worse than that materialism which assumes only the substance of the soul to be a compound, but nevertheless takes thought to be simple. Uncultivated reflection first has recourse to composition, as a wholly external relation, which is the worst form under which things can be considered; even the lowest natures must be an *inner* unity. But if, to crown all, the form of the untruest existence is applied to Ego, to the Notion, this is more than was to be expected: it must be considered as unseemly and barbarous.

Notions are further divided into *contrary* and *contradictory*.—If, in treating the Notion, it were necessary to state what kinds of determinate Notions there are, it would be necessary to enumerate every possible determination (for all determinations are Notions and consequently determinate Notions); and all the categories of Being and determinations of Essence would

have to be enumerated under the kinds of Notions. Indeed, treatises of logic rehearse, in greater or less detail, that there are affirmative, negative, identical, conditioned, necessary, and other Notions. Such determinations have already been surpassed by the nature of the Notion itself, and therefore, if they are recited here, they do not occur in their due place; they therefore admit only of superficial verbal explanations, and appear to be quite without interest here.—Contrary and contradictory Notions—a distinction which chiefly is noted here—are based upon the Reflection-determinations of Variety and Opposition. They are looked upon as two separate species, that is, as each fixed for itself and indifferent to the other, without any consideration of the dialectic and of the inner nullity of these distinctions,—as though that which is contrary must not equally be determined as contradictory. The nature and the essential transition of the forms of Reflection which they express, have been considered in their own place. In the Notion, Identity has been developed into Universality, Difference into Particularity, and Opposition (which passes back into Ground) into Individuality. In these forms the above-mentioned Determinations of Reflection exist as they are in their Notion. The universal turned out to be not only the identical, but also the different or *contrary* as against the particular and individual, and, further, to be opposed to them or *contradictory*; but in this opposition it is identical with them and is their true Ground, in which they are transcended. And the same holds of Particularity and Individuality, which also are the totality of the Determinations of Reflection.

Again, Notions are divided into *subordinate* and *coordinate*,—a distinction which more closely concerns the determination of the Notion, namely the relation between Universality and Particularity, where in fact these expressions have been cursorily mentioned. Only, they too are usually considered as firmly fixed relations, and numerous barren propositions are put forward about them. The lengthiest treatment in this connexion again refers to the relation of contrariety and contradictoriness to subordination and coordination. *Judgment* is the relation of determinate Notions, and accordingly the true relationship can result only at that point. The fashion of comparing these determinations without any thought of their

dialectic and of the progressive change of their determination, or, rather, of the connexion of opposite determinations which is present in them, renders barren and unsubstantial the whole consideration about their harmony and disharmony; as though such harmony or disharmony were something separate and enduring.—The great Euler, who was infinitely fruitful and ingenious in seizing and combining the profounder relations of algebraical magnitudes; more especially the dry intelligence of Lambert; and others, too, have attempted a notation by means of lines, figures, and the like for this kind of relation between the determinations of Notions: the general purpose was to raise the logical types of relation to a calculus,—or, rather, to reduce them to one. Even the attempt at notation immediately manifests its own nullity if the nature of the symbol is compared with that which it is to symbolize. The determinations of the Notion, Universality, Particularity, and Individuality, are indeed distinct, like lines, or the letters of algebra;—further they are opposite, and in so far would also admit the signs of *plus* and *minus*. But they themselves, and their relations much more (even if no progress is made beyond subsumption and inherence), are of an essential nature which is wholly different from letters and lines and their relations, like equality or difference of magnitude, *plus* and *minus*, or the position of lines over one another, their connexion to form angles, and the dispositions of spaces which they enclose. Such objects have the peculiar distinction, as against them, that they are external to one another and have a fixed determination. Now if Notions are taken in this manner, so that they correspond to such symbols, then they cease to be Notions. Their determinations are not such dead matter as numbers and lines, in which their relation is not immanent; they are living movements; the different determinateness of one side is also immediately internal to the other; and what would be a complete contradiction with numbers and lines is essential to the nature of the Notion.—Higher mathematics, which also goes on to the infinite and permits itself contradictions, can no longer employ its former signs for the representation of such determinations. To denote the image (which is very far removed from the Notion) of the infinite approximation of two ordinates, it does no more than draw two straight lines outside of each other;

or when it identifies a curve with an infinite number of infinitely small straight lines, it does no more than draw straight lines into a curve but different from it. For the infinite, which is the real matter here, it refers to imagination.

It is chiefly the *quantitative* relation, in which Universality, Particularity, and Individuality are supposed to stand to one another, that has led to this attempt; universal means wider than particular and individual, and particular wider than individual. The Notion is the concrete and richest entity because it is the ground and the totality of the earlier determinations—of the categories of Being and the Determinations of Reflection; the latter therefore may also chance to emerge in it. But the nature of the Notion is wholly misunderstood if these are retained in it in that abstraction, and if the further volume of the universal is taken as though it were something *more*, or a bigger *quantum*, than the particular and the individual. The Notion, as absolute Ground, is the possibility of quantity, but also of quality, that is, its determinations are also distinguished qualitatively; they are therefore considered in a manner which does not agree with their truth if they are posited under the form of quantity alone. And further the Determination of Reflection is something relative in which its opposite shows; unlike a quantum, it is not in the external relation. But the Notion is more than all this: its determinations are determinate *Notions*, and are essentially the totality itself of all determinations. It is therefore quite unfitting to attempt to apply numerical and spatial relations in order to apprehend such an intimate totality; in such relations all determinations fall apart, and they are indeed the last and worst medium that could be used. Natural relations like magnetism or colour-relations would be infinitely higher and truer symbols. Man has language as the means of designation peculiar to reason, and therefore it is an idle caprice to engage in a weary search for a less perfect manner of description. The Notion as such can essentially be apprehended only by Spirit, of which it is not only the peculiar property, but the pure self. It is in vain that an attempt is made to fix it by means of spatial figures and algebraical symbols for the purposes of the external eye and of a notionless mechanical treatment or calculus. And anything else which should serve for symbol (like symbols of the

nature of God) can at best excite only presentiments and echoes of the Notion; but if it were a serious attempt to express and understand the Notion by their aid, then we must declare that the external nature of all symbols is inadequate: the relation is the opposite, and what in the symbols is echo of a higher determination is understood only through the Notion, and can be approximated to it only by the elimination of every sensuous accretion which was meant to express it.

C

THE INDIVIDUAL

Individuality, as was seen, is posited already by Particularity, which is determinate Universality, that is, self-relating determinateness or the determinate determinate.

1. At first therefore Individuality appears as the intro-Reflection of the Notion out of its determinateness. It is the self-mediation of the Notion in so far as its otherness has made itself into an Other, whence the Notion has been restored as self-equal, but is in the determination of absolute negativity.—The negative in the universal whereby this is a particular, was determined above as a double Show. In so far as it is a showing inwards, the particular remains a universal; by virtue of showing outwards, it is a determinate; and the return of this side into the universal is of double kind,—either by means of abstraction, which omits the particular and ascends to higher and highest genus,—or by means of Individuality, to which the universal itself descends in determinateness.—At this point the divagation occurs by which abstraction leaves the road of the Notion and deserts the truth. Its higher and highest universal to which it rises is but the surface which has less and less content; the Individuality which it scorns is that profundity in which the Notion comprehends itself and is posited as Notion.

Universality and Particularity on the one hand appeared as the moments of the becoming of Individuality. But it has already been shown that they are the total Notion in themselves, and therefore in Individuality do not pass over into an Other, but that only that is posited in Individuality which they are in and

for themselves. The universal is for itself because in itself it is absolute mediation, self-relation only as absolute negativity. It is abstract universal in so far as this transcendence is an external act and therefore an omission of determinateness. Thus although this negativity is in the abstract, yet it remains external to and a mere condition of it: it is abstraction itself, which retains its universal over against itself, so that the latter has not in itself Individuality and remains notionless.—Life, Spirit, God, and also the pure Notion cannot therefore be apprehended by abstraction, because it keeps off from its products Individuality, the principle of singularity and personality, and thus reaches nothing but universalities lacking both life and spirit, colour and content.

But the unity of the Notion is so inseparable that even these products of abstraction, while they are supposed to omit Individuality, are individuals themselves. It raises the concrete into Universality, and takes the universal only as determinate Universality: but then this is just Individuality which has resulted in the shape of self-relating determinateness. Consequently abstraction is a separation of the concrete and an isolation of its determinations: it seizes only individual properties and moments, for its product must contain that which it is itself. The distinction between this individuality of its products and the Individuality of the Notion is that, in the former, the individual as content and the universal as form are distinct from each other,—just because the former does not exist as absolute form, or as the Notion itself, nor the latter as the totality of form.—But this closer consideration shows the abstract itself as unity of the individual content and abstract Universality, that is, as *concrete*,—which is the opposite of what it is supposed to be.

For the same reason (because it is only the determinate universal) the particular too is individual; and, conversely, because the individual is the determinate universal, it is equally a particular. If this abstract determinateness is retained, the Notion has three separate determinations—universal, particular, and individual; whereas before universal and particular alone were enumerated as species of the particular. Individuality is the return of the Notion, as negative, to itself; and thus this return from abstraction, which really is transcended

in it, may be placed and counted as an indifferent moment by the side of the others.

Individuality has been mentioned as one of the *particular* determinations of the Notion: Particularity is the totality which comprehends them all; and, as this totality, it is their *concrete*, or Individuality itself. But it is concrete also from the side (noticed before) of determinate Universality; and thus it is immediate unity, in which no one of these moments is posited as distinct or as determining; and in this form it will constitute the *middle* of the formal Syllogism.

It is obvious that every determination which so far has been made in the exposition of the Notion has dissolved immediately and lost itself in its other. Every distinction confounds itself under the scrutiny which is meant to isolate and fix it. Only bare imagination, for which it has isolated the process of abstraction, can steadfastly keep apart universal, particular, and individual: thus they can be counted, and, for further distinction, imagination has recourse to perfectly external Being, to Quantity, whose place is nowhere less than here.—In Individuality the inseparability of the determinations of the Notion—their true relation—is posited; for, as negation of negation, it contains both their opposition and also the Notion in its Ground or unity: the completed coincidence of each one with its other. This Reflection contains Universality in and for itself: it is therefore essentially the negativity of the determinations of the Notion,—and this not only as though it were only a third and different term as against them, but it is posited that positedness is Being-in-and-for-Self; that is, that the determinations which belong to the distinction are each the totality. The return to itself of the Determinate Notion is this, that it has the determination of being, in its determinateness, the whole Notion.

2. But Individuality is not only the return of the Notion into itself; it is also immediately its loss. In Individuality it is *in* itself; and, because of the manner in which it is in itself, it becomes external to itself and enters into actuality. Abstraction is the soul of Individuality, and, as such, is the relation of negative to negative; and it, as has been seen, is not external to the universal and the particular but immanent; and they through it are concrete, content, and individual. And Indi-

viduality as this negativity is determinate determinateness, is distinguishing as such; through this intro-Reflection of distinction it becomes fixed; the determining of the particular takes place only through Individuality, for it is that abstraction which now, as Individuality, is posited abstraction.

The individual, then, as self-relating negativity, is immediate self-identity of the negative; it is-for-self. In other words, it is abstraction which determines the Notion, according to its moment (which is of ideal nature) of Being, as *immediate*.—Thus the individual is a qualitative One or This. According to this quality it is, first, self-repulsion, by which process the many other Ones are presupposed; and secondly it is negative relation against these presupposed others; and, in so far, the individual is exclusive. If Universality is related to these individuals as indifferent Ones (and it must be so related because it is a moment of the notion of Individuality), then it is merely their common element. If by the universal is meant that which is common to more than one individual, then the beginning is being made from their indifferent persistence, and the immediacy of Being is mixed with the determination of the Notion. The lowest possible image of the universal in its relation to the individual is this external relation of it as a mere common element.

The individual, which in the sphere of Reflection belonging to Existence is as This, has not the exclusive relation to other Ones which belongs to qualitative Being-for-Self. "This," as intro-reflected One, is, for itself, without repulsion; or, repulsion in this Reflection is one with abstraction, and is reflecting mediation which appertains to This in such a manner that it is a posited immediacy, demonstrated by an external element. "This" is; it is immediate; but it is This only in so far as it is pointed at. And pointing is that reflecting movement which collects itself within itself and posits immediacy as something external to itself.—Now the individual is This, since it is an immediate constructed out of mediation; but mediation is not external to it: it is self-repelling separation, posited abstraction, but in its separation it is itself positive relation.

This abstracting of the individual is, first, as the intro-Reflection of distinction, a positing as independent and intro-reflected of the distinct terms. They *are* immediate; but, further,

this separating is Reflection in general, the showing of one in another; they are thus in essential relation. But further they are not merely existent individuals as against one another; such manyness belongs to Being; Individuality which posits itself as determinate posits itself not in an external but in a notional distinction; thus it excludes the universal from itself, but, since this is a moment of itself, the latter also essentially relates itself to it.

The Notion as this relation between its independent determinations has vanished; for now it is no longer their posited unity, and they are no longer its moments or Show, but persist in and for themselves.—As Individuality the Notion returns to itself in determinateness; and thus the determinate has become totality itself. Its return to itself is therefore the absolute and original division of itself; or, as Individuality, it is posited as *Judgment*.

CHAPTER II

THE JUDGMENT

THE Judgment is the determinateness of the Notion posited in the Notion itself. The determinations of the Notion (or, which is the same thing, as we saw, the determinate Notions) have already been considered by themselves; but this consideration was rather a subjective reflection or subjective abstraction. But the Notion is itself this process of abstraction: the opposing of its determinations is its own determining. The Judgment is this positing of determinate Notions through the Notion itself.

Judgment is a different function from the forming of Notions (or rather, it is the other function of the Notion), in so far as it is the self-determination of the Notion; and the further progress of the Judgment into the variety of Judgments is this progressive determination of the Notion. What determinate Notions there are, and how these its determinations yield themselves necessarily, will have to be shown in the Judgment.

Consequently the Judgment may be called the next realization of the Notion, in so far as reality designates *as determinate Being* in general an entry into existence. More precisely the nature of this realization has appeared to be this, that, first, the moments of the Notion, by virtue of its intro-Reflection or its Individuality, are independent totalities, while, secondly, the unity of the Notion exists as their relation. The intro-reflected determinations are determinate totalities as essentially in their indifferent and unrelated persistence, as in reciprocal mediation. The act of determining, itself, is totality only in so far as it contains these totalities and their relation. This totality is the Judgment.—First, then, it contains the two independent terms which are called *subject* and *predicate*. It is not yet properly possible to say what each is: they are as yet indeterminate, for they are to be determined only by the Judgment. In so far as the Judgment is the Notion as determinate Notion, only this general mutual distinction is present, that the Judgment contains the determinate Notion as against that which still

remains indeterminate. At this point, then, subject may be taken against predicate as individual against universal, or again as particular, in so far as they are opposed to each other at all as more determinate and more universal.

It is consequently fit and necessary to have these names of subject and predicate for the determinations of the Judgment; as names they are something indeterminate which still awaits its determination; consequently they are not more than names. Determinations of the Notion themselves could not be used for the two sides of the Judgment, partly for this reason, and partly (and more particularly) because the nature of the determination of the Notion reveals itself as being not abstract and fixed, but as containing, and positing in itself, its opposites. The sides of the Judgment are themselves Notions (that is, the totality of its determinations); they must thus pass through the whole scale of the latter and show them in themselves, whether in abstract or concrete form. Now, in order to fix in a general manner the sides of the Judgment during this change of their determination, names, which remain unchanged, will serve best.—But the name stands opposed to the fact or Notion; this distinction occurs in the Judgment as such. The subject in general expresses the determinate and therefore rather that which *is* immediately; the predicate expresses the universal (namely the essence or the Notion); and thus the subject as such is at first only a kind of name; for it is only the predicate (which contains Being within the meaning of the Notion) that expresses *what it is*. When it is asked what this *is*, or what kind of a plant this *is*, and so on, the name alone often is meant, and no other kind of Being, and when the enquirer has learnt this he is satisfied and knows what the thing is. This is Being within the meaning of the subject. But only the predicate furnishes the Notion, or at least the essence and the universal in general, and it is this that is asked for within the meaning of the Judgment.—As subject of a Judgment, therefore, God, Spirit, Nature, or whatever else it may be, is only the name: what such a subject is according to the Notion is given only in the predicate. If the predicate proper to such a subject is looked for, then a Notion must already be implied to furnish a ground for judgment; but it is only the predicate that expresses this Notion. Really therefore the mere image con-

stitutes the presupposed significance of the subject and leads to a declaration of name; and what is or is not understood by a name is a historical fact, and contingent. Many controversies whether a predicate is proper or not to a certain subject are therefore no more than verbal disputes, because they begin from this form; that which lies at the bottom (*subiectum*, ὑποκείμενον) is as yet no more than the name.

Secondly, it remains to consider more closely how the relation of subject and predicate in the Judgment is determined, and how they themselves are, in the first instance, determined by it. The Judgment has for its sides totalities, which here exist as essentially independent. The unity of the Notion is consequently only a *relation* of independent terms; it is not yet the concrete or completed unity, which has returned to itself out of this reality, but a unity outside of which they persist as extremes which are not transcended in it.—Now the consideration of the Judgment may begin from the original unity of the Notion or from the independence of the extremes. The Judgment is the self-diremption of the Notion: consequently this unity is the foundation from which it is considered in its true objectivity. In so far the Judgment is the original division (*ursprüngliche Teilung*) of the original One: the word “Judgment” (*Urteil*) thus refers to what it is in and for itself. That side of externality, on the other hand, by which the Notion is in the Judgment in the shape of appearance (since its moments have therein attained independence) is favoured rather by imagination.

In this subjective consideration, then, subject and predicate are each considered as complete by itself apart from the other: the subject as an object which would exist even if it had not this predicate; and the predicate as a general determination which would exist even if it did not belong to this subject. Accordingly judging is associated with the reflection whether this or that predicate, which is in the mind, can and ought to be attached to the subject, which exists externally by itself; and judging itself consists in this, that only by this process a predicate is connected with the subject in such a manner that, if this connexion did not take place, each for itself would still remain what it is—the one an existing subject and the other an image in the mind.—But the predicate which is attached

to the subject ought also to be proper to it, that is, to be identical with it in and for itself. Through this meaning of attachment, the subjective significance of judging and the indifferent external persistence of subject and predicate are transcended again. "This action is good": the copula denotes that the predicate belongs to the Being of the subject, and is not connected with it merely externally. In the grammatical sense this subjective relation, in which a beginning is made from the indifferent externality of subject and predicate, has complete validity; for the terms which here are externally connected are words.—It may be mentioned in this context that a sentence has a subject and predicate in the grammatical sense, but is not necessarily a Judgment for that reason. A Judgment requires that predicate should be related to subject as the determinations of the Notion are related, that is, as universal to particular or individual. If that which is predicated of the individual subject itself only expresses an individual fact, then this is a mere sentence. Thus it is a sentence, and not a Judgment, that Aristotle died in his seventy-third year and in the fourth year of the 115th Olympiad. The sentence would contain an element of Judgment only if one of the circumstances—the time of death or the age of this philosopher—had been questioned, and the numbers stated were nevertheless for some reason upheld. For in this case they would be taken as something universal, as time having some other filling and persisting apart from that determinate content, the death of Aristotle, or even as empty time. Thus the news "My friend N. has died" is a sentence, and would be a Judgment only if the question were whether he is really dead or only appears to be.

Judgment is usually explained as being the connexion of two Notions, and for the external copula the indefinite expression of connexion may be allowed; and it may also be allowed that the connected terms are at least supposed to be Notions. But otherwise this explanation is most superficial: for instance in the Disjunctive Judgment more than two so-called Notions are connected; and, quite apart from this, the explanation is much better than the fact; for not Notions are meant here, hardly even determinations of the Notion, but properly only determinations of imagination. It was observed under Notion in general and under Determinate Notion that what commonly

is designated as such in no way deserves the name of Notion; whence then could Notions be derived in the Judgment?—In that explanation, above all, the essential part of the Judgment, namely the distinction of its determinations, is passed over; and the relation of the Judgment to the Notion is even less regarded.

With regard to the further determination of subject and predicate, it has been mentioned that they have really to receive their determination only in the Judgment. In so far as the Judgment is the posited determinateness of the Notion, it contains the distinctions stated, immediately and abstractly, as Individuality and Universality.—But, in so far as it is the Determinate Being or otherness of the Notion (which has not yet reconstituted itself into that unity in which it is as Notion), in so far notionless determinateness emerges—the opposition between Being and Reflection or Being-in-Self. But the Notion constitutes the essential ground of Judgment, and therefore these determinations are indifferent at least in this way, that, while one belongs to the subject and the other to the predicate, this relation also holds in a converse manner. The subject as the individual appears at first as that which *is* or *is-for-self* according to the determinate determinateness of the individual—as an actual object even although it is object only of imagination,—for instance, as courage, law, harmony, and so forth—about which a judgment is made. The predicate, on the other hand, as the universal, appears as this reflection about the object, or rather as its intro-Reflection, which passes beyond that immediacy and transcends the determinatenesses as merely *being*: it appears as the object's Being-in-Self.—In so far a beginning is made from the individual as first and immediate, and it is raised into universality by the Judgment; while conversely the universal which is merely *in-itself* descends into Determinate Being in the individual, or becomes something which *is-for-self*.

This significance of the Judgment must be taken as its *objective* meaning and also as the true one among the earlier forms of transition. What has Being becomes and changes; Finite is submerged in Infinite; the Existent emerges out of its Ground into Appearance and perishes; Accident manifests the riches of Substance and its power; in Being there is *transition*

into other and in Essence showing in an other, wherein the *necessary* relation reveals itself. This transition and showing have now passed over into the original dividing of the Notion, which, leading back the Individual into the Being-in-Self of its Universality, equally determines the Universal as actual. That Individuality is posited in its intro-Reflection, and the Universal as determinate—these two processes are one and the same.

But this must be added to this objective significance, that the distinctions which have been mentioned, when they re-emerge in the determinateness of the Notion, are at the same time posited as only appearing, that is, as not fixed, but as applying to one determination of Notion as well as to the other. Consequently the subject may equally well be taken as Being-in-Self, and the predicate as Determinate Being. Thus the subject without predicate is like the Thing without Properties, the Thing-in-itself, in Appearance,—it is an empty and indeterminate Ground; thus it is the Notion in itself, which receives a distinction and determinateness only in the predicate; the latter then constitutes the side of Determinate Being in the subject. By virtue of this determinate universality the subject stands in relation to the outside, is open to the influence of other things, and thus enters into activity as against them. That which exists passes out of its Being-in-Self into the universal element of connexion and relations, into the negative relations and reciprocal play of actuality; this is a continuation of the Individual into others, that is, Universality.

The identity which has just been demonstrated—namely, that the determination of the subject also applies to the predicate, and conversely—does not belong to this consideration alone; it is not only *in itself*, but is also posited in the Judgment; for the Judgment is the relation of the two, and the copula expresses that *the subject is the predicate*. The subject is determinate determinateness, and the predicate is this its *posited* determinateness; the subject is determinate only in its predicate, or, it is subject in it alone; it has returned to itself in the predicate, and is in it the universal.—But in so far as the subject is the independent, this identity has the relation that the predicate has no independent persistence for itself, but only in the subject, in which it inheres. In so far as now the predicate is distinguished from the subject, it is only an isolated

determinateness of the latter, only one among its properties; while the subject itself is the concrete, the totality of those manifold determinatenesses, of which the predicate contains one; it is the universal.—But on the other hand the predicate too is independent universality, and the subject conversely is only one of its determinations. To this extent the predicate subsumes the subject: neither individuality nor particularity is for itself, but each has its essence and its substance in the universal. The predicate expresses the subject in its Notion; individual and particular are contingent determinations of it, and it is their absolute possibility. When in subsumption an external relation of subject and predicate is present before the mind, and the subject is imagined as independent, then the subsumption refers to the above-mentioned subjective judging in which the beginning is made from the independence of both. Thus subsumption is no more than the application of the universal to a particular or individual, which, according to an indeterminate imagination, is posited *under* it, as being of inferior quality.

The identity of subject and predicate has been considered in such a way that (a) one determination of the Notion belongs to the former and the other to the latter, and (b) the converse happens,—thus the identity still is one which *is in itself*; and because of the independent distinctness of the two sides of the Judgment, their *posited* relation also has these two sides, which at this point are different. But really distinctionless identity constitutes the true relation of subject to predicate. The determination of the Notion is essentially itself relation, for it is a universal; hence their relation itself has the same determinations that subject and predicate have. The relation is universal, for it is the positive identity of these two, subject and predicate; but it is also determinate, for the determinateness of the predicate is that of the subject; and further it is also individual, since in it the independent extremes (as being in their negative unity) are transcended.—But in the Judgment this identity has not yet been posited; the copula exists as the relation (as yet indeterminate) of Being in general: *A* is *B*; for the independence of the determinatenesses of the Notion, or of the extremes, is, in the Judgment, the *reality* which the Notion has at this point. If the “is” of the copula were already posited as this

determinate and completed unity of subject and predicate, or as their Notion, then it would already be Syllogism.

It is the aim of the movement of the Judgment to reconstitute this identity of the Notion, or, rather, to posit it. What is already given in the Judgment is partly the independence but also the determinateness of subject and predicate as against each other, and partly also their relation, which, however, is abstract. The Judgment at first affirms that the subject is the predicate; but, since the predicate is held *not* to be what the subject is, there is a contradiction which must be resolved, or pass over into some result. But, since in and for themselves subject and predicate are the totality of the Notion and the Judgment is the reality of the Notion, its progress is only development. It already contains what emerges in it, and in so far the demonstration is only a monstration, a Reflection as a positing of that which is already given in the extremes of the Judgment. But this positing too is already given: it is the relation of the extremes.

The Judgment in its immediacy is, first, *the Judgment of Inherence*; its subject is, immediately, an abstract, existent individual, and the predicate is an immediate determinateness or property of it—an abstract universal.

This qualitative element in subject and predicate transcends itself, and the determination of one shows in the other: the Judgment now is, secondly, *the Judgment of Subsumption*.

But this somewhat external coincidence passes over into the essential identity of a substantial and necessary connexion; thus, thirdly, it is *the Judgment of Necessity*.

Fourthly, in this essential identity the distinction between subject and predicate has become a form, and so the Judgment becomes subjective; it contains the opposition between the Notion and its reality, and the comparison of both: it is *the Judgment of the Notion*.

This emergence of the Notion is the foundation of the transition of the Judgment into *the Syllogism*.

A

THE JUDGMENT OF INHERENCE

In the subjective Judgment the attempt is made to see one and the same object twofold,—first in its individual actuality, secondly in its essential identity, or in its Notion : the individual raised to its universality, or, what is the same thing, the universal individualized into its actuality. In this manner the Judgment is truth ; for it is the agreement of Notion and reality. At first, however, this is not the nature of the Judgment ; for at first it is immediate, since as yet no Reflection and movement of determinations have come to light in it. This immediacy makes the first Judgment to be a Judgment of Determinate Being, which may also be called qualitative, but only in so far as Quality not only belongs to the determinateness of Being but also includes abstract universality, which, because of its simplicity, has also the form of immediacy.

The Judgment of Determinate Being is also the Judgment of *Inherence* ; immediacy is its determination, and, in the distinction between subject and predicate, the former is the immediate element and therefore is the essential and logically first part in this Judgment ; hence the predicate is formally a dependent element which has its foundation in the subject.

(a) THE POSITIVE JUDGMENT

1. As has already been mentioned, subject and predicate are at first names whose real determination is reached only in the course of the Judgment. But, as sides of the Judgment (which is posited determinate Notion), they have the determination of being its moments ; but, because of their immediacy, they are as yet quite simple,—partly as they have not been enriched by mediation, and partly because they are abstractly opposed as abstract individuality and universality.—The predicate (to discuss this first) is the abstract universal ; but the abstract is conditioned through the mediation of the transcendence of the individual or particular, and therefore, in so far, this mediation is only a presupposition. In the sphere of the Notion there can be no other immediacy than one which contains mediation

in and for itself and has arisen only out of the transcendence thereof—a universal immediacy. Thus also qualitative Being itself is in its Notion a universal; but, as Being, universality has not yet been posited in this manner: only as universality does it become that determination of the Notion in which it is posited that negativity essentially belongs to it. This relation is present in the Judgment, where it is the predicate of a subject.—In the same manner the subject is an entity which is abstractly individual, or, the immediate which is supposed to be as such: it must therefore be the individual as a Something in general. In so far the subject constitutes the abstract side in the Judgment, according to which the Notion in it has passed over into externality.—In the same manner that the two determinations of Notion are determined, their relation, the “is,” or copula, is determined: it too can have the meaning only of an immediate and abstract Being. This Judgment is called the Positive from the relation, which as yet contains no mediation nor negation.

2. Hence the next pure expression of the Positive Judgment is this proposition: “*The individual is universal.*”

This expression must not be understood as *A is B*; for *A* and *B* are perfectly formless and therefore meaningless names; while Judgment in general (and, consequently, even the Judgment of Inherence) has determinations of Notion for its extremes. *A is B* can represent any mere proposition as well as a Judgment. But in every Judgment (even in that which by its form is determined as a richer one) the proposition of this determinate content is asserted: “*the individual is universal,*”—that is, in so far as every Judgment is also abstract Judgment in general. Negative Judgment, and the question how far it also must fall under this expression, will be discussed presently.—It is usually forgotten that in every Judgment (or at least in every Positive Judgment) the assertion is made that the individual is a universal; and this happens, partly because the determinate form through which subject and predicate are distinguished is overlooked (since the Judgment is thought to be nothing more than the relation of two Notions); and partly perhaps because the further content of such a Judgment as “Gaius is learned” or “the rose is red” is vaguely present before consciousness, which, busy with the image of Gaius or the rose, does not

reflect upon the form; although such a content at least as the Gaius of logic (who usually must furnish the example) is an exceedingly uninteresting content, and indeed is selected to be uninteresting in order not to distract attention from the form to itself.

In its objective significance the proposition that *the individual is universal* denotes (as was mentioned above in passing) partly the perishable nature of individual things and partly their positive persistence in the Notion in general. The Notion itself is immortal, but that which in its separation emerges from it is subject to change and to the regress into its universal nature. But, conversely, the universal achieves a Determinate Being. Essence passes out into Show in its determinations, Ground into the Appearance of Existence, and Substance into Manifestation and into its Accidents; and similarly the universal unfolds itself into the individual: Judgment is this its unlocking, the development of that negativity which in itself it is already.—This latter fact is expressed in the converse proposition that *the universal is individual*, which is equally asserted in the Positive Judgment. The subject, being, at first, that which is immediately individual, is related in the Judgment itself to its Other, namely the universal; it is thus posited as the Concrete: as Being it is posited as a Something of many qualities, or, as the concrete of Reflection, as a Thing of manifold Properties, an Actual of manifold Possibilities, or a Substance of manifold Accidents. These manifolds here belong to the subject of the Judgment; hence the Something or Thing or whatever it may be is intro-
reflected in its qualities, properties, or accidents, or continues itself through them, preserving itself in them and equally them in it. Positedness or determinateness belongs to Being-in-and-for-Self. Consequently the subject is the universal in itself.—The predicate on the other hand, as abstract, and not real or concrete, universality, is determinateness as against the subject, and contains only one moment of the totality of the subject to the exclusion of the others. Because of this negativity, which, at the same time, as extreme of the Judgment, refers itself to itself, the predicate is abstractly individual.—Thus in the proposition “the rose is fragrant” it expresses one only of the many properties of the rose; it isolates the property which, in the subject, is commingled with the others, just as, in the dis-

solution of the thing, the manifold properties which inhere in it become matters, grow independent, and are thus isolated. According to this side therefore the proposition of the Judgment runs: *the universal is individual*.

In the Judgment this reciprocal determination of subject and predicate is gathered in one point, with this twofold result. First, the subject exists immediately as that which *is*, as the individual, and the predicate as the universal. But the Judgment is the relation of the two, and the subject is determined as universal by the predicate, and therefore the subject is the universal. Secondly, the predicate is determined in the subject; for it is not any determination in general, but a determination of the subject. "The rose is fragrant"; and this fragrance is not any indeterminate fragrance, but that of the rose. Thus the predicate is an individual.—Now subject and predicate stand in the relation of Judgment, and therefore they ought to remain opposed, according to the determinations of the Notion; as in the reciprocal action of Causality, before they have reached their truth, the two sides ought to remain independent and opposite, against the equality of their determination. Consequently, if the subject is determined as universal, its determination of universality must not also be taken up by the predicate (else no Judgment could arise), but only its determination of individuality; while in so far as the subject is determined as individual, the predicate must be taken as universal.—If this mere identity is considered, two propositions of identity appear:—

The individual is individual;

The universal is universal.

Here the determinations of the Judgment would have fallen quite apart, only their self-relation would be expressed; while their reciprocal relation would be dissolved, and the Judgment thus cancelled.—Of these two propositions one (*the universal is individual*) expresses the Judgment according to its content, which in the predicate is an isolated determination, but in the subject is its totality; the other (*the individual is universal*) expresses the form, which is given immediately in the proposition itself.—In the immediate Positive Judgment the extremes are still simple; consequently form and content are still at one. Or, the Judgment does not consist of two propositions: the

double relation, which arose in it, immediately constitutes the one Positive Judgment. For its extremes are (a) the independent, abstract determinations of the Judgment; and (b) each side is determined by the other through the copula which relates them. But *in itself*, for this reason, the distinction of form and content is present in the Judgment, as it has resulted; and the content of the first proposition (*the individual is universal*) belongs to form, because it expresses the immediate determinateness of the Judgment. But the relation which is expressed by the other proposition (*the universal is individual*),—that is, that the subject is determined as universal and the predicate as particular or individual,—affects content because its determinations arise only through intro-Reflection, whereby the immediate determinatenesses are cancelled, and thus the form constitutes itself an identity which has coincided with itself; it persists against the distinction of form, and is content.

3. There are two propositions, one of form and one of content:—

(Subject)	(Predicate)
<i>The individual</i>	<i>is universal;</i>
<i>The universal</i>	<i>is individual.</i>

If now these two propositions, because they are contained in one Positive Judgment, were united, so that both, subject as well as predicate, were determined as unity of individuality and universality, then both would be the particular, and this in itself must be recognized as their inner determination. But then, partly, this connexion would only have been effected by an external reflection, and partly the resulting proposition *the particular is the particular* would no longer be a Judgment, but an empty proposition of identity, like the propositions which were already discovered, *the individual is individual* and *the universal is universal*.—Individuality and universality cannot yet be united into particularity, because in the Positive Judgment they are still posited as immediate.—Or, the Judgment must still be distinguished according to its form and to its content, just because subject and predicate are still distinguished as immediacy and mediated respectively, or because the Judgment according to its relation is both independence of the related terms, and their reciprocal determination or mediation.

First, then, the Judgment, considered according to its form, runs :—

The individual is universal. But such an immediate individual is not universal ; its predicate is more comprehensive and thus does not correspond to it. The subject is an entity which is immediately for itself, and consequently is the opposite of that abstraction (namely, universality posited by mediation) which was to be predicated of it.

Secondly, if the Judgment is considered according to its content (or as the proposition *the universal is individual*), the subject is a universal of qualities, a concrete, which is determined as infinite ; its determinatenesses are only qualities, properties, or accidents, and therefore its totality is their infinite number in the bad sense. Such a subject therefore is not such an individual property as its predicate affirms it to be. Both propositions must therefore be negated ; and the Positive Judgment must be posited as *Negative*.

(b) NEGATIVE JUDGMENT

1. We have already mentioned the common idea that the truth or untruth of a Judgment depends only upon its content, logical truth relating to nothing but the form and demanding only that the content shall not be self-contradictory. The form of the Judgment is held to be made up only of the relation of two Notions. But it was seen that these two Notions have not only the relationless determination of an Amount, but that they are related as individual and universal. These determinations constitute the truly logical content, which in this abstraction is the content of the Positive Judgment ; what further content may occur in a Judgment (“the sun is round,” “Cicero was a great orator of Rome,” “it is now day,” and so forth) is irrelevant to the Judgment as such ; it merely asserts this, that the subject is predicate, or (since these are only names) in a more closely determinate manner, that the individual is universal, and conversely.—The Positive Judgment is untrue because of this purely logical content, and has its truth in the Negative Judgment.—It is only demanded that the content of the Judgment must not be self-contradictory ; but in the Positive Judgment it was seen that it is self-contradictory.—

Nevertheless it is quite indifferent if this logical content is also called form, and only further empirical filling is reckoned as content: form then does not contain only empty identity, with the determination of content lying outside of it. In that case the Positive Judgment is devoid of truth through its *form* as Positive Judgment; and if correctness of intuition or perception, or correspondence of image with object, were to be called truth, no expression would be left over for that which is the object and purpose of philosophy. At least, the latter would have to be called truth of Reason; and it will be admitted that such Judgments as these, that Cicero was a great orator, that it is now day, and so forth, are no truths of Reason. But they are not truths of Reason, not because they have an empirical content in a contingent kind of way, but because they are only Positive Judgments which can and ought to have no other content than an immediate individual and an abstract determination.

The Positive Judgment has, at first, its truth in the Negative Judgment, *the individual is not abstractly universal*;—but the predicate of the individual (because it is such a predicate or because, considered for itself without relation to the subject, it is abstractly universal) is itself determinate; so far, then, *the individual is a particular*. Further, according to the other proposition which is contained in the Positive Judgment, the Negative Judgment runs thus: *the universal is not abstractly individual*; but this predicate, because it is predicate, or because it stands in a relation to a universal subject, is something further than a mere individuality, and consequently *the universal too is, so far, a particular*.—Now this universal, as subject, is itself in the Judgment-determination of individuality, and thus the two propositions are reduced to the one: *the individual is a particular*.

What follows may here be observed: (a) Particularity, which has already been mentioned, here shows itself to be the predicate; but here it is not posited by external reflection, but has originated through the negative relation which was demonstrated in Judgment. (b) This determination here results only for the predicate. In the immediate Judgment, the Judgment of Inherence, the subject is the foundation, and consequently the determination seems to exhaust itself upon the predicate. But in fact this first negation cannot yet be a determination,

or, more properly, cannot be a positing of the individual, since that is only second negation, or the negative of the negative.

The proposition *the individual is a particular* is the positive expression of the Negative Judgment. This expression is not Positive Judgment itself, in so far as, because of its immediacy, the latter has only the abstract for its extremes; whereas the particular results precisely through the positing of the relation of Judgment as the first mediated determination.—But this determination must not be taken only as moment of the extreme, but also as determination of the relation (which, in fact, so far, it is); or, this Judgment must also be considered as Negative.

This transition is founded upon the relation between the extremes and upon that of their general connexion in the Judgment. The Positive Judgment is the relation of the immediately individual and the universal, of terms, that is, of which one at the same time is not what the other is. Consequently the relation equally essentially is separation, or is negative: for this reason the Positive Judgment had to be posited as Negative. Hence logicians need not have protested so violently because the *not* of Negative Judgment had been attached to the copula. What in the Judgment is determination of the extreme is, equally, determinate relation. The determination of the Judgment, or the extreme, is not purely qualitative, like immediate Being, which is meant to stand opposed merely to some Other outside it. Nor is it determination of Reflection, which, according to its general form, takes up the attitude of positive and negative, each of which terms is posited as exclusive and is identical with the other only in itself. The determination of Judgment (as determination of Notion) is in itself a universal, posited as continuing itself into its other. Conversely, the relation of Judgment is the same determination as that which the extremes possess, for it is just this universality and continuation of one into the other: in so far as these are distinct it also contains negativity.

The above-mentioned transition from the form of relation to the form of determination constitutes the immediate result that the *not* of the copula must equally be added to the predicate, whence the latter must be determined as the non-universal. But the non-universal, by an equally immediate consequence, is the particular.—If the negative is kept fast

according to the wholly abstract determination of immediate Not-being, then the predicate is just the quite indeterminate non-universal. This determination is otherwise dealt with in logic under the *contradictory* Notions, and it is emphasized as being important that in the negative of a Notion only the negative must be held fast: it must be taken as the merely indeterminate extent of the Other of the positive Notion. Thus the merely not-white would be red, yellow, blue, and so on, as much as black. But white as such is the notionless determination of intuition; the *not* of white is, then, equally notionless Not-being, which abstraction was considered at the very beginning of the Logic, when its next truth was recognized to be Becoming. If, in the consideration of the determinations of Judgment, such notionless content, coming from intuition and imagination, is used as example, and the determinations of Being and of Reflection are taken for determinations of Judgment, then this is that same uncritical procedure as when, in imitation of Kant, the notions of understanding are applied to the infinite idea of reason or the so-called Thing-in-itself. The Notion (which includes the Judgment issuing from it) is the true Thing-in-itself or *reasonable* entity; while these determinations belong to Being or Essence, and are not forms developed to that state in which they are in their truth, in the Notion.—If no progress is made beyond white or red as sensuous images, then (as happens so often) something is called notion which in fact is only determination of imagination; and then it is true that not-white and not-red are not positive, while further the not-triangular is something quite indeterminate, since that determination which rests upon number and quantum in general is essentially indifferent and notionless. But a notion ought to be formed both about Not-being and about every such sensuous content: it ought to lose that indifference and abstract immediacy which it has in blind and motionless imagination. Already in Determinate Being the thoughtless Nothing becomes a Limit by which Something does after all relate itself to an Other which is outside it. But in Reflection it is the Negative which essentially relates itself to a Positive, and is thus determinate. Already a Negative is no longer that indeterminate Not-being; it is posited as being only in so far as the Positive stands opposite to it; the third term is *their*

Ground; and thus the Negative is held in an enclosed sphere where that which the one is *not* is something *determinate*.—Still more this *not* is immediately a Positive in the absolutely fluid continuity of the Notion and its determinations; and negation is not only determinateness, but is taken up into universality, and thus identified with it. Consequently the non-universal is forthwith the particular.

2. Since negation concerns the relation of Judgment, and Negative Judgment is still being considered as such, it is still a Judgment; thus the relation of subject and predicate or of individuality and universality is present here, as well as their connexion, the form of the Judgment. The subject, as the fundamental immediate, remains untouched by negation; thus it retains its determination of having a predicate, or its relation to universality. What therefore is negated is not universality in general in the predicate, but its abstraction, or determinateness, which appeared as content as against that universality.—The Negative Judgment then is not total negation; the universal sphere, which the predicate contains, still remains; the relation of subject to predicate is therefore still essentially positive, and the surviving determination of the predicate is equally relation.—If for example it is said that the rose is *not* red, this negates only the determinateness of the predicate, which is distinguished from the universality which also belongs to the predicate. The universal sphere, *colour*, is retained; if the rose is not red, it is assumed that it has a colour—some other colour; and, according to this universal sphere, the Judgment still is positive.

This is expressed immediately in the positive form of the Negative Judgment—*the individual is a particular*; the particular contains universality. This proposition moreover expresses that the predicate is not only a universal, but also a determinate. The negative form contains the same; for although, for example, the rose is not red, still it is not only to retain for predicate the universal sphere of colour, but it is also to have some other determinate colour; thus only the individual determinateness of red is cancelled, and not only is the universal sphere left, but determinateness too is preserved, although it has been turned into indeterminate or universal determinateness, that is, into particularity.

3. Particularity, which has yielded itself as the positive determination of the Negative Judgment, is the mediating term between individuality and universality; hence now Negative Judgment in general, at the third step, is the mediating term of the intro-Reflection of the Judgment of Inherence. In its objective significance it is only the moment of the change of accidents,—or, in Determinate Being, of the individual properties of the Concrete. By virtue of this change the complete determinateness of the predicate, or the Concrete, emerges as posited.

The individual is particular, according to the positive expression of the Negative Judgment. But also the individual is *not* particular, for particularity is of wider compass than individuality; it is thus a predicate which does not correspond with its subject; in which, therefore, it has not yet its truth. *The individual is only individual*, it is negativity relating itself not to Other, either positively or negatively, but only to itself.—The rose is not *any* coloured something, but it has only that determinate colour which is rose-colour. The individual is not an indeterminate determinate, but the determinate determinate.

If the start is made from this positive form of the Negative Judgment, this its negation appears again as only a first negation. But it is not this in fact. Rather the Negative Judgment in and for itself is already second negation or negation of negation; it remains to *posit* what it is in and for itself. It negates, then, the *determinateness* of the predicate of the Positive Judgment, its *abstract* universality, or, considered as content, the individual quality which it receives from the subject. But already negation of determinateness is second negation, that is, the infinite return upon itself of individuality. Thus the construction of the concrete totality of the subject has been effected, or rather it has only now been *posited* as individual, since it has been mediated with itself through negation and its transcendence. The predicate for its part has herewith passed over from first universality to absolute determinateness, and has equated itself with the subject. In so far the Judgment runs: *the individual is individual*.—From the other side, since the subject equally was to be taken as universal, and in so far as in Negative Judgment the predicate (which is the individual as against this determination of the subject) became extended into particu-

larity, and since further the negation of this determinateness is equally the purification of the universality which it contains, now therefore this Judgment also runs: *the universal is the universal*.

In these two Judgments, which before had been reached through external reflection, the predicate is already expressed in its positivity. But here the negation of the Negative Judgment must itself appear in the form of a Negative Judgment. It was seen that a positive relation of subject to predicate, and the universal sphere of the latter, remained in this Judgment. From this side therefore it contained a universality more clear of restrictedness than did the Positive Judgment, and consequently it must be negated all the more of the subject as individual. In this manner the whole volume of the predicate has been negated, and no positive relation remains between it and the subject. This is *Infinite Judgment*.

(c) INFINITE JUDGMENT

The Negative Judgment is no more a true Judgment than is the Positive Judgment. But the Infinite Judgment, which is to be its truth, is negatively expressed and therefore is Negatively-infinite Judgment—a Judgment in which the form of Judgment too is transcended.—But this is an absurd Judgment. It is supposed to be a Judgment, and thus to contain a relation of subject and predicate; but at the same time such a relation is not to be contained in it.—The name of Infinite Judgment is generally mentioned in ordinary systems of logic; but it is not made very clear what it really is.—Examples of Negatively-infinite Judgments are easily obtained: determinations are negatively connected as subject and predicate, and one of these not only does not contain the determinateness of the other, but also does not contain its universal sphere: Spirit (for example) is not red, yellow, and so forth, nor acid nor alkaline; the rose is not an elephant; understanding is not a table; and the like.—These Judgments are correct or true, as the expression goes, but in spite of such truth they are absurd and trivial.—Or, rather, they are not Judgments at all.—An evil deed is a more valid example of Infinite Judgment. In a civil case Something is negated only as the property of one party, while it is admitted

that it should belong to that party if it had a good claim; it is claimed only in the name of law: thus the universal sphere, namely law, is recognized and preserved in this Negative Judgment. But the *misdeed* is that Infinite Judgment which negates not only the particular application of law but also the universal sphere, or law as law. It has of course "correctness" because it is an actual deed, but it is absurd because it is related in a wholly negative manner to morality, which constitutes its universal sphere.

The positive element of the Infinite Judgment, or of the negation of negation, is the intro-Reflection of individuality: it is only through this that it is posited as determinate determinateness. According to this reflection its expression was this: *the individual is individual*. In the Judgment of Inherence the subject exists as *immediate* individual, and to that extent is only as Something in general. It is *posited* as individual only through the mediation of Negative and Infinite Judgment.

Hereby the individual is posited as continuing itself into its predicate, which is identical with it; and thus now equally universality exists no longer as immediate, but as a comprehension of distincts. The Positively-infinite Judgment also runs: *the universal is universal*; and thus it is also posited as return into itself.

Judgment has now transcended itself through this intro-Reflection of the determinations of Judgment. In Negatively-infinite Judgment the distinction is, so to speak, so great that it cannot remain a Judgment; subject and predicate have no positive relation to each other at all. On the other hand in Positively-infinite Judgment there is nothing but identity: there is no distinction whatever, and consequently no Judgment.

More precisely, it is the Judgment of Inherence which has transcended itself: here that is posited which the copula of the Judgment contains—namely, that the qualitative extremes are transcended in this their identity. But this unity is the Notion, and thus this identity immediately is sundered again into its extremes, and exists as Judgment, the determinations of which are however no longer immediate but intro-reflected. The Judgment of Inherence has passed over into *the Judgment of Subsumption* [Reflection].

B

THE JUDGMENT OF SUBSUMPTION

In the Judgment which has now arisen the subject is an individual as such; and similarly the universal is no longer abstract universality or individual property: it is posited as a universal which has comprehended itself into one through the relation of distincts, or (considered according to the content of different determinations in general) as the automatic coalescing of manifold properties and existences.—If examples are to be given of predicates of Judgments of Reflection, they must be of another kind than for Judgments of Inherence. Really a determinate content—the only possible content—is given only in the Judgment of Reflection; for it is determination of form reflected into identity, as distinct from form, in so far as the latter is distinct determinateness, which it still is as Judgment. In the Judgment of Inherence the content is merely immediate or abstract, and indeterminate.—Consequently the following may serve for examples of Judgments of Reflection: “man is mortal”; “things are perishable”; “such and such a thing is useful, or harmful.” Hardness or elasticity of bodies, happiness, and so forth, are such peculiar predicates; they express an essentiality, which however is a determination in the relation, or a comprehensive universality. This universality, which will further determine itself in the movement of the Judgment of Reflection, is as yet distinct from the universality, as such, of the Notion; it is no longer the abstract universality of qualitative Judgment, but it still has the relation to the immediate from which it is derived, and has the latter for the foundation of its negativity.—The Notion at first determines Inherence to exist as determinations of relation or continuities of themselves into the various manifold of existence;—so that the true universal is their inner essence, but is also in appearance; and this their relative nature or characteristic is not yet their Being-in-and-for-Self.

The Judgment of Reflection may seem almost to imply that it should be determined as Judgment of Quantity, just as the Judgment of Inherence was determined also as Qualitative Judgment. But immediacy, in the latter, was not only existent

immediacy, but essentially also was mediated and abstract; and similarly here this transcended immediacy is not merely transcended Quality; it is not, then, merely Quantity. Rather, as Quality is the most external immediacy, this similarly is the most external determination which belongs to mediation.

A further observation remains to be made about determination and the manner in which it appears in its movement in the Judgment of Reflection. In the Judgment of Inherence its movement showed itself in the *predicate*, because that Judgment was in the determination of immediacy, and consequently the subject appeared as the fundamental element. For the same reason the progressive movement of determining, in the Judgment of Reflection, exhausts itself upon the *subject*; for this Judgment has reflected Being-in-Self for its determination. Here therefore what is essential is the universal, or the predicate, which consequently constitutes the fundamental element; it is the measure of the subject, which must be determined in accordance with it.—However, through the further development of the form of the subject, the predicate too obtains a further, although an *indirect*, determination; whereas the other, for the reason which was indicated, shows itself as a *direct* further determination.

With regard to the objective significance of the Judgment, the individual enters into existence through its universality; but it does this as in an essential determination of relation, an essentiality which preserves itself through the manifold of appearance; the subject ought to be that which is determined in and for itself; and it has this determinateness in its predicate. The individual on the other hand is reflected into this its predicate, which is its general essence; in so far the subject is that which exists and appears. In this Judgment the predicate no longer *inheres* in the subject; it is rather that under which, while it is in itself, the other, which is an individual, is *subsumed* as accidental. If the Judgments of Determinate Being can also be determined as Judgments of Inherence, the Judgments of Reflection are rather Judgments of *Subsumption*.

(a) THE SINGULAR JUDGMENT

The immediate Judgment of Subsumption has now again become this: *the individual is universal*; but subject and pre-

dicade have the significance which has been indicated; it may therefore be further expressed thus: *This is an essentially universal entity.*

But a "this" is not an essentially universal entity. And this Judgment, which in its general form is positive, must be taken as negative. But, since the Judgment of Subsumption is not merely positive, the negation does not directly concern the predicate, which does not inhere but is the term which is in itself. It is the subject that is changeable and must be determined. Consequently the negative Judgment must here be framed thus: *not a This is a universal of Reflection*; such an In-itself has a more universal existence than merely in a This. The Singular Judgment thus has its next truth in *the Particular Judgment.*

(b) THE PARTICULAR JUDGMENT

That non-individuality of the subject which must be posited in place of the singularity which it has in the first Judgment of Subsumption, is particularity. But in the Judgment of Subsumption individuality is determined as essential individuality: particularity therefore cannot be simple and abstract determination, in which the individual would be transcended and the existing would have perished: it is only the extension of the individual in external reflection. Consequently the subject is *some These, or a particular number of individuals.*

This Judgment, *some individuals are a universal of Reflection*, appears at first as a positive Judgment; but it is equally negative. For "some" contains universality, and accordingly it can be considered as comprehensive; but, in so far as it is particularity, it also is inadequate to universality. The negative determination which the subject has obtained through the transition of the Singular Judgment is also (as was shown above) determination of the relation, the copula.—The Judgment "*some men are happy*" implies immediately "*some men are not happy.*" If *some* things are useful, *some* things, in consequence, are not useful. Positive and Negative Judgment no longer fall apart: the Particular Judgment contains both together immediately, just because it is a Judgment of Subsumption.—But, for this reason, the Particular Judgment is indeterminate.

If we further consider the subject in the examples of such judgments ("some men," "animals," and so on), we find that, besides the particular determination of form ("some"), it contains also a determination of content ("man," and so on). The subject of the Singular Judgment could be "*this* man," a singularity which really is proper to external indication; really therefore it should run (for example): "Gaius." But the subject of the Particular Judgment can no longer be "some Gaii," for Gaius is supposed to be an individual as such. A more universal content is therefore added to the "some," such as "men," "animals," and so forth. This is not a merely empirical content, but one determined by the form of the Judgment: it is a universal because "some" contains universality, and because at the same time universality must be separated from the individuals; for reflected individuality is the foundation. Further, this universality is also a general nature, or the *genus* man, or animal;—that universality which is the result of the Judgment of Subsumption anticipates—as also the Positive Judgment, which has for subject the individual, anticipated—the determination which is the result of the Judgment of Inherence.

The subject which contains the individuals, their relation to particularity, and universal nature, is in so far already posited as the totality of the determinations of the Notion. But really this is an external consideration. What is here posited in the subject in relation to one another through its form, is the extension of the "*this*" into particularity. But this extension is not adequate to it: "*this*" is completely determinate, but "*some this*" is indeterminate. The extension is meant to apply to the "*this*," that is, to correspond to it and to be completely determinate: now such an extension is totality, or, at this point, universality in general.

This universality is founded upon the "*this*," for here the individual is the intro-reflected term; its further determinations therefore act upon it externally. For such a reason particularity determined itself as "*some*," and similarly the universality, which the subject has reached, is *allhood*: the Particular Judgment has passed over into *the Universal Judgment*.

(c) THE UNIVERSAL JUDGMENT

Universality as it is in the subject of the Universal Judgment is the external universality of reflection, or allhood; all the terms are as individuals, and the individual here remains unchanged. Consequently this universality is only a comprehension of individual entities which persist for themselves; it is a common quality which belongs to them only in comparison.—It is this common quality which usually first occurs to subjective imagination when universality is mentioned. The fact that a determination is common to several entities is given as the most obvious reason why it should be looked upon as universal.—This notion of universality is especially present also in analysis, when, for example, the development of a function in terms of a polynomial is considered to be more universal than its development in terms of a binomial, since the polynomial represents more individualities than the binomial. The demand that the function should be represented in its universality really asks for a pantonomial, or exhausted infinity; but here the barrier of that demand arises automatically, and the representation of the infinite amount is forced to content itself with its *ought* and, in consequence, with a polynomial. In fact however the binomial is pantonomial already in those cases in which the method or rule regards only the dependence of one term upon another, and the dependence of several terms upon their antecedents does not particularize itself, one and the same function still remaining fundamental. The method or rule must be looked upon as the true universal; in the continuation of development, or in the development of a polynomial, it is only repeated, and thus gains nothing in universality through the increased number of terms. Bad infinity and the illusion which it involves have already been mentioned above; the universality of the Notion is the achieved Beyond, while this infinity remains infected with this Beyond as with an unattainable term, in so far as it remains mere progress to infinity. If under universality nothing better is present to imagination than allhood, a universality which is supposed to be exhausted in the individuals as individuals, then this is a relapse into that bad infinity; or else mere manyness is being taken in place of allhood. But manyness, however

great it is, still remains particularity and is not allhood.—A dim image of the universality of the Notion which is in and for self is here presented: it is the Notion which forcibly urges beyond the stubborn individuality to which imagination clings and beyond the externality of its reflection, substituting allhood as totality, or, rather, categorical Being-in-and-for-Self.

This appears elsewhere too in allhood, which indeed is empirical universality. In so far as the individual is presupposed as an immediate, and therefore is discovered and taken up externally, the reflection which comprehends it into allhood is equally external to it. But the individual, as “this,” is utterly indifferent to this reflection, and therefore universality and such an individual cannot unite in one unity. Empirical allhood therefore remains a problem or “ought” which cannot be represented as Being. An empirically universal proposition (for such are nevertheless advanced) rests only upon the tacit agreement that, if no instance of the opposite can be adduced, the majority of cases is to be reckoned as allhood; or that subjective allhood (namely, the cases which have come to knowledge) may be taken as being an objective allhood.

The Universal Judgment has been reached; if it is considered more closely, the subject is seen to contain universality which is in and for itself as posited, whereas before (as we observed) it contained it as presupposed. “All men” expresses, first, the genus man, and secondly expresses this genus in its individuation, but in such a manner that at the same time the individuals are extended into the universality of the genus. Conversely, through this connexion with individuality, universality is determined as completely as individuality; hereby posited universality has become equivalent to presupposed universality.

But properly that which is presupposed should not be regarded first: the result ought to be considered by itself in the determination of form.—Individuality, since it has extended itself to allhood, is posited as negativity which is identical self-relation. Thus it has not remained that first individuality (like that, for example, of “Gaius”), but is that determination which is identical with universality, or the absolute determinateness of the universal.—That first individuality of the Singular Judgment was not the immediate individuality of the Positive Judgment, but arose through the dialectic movement of the

Judgment of Inherence in general; and this individuality had already been determined to be the negative identity of the determinations of that Judgment. This is the true presupposition of the Judgment of Subsumption; as against the positing which operates upon it that first determinateness of individuality was its *in-itself*; that which it is in-itself is now, accordingly, posited through the movement of the Judgment of Subsumption—namely, individuality as identical self-relation of the determinate. By virtue of this that Reflection which extended individuality into allhood is not external to it; but through that Reflection it only becomes *for itself* what it already is *in itself*.—The result is thus in truth *objective universality*. In so far the subject has discarded the form-determination of the Judgment of Subsumption, which passed from “this” through “some” to allhood; in place of “all men” we must now say “man.”

The universality which has hereby arisen is the genus—that universality which is concrete in itself. The genus does not inhere in the subject and is not an individual property of it, or indeed any property; it contains every isolated determinateness resolved in its substantial homogeneity.—For this reason—because it is posited as this negative self-identity—it is essentially subject; but it is no longer subsumed in its predicate. The nature of the Judgment of Subsumption is now altogether changed hereby.

This Judgment was essentially Judgment of *Subsumption*. The predicate was determined as the universal which was in itself as against its subject; according to its content it could be taken as essential determination of relation, or also as characteristic—a determination according to which the subject is only an essential appearance. But, determined as such an objective universality, the predicate ceases to be subsumed under such a determination of relation or comprehensive reflection: rather, such a predicate is a particular against this universality. The relation between subject and predicate has become inverted, and in so far the Judgment has now transcended itself.

This transcendence of the Judgment coincides with that which becomes the determination of the copula, which latter still remains to be considered: the transcendence of the determinations of the Judgment and their transition into the copula

are one and the same thing.—For in so far as the subject has risen into universality, it has become equal to the predicate in this determination, and the predicate, as reflected universality, also includes particularity; subject and predicate are consequently identical, that is, they have coalesced into the copula. This identity is the genus, or the nature which is in and for itself of a thing. And in so far as this nature again sunders itself and becomes a Judgment, it is the inner nature through which subject and object are related to each other,—a relation of Necessity, in which these determinations of the Judgment are no more than unessential distinctions. *What belongs to all the individuals of a genus belongs to the genus through its nature:* this consequence follows immediately, and is the expression of that which resulted before, namely, that the subject (“all men,” for example) discards its form-determination and that “man” must be said instead.—This connexion, which is in and for itself, constitutes the foundation of a new Judgment—the *Judgment of Necessity*.

C

THE JUDGMENT OF NECESSITY

Universality has developed into a determination which is, as was seen, objective universality or universality which is in and for itself,—that to which in the sphere of Essence Substantiality corresponds. It is distinct from the latter in that it belongs to the Notion; hence not only the inner but also the posited necessity of its determinations is immanent in it: in other words, distinction is immanent in it, whereas in Substance distinction lies only in its Accidents and is not contained in it as principle.

Now this objective universality is *posited* in the Judgment, and hence first with this its essential determinateness as immanent in it, and secondly as distinct from it as particularity, of which this universality constitutes the substantial foundation. In this manner it is determined as genus and species.

(a) THE CATEGORICAL JUDGMENT

The genus divides or repels itself essentially into species: it is genus only in so far as it comprehends inferior species; species is species only in so far as (a) it exists in individuals and (b) is a higher universality in the genus.—Now the Categorical Judgment has for predicate such a universality as provides for the subject its immanent nature. But it is itself the first or immediate Judgment of Necessity; hence the determinateness of the subject by virtue of which it is a particular or individual as against genus or species, belongs, to this extent, to the immediacy of external existence.—But, equally, objective universality has only here its immediate particularization; for this reason it is determinate, having higher genera relatively to itself;—and, on the other hand, it is not precisely the nearest genus, that is, its determinateness is not precisely the principle of the specific particularity of the subject. What is necessary in it is the substantial identity of subject and predicate, against which the peculiarity by which the former is distinct from the latter is only an unessential positedness, or a mere name; in its predicate the subject is reflected into its Being-in-and-for-Self.—Such a predicate should not be ranked together with the predicates of the Judgments which have been treated so far; if, for example, the Judgments

“the rose is red,”
 “the rose is a plant,”
 or “this ring is yellow,”
 “it is gold,”

are confounded into one class, and if so external a property as the colour of a flower is taken as a predicate of equal rank with its vegetable nature, then a distinction is overlooked which must be obvious to the most vulgar apprehension.—The Categorical Judgment must therefore be definitely distinguished from the Positive and the Negative Judgment; in these that which is predicated of the subject is an individual and contingent content, in the Categorical Judgment it is the totality of the intro-reflected form. In it therefore the copula signifies necessity, but in the Positive and Negative only abstract and immediate Being.

At this point the determinateness of the subject, by virtue of which it is a particular as against the predicate, is still contingent; subject and predicate are not related through form or determinateness as necessary; so far, therefore, the necessity is still an inner one.—But the subject is subject only as particular, and, in so far as it has objective universality, it is supposed to have it essentially only according to that immediate determinateness. The objectively-universal determines itself, that is, it posits itself into the Judgment; and in so doing it is essentially in identical relation with this determinateness (which has been repelled out of itself) as such; that is, essentially this determinateness must not be posited as merely contingent. The Categorical Judgment corresponds to its objective universality only through this necessity of its immediate being: in this manner it has passed over into the *Hypothetical Judgment*.

(b) THE HYPOTHETICAL JUDGMENT

If *A* is, *B* is; or, the being of *A* is not its own being but the being of another, of *B*.—What is posited in this Judgment is the necessary connexion of one immediate determinateness with another: this is not yet posited in the Categorical Judgment.—Here there are two immediate or externally contingent existences, whereas in the Categorical Judgment there is one only, namely the subject; but, since one is external as against the other, this other immediately is also external to the first.—According to this immediacy the content of each side is indifferent to the other; consequently this Judgment at first is a purely formal proposition. Now it is true that immediacy (1) as such is an independent and concrete Being; but (2) its relation is what is essential; hence equally this Being exists as mere possibility; the Hypothetical Judgment does not imply that *A* is or that *B* is, but that *if* one is, then the other is: only the connexion of the extremes is posited as being, not the extremes themselves. Rather, in this necessity each is posited as equally the Being of an Other.—The proposition of identity merely states that *A* is only *A* and not *B*, and *B* is only *B* and not *A*: in the Hypothetical Judgment, on the contrary, the Being of finite things according to their formal truth is posited

through the Notion; that is, it is posited that the finite is its own Being, but equally is not its own but is the Being of an Other. In the sphere of Being the finite changes and becomes an Other; in the sphere of Essence it is Appearance, and it is posited that its Being consists in this, that an Other shows in it, and here Necessity is the inner relation not yet posited as such. But the Notion is this, that this identity is *posited*, and that the being entity is not abstract self-identity, but *concrete* identity; it is immediately of itself the Being of an Other.

The Hypothetical Judgment can be taken, in closer determinateness through the relations of Reflection, as relation of ground and consequence, condition and conditioned, causality, and so forth. In the Categorical Judgment, Substantiality is in its notional form: in the Hypothetical Judgment, the connexion of Causality. This and other relations are all subordinate to it, but they are here no longer relations between independent sides: the latter exist essentially only as moments of one and the same identity.—However, they are not yet opposed to each other in the Judgment according to their notional determinations as individual or particular and universal, but only *as* moments in general. In so far, the Hypothetical Judgment has rather the aspect of a proposition; the Particular Judgment was of indeterminate content, and similarly the Hypothetical Judgment is of indeterminate form, since its content does not reside in the relation between subject and predicate.—In itself however the Being, since it is Being of the Other, is thereby unity of itself and the Other, and, therefore, universality; and for that reason it is at the same time really only a particular, since it is determinate and in its determinateness is not merely self-relating. But it is not *simple* and abstract particularity that is posited; but, through the immediacy which belongs to each *determinateness*, the moments of particularity are distinct; and, at the same time, through its unity (which constitutes their relation) particularity is also their totality.—In truth therefore what is posited in this Judgment is universality as the concrete identity of the Notion whose determinations have no persistence by themselves but are only particularities posited in universality. Thus it is *the Disjunctive Judgment*.

(c) THE DISJUNCTIVE JUDGMENT

In the Categorical Judgment the Notion exists as objective universality and as an external individuality. In the Hypothetical Judgment the Notion in its negative identity emerges in this externality; through this identity its moments acquire the determinateness which is now posited in the Disjunctive Judgment; in the Hypothetical Judgment they have it immediately. The Disjunctive Judgment therefore is objective universality posited at the same time in conjunction with form. Hence it contains, first, concrete universality or genus, in simple form, as the subject; secondly it contains it as the totality of its distinct determinations. *A* is either *B* or *C*. This is the necessity of the Notion, where, first, the indiscernibility of the two extremes is sameness of comprehensiveness, content, and universality; secondly, they are distinguished according to the form of the determinations of Notion, but in such a manner that the form (because of this identity) is *mere* form. For this reason, thirdly, identical objective universality appears as the intro-reflected term as against unessential form,—as content, which however has in itself the determinateness of form, first as the simple determinateness of genus, next as this same determinateness developed into its distinction,—in which manner it is the particularity of species and their totality, the universality of the genus.—In its development particularity constitutes the predicate, because it is the more universal in so far as it contains the whole universal sphere of the subject, but also contains it in the analysis of particularization.

If this particularization is considered more closely, the genus, first, constitutes the substantial universality of the various species; consequently the subject is as well *C* as *B*; and this “as well as” designates the positive identity of the particular with the universal; this objective universal preserves itself intact in its particularity. Secondly, the species are mutually exclusive; *A* is either *B* or *C*; for these are the determinate distinction of the universal sphere. This “either—or” is their negative relation. But here they are identical as much as in the former relation; the genus is their unity, in which they are determinate particulars.—If the genus were an abstract universality as in the Judgments of Inherence, then the species too would

have to be taken as merely various and indifferent to one another: but it is not this external universality, which arises out of comparison and omission only: it is the universality immanent and concrete in them.—An empirical disjunctive judgment lacks necessity; *A* is either *B* or *C* or *D* and so forth because the species *B*, *C*, *D* and so forth are given; really no “either—or” can be expressed by this judgment; for such species at best constitute only a subjective completeness. One species does exclude another; but “either—or” excludes *every* other, and thus concludes by itself a total sphere. This totality has its necessity in the negative unity of the objectively universal, which contains individuality dissolved within itself, immanent as simple principle of distinction: through this the species are determined and related. On the other hand the empirical species have their distinctions in any contingent characteristic, which is an external principle and therefore not their own principle or the immanent determinateness of the genus; for this reason too they are not related according to their determinateness.—But the species constitute the universality of the predicate through the relation of their determinateness.—The so-called contrary and contradictory Notions should really not find their place until this point; for in the Disjunctive Judgment the essential distinction of the Notion is posited; but at the same time they have here their truth, which is, that the contrary and contradictory themselves are distinct both as contrary and as contradictory. The species are contrary just in so far as they are various,—that is, they have a persistence which is in and for itself, through the genus as their objective nature; and they are contradictory in so far as they exclude one another. But by itself each of these determinations is one-sided and without truth; in the “either—or” of the Disjunctive Judgment their unity is posited as their truth, according to which this independent persistence, as concrete universality, is itself also the *principle* of negative unity, by means of which they exclude one another.

By virtue of the identity of subject and predicate (which has just been demonstrated), according to negative unity, the genus in the Disjunctive Judgment is determined as that which comes next. At first this expression points to a merely quantitative distinction of more or less,—which determinations a universal

is supposed to contain against a particularity which stands subordinate to it. Accordingly, it remains contingent what the next genus is, in fact. But in so far as the genus is taken as a universal which is formed through the mere omission of determinations, it cannot really form a Disjunctive Judgment; for it is contingent whether the determinateness which constitutes the principle of the "either—or" happens to remain in it; the genus then would not be represented in its determinateness in the species, and these could have only a contingent completeness. In the Categorical Judgment the genus remains only in this abstract form as against the subject: it is therefore not necessarily the genus next to it, and in so far is external. But the genus is concrete and as such is essentially determinate universality, and therefore as simple determinateness it is the unity of moments of Notion which are merely suspended in that simplicity but have their real distinction in the various species. The genus therefore is that which is next to a species in so far as the latter has its specific distinction in the essential determinateness of the former, and the species in general have their distinct determination as principle in the nature of the genus.

The side which has just been considered constitutes the identity of subject and predicate according to the side of determinateness in general, a side which was posited through the Hypothetical Judgment, whose necessity is an identity of immediate and various entities—that is, essentially, a negative unity. Indeed, it is this negative unity which segregates subject and predicate, although now it is itself posited as distinct, in the subject as simple determinateness and in the predicate as totality. This segregation of subject and predicate is the distinction of Notion; but the totality of the species in the predicate cannot for that very reason be any other distinction.—Thus the determination of the disjunctive members against one another results from this. It is nothing more than the distinction of the Notion, for it is this only which disjoins itself and in its determination manifests its negative unity. The species further comes under consideration here only according to its simple Notion-determinateness, and not according to *shape*, which is the manner in which it has passed out of the Idea into further independent Reality. The latter indeed is neglected in the

simple principle of the genus; but the essential process of distinguishing must be a moment of the Notion. In the Judgment which is here under consideration the developing process of self-determination of the Notion has really itself posited its disjunction,—that is, that which, under Notion, was found to be its determination which is in and for itself, or its distinction into determinate notions.—Now the Notion is the universal; it is equally the positive and the negative totality of the particulars, and it is also for this reason immediately one of its disjunctive members; the other member is this universality resolved into its particularity, or the determinateness of the Notion as determinateness, in which it is precisely the universality which represents itself as totality.—If the disjunction of a genus into species has not yet attained this form, this is a proof that it has not yet risen to the determinateness of the Notion and has not emerged out of it.—A colour is either violet, dark blue, light blue, green, yellow, orange, or red;—such a disjunction shows plainly its empirical admixture and impurity; and considered from this side, and by itself, it may even be called barbarous. If a Notion is formed about colour that it is the concrete unity of light and dark, then this genus contains the determinateness which constitutes the principle of its particularization into species. But one of these must be just simple colour, which contains the opposite equally balanced, and enclosed and negated in its intensity; opposed to it the opposition of the relation between light and dark must present itself, to which must be added (since this is a phenomenon of nature) the indifferent neutrality of the opposition.—If mixtures like violet and orange, and degrees of intensity like dark and light blue, are held to be species, this can only be the result of a wholly unconsidered procedure, showing too little reflection even for empiricism.—But this is not the place for developing what distinct or more closely determinate forms may belong to disjunction as it takes place in the element of Nature or of Spirit respectively.

The Disjunctive Judgment has the members of disjunction, at first, in its predicate; but equally it is disjunct itself; its subject and predicate are the members of disjunction; they are the moments of Notion, posited in their determinateness, but also as identical—(a) in objective universality, which in

the subject is as simple genus and in the predicate as the universal sphere and as the totality of the moments of Notion,—and (β) in negative unity, or the developed connexion of necessity, according to which simple determinateness in the subject has separated into the distinction of the various species, where precisely it is their essential relation and the self-identical.

This unity—the copula of this Judgment, where the extremes have coincided through their identity—is thus the Notion itself, and, further, as posited; and now the mere Judgment of Necessity has risen to be *the Judgment of the Notion*.

D

THE JUDGMENT OF THE NOTION

A skill in making Judgments of Inherence, such as “the rose is red,” “the snow is white,” and so forth, will hardly be accounted as evidence of great power of judgment. The Judgments of Subsumption are rather propositions; in the Judgment of Necessity the object exists, it is true, in its objective universality, but its relation to the Notion is to be found only in the Judgment which is now to be considered. The Notion thus is the basis, and, since it is in relation to the object, it is this as an *ought*, to which reality may or may not be adequate.—Consequently it is only this Judgment which contains a true judgment; the predicates good, bad, true, beautiful, correct, and so on, signify that the fact has been measured against its general Notion, which is just a presupposed *ought*, and that it does, or does not, agree with it.

The Judgment of the Notion has been called *judgment of modality*; it has been considered to contain the form according to which the relation of subject and predicate is found in an external understanding, and to concern the value of the copula only in regard to thought. Accordingly the Problematic Judgment is supposed to consist in its affirmation or negation being taken as optional or possible, the Assertoric Judgment in its being taken as true—that is, as actual, and the Apodeictic Judgment in its being taken as necessary.—It is easy to see why in this Judgment the judgment itself is so readily surpassed, and its determination regarded as something merely subjective.

For here it is the Notion, or subjective element, which emerges again in the Judgment and stands related to an immediate actuality. But this subjective quality must not be confused with external reflection, which, though it is of course subjective, is subjective not in the same sense as the Notion itself; this Notion, which re-emerges from the Disjunctive Judgment, is indeed the opposite of a mere way and manner. In this sense the earlier Judgments are merely subjective, for they are based upon an abstraction and one-sidedness in which the Notion is lost. Rather, the Judgment of the Notion is objective and is truth as against them, just because it is founded upon the Notion in its determinateness as Notion and not in external reflection or in relation to subjective, that is, to contingent, thought.

In the Disjunctive Judgment the Notion was posited as identity of universal nature and its particularization: thus the relation of the Judgment had cancelled itself. This concretion of universality and particularization is, at first, simple result; it must now develop into totality, since the moments which it contains have perished in it and do not yet stand opposed to each other in definite independence.—The inadequacy of the result may also be expressed more definitely in these terms, that in the Disjunctive Judgment objective universality has indeed become complete in its particularization, but that the negative unity of the latter passes back only into the former, and has not yet determined itself to be the third term, or individuality.—But, in so far as the result is itself negative unity, it is already this individuality; but now it is only this one determinateness which must now posit its negativity, sunder itself into the extremes, and in this manner finally develop into the Syllogism.

The first diremption of this unity is that Judgment in which it is posited first as subject, as an immediate individual, and then as predicate, as determinate relation of its moments.

(a) THE ASSERTORIC JUDGMENT

At first the Judgment of the Notion is immediate: thus it is the Assertoric Judgment. The subject is any concrete individual, and the predicate expresses this same as the relation of its actuality, determinateness, or character, to its Notion. ("This

house is bad," "this action is good.") Further then it contains this:—(a) that the subject *ought* to be something; its universal nature has posited itself as the independent Notion; (b) particularity, which exists as character and external existence not only because of its immediacy but also because it is expressly distinguished from its independent and universal nature; and, since the Notion is independent, this existence for its part is indifferent to the universal, and may, or may not, be adequate to it.—This character is the individuality which lies beyond the necessary determination of the universal in the Disjunctive Judgment, a determination which exists only as particularization of the species and as negative principle of the genus. In so far the concrete universality which emerged from the Disjunctive Judgment is split into the form of extremes in the Assertoric Judgment; these extremes lack the Notion as posited unity which relates them.

For this reason the Judgment so far is no more than assertoric; it is vouched for by a subjective asseveration. It depends upon some outside third term whether something is good or bad, correct, fitting or unfitting, and so on. But the fact that this dependence is *posited externally* means that it is only *in itself* or internal.—Consequently nobody will suppose that if something is good or bad (and so forth), it is good only in subjective consciousness but perhaps bad in itself, or that good and bad, correct, fitting, and the rest, are not predicates of the objects themselves. The merely subjective element of the assertion in this Judgment consists then in this, that the connexion between subject and predicate, which is *in itself*, is not yet *posited*, or, what is the same thing, that it is merely external; as yet the copula is an immediate and abstract Being.

Consequently the asseveration of the Assertoric Judgment is opposed with equal authority by its opposite. If it is stated that an action is good, the opposite assertion, that it is bad, has an equal justification.—Or, considered by itself, the subject of the Judgment is immediate individual, and therefore in this abstraction no determinateness is yet posited in it containing its relation to the universal Notion. It is therefore still contingent whether it corresponds to the Notion or not. Hence the Judgment is essentially *Problematic*.

(b) THE PROBLEMATIC JUDGMENT

The Problematic is the Assertoric Judgment in so far as the latter must equally be taken positively and negatively.—From this qualitative side the Particular Judgment is also a Problematic Judgment, for it is equally valid positively and negatively;—and similarly in the Hypothetical Judgment the being of the subject and predicate is problematic;—through these too it is posited that the Singular and the Categorical Judgments are still something merely subjective. But this positing is more immanent in the Problematic Judgment as such than in those others; for in the former the content of the predicate is the relation of the subject to the Notion, and here therefore the determination of the immediate as contingent is actually given.

At first it only appears to be problematic whether or not the predicate is to be connected with a certain subject, and in so far the indeterminateness falls within the copula. No determination can emerge therefrom for the predicate, for it is already objective and concrete universality. Thus the problematic element concerns the immediacy of the subject, which thus is determined as contingency.—Further, for this reason abstraction must not be made from the individuality of the subject: purged of individuality it would be merely a universal; the predicate contains just this, that the Notion of the subject is to be posited in relation to its individuality.—It is impossible to say “the house” or “a house is good”; it is necessary to add “according to its character.”—The problematic part of the subject in itself constitutes its contingency as moment: it constitutes the subjectivity of the thing (as opposed to its objective nature or Notion), and the mere manner or character of it.

Thus the subject itself is distinguished into its universality or objective nature (its *ought*) and into the particular character of Determinate Being. Hence it contains the Ground whether it is as it *ought* to be. In this manner it is equated with the predicate.—The negativity of the problematic, in so far as it is directed against the immediacy of the subject, accordingly means only this its original division (and it already exists in itself as the unity of the universal and the particular) into these its moments—a division which is the Judgment itself.

It may further be observed that each of the two sides of the

subject, its Notion and its character, might be called its subjectivity. The Notion is the introverted universal Essence of a thing, or its negative self-unity: this constitutes its subjectivity. But a thing is also essentially contingent, and has an external character; and this is equally called its mere subjectivity, as opposed to that other, which is its objectivity. The thing itself is indeed just this, that its Notion as negative self-unity negates its universality and transposes itself into the externality of individuality.—Here the subject of the Judgment is posited as this duality; and those opposite meanings of subjectivity reside, according to their truth, in one entity.—The significance of the subjective part has itself become problematic because it has lost the immediate determinateness which it had in the immediate judgment, together with its definite opposition to the predicate.—This opposite significance of the subjective element, which occurs also in the reasonings of ordinary reflection, ought by itself at least to draw attention to the fact that in one of these it has no truth. The double significance is the manifestation of the fact that each by itself is one-sided.

The problematic being thus posited as the problematic element of the thing, or the thing together with its character, the Judgment itself is no longer Problematic, but *Apodeictic*.

(c) THE APODEICTIC JUDGMENT

The subject of the Apodeictic Judgment ("the house, if of such and such a character, is good"; "the action, if of such and such a character, is just") contains first the universal which it *ought* to be, and secondly its character; the latter contains the ground why a predicate of the Notion-Judgment belongs, or does not belong, to the whole of the subject; that is, whether the subject does or does not correspond to its Notion.—Now this Judgment is truly objective; that is, it is the truth of judgment in general. Subject and predicate correspond to each other and have the same content, and this content itself is concrete posited universality; for it contains the two moments, the objective universal (or genus) and the individualized entity. It is here therefore the universal which is itself, and continues itself through its opposite, and is universal only as unity with the latter.—A universal like the predicates "good," "fitting,"

“correct,” and so forth, is based upon an *ought* and also contains the fact that Existence corresponds; it is not the *ought* nor the genus by itself, but this correspondence, that is the universality which constitutes the predicate of the Apodeictic Judgment.

The subject too contains these two moments in immediate unity, as Thing. But its truth is, that it is inwardly severed into its *ought* and its *is*; and this is the absolute judgment about all actuality.—This original division, which is the omnipotence of the Notion, is equally return to its unity and absolute relation to each other of *ought* and *is*, and so causes the actual to be one Thing; its inner relation, this concrete identity, constitutes the soul of the Thing.

The transition from the immediate simplicity of the Thing to that correspondence, which is the determinate relation of its *ought* and its *is*, or the copula, is now seen to lie in the particular determinateness of the Thing. The genus is the universal which is in and for itself, and, in so far, appears as unrelated; while the determinateness is that which in this universality reflects itself into itself but also into an Other. Consequently the Judgment has its ground in the character of the subject, and thereby is Apodeictic. Thus there is now given the determinate and completed copula, which formerly consisted in the abstract “is” but has now developed itself further into ground in general. At first it exists in the subject as immediate determinateness; but it is equally relation to the predicate, which has no other content than just this correspondence, or the relation of the subject to universality.

The form of Judgment has thus perished: first, because subject and predicate in themselves are the same content; but secondly because the subject, through its determinateness, points beyond itself and relates itself to the predicate. But, thirdly, this process of relating has equally passed over into the predicate; it constitutes the latter’s content alone, and is thus the *posited* relation or the Judgment itself.—Thus the concrete identity of the Notion, which was the result of the Disjunctive Judgment and constitutes the inner foundation of the Notion-Judgment, is established in the whole, whereas originally it was posited only in the predicate.

If the positive part of this result, which effects the transition of the Judgment into another category, is further considered,

it appears (as was seen) that subject and predicate are in the Apodeictic Judgment each the whole of the Notion.—The unity of the Notion, as that determinateness which constitutes the copula which relates them, is also distinct from them. At first it merely stands on the other side of the subject as its immediate character. But its essential function is to relate, and thus it is not only such immediate character, but also that which passes through subject and predicate and is universal.—On the other hand, since subject and predicate have the same content, the *form-relation* is posited through this determinateness, that is, determinateness as a universal, or particularity.—Thus it contains the two form-determinations of the extremes, and is the determinate relation of subject and predicate; it is the completed copula of the Judgment, full of content, the unity of the Notion which has re-emerged out of the Judgment, where it lost itself in the extremes.—Through this completion of the copula the Judgment has become *the Syllogism*.

CHAPTER III

THE SYLLOGISM

It has resulted that the Syllogism is the reconstruction of the Notion in the Judgment, and is thus the unity and truth of both. The Notion as such holds its moments suspended in unity; in the Judgment this unity is internal, or, what is the same thing, it is external, and the moments, although related, are posited as independent extremes. In the Syllogism the Notion-determinations are posited like the extremes of the Judgment; at the same time their determinate unity is posited.

The Syllogism thus is the Notion posited in its completeness; consequently it is the Reasonable.—Understanding is taken to be the capacity of the determinate Notion, which is held fast for itself through abstraction and the form of universality. But in reason the determinate Notions are posited in their totality and unity. Consequently not only is the Syllogism reasonable, but whatever is reasonable is a Syllogism. To syllogize has for long been held to be the part of reason; on the other hand, reason in and for itself, and reasonable axioms and laws, are spoken of in a manner which leaves it dark how the former syllogizing reason is connected with the latter reason which is the source of laws and other eternal truths and absolute thoughts. If the former is supposed to be only formal reason, while the latter is supposed to produce the content, then, according to this distinction, it is precisely the *form* of reason, the Syllogism, that could not be lacking in the latter. In spite of this both are commonly kept apart, and when one is mentioned the other is neglected, so that the reason of absolute thoughts seems to be ashamed of the reason of the Syllogism, and the Syllogism to be cited only traditionally as an activity of reason. But, as has just been observed, logical reason, when it is considered as formal, plainly should be recognizable in that reason which concerns itself with a content: indeed, content can be reasonable only through the form of reason. It is impossible here to have recourse to common chat about reason,

which refrains from stating what is to be understood by reason; this cognition which is supposed to be reasonable is generally so busy about its objects that it forgets to cognize reason itself, distinguishing and designating it only by those objects which are supposed to belong to it. If reason is supposed to be that cognition which has knowledge of God, freedom, right, duty, the infinite, the unconditioned, the supersensuous, or even yields only ideas and sentiments about them, then partly these latter are only negative objects, and partly the first question still remains, what it is in all these objects that makes them reasonable.—It is this:—that their infinite element is not empty abstraction from the finite, nor universality without content or determination: it is filled universality, the Notion which is determinate, and contains its determinateness in this veritable manner, that it distinguishes itself in itself and exists as the unity of these its rational and determinate distinctions. It is only thus that reason rises above the finite, conditioned, or sensuous, or however else it may be determined; in this negativity it is essentially full of content, for it is unity as unity of determinate extremes; but thus the reasonable is Syllogism and Syllogism only.

At first the Syllogism like the Judgment is immediate; hence its determinations (*termini*) are simple and abstract determinatenesses; thus it is the Syllogism of Understanding. If no progress is made beyond this form of it, its reasonableness, although present and posited in it, is insignificant. Its essential elements are the unity of the extremes, the middle term which unites and the ground which sustains them. Abstraction holds fast the independence of the extremes, and, in so doing, opposes to them this unity as a determinateness which is equally fixed and is for itself; in this manner it takes it as non-unity rather than as unity. The expression “middle” (*medius terminus*) has been introduced from spatial imagery, and contributes its part in preventing progress beyond the mutual externality of the determinations. Now if the Syllogism consists in this, that the unity of the extremes is posited in it, and if this unity is taken altogether (*a*) as a particular by itself, and (*b*) as a merely external relation, non-unity being made the essential relation of the Syllogism, then reason (and the Syllogism is reason) does not help to produce reasonableness.

First *the Qualitative Syllogism*, in which the determinations are thus immediately and abstractly determined, demonstrates in itself (because, like Judgment, it is their relation) that they are not such abstract determinations, but that each contains the relation to the other, and that the middle not only contains particularity as against the determinations of the extremes, but also contains particularity posited in itself.

Through this its dialectic it becomes *the Syllogism of Reflection*, the second Syllogism,—with determinations as such, in each of which essentially the other shows; in other words, they are posited as mediated, and this, according to the Syllogism, they are supposed to be.

Thirdly, this showing or mediatedness is intro-reflected, and thus the Syllogism is determined as *Syllogism of Necessity*, where the objective nature of the thing is the mediator. This Syllogism equally determines the extremes of the Notion as totalities; it has thus reached its truth—the correspondence of its Notion (or the middle) and its Existence (or the extreme distinctions). It has thus passed over from Subjectivity into *Objectivity*.

A

THE QUALITATIVE SYLLOGISM

1. The Syllogism in its immediate state has for its moments the Notion-determinations as immediate. They thus are the abstract determinatenesses of the form; they have not yet been shaped by mediation into concreteness, but each is only an individual determinateness. The first is therefore the strictly formal Syllogism. The formalism of syllogizing consists in making a halt at the determination of this first Syllogism. The Notion, sundered into its abstract moments, has individuality and universality for its extremes, and it itself appears as the particularity which stands between them. Because of their immediacy, and as only self-relating determinatenesses, they are all together one individual content. Particularity at first constitutes the middle in so far as it immediately unites in itself the two moments of individuality and universality. It is determinate and therefore subsumed under the universal; on the other hand the individual (as against which it has univer-

sality) is subsumed under it. But at first this concretion is only a two-sidedness; in the immediate Syllogism the *medius terminus* is immediate and therefore is as simple determinateness; and the mediation which it constitutes is not yet posited. Now the dialectic movement of the Qualitative Syllogism consists in this, that the mediation, which alone constitutes the Syllogism, is to be posited in its moments.

(a) FIRST FIGURE OF THE SYLLOGISM

The general scheme of the determinate Syllogism is $I - P - U$. Individuality joins itself with universality through particularity; and the individual is not immediately universal, but only through particularity; and conversely the universal is likewise not immediately individual, but lowers itself to individuality through particularity.—These determinations stand opposed to each other, as extremes, and are one in a different third term. Each is determinateness, and in this they are identical; and this their general determinateness is particularity. But they are extremes against the latter as much as against each other, because each is in its *immediate* determinateness.

The general meaning of this syllogism is that the individual (which as such is infinite self-relation, and therefore would be only inner) passes through particularity into Existence as into universality: here it no longer belongs to itself alone, but has external connexions. Conversely the individual severs itself into its determinateness as particularity; in this separation it is therefore concrete, and, as self-relation of determinateness, a universal self-relating entity, and therefore also one which is truly individual; in the extreme of universality it has passed out of externality into itself.—In the first syllogism, the objective significance of the Syllogism is present only in a superficial manner, for here the determinations are not yet posited as the unity which constitutes the essence of the Syllogism. The latter is still subjective in so far as the abstract meaning which its terms have is not in and for itself, but is thus isolated only in subjective consciousness.—For the rest, the relation between individuality, particularity, and universality is the necessary and essential form-relation (as was seen) of the determinations

of the Syllogism; the fault does not consist in this determinateness of the form, but in the fact that under this form each individual determination is not also richer.—Aristotle clung rather to the bare relation of inherence when he described the nature of the Syllogism as follows:—"If three determinations are so related that one extreme is in the whole of the middle determination, and this middle determination is in the whole of the other extreme, then these two extremes are necessarily bound together." What is here expressed is rather the repetition of the same relation of inherence (*a*) between one extreme and the middle and (*b*) between the middle and the other extreme, than the determinateness of the three terms to one another.—Now the Syllogism rests upon this their determinateness against one another, so that it is immediately plain that other relations of the terms which result from the other Figures can have validity as rational syllogisms only in so far as they can be reduced to this original relation. There are not various kinds of Figures standing by the side of the First Figure; but, first, in so far as they are supposed to be correct syllogisms, they rest only upon the essential form of the Syllogism in general, which is the First Figure; and next, in so far as they diverge from it, they are modifications into which this first abstract form necessarily passes over, whereby it determines itself further, and towards totality. The nature of this process will soon be seen.

The general formula of the Syllogism in its determinateness is, then, $I - P - U$. The individual is subsumed under the particular, and the particular under the universal; consequently the individual is also subsumed under the universal. Or, the particular inheres in the individual, and the universal in the particular; consequently the universal inheres also in the individual. In one direction (namely, as against the universal) the particular is subject; it is predicate as against the individual; or again it is individual as against the former and universal as against the latter. The two determinatenesses are united in it, and therefore the extremes are bound together through this their unity. The "consequently" appears as the conclusion which has taken place in the subject, and is supposed to be derived from subjective insight into the relation between the two immediate premisses. Subjective reflection asserts that the two relations of middle to extremes are particular and indeed

immediate judgments or propositions; and thus the conclusion, as mediated relation, must be allowed to be a particular proposition; the “consequently” or “accordingly” expresses that it is the mediated proposition. But this “consequently” must not be considered as a determination external to this proposition, having its ground and seat only in subjective reflection: it is grounded in the very nature of the extremes, whose relation is again asserted to be mere judgment or proposition only as a makeshift by abstracting reflection, while their true relation is posited as the middle term.—Accordingly it is a merely subjective circumstance that “*I* is *U*” is a judgment; the Syllogism is the very fact that this is not merely a judgment, that is, not a relation effected through the bare copula or the empty “is,” but through the determinate middle which is full of content.

If then the Syllogism is merely regarded as consisting of three judgments, this is a formal view which takes no account of the relation of determinations, which alone are important in the Syllogism. And altogether it is a merely subjective reflection which separates the relation of the terms into detached premisses and a conclusion distinct from them:—

All men are mortal,
Gaius is a man,
therefore he is mortal.

Boredom immediately descends when such a syllogism is heard approaching;—this is due to the otiose form, which gives an appearance of variety through the detached propositions that, in fact, is immediately dissolved. It is this subjective formation that chiefly causes syllogizing to appear as a subjective makeshift to which reason or understanding has recourse when it cannot cognize immediately.—The nature of things—the reasonable—does not indeed proceed by first setting up a major premiss (the relation of a particularity to a persisting universal), and next discovering a detached relation of an individuality to the particularity, whence at length and thirdly a new proposition comes to light.—This process of syllogizing which proceeds by detached propositions is just a subjective form: the nature of the situation is, that the distinct Notion-determinations of the thing are united in the essential unity. This

reasonableness is not a makeshift; rather, in opposition to the immediacy of relation which still is found in the Judgment, it is the *objective*, while the immediacy of cognition is the merely subjective; the Syllogism, again, is the truth of the Judgment.—All things are a Syllogism, a universal which is bound together with individuality through particularity; but of course they are not wholes consisting of three propositions.

2. In the *immediate* Syllogism of understanding the terms have the form of immediate determinations; it must now be considered from this side, according to which its terms are content. So far it may be regarded as the Qualitative Syllogism; and the Judgment of Inherence has this same side of qualitative determination. Hence the terms of this Syllogism, like the terms of that Judgment, are individual determinatenesses; for, through its self-relation, the determinateness is posited as indifferent to form,—that is, as content. The individual is any immediate concrete object; particularity is one of its determinatenesses, properties, or relations; and universality is a still more abstract and more individual determinateness in the particular.—The subject is immediately determinate and therefore is not yet posited in its Notion; hence its concretion is not reduced to the essential Notion-determinations; consequently its self-relating determinateness is indeterminate and infinite manifoldness. In this immediacy the individual has an infinity of determinatenesses which belong to its particularity; consequently each of these can constitute a middle term for it in a syllogism. But through every other middle term it binds itself to another universal; through each of its properties it has a different contact and connexion with Existence.—Further, in comparison with the universal, the middle term is a concrete; it itself contains more than one predicate, and through the same middle term the individual may again be bound to more than one universal. Which of the many properties of a thing is taken up, so that it may serve to connect it with a predicate, is, therefore, a matter of pure contingency and caprice; other middle terms serve as links with other predicates, and even one and the same middle term may be the transition to various predicates; for, being particular as against the universal, it contains several determinations.

But it is not only true that for any one subject an indefinite

number of syllogisms are equally possible, and any individual syllogism is in its content contingent: these syllogisms, which relate to the same subject, must further pass over into contradiction. For difference in general, which at first is indifferent variety, is equally essentially opposition. The concrete is no longer something which merely appears, but is concrete through the unity of opposites (which have determined themselves to be Notion-moments) in the Notion. Now, according to the qualitative nature of the terms in the formal syllogism, the concrete is taken up according to some particular one of the determinations, which is proper to it, and the syllogism allots to it the predicate which corresponds to this middle term. But, from some other side, a syllogism reaches the opposite determinateness, and thus the former conclusion shows itself to be false, although in themselves its premisses and also its consequence are quite correct.—If, from the middle term that a canvas has been painted blue, the conclusion is drawn that therefore it is blue, then this conclusion has been drawn correctly; but in spite of this conclusion the canvas may be green if it has also been covered with yellow colour (from which latter circumstance by itself it would follow that it was yellow).—If, from the middle term of sensuousness, it is concluded that man is neither good nor evil, because neither the one nor the other can be predicated of the sensuous, the syllogism is correct but the conclusion is false; for the middle term of spirituality is equally valid of man as the concrete.—From the middle term of the gravity of planets, satellites, and comets as against the sun, it follows correctly that these bodies are falling into the sun; but they do not do so, for they are each equally for itself a private centre of gravity, or, as the expression runs, they are driven by centrifugal force.—And similarly the community of goods among the citizens may be reached from the middle term of sociality, while the dissolution of the state follows from the middle term of individuality, if it is followed with equal abstractness; as has happened for example in the Holy Roman Empire, since men clung to the latter middle term.—Justly nothing is held to be more inadequate than such a formal syllogism, since it rests upon contingency or caprice which middle term is used. However prettily such a deduction has run through its syllogisms, and however completely its correct-

ness may be admitted, it still leads nowhere, for it is always possible to find other middle terms from which the precise opposite can equally correctly be deduced.—Kant's Antinomies of Reason are just this, that first one determination of a Notion is made the foundation of the Notion, and next, and with equal necessity, the other.—But this inadequacy and contingency of a syllogism must not be put to the account merely of the content, as though they were independent of the form, and the latter alone concerned logic. Rather it is implied in the form of the formal Syllogism that the content is such a one-sided quality; this one-sidedness is determined in it through the abstract form. For the content is one quality of the many qualities or determinations of a concrete object or Notion, since formally it is supposed to be nothing more than such an immediate and individual determinateness. The extreme of individuality, as abstract individuality, is the immediate Concrete, and consequently the infinitely or indeterminably Manifold; the middle is equally abstract particularity, and consequently is one individual quality among these manifold qualities; and, equally, the other extreme is the abstract universal. The formal Syllogism therefore is essentially something wholly contingent in its content because of its form; this is not because it is the case that it is contingent for the Syllogism whether this or some other object is submitted to it; logic abstracts from this content; but, in so far as a subject is the foundation, it is contingent what content-determinations the Syllogism infers from it.

3. The determinations of the Syllogism are content-determinations in so far as they are immediate, abstract, and intro-reflected determinations. But their essential element is that they are not such intro-reflected and mutually indifferent determinations, and that they are form-determinations: in so far they are essentially relations. These relations are, firstly, those of the extremes to the middle,—relations which are immediate (*the premisses*), partly of particular to universal (*major premiss*), and partly of individual to particular (*minor premiss*). Secondly, there is the relation between extreme and extreme: this is mediated (*the conclusion*). These immediate relations, the premisses, are propositions or judgments in general, and conflict with the nature of the Syllogism, according to which the distinct Notion-determinations are not immediately related:

their unity too is supposed to be posited: the truth of the Judgment is the Syllogism. The premisses can remain immediate relations all the less, because their content consists of immediately distinct determinations, so that they are not immediately identical in and for themselves; unless they are pure identical propositions, that is, empty tautologies which lead to nothing.

It is therefore generally demanded of the premisses that they shall be proved, that is, that they too are to be represented as conclusions. Thus the two premisses provide two further syllogisms. But these two new syllogisms in turn provide altogether four premisses, which require four new syllogisms; these have eight premisses, whose eight syllogisms in turn for their sixteen premisses provide sixteen syllogisms, and so to infinity in geometrical progression.

Here again that progress to infinity re-emerges which before occurred in the lower sphere of Being but was no longer to be expected in the field of the Notion, of the absolute intro-Reflection out of the finite, and the region of free infinity and truth. It was shown in the sphere of Being that where bad infinity, whose manifestation the progress is, emerges, a contradiction is present between a qualitative Being and an impotent Ought which passes beyond it; the progress itself is the repetition of the demand for unity which has arisen as against the Qualitative, and the continued relapse into the barrier which is inadequate to this demand. Now in the formal Syllogism the immediate relation or the qualitative Judgment is the foundation, while the mediation of the Syllogism is that which is posited against it as the higher truth. The infinite process of demonstration of the premisses does not solve this contradiction, but only perpetually renews it: it is the repetition of one and the same original defect.—The truth of the infinite progress is rather that both it and the form which by it is determined as defective are to be transcended.—This form is the form of mediation as $I - P - U$. The two relations $I - P$ and $P - U$ are supposed to be mediated; if this is done in the same manner, the defective form $I - P - U$ is doubled, and so to infinity. P also has to I the form-determination of a universal, and to U the form-determination of an individual, since it is the case that these relations are Judgments. They therefore require mediation; but when they have this form,

that relation only arises again which is supposed to be transcended.

The mediation must therefore be made in some other manner. For the mediation of $P - U$, I is given; consequently the mediation must take the form $P - I - U$. To mediate $I - P$, U is given; consequently this mediation becomes the syllogism $I - U - P$.

If this transition is considered more closely, according to its Notion, then, first, the mediation of the formal Syllogism according to its content is contingent, as was shown above. In its determinatenesses the immediate individual has an indeterminable number of middle terms, and these in turn have altogether a similar number of determinatenesses; so that it lies with an external caprice, or, generally, in some external circumstance or contingent determination, which is the universal with which the subject of the Syllogism is to be bound together. According to its content therefore the mediation is nothing either necessary or universal; it is not grounded in the Notion of the thing: the ground of the Syllogism rather is that which is external in it, that is, the immediate; but, among the Notion-determinations, the immediate is the individual.

With respect to form similarly mediation has for presupposition the immediacy of relation; the former therefore is itself mediated—through the immediate, that is, the individual.—More precisely, through the conclusion of the first Syllogism the individual has become the mediator. The conclusion is $I - U$; it thus posits the individual as universal. In one of the premisses (the minor premiss, $I - P$) it already exists as particular, that is, as that in which these two determinations are united.—In other words, the conclusion in and for itself expresses the individual as universal; not in an immediate manner but through mediation, that is, as a necessary relation. *Simple* particularity was middle term; in the conclusion this particularity is developed and posited as the relation of the individual and of universality. But as yet the universal is a qualitative determinateness, a predicate of the individual; the individual, being determined as universal, is posited as the universality of the extremes, or as middle; for itself it is extreme of individuality, but it is now determined as universal, and therefore at the same time it is the unity of the two extremes.

(b) THE SECOND¹ FIGURE: $P - I - U$

1. The truth of the first qualitative Syllogism is that something is not bound together in and for itself with a qualitative determinateness as a universal determinateness, but is bound contingently or in an individuality. In such a quality the subject of the Syllogism has not returned into its Notion; a Notion is formed about it only in its externality. Immediacy constitutes the ground of the relation, and therefore the mediation: in so far the individual is in truth the middle.

But further the syllogism-relation is the transcendence of immediacy: the conclusion is not an immediate relation, but the relation is mediated by a third term; consequently the mediation is now determined to contain a negative moment.

In this second Syllogism the premisses are $P - I$ and $I - U$; only the first of these premisses remains immediate; the second, $I - U$, already is mediated (by the first Syllogism): thus the second Syllogism presupposes the first, while conversely the first presupposes the second.—Here the two extremes are determined against each other as particular and universal; in so far the latter still has its place, it is predicate. The particular however has exchanged its place; it is subject, or is posited under the determination of extreme of individuality, while the individual is posited with the determination of middle or of particularity. Accordingly neither is now the abstract immediacy which it was in the first Syllogism. They are nevertheless not yet posited as concrete: because each stands in the place of the other, it is posited in its own determination and also (though only externally) in the other determination.

The determinate and objective meaning of this Syllogism is, that the universal is a definite particular not in and for itself (for in fact it is the totality of its particulars), but that it is thus one of its species through individuality; its other species are excluded from it through immediate externality. On the other hand the particular, in the same manner, is not immediately and in and for itself the universal, but negative unity strips it of determinateness and thus raises it into universality.—Individuality is *negatively* related to the particular in so far as it is supposed to be its predicate; it is *not* predicate of the particular.

¹ [The ordinary Third Figure. See p. 314 below.]

2. As yet however the terms are each an immediate determinateness; through themselves they have not developed to any objective significance. The changed position which is given to two of them is formal, and at first it is external to them; therefore, as in the first Syllogism, each is a content indifferent to the other—two qualities which are connected by a contingent individuality and not in and for themselves.

The Syllogism of the First Figure was the immediate Syllogism, or, equally, it was Syllogism in so far as it is in its Notion, as abstract form which has not yet realized itself in its determinations. Now this pure form has passed over into another Figure; hence (1) this is the beginning of the realization of the Notion, the negative moment of mediation—and hence a further form-determinateness—being posited in the determinateness of the terms which so far is immediate and qualitative.—(2) At the same time the pure form of the Syllogism now becomes other; the Syllogism no longer completely corresponds to it, and the determinateness which is posited in its terms is different from the original form-determination.—In so far as it is considered only as a subjective Syllogism which takes place in an external reflection, it is reckoned as a species of Syllogism which should correspond to the genus, namely the general scheme of $I - P - U$. But at first it does not correspond to this; its two premisses are $P - I$ (or $I - P$), and $I - U$; consequently the middle term is subsumed, or is subject, on each of the two occasions, so that the other two terms inhere in it; and it is therefore not a middle which is supposed first to subsume (or to be predicate) and next to be subsumed (or to be subject), or to inhere in the one term, while the other inheres in it.—This Syllogism does not correspond to the general form of the Syllogism; and the true meaning of this fact is, that the form has passed over into it, since its truth consists in being a subjective and contingent binding together. If the conclusion in the Second Figure (without recourse being had to the limitation which is about to be mentioned and which makes it to be something indeterminate) is correct, then it is correct because it is so for itself, and not because it is the conclusion of this Syllogism. But this is also the case with the conclusion of the First Figure; and it is this its truth which is posited by the Second Figure.—The opinion

which holds that the Second Figure is only one species overlooks the necessary transition from the first into this second form, and a halt is made at the first as being the true form. Consequently, in so far as a *correct* syllogism, in this subjective sense, can be constructed in the Second Figure (which, from old habit, is, without reason given, quoted as the third), such a Syllogism ought to be conformable to the first; and, since the one premiss $I - U$ has the relation of subsumption of the middle term under one extreme, the other premiss $P - I$ must be given the relation opposite to that which it has; and it ought to be possible to subsume P under I . But such a relation would be the transcendence of the determinate judgment I is P , and could only take place in an indeterminate, or a particular, judgment; whence the conclusion in this figure can only be particular. But, as was observed above, the Particular Judgment is as well positive as negative—a conclusion to which for this reason no great value can be attached.—And in so far as particular and universal are extremes, and immediate and indifferent determinatenesses as against each other, their relation itself is indifferent; either one may arbitrarily be taken as major or as minor term, and consequently either premiss may be taken indifferently as major or minor.

3. The conclusion, being positive as well as negative, is a relation indifferent to these determinatenesses and therefore universal. More closely considered, the mediation of the first Syllogism was *in itself* contingent: in the second Syllogism this contingency is *posited*. It is thus a self-transcending mediation; the mediation has the determination of individuality and immediacy. What is bound together by this Syllogism must rather be identical in itself and immediately; for that middle (the immediate individuality) is infinitely manifold and external determinateness. Thus rather self-external mediation is posited in this mediation. But the externality of individuality is universality; and this mediation through the immediate individual points beyond itself to that which is other to it and which thus takes place through the universal.—Or what is to be united by the second Syllogism must be bound together immediately; the immediacy which is its foundation does not serve to effect a definite binding. The immediacy to which it points forward is other to its own immediacy (which is the transcended first

immediacy of Being); it is therefore intro-reflected or self-existent immediacy, and abstract universal.

According to the side which has been considered, the transition of this Syllogism was a becoming other, like the transition of Being, because its foundation is the qualitative—immediate individuality. But according to the Notion, individuality binds together particular and universal in so far as it transcends the determinateness of the particular, which process manifests itself as the contingency of this Syllogism. The extremes are not bound together by their determinate relation, which is their middle term; consequently it is not their determinate unity, and that positive unity which does belong to it is only abstract universality. But the middle term being posited in this determination (which is its truth), a different form of the Syllogism has arisen.

(c) THE THIRD FIGURE: $I - U - P$

1. This third Syllogism has no longer any immediate premiss; the relation $I - U$ has been mediated by the first Syllogism, and the relation $P - U$ by the second. Hence it presupposes the two first Syllogisms; but, conversely, these two presuppose it, and indeed each one presupposes the two others. Thus the determination in general of the Syllogism is completed in it.—What this reciprocal mediation contains is this, that each Syllogism is mediation for itself but is not in itself the totality thereof; it has in it an immediacy whose mediation lies outside it.

If the Syllogism $I - U - P$ is considered in itself, it is the truth of the formal Syllogism. It expresses this, that the mediation of the latter is the abstractly universal, and that the extremes according to their essential determinateness are contained not in the middle but only according to their universality; so that precisely that which here is supposed to be mediated is not bound together in it. Thus that in which the formalism of the Syllogism consists is here posited; the terms of this Syllogism have a content immediate and indifferent to form, or (which is the same thing) they are form-determinations which have not yet reflected themselves so as to become content-determinations.

2. The middle of this Syllogism is the unity of the extremes; but in this unity abstraction is made from their determinateness: it is the indeterminate universal. This universal, however, at the same time is distinct (as abstract) from the extremes (as determinate); in so far, however, it is itself also determinate as against these, and the whole is a Syllogism, whose relation to its Notion must be considered. The middle as the universal is related as subsuming, or as predicate, to its two extremes: it is not also subsumed, nor is it subject. Consequently, in so far as this Figure is supposed to correspond to the Syllogism as being one species of Syllogism, this can happen only if the one relation $I - U$ already has the due relationship while at the same time the other, $U - P$, also acquires the same relationship. This happens in a judgment where the relation of subject and predicate is indifferent, that is, in a *negative* judgment. Thus the Syllogism becomes legitimate, but the conclusion, necessarily, negative.

Thus also it has now become indifferent which of the two determinations of this proposition is taken as predicate and which as subject; and, in the conclusion, whether it is taken as extreme of individuality or of particularity—that is, whether it is taken as minor or as major term. According to the common assumption it depends upon this which of the two premisses is to be major and which minor; thus this has here become indifferent.—This is the ground of the ordinary Fourth Figure of the Syllogism; Aristotle was not acquainted with it, and indeed it deals with a wholly uninteresting and empty distinction. Here the immediate position of the terms is the reverse of their position in the First Figure; in the negative conclusion subject and predicate, according to the formal consideration of the Judgment, have not the determinate relation of subject and predicate, and one can take the place of the other; and therefore it is indifferent which term is taken as subject and which as predicate; and consequently it is equally indifferent which premiss is taken as major and which as minor.—This indifference, which is aided by the determination of particularity (especially in so far as it is remarked that it may be taken in the comprehensive sense), renders this Fourth Figure quite nugatory.

3. The objective meaning of the Syllogism where the uni-

versal is the middle is that the mediating term as unity of the extremes is essentially universal. But here this universality is only qualitative or abstract, and therefore does not contain the determinateness of the extremes. If it is to be brought about that they are bound together, this must have its ground in a mediation which lies outside this Syllogism; and, with respect to this ground, it is quite as contingent as in the previous forms of Syllogisms. But, since the universal is determined as the middle and does not contain the determinateness of the extremes, this determinateness is posited as completely indifferent and external.—From this bare abstraction a Fourth Figure of the Syllogism has, indeed, arisen—that of the relationless Syllogism, or $U - U - U$, which abstracts from the qualitative distinction of the terms, and thus has their merely external unity, namely their equality, for determination.

(d) THE FOURTH FIGURE: $U - U - U$, OR THE MATHEMATICAL SYLLOGISM

1. The Mathematical Syllogism runs: *If two things or determinations are equal to a third, they are equal to each other.*—Here the relation of inherence or subsumption of terms is extinct.

The mediating term here is a *third* term in general; but it has no determination whatever as against its extremes. Consequently each one of the three terms may equally well be the third term which mediates. Which shall be used to that end, and hence which of the three relations are to be taken as the immediate and which as the mediated, depends upon external circumstances and other conditions—namely, upon the question which two of them are the immediately given terms. But this determination does not concern the Syllogism itself and is entirely external.

2. In mathematics the Mathematical Syllogism counts as an axiom,—as an elementary and self-evident proposition which neither admits nor requires proof (that is, mediation), presupposes nothing beyond itself, and cannot be derived from anything.—When this its advantage of immediate self-evidence is more closely considered, it appears that it is implied in the formalism of this Syllogism, which abstracts from every quali-

tative variety of its determinations and accepts only their quantitative equality or inequality. But for this very reason it is not without presupposition and not unmediated; that quantitative determination which is alone regarded in it exists only by virtue of abstraction from qualitative distinction and Notion-determinations.—Lines or figures which are posited as equal to each other are understood only according to their magnitude: a triangle is said to be equal to a quadrilateral, but only in area and not because a triangle is a quadrilateral; and so on. And similarly the Notion and its determinations have no place in this syllogizing; it thus is in no way a notional process; understanding even has not so much as the formal and abstract Notion-determinations before itself; and the self-evident element of this Syllogism rests only upon the fact that it is so abstract and poor in thought-determination.

3. But the result of the Qualitative Syllogism is not merely this abstraction from every Notion-determinateness; the negativity of the immediate and abstract determinations, which emerged from it, has another and positive side, namely that where its other is posited into abstract determinateness, and it thereby has become concrete.

First, all Qualitative Syllogisms presuppose one another, and the extremes which are bound together in the conclusions are true and bound together in and for themselves only in so far as they are otherwise united by an identity which is grounded elsewhere; the middle term, having the nature which it has in these Syllogisms which have been considered, is supposed to be their Notion-unity, but in fact is only a formal determinateness which is not posited as their concrete unity. But this presupposed element in each of these mediations is not merely a given immediacy in general (as in the Mathematical Syllogism), but is itself a mediation—namely, for each of the other two Syllogisms. There is before us here, therefore, in fact a mediation founded, not upon a given immediacy, but upon mediation. Consequently this is the mediation of Reflection; not quantitative or abstracting from the form of mediation, but rather mediation relating itself to mediation. The circle of reciprocal presupposing which these Syllogisms form one with another is the self-return of this presupposing, which here forms a totality, having that Other, towards which each

individual Syllogism points, not outside (which would be the work of abstraction), but included within the circle.

It has further appeared, from the side of the individual form-determinations, that in this Whole of the formal Syllogisms each individual determination has in turn had the place of middle. Immediately it was determined as particularity; it then determined itself by dialectic movement as individuality and universality. Similarly each of these determinations passed through the places of the two extremes. The merely negative result is the extinction of the qualitative form-determinations in the merely quantitative Mathematical Syllogism. What however is in truth given here is this positive result, that mediation does not take place through an individual qualitative form-determinateness, but through the concrete identity of the form-determinations. The deficiency and formalism of the three Syllogistic Figures which have been considered consists precisely in this, that such an individual determinateness was supposed to constitute their middle.—The mediation has thus determined itself as the indifference of the immediate or abstract form-determinations and as positive Reflection of one into the other. And now the immediate Qualitative Syllogism has passed over into *the Syllogism of Reflection*.

Observation

In the exposition of the nature of the Syllogism and its various forms, which has here been given, that element too was cursorily regarded which is of main interest in the ordinary consideration and treatment of Syllogisms, namely, the question how in each figure a correct syllogism may be made. However, only the chief moment was indicated, and those instances and complications were omitted which arise when the distinction between positive and negative judgments, together with quantitative determination (especially particularity), is also taken into consideration.—Some observations about the common view and treatment of the Syllogism in logic will not be out of place here.—It is well known that this system was developed to such a degree of exactitude that its so-called subtleties became universally tedious and disgusting. Natural understanding asserted itself against the unsubstantial forms of reflection in

every field of intellectual development; and thus it came to revolt against this artificial cognition of the forms of reason, and thought that it might dispense with this science because it effected the individual operations of thought specified therein naturally by itself and without having to learn them for the purpose. Indeed, with regard to reasonable thought, if it depended upon the laborious study of syllogistic formulae, man would be in as sorry a case as he would be (as was observed in the Preface) if he could not walk or digest without a previous study of anatomy and physiology. The study of these sciences may not be without value in dietetics; and similarly the study of the forms of reason may doubtless be allowed to have an influence of even greater importance upon the correctness of thought. But even if this side (which concerns the formation of subjective thought and is therefore really an educational subject) is here neglected, it will have to be admitted that the study which concerns itself with the manners and laws by which reason operates must be of the greatest interest for itself,—at any rate not less than a knowledge of the laws of nature and their particular formations. It is esteemed no mean thing to have discovered some sixty species of parrots, one hundred and thirty-seven species of veronica, and so forth; but it must be considered much less a negligible matter to discover the forms of reason; for is not a syllogistic figure an infinitely higher matter than a species of parrot or of veronica?

If, therefore, it is to be regarded as just barbaric to despise all knowledge of the forms of Reason, still it must equally be admitted that the ordinary presentation of the Syllogism and of its particular formations is not a reasonable cognition; it does not present them as forms of reason, and the contempt which syllogistic lore suffered was due to its uselessness. Its flaw is this, that it just stops short at that syllogistic form of understanding according to which the Notion-determinations are taken as abstract formal determinations. It is all the more inconsistent to retain them as abstract qualities because in the Syllogism their relations constitute the essential part; it is already implicit in inherence and subsumption that the individual is itself universal because the universal inheres in it, and that the universal is itself individual because it subsumes the individual, while, more precisely, the Syllogism expressly

posits this unity as middle, its determination being just mediation, which means that now the Notion-determinations are no longer external to each other (as in the Judgment) but rather have for foundation their unity.—The Notion of the Syllogism thus declares the imperfection of the formal Syllogism, in which the middle is to be held fast, not as unity of the extremes, but as a formal determination, abstract and qualitatively distinct from them.—And this consideration becomes further exhausted of content because such relations and judgments are still assumed to be complete relations, even though their formal determinations become indifferent (as in the Negative and the Particular Judgment) so that they approximate to propositions.—The qualitative form $I - P - U$ is counted as the ultimate and absolute, so that the dialectic view of the Syllogism is altogether lost; the remaining Syllogisms accordingly are not considered as necessary mutations of this form, but as species.—It is here indifferent whether the first formal Syllogism is considered only as one species alongside the others, or as genus and species simultaneously; the latter happens when the other Syllogisms are reduced to the first. If this reduction is not performed expressly, the same formal relation of external subsumption which is expressed by the First Figure always lies at the bottom.

This formal Syllogism is a contradiction in this way, that the middle is supposed to be the determinate unity of the extremes, but exists not as this unity, but as a determination which is qualitatively distinct from those terms of which it is supposed to be the unity. The Syllogism is this contradiction, and therefore is dialectical in itself. Its dialectic movement presents it in the complete Notion-moments, and shows that not only this relation of subsumption (or particularity) but, equally essentially, negative unity and universality are moments of the process of binding together. Each of these, in so far as for itself it is only a one-sided moment of particularity, is likewise an incomplete middle; but, simultaneously, they constitute together the developed determinations of these. The entire course taken through the three Figures shows the middle in each of these determinations one after the other; and the true result which emerges is that the middle is not one from among them, but their totality.

The flaw of the formal Syllogism therefore is not in its form—which indeed is the form of reasonableness—but in the fact that it is only abstract, that is, notionless, form. It has been shown that abstract determination, because of its abstract self-relation, can equally be considered as content; in this regard the formal Syllogism only effects this, that the relation of a subject to a predicate follows or does not follow from a given middle term. To prove a proposition by such a Syllogism is useless; the middle term is abstractly determinate and is a notionless quality, and therefore there may equally be other middle terms from which the opposite follows, and it is even possible to derive opposite predicates, through further Syllogisms, from the same middle term.—The formal Syllogism not only effects very little, but also is extremely simple; the many rules which have been invented are tiresome both because they contrast so harshly with the simple nature of the thing in hand, and also because they refer to those cases where the formal content of the Syllogism is finally reduced through external form-determination,—chiefly that of particularity, especially since to this end it must be taken in the comprehensive sense; formally too only quite empty results are here produced.—But the justest and most important aspect of the disfavour into which Syllogistics have fallen is this, that they constitute a cumbrous and notionless occupation with an object whose only content is the Notion itself.—The multitude of syllogistic rules recalls the procedure of arithmeticians, who also give a multitude of rules about arithmetical operations, all of which presuppose that the Notion of the operations is not in the mind.—But numbers are a notionless material, and the operations of arithmetic are external processes of connexion or separation—a mechanical procedure: indeed, machines have been invented which effect these operations. It is the severest and most violent contradiction if the form-determinations of the Syllogism, which are Notions, are treated as a notionless material.

The extreme example of this notionless treatment of the Notion-determinations of the Syllogism is probably Leibniz's subjection of the Syllogism (*Opp. Tom. II. P. I*) to the calculus of combinations, by which he calculated how many formations of the Syllogism are possible—regard being had to the distinctions between positive and negative, and between universal,

particular, indeterminate, and singular Judgments: 2,048 such combinations are found to be possible, of which, after exclusion of the useless figures, 24 useful figures remain.—Leibniz makes much of the utility of combinatory analysis in helping to find not only the forms of the Syllogism, but also combinations of other Notions. The operation by means of which this is discovered is the same as that by which it is calculated how many combinations of letters are possible in an alphabet, how many casts in a game of dice, how many games in a hand of ombre, and so forth. Thus here the determinations of the Syllogism are placed in one class with the points of dice and of a card of ombre; what is reasonable is taken as dead and notionless, and the peculiarity of the Notion and its determinations (namely that, as spiritual essences, they relate themselves and through this relating transcend their immediate determination) are left on one side.—Leibniz's application of the calculus of combinations to the Syllogism and to the connexion of other Notions differed in nothing from the notorious art of Lullus¹ except that it was more methodical in regard to amount; in senselessness they were equal.—This procedure is associated with a favourite idea of Leibniz, conceived in his youth and never surrendered in spite of its immaturity and shallowness, the idea of a *general characteristic* of Notions,—a set of symbols in which each Notion is represented as a relation derived from others or as related to others;—as though in that reasonable connexion which is essentially dialectic a content retained those determinations which it had while it was fixed by itself.

Undoubtedly Ploucquet's² calculus adopted the most consistent method by which the relation of the Syllogism admits of being subjected to a calculus. Its basis is this, that abstraction is made from the relation-distinction (the distinction of individuality, particularity, and universality) in the Judgment, and the abstract identity of subject and predicate is retained; they are thus mathematically equal,—which relation makes the process of syllogizing a wholly empty and tautological casting of propositions.—In the proposition "the rose is red," the predicate is not to denote red in general, but only the particular

¹ Raymundus Lullus, c. 1232-1315: *Ars magna s. generalis*.

² Ploucquet, Gottfried, 1716-1790: *Principia de substantiis et phaenomenis, accedit methodus calculandi in logicis ab ipso inventa*, 1753.

red of the rose; in the proposition "all Christians are men," the predicate is to denote those men only who are Christians. From this proposition and the proposition "the Jews are not Christians" follows the conclusion (which Mendelssohn found so poor a recommendation of this syllogistic calculus) "therefore the Jews are not men" (namely not those men that the Christians are).—Ploucquet states that it follows from his discovery "*posse etiam rudes mechanice totam logicam doceri, uti pueri arithmeticam docentur, ita quidem, ut nulla formidine in ratiociniis suis errandi torqueri, vel fallaciis circumveniri possint, si in calculo non errant.*"—This recommendation—that by means of the calculus the whole of logic can mechanically be inculcated into the ignorant—is perhaps the worst thing that could be said about an invention touching the presentation of the science of logic.

B

THE SYLLOGISM OF REFLECTION

In the course of the Qualitative Syllogism the abstract element of its determinations was transcended; thus each term has posited itself as such a determinateness as has the other determinateness showing within it. Apart from the abstract terms the Syllogism also contains their relation, which, in the conclusion, is posited as mediated and necessary; thus every determinateness in truth is posited not as individual for itself, but as relation of the others, or as *concrete* determinateness.

The middle was abstract particularity: it was for itself a simple determinateness, and was middle only externally and relatively to the independent extremes. It is now posited as the totality of the determinations: it is thus the *posited* unity of the extremes; but so far it is the unity of Reflection, which it includes within itself—an inclusion which, as first transcendence of immediacy and first relating of the determinations, is not yet the absolute identity of the Notion.

The extremes are the determinations of the Judgment of Reflection—individuality and universality, properly so called, as determination of relation, or a Reflection comprehending a manifold within itself. But also—as was shown in the Judgment of Reflection—the individual subject contains determi-

nateness as utterly intro-reflected universality and apart from mere individuality (which belongs to form),—determinateness which is genus presupposed or here still taken as immediate.

From this determinateness of the extremes, which belongs to the course of the determination of the Judgment, the further content of the middle term results: the middle distinguishes the Syllogism from the Judgment, and is therefore of capital importance in the Syllogism. The middle contains (1) individuality, (2) the same, but extended into universality as All, (3) the fundamental universality which unites utterly within itself individuality and abstract universality, that is, the genus.—It is now only in this manner that the Syllogism of Reflection has the proper determinateness of form, the middle being posited as totality of the determinations; the immediate Syllogism is, as against it, the indeterminate Syllogism, since the middle still is abstract particularity in which the moments of its Notion are not yet posited.—This first Syllogism of Reflection may be called *the Syllogism of Allness*.

(a) THE SYLLOGISM OF ALLNESS

1. The Syllogism of Allness is the syllogism of understanding in its completeness, but as yet no more. It is indeed an essential requirement for the Notion that the middle is not abstract particularity in it, but is developed into its moments and is therefore concrete; but, at first at least, the form of Allness comprehends the individual into universality only externally, and, conversely, it still preserves the individual as something which persists immediately for itself, in universality. The negation of the immediacy of the determinations which was the result of the Qualitative Syllogism is only first negation, and not yet the negation of negation or absolute intro-Reflection. They are still therefore the foundation of that universality of Reflection which comprehends the individual determinations within itself,—in other words, Allness is not yet the universality of the Notion, but the external universality of Reflection.

The Qualitative Syllogism was contingent because its middle term is a single determinateness of the concrete subject, and as such admits an indeterminable number of other such middle

terms, so that it was possible for the subject to be bound together with predicates indeterminably other, or opposite. But now the middle contains individuality and thereby is concrete itself, so that it can serve to connect only one predicate with the subject, which belongs to the latter as concrete.—For example, from the middle term “green” it might be concluded that a picture is pleasant because green is pleasant to the eye, or it might be inferred that a poem or a building, and so forth, is beautiful because it possesses regularity; but nevertheless the picture (and the other things) might be ugly, because of other determinations from which one might conclude to this latter predicate. But now the middle term has the determination of Allness, and therefore contains green or regularity as *concrete*, which for this very reason is not the abstraction of something merely green or regular and so forth; and with this concrete term only such predicates can be connected as are adequate to the totality of the concrete.—In the judgment “the green (or regular) is pleasant,” the subject is only the abstraction of green, or regularity; but in the proposition “whatever is green (or regular) is pleasant,” the subject is all actual, concrete objects which are green or regular,—which consequently are taken as concrete with all their properties which they have besides greenness or regularity.

2. But the very perfection of Reflection in this Syllogism now makes it a mere delusion. The middle term has the determinateness of “all”; to these latter the predicate which is bound together with the subject belongs immediately in the major premiss. But *all* are all individuals; and thus each individual subject already contains the predicate immediately, and does not wait to receive it through the Syllogism.—Or again the subject obtains a predicate as a consequence in the conclusion; but the major premiss already contains this conclusion; thus the major premiss is not valid for itself; it is not an immediate, presupposed judgment, but already presupposes the conclusion of which it was supposed to be the ground.—In the favourite complete Syllogism:—

All men are mortal,
Gaius is a man,
therefore Gaius is mortal,

the major premiss is correct only because and in so far as the conclusion is correct; if Gaius happened not to be mortal, the major premiss would be incorrect. The proposition destined to be conclusion must be correct immediately for itself, because otherwise the major premiss cannot comprehend all the individuals; before the major premiss can be pronounced correct, the question exists whether the conclusion itself may not testify against it.

3. In the Qualitative Syllogism it resulted from the Notion of the Syllogism that the premisses, as immediate, contradicted the conclusion, which is the mediation demanded by the Notion of the Syllogism; so that the first Syllogism presupposed others, and conversely these others presupposed it. And it is posited in the Syllogism of Reflection itself that the major premiss presupposes its conclusion, since the former contains a connexion of the individual with a predicate, which connexion precisely is itself to be the conclusion.

The position which has been reached may then be thus expressed, that the Syllogism of Reflection is no more than an external and empty show of syllogizing, and that consequently the essence of this syllogizing rests upon subjective individuality, which latter therefore constitutes the middle and is to be posited as such,—the individuality which exists as such and has universality only in an external manner.—Or again, it appeared from the content of the Syllogism of Reflection, more precisely examined, that the individual stands in an immediate and not in an inferred relation to its predicate; and that the major premiss (the connexion of a particular with a universal, or, better, of a formally universal term with one which is universal in itself) is mediated by the relation of individuality which exists in the former—individuality as Allness. Now this is the *Syllogism of Induction*.

(b) THE SYLLOGISM OF INDUCTION

1. The Syllogism of Allness stands under the scheme of the first figure $I - P - U$, the Syllogism of Induction under that of the second $U - I - P$, since it once more has individuality for middle,—not abstract individuality, but individuality posited as complete, that is, posited with the determination

opposite to itself, namely universality.—The one extreme is just any predicate which is common to all these individuals; its relation to these constitutes the immediate premisses, which are such that one of them, in the previous Syllogism, was to be conclusion.—The other extreme can be the immediate genus as it is found in the middle of the previous Syllogism or in the subject of the Universal Judgment, which genus is exhausted in the collected individuals (or species) of the middle. Consequently the Syllogism has this shape:—

$$\begin{array}{c}
 i \\
 i \\
 U - \quad - P \\
 i \\
 i \\
 \text{to infinity.}
 \end{array}$$

2. The second figure of the formal Syllogism $U - I - P$ did not correspond to the scheme, because in one of the premisses I , which constitutes the middle, did not exist as subsuming, or as predicate. This fault is removed in Induction: here the middle is “all the individuals”; the proposition $U - I$, which contains the objective universal or the genus as segregated into an extreme, as subject, has a predicate which at least is co-extensive with it, and therefore, for external reflection, identical. Lion, elephant, and so on, constitute the genus of quadruped; the distinction that the same content is first posited in individuality and next in universality is thus a merely indifferent form-determination—an indifference which is the result of the formal Syllogism posited in the Syllogism of Reflection: here it is posited through the equality of extent.

Consequently Induction is not the Syllogism of mere perception or of contingent Existence, like the second figure which corresponds to it, but it is the Syllogism of Experience—of the subjective comprehension of the individual in the genus and the binding together of the genus with a universal determinateness because it is found in all the individuals. This Syllogism has the further objective meaning that the immediate genus determines itself through the totality of individuality into a universal property—that it has its existence in a universal relation or characteristic.—However, the objective meaning

of this Syllogism, as of the others, is as yet only their inner Notion, and is not yet here posited.

3. Rather, Induction is still essentially a subjective Syllogism. The middle consists of the individuals in their immediacy; their comprehension into the genus by means of allness is an external reflection. Because of the persistent immediacy of the individuals and the externality which follows thence, universality is no more than completeness, or rather remains a problem to be solved.—Consequently the progress to bad infinity once more emerges in universality: individuality is to be posited as identical with universality; but, the individuals being equally posited as immediate, this unity remains no more than an enduring Ought; it is a unity of equality; the terms which are to be identical at the same time are not to be identical. *a, b, c, d, e*, but only to infinity, constitute the genus and give perfected experience. In so far, the conclusion of Induction remains problematical.

But, while it expresses that perception, in order to become experience, *ought* to be continued into infinity, it presupposes that the genus is bound together in and for itself with its determinateness. Thus really it presupposes its conclusion as immediate, just as the Syllogism of Allness presupposes the conclusion for one of its premisses.—An experience which rests upon induction is taken as valid although admittedly the perception is not completed; but no more can be assumed than that no example can be produced contrary to this experience, in so far as the latter is true in and for itself. Thus the Syllogism through Induction grounds itself upon an immediacy, but not upon that upon which it ought to ground itself, upon the existent immediacy of individuality; it grounds itself upon that only which is in and for itself, or universal immediacy.—The fundamental determination of Induction is that it is a Syllogism; if individuality is taken as the essential determination of the middle, and universality only as its external determination, the middle falls apart into two unconnected parts, and no Syllogism would be there: this externality belongs rather to the extremes. Individuality can be middle only as immediately identical with universality; such universality is really objective—it is the genus.—This may also be considered in the following manner: universality is external, but essential, to the determination of individuality, which is the foundation of the middle

of Induction ; but such an external entity is equally immediately its opposite, the internal.—The truth of the Syllogism of Induction is therefore such a Syllogism as has an individuality for middle which is universality immediately in itself—the *Syllogism of Analogy*.

(c) THE SYLLOGISM OF ANALOGY

1. This Syllogism has for its abstract scheme the third figure of the immediate Syllogism, $I - U - P$. But its middle no longer is any individual quality, but a universality which is the intro-Reflection of some concrete entity, and therefore its nature;—and conversely, because it is universality as universality of a concrete, it also is this concrete in itself.—Thus here an individual is the middle, but is so according to its general nature; further some other individual is the extreme, which has the same general nature as the former. For example:—

The earth has inhabitants,
the moon is an earth,
therefore the moon has inhabitants.

2. The analogy is the more superficial, the more the universal (in which the two individuals are one, and according to which one individual becomes predicate of the other) is a mere quality or (since quality here is taken subjectively) some characteristic or other, when the identity of the two in it is taken as a mere similarity. But there should be no place in logic for such a superficiality as that to which a form of understanding or reason is reduced by being degraded to the sphere of mere sensuous representation.—It is also improper to represent the major premiss of this Syllogism as running thus: “whatever resembles an object in some characteristics also resembles it in others.” In this manner the form of the Syllogism is expressed as a content, and its empirical content (which really deserves that name) is altogether localized in the minor premiss. Thus also the whole form of, for example, the first Syllogism might be expressed as its major premiss:—“if A is subsumed under another term in which a third term inheres, then this third term too inheres in A ; now . . .” and so forth. But its empirical content is irrelevant to the Syllogism itself, and it is as indifferent

to make its own form the content of a major premiss as if any other empirical content were taken for it. But, in so far as this content were irrelevant in the Syllogism of Analogy (which content contains nothing but the peculiar form of the Syllogism), so far also it would be irrelevant in the first Syllogism; that is, that is irrelevant which makes the Syllogism a syllogism.—What matters is always the form of the Syllogism, whether it has for empirical content this form itself or something else. Thus the Syllogism of Analogy is a peculiar form, and it is quite invalid to refuse to regard it as such because its form might be made the content or matter of a major premiss and matter does not concern logic.—This idea may be fostered in the Syllogism of Analogy, and possibly in the Syllogism of Induction, by the fact that in these the middle and the extremes are determined further than in the merely formal Syllogism, so that the form-determination, because it is no longer simple and abstract, must also appear as content-determination. But the fact that the form does in this manner determine itself as content is, first, a necessary progress of the formal element, and thus touches essentially the nature of the Syllogism; consequently, secondly, such a content-determination cannot be looked upon in the same light as any other empirical content, nor can abstraction be made from it.

The form of the Syllogism of Analogy may also be considered in that expression of its major premiss which states that if two objects agree in one or more properties, then the one has still a further property which belongs to the other; and if this is done it might seem as though this Syllogism contained four determinations, a *quaternio terminorum*;—which circumstance made it so difficult to reduce Analogy into the form of a formal Syllogism.—There are two individuals, thirdly there is a property which is immediately assumed to be common to them, and fourthly the other property, which the one individual has immediately, while the other obtains it only through the Syllogism.—The reason for this is that in the Syllogism of Analogy (as was seen) the middle is posited as individuality, but also and immediately as the latter's true universality.—In Induction, apart from the two extremes, the middle is an indeterminable number of individuals; hence in this Syllogism an infinite number of terms ought to be enumerated.—In the

Syllogism of Allness, universality is in the middle only as external form-determination of allness, but in the Syllogism of Analogy as essential universality. In the above example the middle term (the earth) is taken as a concrete which in its truth is a universal nature or genus as much as an individual.

From this side the *quaternio terminorum* does not make Analogy into an imperfect Syllogism. But the Syllogism does suffer this from another side; for although one subject has the same general nature as the other, it is not determined whether the one subject has that determinateness which is also inferred for the other by virtue of its nature or of its particularity; whether, for example, the earth has inhabitants as heavenly body *in general*, or as this heavenly body *in particular*.—Analogy is still a Syllogism of Reflection in so far as individuality and universality are *immediately* united in its middle. Because of this immediacy the externality of the unity of Reflection is preserved; the individual is genus only *in itself*, it is not posited in that negativity through which its determinateness would be the peculiar determinateness of the genus. For this reason the predicate which belongs to the individual of the middle is not, for that reason, also predicate of the other individual, although both belong to the same genus.

3. $I - P$ ("the moon has inhabitants") is the conclusion; but one of the premisses ("the earth has inhabitants") is likewise $I - P$; and in so far as $I - P$ is to be a conclusion, this includes the demand that that premiss too shall be one. This Syllogism thus is its own postulation as against the immediacy which it contains: it presupposes its own conclusion. A Qualitative Syllogism has its presupposition in the other Qualitative Syllogisms: in the Syllogisms which have just been considered the presupposition has been planted within them, since they are Syllogisms of Reflection. Accordingly, since the Syllogism of Analogy is the postulation of its mediation as against the immediacy with which its mediation is infected, it is the moment of individuality of which this Syllogism demands that it shall be transcended. Thus the objective universal remains for the middle, purged of immediacy—the genus.—In the Syllogism of Analogy the genus was moment of the middle only as immediate presupposition; since the Syllogism itself demands the transcendence of the presupposed immediacy, the negation of

individuality, and hence the universal, is no longer immediate, but posited.—The Syllogism of Reflection contained only the first negation of immediacy: now the second has appeared, and has determined the external universality of Reflection as one which is in and for itself.—Considered from the positive side, the conclusion shows itself to be identical with the premiss, and the mediation as having coincided with its presupposition; thus there is an identity of the universality of Reflection by virtue of which it has become a higher universality.

If we contemplate the course of the Syllogisms of Reflection, mediation in general is the posited or concrete unity of the form-determinations of the extremes; Reflection consists of this positing of one determination in the other; Allness is thus the mediating entity. But individuality shows itself as the essential ground, and universality as a merely external determination in it—as completeness. But universality is essential to the individual: the individual must be middle, and must bind together; consequently it must be taken as universal which is *in itself*. But it is not united with universality in this merely positive manner: it is transcended in it, and is negative moment; and thus the universal (that which is in and for itself) is posited genus, and the individual as immediate is rather its externality, or is extreme.—Taken generally, the Syllogism of Reflection falls under the scheme $P - I - U$; the individual is still here, as such, essential determination of the middle. But its immediacy has transcended itself, and the middle has determined itself as universality which is in and for itself: the Syllogism then has entered into the formal scheme $I - U - P$, and the Syllogism of Reflection has passed over into *the Syllogism of Necessity*.

C

THE SYLLOGISM OF NECESSITY

The mediating element has now determined itself (1) as simple determinate universality, like particularity in the Qualitative Syllogism; but (2) as objective universality, which contains (that is) the whole determinateness of the extremes in their distinctness, like the allness of the Syllogism of Reflection,

a completed but simple universality,—the general nature of the Thing, the genus.

This Syllogism is full of content because the abstract middle of the Qualitative Syllogism has posited itself as determinate distinction (as it is as middle of the Syllogism of Reflection), while further this distinction has reflected itself into simple identity.—Consequently this Syllogism is Syllogism of Necessity, since its middle is not some alien and immediate content, but is the intro-Reflection of the determinateness of the extremes. These have their inner identity in the middle, whose content-determinations are the form-determinations of the extremes.—So now that by means of which the terms are distinct from one another exists as external and unessential form, while they themselves exist as the moments of a necessary Existence.

At this point this Syllogism is immediate, and in so far formal in such a way that the connexion of the terms is the essential nature, as content; the latter is in the distinct terms in only a various form, while the extremes for themselves are only as an unessential persistence.—This Syllogism must, by the process of its realization, be determined in such a manner that the extremes too are posited as this totality (which the middle is at first); while the necessity of the relation—which at first is only the substantial content—is a relation of the posited form.

(a) THE CATEGORICAL SYLLOGISM

1. The Categorical Syllogism has the Categorical Judgment for one or both of its premisses.—Here this more determinate significance is connected with this Syllogism (as with the Judgment), that its middle is objective universality. Superficially the Categorical Syllogism too is taken for nothing more than a mere syllogism of inherence.

According to the significance of its content the Categorical Syllogism is the first Syllogism of Necessity, in which a subject is bound together with a predicate through its substance. But substance, raised to the sphere of Notion, is the universal, posited as being in and for itself in such a way that it has for form and for the manner of its being not accidentality (which it had in its peculiar relation) but the Notion-determination. Its distinctions therefore are the extremes of the Syllogism, or

(determinately) universality and individuality. The former, as against the genus (which now is the closer determination of the middle) is abstract universality or universal determinateness—the accidentality of substance comprehended into simple determinateness, which however is its essential distinction or specific difference.—Individuality on the other hand is the actual; in itself it is the concrete unity of genus and determinateness, while here (as in the immediate Syllogism) it is as yet immediate individuality, accidentality which is comprehended into the form of persistence which is for itself.—The relation of this extreme to the middle constitutes a Categorical Judgment; but the other extreme too expresses the specific difference of the genus or its determinate principle, according to the determination which has been mentioned; and, in so far, this other premiss too is categorical.

2. At first this Syllogism, as being first and therefore immediate Syllogism of Necessity, stands under the scheme of the first formal Syllogism $I - P - U$.—But the middle is the essential nature of the individual, and not just any determinateness or property of it; and similarly the extreme of universality is not just any abstract universal, or any individual quality, but the universal determinateness, the specific part of the distinction of the genus; and therefore that contingency vanishes which would cause the subject to be bound together by just any middle term with just any quality.—And thus the relations of the extremes to the middle have not that external immediacy which they have in the Qualitative Syllogism, and consequently the necessity of a proof does not arise as it did there, leading to the infinite progress.

Further this Syllogism, unlike a Syllogism of Reflection, does not presuppose its conclusion for its premisses. The terms, according to their substantial content, stand to one another in an identical relation which is in and for itself: there is one essence pervading the three terms, in which the determinations of individuality, particularity, and universality are only formal moments.

Consequently the Categorical Syllogism is in so far no longer subjective; in this identity, objectivity commences; the middle is the identity (which is full of content) of its extremes, and these are contained in it according to their independence; for

their independence is that substantial universality, the genus. The subjective element of the Syllogism consists in the indifferent persistence of the extremes against the Notion (or the middle).

3. But there remains something subjective in this Syllogism: the identity exists still as substantial (or as content), and not at the same time as identity of form. Consequently the identity of the Notion is still an internal bond, whence, as relation, it is still Necessity; the universality of the middle is solid and positive identity, and does not equally exist as the negativity of its extremes.

More closely considered, in this Syllogism the immediacy, which is not yet *posited* as that which it is *in itself*, is present in the following manner. The properly immediate element of the Syllogism is the individual. This is subsumed under its genus as middle; but below it there stand other individuals of indeterminate number; it is therefore contingent that only this one individual is posited under it as subsumed.—But further this contingency does not belong merely to external reflection, which discovers the individual posited in the syllogism to be contingent through comparison with others; rather, it is posited as contingent (as a subjective actuality) because it is itself related to the middle as to its objective universality. On the other side the subject, since it is an immediate individual, contains determinations which are not contained in the middle as in the universal nature; consequently it has also an existence which is indifferent to it and is determined for itself, having a peculiar content. And hence this other term too, conversely, has an indifferent immediacy and an existence different from the former.—The same relation subsists also between the middle and the other extreme; for the latter too has the determination of immediacy, and hence of a contingent being as against its middle.

The following then are the positings of the Categorical Syllogism:—(a) extremes having such a relation to the middle that they have objective universality or independent nature in themselves and at the same time exist as immediate terms, that is, as actualities indifferent to each other; (b) they exist equally as contingent, that is, their immediacy is determined as transcended in their identity. But, by reason of this independence,

and totality of actuality, this identity is only formal and inner; thus the Syllogism of Necessity has determined itself as *the Hypothetical Syllogism*.

(b) THE HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISM

1. The Hypothetical Judgment contains only the necessary relation without the immediacy of the related terms. If *A*, then *B*; in other words, the being of *A* is also and equally the being of an Other, namely *B*; but this implies neither that *A* is nor that *B* is. The Hypothetical Syllogism adds this immediacy of being:—

If *A* is, then *B* is,
but *A* is,
therefore *B* is.

The minor premiss by itself expresses the immediate being of *A*.

But not this alone has been added to the Judgment. The Syllogism contains the relation of subject and predicate not as abstract copula but as completed mediating unity. Consequently the being of *A* must be taken not as mere immediacy but essentially as middle of the Syllogism. This must be further considered.

2. First the relation of the Hypothetical Judgment is necessity or inner substantial identity combined with external variety of existence or mutual indifference of the being which appears—an identical content which forms an internal foundation. Consequently the two sides of the Judgment are not an immediate being, but a being which is held suspended in Necessity: that is, they are at the same time transcended, or merely apparent, being. Further they are related as sides of the Judgment, as universality and individuality; consequently the one is this content as totality of conditions, the other as actuality. It is however indifferent which side is taken as universality and which as individuality. For in so far as the conditions still are the inner or abstract element of an actuality, they are the universal; and they have entered into actuality by virtue of the fact that they are comprehended into one individuality. Conversely the conditions are an isolated and scattered appear-

ance which acquires unity, significance, and a universally valid Determinate Being only in actuality.

But the closer relation which has been here assumed between the two sides as being the relation between condition and conditioned, can also be taken as that of cause and effect, or ground and consequence. Here this is indifferent; but the relation of condition corresponds more closely to the relation which is present in the Hypothetical Judgment and Syllogism, in so far as condition essentially is as an indifferent existence, while ground and cause pass over into Other through themselves; and also condition is a more universal determination, for it comprehends both sides of these relations, since effect, consequence, and the like, are as much condition of cause, or ground, as these latter are of the former.—

Now *A* is mediating being, first, in so far as it is an immediate being, an indifferent actuality; but also, secondly, in so far as it is a being contingent in itself and self-transcending. What translates the conditions into the actuality of the new shape of which they are the conditions, is this, that they are not being as the abstract immediate, but Being in its Notion and, at first, Becoming; but, since the Notion no longer is the process of passing over, they are (being more closely determined) individuality as self-relating negative unity.—The conditions are a scattered material awaiting and demanding employment; this negativity is the mediating entity, the free unity of the Notion. It determines itself as activity, since this middle is the contradiction between objective universality (or the totality of the identical content) and indifferent immediacy.—This middle consequently is no longer necessity which is merely inner, but existent necessity; objective universality contains self-relation as simple immediacy, as Being;—in the Categorical Syllogism this moment is at first determination of the extremes, but it determines itself as contingency against the objective universality of the middle, and hence as something merely posited or also as transcended, that is, as something which has passed back into the Notion or into the middle as unity, which middle itself now in its objectivity is Being.

The conclusion “therefore *B* is” expresses the same contradiction, that *B* is immediately but equally is through an Other, or is mediated. Formally therefore it is the same Notion

which the middle also is; only it is distinguished from Necessity as the Necessary,—in the form (which is quite superficial) of individuality as against universality. The absolute content of *A* and of *B* is the same; they are only two different names of the same foundation for imagination, in so far as it holds fast the appearance of the diversified shape of Determinate Being and distinguishes its necessity from the necessary; but in so far as this necessity were supposed to be separated from *B*, it would not be the necessary. There is thus here the identity of mediator and mediated.

3. The Hypothetical Syllogism at first represents the necessary relation as connexion through form, or as negative unity, just as the Categorical Syllogism represented, through positive unity, the solid content, or objective universality. But necessity collapses into the necessary; the formal activity of the translation of conditioning into conditioned actuality is in itself the unity in which the determinatenesses of the opposition (which had before achieved the licence of indifferent existence) are transcended, and the distinction between *A* and *B* is an empty name. Consequently it is intro-reflected unity,—and therefore also an identical content; and this not only *in itself*,—it is also *posited* through this Syllogism, since the being of *A* is not its own but also that of *B*, and, conversely and in general, the being of the one is the being of the other, and in the conclusion immediate being or indifferent determinateness exists definitely as mediated—since, that is, externality has transcended itself, and its unity which has passed into itself is now posited.

The mediation of the Syllogism has thus determined itself as individuality, immediacy, and self-relating negativity, or as identity which distinguishes itself and, out of this distinction, collects itself into itself;—that is, as absolute form, and for this very reason as objective universality or self-identical content. In this determination the Syllogism is *the Disjunctive Syllogism*.

(c) THE DISJUNCTIVE SYLLOGISM

The Hypothetical Syllogism in general stands under the scheme of the second figure, $U - I - P$: the Disjunctive Syllogism stands under the scheme of the third figure of the formal syllogism, $I - U - P$. But the middle is universality

filled with form ; it has determined itself as totality, as developed objective universality. Consequently the middle term is as well universality as particularity and individuality. As the former it is, first, the substantial identity of the genus ; but secondly it exists as one which has absorbed particularity, as being equal with itself, that is, as general sphere which contains its total particularization—as the genus divided into its species, or *A* which is *B* as much as *C* or *D*. But particularization is distinction, and therefore is equally the alternativeness of *B*, *C*, and *D*, or negative unity, or reciprocal exclusiveness of the determinations.—This exclusiveness further is not only reciprocal, and the determination is not merely relative, but is equally and essentially self-relating determination,—the particular as individuality to the exclusion of the others.

A is either *B* or *C* or *D*,
but *A* is *B*,
therefore *A* is neither *C* nor *D* ;

or again

A is either *B* or *C* or *D*,
but *A* is neither *C* nor *D*,
therefore *A* is *B*.

A is subject not only in the two premisses, but also in the conclusion. In the first premiss it is universal, and in its predicate it is the universal sphere particularized into the totality of its species ; in the second it exists as determinate or as one species ; in the conclusion it is posited as the exclusive individual determinateness.—Or again the subject is already posited in the minor premiss as exclusive individuality, and in the conclusion, positively, as that determinate entity which it is.

The term which here appears as mediated is the universality of *A*, which is mediated with individuality. But the mediating term is this *A*, which is the universal sphere of its particularizations and is an entity determined as individual. Thus the truth of the Hypothetical Syllogism—the unity of mediator and mediated—is *posited* in the Disjunctive Syllogism, which for this reason has also ceased to be a Syllogism. For the middle, which in it is posited as the totality of the Notion, contains itself the two extremes in their complete determinateness. The

extremes, in distinction from this middle, exist only as a positedness no longer having a peculiar determinateness as against the middle.

If this is considered with more particular respect to the Hypothetical Syllogism, it appears that the latter contained (1) a substantial identity as the inner bond of necessity, and (2) a negative unity distinct therefrom—namely activity, or the form which translated one existence into another. The Disjunctive Syllogism in general is in the determination of universality; its middle is the *A* as genus and as perfectly determinate entity; by virtue of this unity this content (which was inner before) is also posited; and conversely positedness or form is not external negative unity as against an indifferent existence, but is identical with that solid content. The whole form-determination of the Notion is posited in its determinate distinction and at the same time in the simple identity of the Notion.

Hereby the formalism of the syllogizing process, and hence the subjectivity of the Syllogism and the Notion, have transcended themselves. This formal or subjective element consisted in this, that that which mediates the extremes is the Notion as abstract determination, so that this latter is thereby distinct from them while it is their unity. But in the perfection of the Syllogism, where objective universality is equally posited as totality of the form-determinations, the distinction between mediator and mediated has disappeared. What is mediated is itself an essential moment of its mediator, and each moment exists as the totality of the mediated.

The figures of the Syllogism represent each determinateness of the Notion separately as the middle, which at the same time is the Notion as Ought, as a demand that the mediating term shall be its totality. But the various genera of Syllogisms represent the stages of the completion or concretion of the middle. In the formal Syllogism the middle is posited as totality only by virtue of the fact that all the determinatenesses (but each separately) run through the function of mediation. In the Syllogisms of Reflection the middle is the unity which externally comprehends the determinations of the extremes. In the Syllogism of Necessity it has determined itself to be a unity equally developed and total, and simple; and the form of the

Syllogism, which consisted in the distinction of the middle as against its extremes, has thereby transcended itself.

And now the Notion altogether has become realized, or, more exactly, it has achieved a reality which is Objectivity. The last reality was that the Notion (as internally negative unity) sunders itself and, as Judgment, posits its determinations in a determinate and indifferent distinction, while in the Syllogism it opposes itself to these. Thus it is still the internality of this its externality; and so in the course of the Syllogisms this externality is equalized with the internal unity. The various determinations return into this unity through the mediation which, while it unites them, is still a third term. Thus externality in itself represents the Notion, which now is no longer an internal unity and, as such, distinct from it.

But that determination of the Notion which had been considered as reality is, conversely, equally a positedness. For in this result the truth of the Notion has turned out to be the identity of its internality and externality; and not only this: already the moments of the Notion, in the Judgment, remain, in their indifference to each other, determinations which have their significance only in their relation. The Syllogism is mediation—the complete Notion in its positedness. Its movement is the transcendence of this mediation, in which nothing is in and for itself, but each term is only through the mediation of another. Consequently the result is an immediacy which has emerged through the transcendence of mediation, a Being which is equally identical with mediation, and is the Notion which has constructed itself out of and in its otherness. Hence this Being is a Thing which is in and for itself, or *Objectivity*.

SECTION TWO

OBJECTIVITY

IN the First Book of Objective Logic abstract Being was shown as passing over into Determinate Being, but as passing back also into Essence. In the Second Book Essence is seen to determine itself to be Ground; thence it enters into Existence and realizes itself as Substance, but passes back again into the Notion. Now, so far, it has been shown of the Notion that it determines itself to be Objectivity. It is self-evident that the latter transition is, in its determination, that which elsewhere had a place in metaphysics as the Syllogism of the Notion—that is, the inference from the Notion of God to his existence,—or as the so-called ontological proof of the existence of God.—It is equally well known that the most sublime conception of Descartes, that the God is that whose Notion implies his Being, was degraded to the bad form of the formal syllogism, namely to the form of this proof, and finally succumbed to the “critique of reason” and to the idea that Existence cannot be extracted out of the Notion. Some points concerning this proof have been examined above. In Volume One (pp. 98 sqq.), where Being has vanished in its next opposite, Not-being, and Becoming has shown itself to be the truth of both, attention was drawn to the confusion which arises when, in some particular Determinate Being, its determinate content and not its Being is held fast; in this case, when one determinate content (for example, a hundred thalers) is compared with some other determinate content (for example, the context of my perception or the condition of my purse), and a distinction is found there, people have treated the question whether these two contents can be juxtaposed or not, as if the distinction between Being and Not-being or (worse still) between Being and the Notion were in question. Further, an examination was made there (p. 124, and Volume Two, p. 69) of the determination, which occurs in the ontological proof, of a sum-total of all realities.—But the essential object of this proof, the connexion between Notion

and Existence, falls under the consideration (which has just been closed) of the Notion and of the whole progress through which it determines itself as Objectivity. As absolutely self-identical negativity the Notion is that which determines itself. It has already been observed that, in unfolding itself into the Judgment in individuality, it posits itself as real and existent. This reality, there still abstract, perfects itself in Objectivity.

It might appear that the transition of the Notion into Objectivity is something different from the transition from the Notion of God to his existence. In this case it must be observed (1) that the determinate content (God) would make no difference in the logical process, and that the ontological proof would only be an application of this logical process to that particular content; and (2) the observation must especially be recalled which was made above, that the subject obtains determinateness and content only in its predicate, and before this is for Notion-forming cognition only a name, whatever it may be for sensation, intuition, or imagination; while in the predicate realization in general begins simultaneously with determinateness.—The predicates however must be taken as themselves still implicit in the Notion, and therefore as something subjective which has not yet entered into Existence; and in so far it is true that the realization of the Notion is not completed in the Judgment. But on the other hand the bare determination of an object by means of predicates, without being the realization and objectivation of the Notion, remains so subjective that it is not even the true cognition and determination of the Notion of the object—something subjective in the sense of abstract reflection and images which have not been operated upon by Notions.—God as living God, and still more as Absolute Spirit, is recognized only in his activity. Man has been instructed early to recognize him in his works; from these alone the determinations can emerge which are called his properties and also contain his being. Thus Notion-forming cognition of his activity, that is, of himself, comprehends the Notion of God in his being, and his being in his Notion. Being by itself, and still more Determinate Being, is so poor and restricted a determination that the difficult undertaking of finding it in the Notion could probably arise only from the fact that no consideration was given to the meaning of Being

and Determinate Being itself.—Being, as wholly abstract and immediate self-relation, is simply the abstract moment of the Notion; it is abstract universality, which also effects that which is demanded of Being, namely, to be outside of the Notion; for, however much universality may be moment of the Notion, it is equally its distinction or abstract Judgment, in which the Notion opposes itself to itself. The Notion (even as formal Notion) already contains Being immediately in a truer and richer form, since, as self-relating negativity, it is individuality.

The difficulty does indeed become insuperable of discovering Being in the Notion in general and in the Notion of God in particular, if it is to occur as palpably perceived in the context of external experience or in the form of sense-perception (like the hundred thalers in the state of my fortune), and not as conceived in its Notion by the spirit,—if it is to be visible essentially to the outer and not to the inner eye, and if that Being is called reality and truth which belongs to things as sensuous, temporal, and perishable.—If a philosophy in contemplating Being does not rise above the senses, then also it does not cast off merely abstract thought even in the Notion, which stands opposed to Being.

It is customary to take the Notion for something as one-sided as an abstract thought; and this custom will hesitate to acknowledge what was suggested above, namely, that the transition from the Notion of God to his being must be regarded as an application of the logical course of the objectivation of the Notion, which has just been set out. But if it is admitted (as is usually done) that the logical is the formal element and as such constitutes for cognition the form of any determinate content, then at least this relation ought to be allowed; unless indeed a halt is made at this opposition of Notion and Objectivity—the untrue Notion and an equally untrue reality being taken as ultimate.—But it was further indicated in the exposition of the pure Notion that this is the absolute and divine Notion itself, so that in truth this relation of *application* would not take place at all, but the logical process would in fact be the immediate demonstration of the self-determination of God as Being. But here this further remark must be made, that, if the Notion is to be represented as the Notion of God, it must be taken in that form in which it has already been admitted into the Idea.

That pure Notion passes through the finite forms of Judgment and Syllogism because it is not yet posited as being in and for itself one with Objectivity, but is as yet conceived in the stage of Becoming towards it. And similarly this Objectivity is not yet the existence of God, not yet Reality which shows in the Idea. But still Objectivity is richer and higher than the Being or Existence of the ontological proof by as much as the pure Notion is richer and higher than that metaphysical void, the sum-total of all reality.—But I postpone to another occasion a closer examination of the manifold misunderstanding which was introduced by logical formalism into the ontological proof as well as into the other so-called proofs of the existence of God, and of Kant's criticism of them; and I refrain at present from reconstructing their true significance, and thus re-establishing their fundamental ideas in their worth and dignity.

It has been recalled that already several forms of immediacy have occurred, although in various determinations. In the sphere of Being, immediacy is Being itself and Determinate Being, in the sphere of Essence, Existence and, further, Actuality and Substantiality, and in the sphere of the Notion (apart from immediacy as abstract universality) it now is Objectivity.—Where the exactitude of philosophic conceptual distinctions is not concerned, these expressions may be used as synonymous: those other determinations have arisen from the necessity of the Notion. Being is, in general, first immediacy; and Determinate Being is the same, *plus* the first determinateness. Existence, *plus* the Thing, is the immediacy which emerges out of Ground,—out of the self-transcending mediation of the simple Reflection of Essence. Then Actuality and Substantiality are the immediacy which has emerged out of the transcended distinction between Existence (as yet unessential) as Appearance, and its essentiality. Finally Objectivity is the immediacy to which the Notion determines itself by the transcendence of its abstraction and mediation.—Philosophy has the right to select from the language of common life, which is adapted to the world of sensuous representations, such expressions as seem to approximate to the determinations of the Notion. Hence it cannot be of importance to demonstrate for any word which has been selected from the language of common life that the same

Notion for which it is used in philosophy is also connected with it in common life; for common life has no Notions, but only sensuous images; and to recognize the Notion of what is else mere image, this is philosophy. It must therefore suffice if in these expressions which are used for philosophic determinations imagination has some vague idea of their distinction, as should be the case with those expressions, so that in them certain shades of the image are recognized which are more closely related to the corresponding Notion.—It will perhaps less readily be admitted that something can be without existing; but at least the *is* (for example) as the copula of a Judgment will hardly be confused with the expression “to exist,” nor will it be said that “these goods *exist* dear, suitable,” and so forth, or “money *exists* metal, or metallic,” instead of “these goods *are* dear, suitable,” and so forth, and “money *is* metal.”¹ But Being and Appearing, Appearance and Actuality, and also mere Being as opposed to Actuality, are distinguished elsewhere too; and all these expressions are distinguished even more from Objectivity.—But even if they should be used as synonyms philosophy is still at liberty to make use of such linguistic superfluities for its distinctions.

Under the Apodeictic Judgment, which is the perfection of the Judgment, so that the subject there loses its determinateness as against the predicate, mention was made of the twofold significance of the Subjectivity which is due to this fact: the terms of duplication are, the Notion, and, also, externality and contingency, which otherwise stand opposed to it. Similarly a twofold significance appears for Objectivity: it stands opposed to the independent Notion, but also is that which is in and for itself. In this sense the object is opposed to that *ego* = *ego* which subjective idealism asserts to be the absolute truth; it is thus the manifold world in its immediate existence, with which Ego, or the Notion, enters into infinite conflict only to achieve, through the negation of this Other of primary self-consciousness (which in itself is nothing), the actual truth of its self-equality.—

¹ In a French report, where the commander states that he waited for the breeze which generally rose near the island about morning in order to make for land, the expression occurs *le vent ayant été longtemps sans exister*; here the distinction arose simply from the common idiom, for example, *il a été longtemps sans m'écrire*.

In a less determinate sense it thus means an object in general for any interest or activity of the subject.

But in the opposite sense the Objective means that which is in and for itself and is without restriction and opposite. Reasonable principles, perfect works of art, and the like, are called objective in so far as they are free and above all contingency. Reasonable theoretical or moral principles belong to the sphere of the subjective and to consciousness, but still that element of them which is in and for itself is called objective: the knowledge of truth is placed in the cognition of the object as object and without the addition of any subjective reflection; and right action is placed in the adherence to objective laws which have no subjective origin and admit no caprice and no treatment which might overthrow their necessity.

At this point of our treatment Objectivity has the meaning of the Being (which is in and for itself) of the Notion; and the Notion has transcended the mediation which is posited in its self-determination so that it has become immediate self-relation. For this reason this immediacy is itself immediate and is wholly saturated with the Notion; and also its totality is immediately identical with its Being. But further the Notion must equally effect the free Being-for-Self of its subjectivity; so that it comes to be related to Objectivity as an End, where the immediacy of the latter becomes negative as against the Notion and becomes the object of its determining activity; it thus obtains the other meaning, that of being null in and for itself in so far as it stands opposed to the Notion.

First, then, Objectivity in its immediacy is *Mechanism*. In this immediacy its moments persist external and independently indifferent to one another, as Objects, by reason of the totality of all the moments; in their relation they have the subjective unity of the Notion only as inner or as outer.

But, secondly, this unity proves to be the immanent law of the Objects themselves; their relation thus becomes their peculiar difference, founded upon their law. In this relation their determinate independence transcends itself. This is *Chemism*.

Thirdly, however, this essential unity of the Objects is hereby posited as distinct from their independence; it is the subjective Notion, posited however as related to Objectivity in and for itself, as End. This is *Teleology*.

The End is the Notion posited as related to Objectivity in itself and as transcending its deficiency (which is, to be subjective) through itself; thus the adequacy to an End, which was at first external, becomes internal through the realization of the End; it becomes *the Idea*.

CHAPTER I

MECHANISM

OBJECTIVITY is the totality of the Notion, which has passed back into its unity; thus something immediate is posited, which is this totality in and for itself and is also posited as such, although in it the negative unity of the Notion has not yet severed itself from the immediacy of this totality;—or Objectivity is not yet posited as Judgment. The Notion is immanent in it, and, to this extent, Objectivity contains the distinction of the Notion; but, because of the objective totality, the distinct terms are complete and independent Objects, which consequently, when they are related, are related only as independent, and in every connexion remain external to one another.—And this constitutes the characteristic of Mechanism, which is, that whatever relation relates the terms is foreign to them and does not concern their nature; even if it involves the appearance of a One, it remains nothing else than a collocation, mixture, heap, or the like. Spiritual like material Mechanism consists in this, that the terms which are related in spirit remain external to it and to one another. A mechanical idea or memory, habit, or a mechanical manner of acting, denotes that the peculiar penetration and presence of spirit is lacking in that which it apprehends or does. Though its theoretical or practical mechanism cannot occur without its self-activity or without an impulse or consciousness, yet the freedom of individuality is lacking, and, because it is not found there, such activity appears to be merely external.

A

THE MECHANICAL OBJECT

It has resulted that the Object is the Syllogism whose mediation has been equalized and has become immediate identity. It is therefore universal in and for itself; universality not in the meaning of a community of properties, but one which penetrates particularity and in it is immediate individuality.

1. First, then, the Object does not divide itself into matter and form, of which the former would be the independent universal part of the Object and the latter the particular and individual; such an abstract distinction between individuality and universality is not, according to its Notion, present in it; if it is considered as matter, it must be taken as matter formed in itself. It may also be determined as a Thing with Properties, as a Whole consisting of Parts, as Substance with Accidents, or according to the other relations of Reflection. But these relations have altogether perished in the Notion; hence the Object has neither properties nor accidents, for these may be separated from the thing or the substance, whereas in the Object particularity is simply reflected into totality. The same independence is indeed present in the parts of a whole as belongs to the distinctions of the Object; but these distinctions are also themselves essentially Objects or totalities, which have not—as the parts have—this determinateness as against the whole.

Consequently the Object is at this point indeterminate in so far as it has no determinate opposite in itself; for it is mediation which has collapsed into immediate identity. In so far as the Notion is essentially determinate, it has determinateness as a complete but otherwise indeterminate, that is, relationless, multiplicity, which constitutes a totality that in turn is itself as yet not further determined: such *sides* or *parts* as may be distinguished in it belong to an external reflection. This wholly indeterminate distinction, then, is only this, that there is a plurality of Objects each of which contains its determinateness reflected only into its universality and does not show outwards.—This indeterminate determinateness is essential to it; it is therefore such an *agglomeration* in itself, and must consequently be regarded as composite or as an aggregate.—It does not however consist of atoms, since these are not Objects because they are not totalities. Leibniz's monad would more nearly be an Object, since it is a totality of representation of the world; but, locked up in its intensive subjectivity, it is supposed to be at least essentially One in itself. The monad, however, determined as exclusive One, is only a principle which reflection *assumes*. But it is Object; partly in so far as the ground of its manifold images, of the developed, that is, the posited, deter-

minations of its totality (which is merely *in itself*), lies outside it; and partly in so far as it is indifferent to the monad whether it constitutes an Object together with others; thus in fact it is not exclusive or determinate for itself.

2. Now the Object is the totality of determinateness, but not its negative unity, because of its indeterminateness and immediacy; and consequently it is indifferent to the determinations as individual entities determined in and for themselves, and these themselves are indifferent to one another. Consequently neither the Object nor the determinations themselves can serve as basis from which Notions may be formed about them; the totality of the Object is the form of general reflectedness of its multiplicity into individuality in general which is not determined in itself. Consequently every determinateness which it has is proper to it; but the form which constitutes their distinction and connects them into a unity is external and indifferent; whether this form is that of a mixture, order, or certain arrangement of parts and sides, these all are connexions which are indifferent to the related terms.

Thus the Object has the determinateness of its totality, as well as a Determinate Being in general, outside itself—in other Objects; these have theirs in yet other Objects, and so to infinity. The return upon itself of this egress into infinity must indeed also be assumed, and must be imagined as a totality or a world; but this world is just universality bounded in itself by indeterminate individuality; it is a Universe.

Thus the Object in its determinateness is equally indifferent to them; and thereby it again points on beyond itself for its determinateness to Objects to which in their turn it is indifferent whether they determine or not. Hence there is nowhere a principle of self-determination; determinism—which is the point at which cognition stands in so far as the Object, as it has just turned out here to be, is the truth—indicates that its every determination is that of some other Object; but this other equally is indifferent both to its determinateness and to its activity.—For this reason determinism itself suffers from an indeterminateness which forces it to go on to infinity; at any point it may halt and rest satisfied, because the Object to which it has passed over is rounded in itself as a formal totality and is indifferent to determination by another. Hence

the explanation of the determination of an Object, and the progress of this idea which is made for this purpose, is only an empty word, because there is no self-determination in the other Object to which it moves on.

3. Since the determinateness of an Object lies in another Object, there is no definite distinction between them; the determinateness is merely double, being first in the one and then in the other Object: it is just identical, and in so far any explanation made or Notion formed is tautological. This tautology is external and empty oscillation. The determinateness acquires no peculiar distinctness as against Objects which are indifferent to it, and therefore it is identical; there is consequently only *one* determinateness; and the fact that it is double expresses just this externality and nullity of a distinction. But at the same time the Objects are *independent* as against each other: hence in this identity they remain utterly external to each other.—Thus there is here a contradiction between the complete *indifference* of the Objects to each other and the *identity* of their determinateness; or of their complete *externality* in the *identity* of their determinateness. Thus this contradiction is the negative unity of a plurality of Objects mutually self-repellent in it,—that is, *the Mechanical Process*.

B

THE MECHANICAL PROCESS

If the Objects are considered merely as totalities rounded off in themselves, they cannot act upon one another. In this determination they are as the monads, which for this same reason were looked on as quite without effect upon one another. But for this very reason the Notion of a monad is a faulty reflection. For, first, it is a definite image of its totality which is only *in itself*; as a certain degree of development and *positedness* of its image of the world it is determinate; and, since now it is a self-rounded totality, it is also indifferent to this determinateness; hence it is not its own determinateness, but one posited through another Object. Secondly, it is an immediate entity in general in so far as it is supposed to be only as imaging; its self-relation therefore is abstract universality; it is thus a

Determinate Being which is open to others.—In order to win the freedom of substance, it is not sufficient to imagine it as a totality which, complete in itself, has need of no acquisitions from without. Rather, notionless and merely imaging self-relation is a passivity as against Other.—Similarly determinateness is external, whether it is taken as the determinateness of an existent or of an imaging entity, or again as a degree of a peculiar development which comes from within;—that degree which the development reaches has its limit in an Other. If the reciprocal action of substances is attributed to an external pre-established harmony, then it is simply made a presupposition, that is, something which is withdrawn from the Notion.—The need to escape from the interaction of the substances was due to the moment of absolute independence and originality, which was made the foundation. But the positedness—the degree of development—does not correspond to this Being-in-Self; and for this very reason the positedness has its ground in an Other.

It was shown in the proper place that the Relation of Substantiality passes over into the Relation of Causality. But here the existent entity has no longer the determination of a Substance, but of an Object; the causal relation has become submerged in the Notion; the originality of one substance as against another has proved to be a show, and its action a transition into the opposite. Consequently this relation has no objectivity. Hence in so far as the one Object is posited in the form of subjective unity as active cause, this no longer counts as an original determination, but as something mediated; the active Object has this its determination only through some other Object.—Mechanism, since it belongs to the sphere of the Notion, contains that posited in itself which turned out to be the truth of the causal relation, namely that the cause, which is supposed to be the term that is in and for itself, is essentially also effect, or positedness. Consequently in Mechanism the causality of the Object is, immediately, a non-originality; it is indifferent to this its determination; and the fact that it is cause is therefore contingent in it.—In so far it might well be said that the causality of substances is merely something imagined. But precisely this imagined causality is Mechanism; for Mechanism is this, that causality, as identical

determinateness of various substances (that is, as submersion of their independence in this identity), is a mere positedness; the Objects are indifferent to this unity and preserve themselves against it. But equally this their indifferent independence is mere positedness: for this reason they admit of mingling and aggregation, and of becoming, as aggregate, one Object. By virtue of this indifference both to their transition and to their independence, the substances are Objects.

(a) THE FORMAL MECHANICAL PROCESS

The Mechanical Process is the positing of that which is contained in the Notion of Mechanism; the positing, first, then, of a contradiction.

1. The interaction of the Objects, as it results from the Notion which has been explained, is the positing of the identical relation of the Objects. This consists in this alone, that the determinateness which is determined is given the form of universality,—a communication which is without any transition into opposite.—Spiritual communication, which in any case takes place in that element which is the universal in the form of universality, is, by itself, a relation of ideal nature, wherein a determinateness continues itself unclouded from one person into another, and, without any change, universalizes itself—as an odour spreads freely in the unresisting atmosphere. But even in the communication between material Objects, their determinateness spreads out (so to speak) in a manner which is of equally ideal nature; and personality is an infinitely more intensive hardness than that which belongs to Objects. The formal totality of the Object in general, which is indifferent to determinateness and therefore is not a self-determination, makes it an entity undistinguished from the other, so that the interaction at this point is an unhindered continuation of the determinateness of the one in the other.

In the spiritual sphere now the communicable content is infinitely manifold; for, being taken up into intelligence, it achieves this form of universality in which it becomes communicable. But that which is universal not only through its form but in and for itself, is (as well in the spiritual as in the material sphere) the objective as such, against which the

individuality of external Objects (and also of persons) is something unessential that can offer it no resistance. Laws, manners, and reasonable ideas in general are, in the spiritual sphere, such communicable entities, which penetrate individuals unconsciously and assert themselves in them. In the material sphere, movement, heat, magnetism, electricity, and the like—which must be determined as imponderable agents even if it is attempted to imagine them as stuff or matter—are agents lacking that part of materiality which is the foundation of their individualization.

2. Now if in the interaction of Objects their *identical* universality is posited first, it is equally necessary to posit the other moment of the Notion, namely particularity: the Objects consequently also demonstrate their independence, preserve themselves as external to one another, and, in that universality, establish individuality. This reconstitution is *reaction* in general. This must not be taken as a mere cancellation of action and of the communicated determinateness; that which has been communicated is universal, and as such is positive in the particular Objects, and particularizes itself only in their variety. In so far, then, that which is communicated remains what it is; only, it distributes itself over the Objects, or is determined by their particularity.—Cause perishes in its Other, or effect, and the activity of the causal substance is lost in its action; but the Object which acts upon others merely becomes universal; its action, at first, is not a loss of its determinateness but a particularization; by means of it the Object, which at first was the whole of that determinateness individual in itself, now becomes a species of it; and it is only through this that the determinateness is posited as universal. Both, the elevation of the individual determinateness into universality (in communication), and its particularization, or degradation, from having been *one*, into a species (in distribution), are one and the same process.

Now reaction is equal to action.—This at first shows itself in this manner, that the other Object has absorbed within itself the whole universal, and thus is now the active term as against the first. Thus its reaction is the same as the action—a reciprocal repulsion of the impulse. Secondly, that which is communicated is the objective; thus, while their difference

is presupposed, it remains substantial determination of the Objects; and so the universal forthwith specifies itself in them; each Object in consequence not merely gives back the whole of the action, but each also has its specific share. Thirdly, however, the reaction is wholly negative action in so far as each, through the elasticity of its independence, ejects from itself the positedness of an other, and preserves its self-relation. The specific particularity of the communicated determinateness in the Objects (which was called species above) returns to individuality, and the Object upholds its externality as against the universality which was communicated. Hereby action passes over into *rest*. It turns out to be a change which is merely superficial and transient in the self-rounded and indifferent totality of the Object.

3. This regress constitutes the Product of the Mechanical Process. Immediately the Object is presupposed (1) as individual, (2) also as particular against others, and (3) as indifferent to its particularity, as universal. The Product is this presupposed totality of the Notion as a totality which now is *posited*. It is the conclusion in which the communicated universal is bound together with individuality through the particularity of the Object; but at the same time, in rest mediation is posited as such as has transcended itself; or it is posited that the Product is indifferent to this its process of determination, and that the determinateness which it receives is external to it.

Thus the Product is the same as is the Object which is just entering into the Process. But at the same time it is determined only through this movement: the Mechanical Object is Object only as Product, because that which it is is in it only through the mediation of an Other. Thus, as Product, it is what it was to have been in and for itself—a conglomerate or mixture, a certain order and arrangement of the parts; it is, altogether, an entity whose determinateness is not self-determination, but something posited.

On the other side the result of the Mechanical Process equally is not already present before itself; its ending is not in its beginning, as in the End.¹ The Product is a determinateness, as posited externally, in the Object. Thus according to the

¹ The End which is reached through Means is here meant (*Zweck*).— *Translators' Note.*

Notion this Product is what the Object is already from its beginning. But in the beginning external determinateness does not yet exist as posited. In so far the result is something wholly different from the first existence of the Object, and exists as something utterly contingent for it.

(b) THE REAL MECHANICAL PROCESS

The Mechanical Process passes over into *rest*. For that determinateness which the Object obtains through it is merely external. This rest itself is equally external to it, since it is the opposite determinateness to the *action* of the Object; but every determinateness is indifferent to the Object. Hence the rest may also be regarded as the effect of some external cause, just as much as it was indifferent to the Object to be active Object.

Now further the determinateness is a posited determinateness, and the Notion of the Object has passed back through mediation to itself; it is therefore an intro-reflected determinateness that applies to the Object. Consequently both the Objects in the Mechanical Process, and the Process itself, have now a more closely determined relation. They are not merely various; they are distinct in a determinate manner as against one another. Thus the result of the Formal Process is on the one hand determinationless rest; but on the other (by virtue of intro-reflected determinateness) it is the distribution among several Objects which are in a mechanical relation to one another, of the opposition which the Object in general has in itself. The Object is on the one hand determinationless and is inelastic and dependent; but on the other it has an independence through which other entities cannot break. And now also this more closely determined opposition of independent individuality and dependent universality belongs to the Objects as against one another.—The difference taken more closely may be apprehended as merely quantitative (as between the various mass-magnitudes of bodies), or as a difference in intensity, and in many other ways. But, in general, it must not be held fast merely in this abstraction: as Objects, both are also positively independent entities.

Here as before the first moment of this Real Process is com-

munication. The weaker can be seized and penetrated by the stronger only in so far as it absorbs the latter and constitutes one sphere together with it. In the material world the weak is secured against what is incomparably stronger (as a linen cloth freely suspended in air is not pierced by a bullet, and a weak organic receptivity is susceptible to weak more than to strong irritants); and similarly a wholly feeble spirit is more secure against a strong than is one which stands closer to the latter. Imagine something wholly dull and ignoble: a high intelligence or nobility can make no impression upon it; and the only consistent expedient against reason is to have no traffic with it.—In so far as dependent and independent cannot coalesce, and no communication can take place between them, the latter also can offer no resistance; that is, it cannot specify for itself the universal which is communicated to it.—If they were not in the same sphere, their mutual relation would be an Infinite Judgment, and no Process would be possible between them.

Taken more closely, the moment of the overcoming of one Object by the other is *resistance*, since it is the beginning moment of the distribution of the universal which has been communicated and of the positing of self-relating negativity, or of that individuality which is to be constructed. Resistance is overcome in so far as its determinateness is inadequate to the communicated universal which has been taken up by the Object and is supposed to singularize itself in it. The Object's relative dependence manifests itself in this, that its individuality has no capacity for what is communicated and is consequently burst open by it, since it cannot, in this universal, constitute itself as subject, and cannot make the universal its predicate.—Force applied to an Object is foreign to it only from this second side. Power is an objective universality; and it becomes force in that it is identical with the nature of the Object, while its determinateness or negativity is not the negative intro-Reflection of the Object itself, according to which the Object is an individual. In so far as the negativity of the Object does not intro-reflect itself in power (or power is not its self-relation), it is as against power only abstract negativity, the manifestation of which is submergence.

Power, taken as objective universality and as force towards the Object, is what is called fate—a notion which falls within

Mechanism in so far as it is called blind; that is, in so far as its objective universality is not recognized by the subject in its specific peculiarity.—To make some short observations on this head, the fate of the living entity in general is the genus, which manifests itself through the transitoriness of the living individuals, which do not possess it as genus in their actual individuality. As bare Objects, the merely living natures (like other things on a lower stage) have no fate; what happens to them is a contingency; but in their Notion as Objects they are external to themselves; the foreign power of fate is therefore entirely their own immediate nature, that is, externality and contingency itself. A real fate is peculiar to self-consciousness, since it is free, and therefore, in the individuality of its ego, is utterly in and for itself and can oppose itself to its objective universality and make itself alien to this. But by this very separation it excites against itself the mechanical relation of a fate. If therefore a fate is to have power over it, it must have given itself some determinateness against essential universality: it must have committed an act. Hereby it has made itself a particular; and this Determinate Being, as abstract universality, is at the same time that side which is open to communication from that Essence which has been alienated from it; it is here that it is snatched away into the Process. A people without deeds is blameless; it is wrapped in objective moral universality and dissolved in it; it is without that individuality which moves the unmoved, and gives itself a determinateness outwards, and a universality severed from objective universality and abstract. But in this process the subject becomes something which has shed its essence—an Object: it has entered into the relation of externality as against its own nature, and into that of Mechanism.

(c) THE PRODUCT OF THE MECHANICAL PROCESS

The Product of Formal Mechanism is the Object in general, an indifferent totality in which determinateness exists as posited. Hereby the Object, as determinate, has entered into the Process; hence (1) in its submersion, rest, as the original formalism of the object, and negativity of its determinedness-for-self, is the result; (2) the cancellation of determinedness,

as its positive intro-Reflection, is determinateness which has entered into itself, or the posited totality of the Notion, the true individuality of the Object. The Object, determined first in its indeterminate universality and next as particular, is now determined as objectively individual; so that here that show of individuality is transcended which is only an independence opposing itself to substantial universality.

This intro-Reflection, in the shape which it has when reached as a result, is the objective unification of the Objects: this is individual independence, or *the Centre*. Secondly, the Reflection of negativity is universality which is a fate not opposed to determinateness but determinate in itself, and reasonable,—a universality which particularizes itself in itself, or a distinction which is at rest and fixed in the dependent particularity of the Objects and their Process: that is, *Law*. This result is the truth and therefore also the foundation of the Mechanical Process.

C

ABSOLUTE MECHANISM

(a) THE CENTRE

First, the empty manifoldness of the Object is now collected into objective individuality, into the simple self-determining middle-point. Secondly, in so far as the Object as immediate totality retains its indifference as against determinateness, in so far the latter also is present in it as unessential, or as the mutual externality of many Objects. The first, or essential, determinateness on the other hand constitutes the real mean between the many Objects which act upon one another mechanically: through it they are bound together in and for themselves, and it is their objective universality. Universality showed itself first, in the relation of communication, as one which is there through positing alone; while as objective it is the penetrating and immanent essence of the Objects.

In the material world it is the central body which is the genus but also the *individual* universality of the individual Objects and their Mechanical Process. The unessential individual bodies are related to one another as pushing and

pressing : this relation does not subsist between the central body and the Objects of which it is the essence, for their externality no longer constitutes their fundamental determination. Consequently their identity with it is rather rest ; they are in their Centre, and this unity is their Notion which is in and for itself. But it remains an Ought, since the externality of the Objects (which still remains posited) does not agree with this unity. Their tendency towards the Centre is therefore their absolute universality which is not posited through communication ; this universality constitutes the true and concrete rest not posited from without, into which the Process of dependence must pass back.—It is on this account an empty abstraction when it is assumed in Mechanics that if a body is set in motion it would move in a straight line to infinity unless it lost its movement through external resistance. Friction and all other forms of resistance are only manifestations of centrality : it is this which absolutely brings resistance back to itself ; for that against which the moving body exerts friction has the force of a resistance only because it is one with the Centre.—In the spiritual sphere the Centre and the unification with it assume higher forms ; but the unity of the Notion and its reality (which here as yet is mechanical centrality) must constitute the fundamental determination there too.

In so far the central body has ceased to be a mere Object, for in a mere Object determinateness is unessential ; it has no longer only the Being-in-Self, but also the Being-for-Self of the objective totality. For this reason it may be looked upon as an Individual. Its determinateness differs essentially from a mere order or arrangement or external coagulation of parts ; as determinateness which is in and for itself it is an immanent form ; it is itself a determining principle in which the Objects inhere, while by it they are connected into a true One.

But so far this Central Individual is only a mean which, as yet, has no true extremes ; however, as negative unity of the total Notion it sunders itself into these. In other words the Objects which before were dependent and self-external are likewise determined as Individuals by the regress of the Notion ; the self-identity of the central body, which still is a tendency, is infected with externality ; and, since it has been absorbed into the objective individuality of the central body, this in-

dividuality is communicated to this externality. Thus, having a centrality of their own, they are placed outside the first Centre, and each is a Centre for the dependent Objects. These second Centres and the dependent Objects are bound together by this absolute mean.

But also the relative Central Individuals constitute the middle of a second syllogism, which (1) is subsumed under a higher extreme, namely the objective universality and power of the absolute Centre, and (2) subsumes under itself the dependent Objects, supporting their superficial or formal isolation.—These dependent entities too are the middle of a third syllogism, the Formal Syllogism; for they are the bond between absolute and relative Central Individuality in so far as the latter has in them its externality, by means of which self-relation also is a tendency towards an absolute middle-point. The formal Objects have for their essence the identical gravity of their immediate central body, in which they inhere, since it is their subject and the extreme of their individuality. By means of the externality which they constitute it is subsumed under the absolute central body; consequently they are the formal mean of particularity.—But the absolute individual is the objectively universal mean, which binds together and holds fast the Being-in-Self of the relative individual and its externality.—Similarly a Government, the individual citizens, and the needs or the external life of the individuals are three terms, each of which is the mean of the two others. The Government is the absolute Centre in which the extreme of the individuals is bound together with their external persistence; and similarly the individuals are mean: they manifest that universal individual in external existence and translate their moral essence into the extreme of actuality. The third is the Formal Syllogism or Syllogism of Show, showing that the individuals are connected with this universal and absolute individuality through their needs and external Determinate Being; which Syllogism as being merely subjective passes over into the others and has its truth in them.

This totality, whose moments are themselves the complete relations of the Notion—that is, syllogisms—where each of the three distinct Objects runs through the determination of middle and extremes, constitutes Free Mechanism. Here the distinct

Objects have objective universality—penetrating gravity which preserves itself self-identical in particularization—for fundamental determination.—The relations of pressure, impulse, attraction, and the like, as well as aggregations or mixtures, belong to the relation of externality, which is the foundation of the third of the syllogisms which have been juxtaposed. The order, which is the merely external determinateness of the Objects, has passed over into immanent and objective determination: this is *Law*.

(b) LAW

In Law the more closely determinate distinction between the ideal reality of objectivity and its external reality comes into view. As immediate totality of the Notion, the Object does not yet possess externality as distinct from the Notion which is not posited for itself. Through the Process it has passed into itself, and thus the opposition has arisen between simple centrality and an externality which is now determined *as* externality, that is, is posited as something which is not in and for itself. This identical or ideal element in individuality is an Ought, because of its relation to externality; it is the unity of the Notion, determinate in and for itself and self-determining, to which that external reality does not correspond, whence it becomes no more than a tendency. But in and for itself individuality is the concrete principle of negative unity, and as such is itself totality,—a unity which sunders itself into determinate Notion-distinctions and remains in its self-equal universality: it is thus the middle-point, extended, within its pure ideality, by distinction.—This reality, which corresponds to the Notion, is of ideal nature; it is distinct from that other reality which merely tends: it is distinction (which at first is a plurality of Objects) absorbed in its essentiality and into pure universality. This real ideality is the *soul* of the objective totality which was developed before: it is the identity, determined in and for itself, of the system.

Consequently objective Being-in-and-for-Self turns out, in its totality and in a more closely determinate manner, to be the negative unity of the Centre, which divides into subjective individuality and external objectivity, receiving the former in

the latter and determining it in a distinction which is of ideal nature. This self-determining unity, which absolutely leads back external objectivity into ideality, is the principle of self-movement; the determinateness of this animation, which is the distinction of the Notion itself, is Law.—Dead Mechanism was the Mechanical Process of Objects which immediately appeared as independent (this has already been considered), but for this very reason are in truth dependent and have their Centre outside themselves: this Process, which passes over into Rest, shows either contingency and indeterminate inequality, or formal uniformity. This uniformity is a *rule*: it is not Law. Only Free Mechanism has a Law, the peculiar determination of pure individuality or of the Notion which is for itself: as distinction in itself it is the imperishable source of a self-kindling movement; and, relating itself to itself alone in the ideality of its distinction, it is *free necessity*.

(c) TRANSITION OF MECHANISM

But this soul is still drowned in its body; the Notion, determinate now but inner, of objective totality is free necessity which demands that the Law does not yet face its Object; it is concrete centrality as universality spread out immediately into its objectivity. Consequently this ideality has not the Objects themselves for its determinate distinction; these are independent individuals of the totality, or also (if we look back upon the formal stage) non-individual external Objects. Law is indeed immanent in them and constitutes their nature and power; but its distinction is locked up in its ideality, and the Objects themselves are not distinguished into the difference (which is of ideal nature) of Law. But the Object has its essential independence in ideal centrality and its Law alone; it has therefore no force to resist the judgment of the Notion and to preserve itself in abstract, indeterminate independence and aloofness. By virtue of the ideal distinction immanent in it its Determinate Being is a determinateness posited through the Notion. In this manner its dependence is no longer merely a tendency towards the middle-point, as against which it still has the appearance of an independent and external Object precisely because its relation is only a tendency: it is, on the

contrary, a tendency towards an Object which is definitely opposed to it. And also the Centre through this fact has fallen apart, and its negative unity has passed over into the objectivated opposition. Consequently now Centrality is the relation of these objectivities which are negative and tense as against one another. Thus Free Mechanism determines itself to be *Chemism*.

CHAPTER II

CHEMISM

IN the whole of Objectivity, Chemism constitutes the moment of Judgment, of difference and Process which have become objective. It begins with determinateness and positedness, and at the same time the Chemical Object is objective totality; hence its immediate course is simple, and is completely determined by its presupposition.

A

THE CHEMICAL OBJECT

The Chemical is distinct from the Mechanical Object because the latter is a totality which is indifferent to determinateness; with the Chemical Object its determinateness, and hence relation to other and the way and manner of this relation, are part of its nature.—At the same time this determinateness is essentially also particularization, that is, it is absorbed into universality; in this manner it is *principle*—universal determinateness, and not only determinateness of the one individual Object, but of the other too. Consequently in the Object its Notion distinguishes itself (1) as the inner totality of both determinatenesses, and (2) as the determinateness which constitutes the nature of the individual Object in its externality and existence. In this manner it is *in itself* the whole of the Notion: it therefore has in itself the necessity and impulse to transcend its opposite and one-sided persistence, and to make itself in Determinate Being the real Whole which it is already in its Notion.

It may be observed with regard to the expression “Chemism” for the relation of the difference (*Differenz*) of Objectivity as it has here turned out, that it must not be understood to mean that this relation is only found in that form of elementary nature which has the name of so-called Chemism proper. The meteorological relation already must be looked upon as a Process, the

parts of which have the nature of physical rather than of chemical elements. In life the relation of the sexes falls under this schema; and it constitutes also the formal foundation of the spiritual relations of love, friendship, and so on.

If the Chemical Object is further considered as an independent totality in general, then it is intro-reflected and to this extent distinct from its reflectedness outwards, that is, an indifferent base and an individual which is not yet determined as different: even a person is such a merely self-relating base. But this immanent determinateness which constitutes its difference is, first, intro-reflected in such a manner that this withdrawal of the relation outwards is only formal abstract universality: thus the relation outwards is determination of its immediacy and existence. From this side it does not pass back *in itself* into individual totality; and the negative unity has the two moments of its opposition in two particular Objects. Accordingly a Chemical Object is not intelligible out of itself, and the being of one is the being of another.—Secondly, however, the determinateness is intro-reflected absolutely, and is the concrete moment of the individual Notion of the whole, which Notion is the general essence or real genus of the particular Object. Thus the Chemical Object is the contradiction of its immediate positedness and its immanent individual Notion; it is a *tendency* to transcend the determinateness of its Determinate Being and to give existence to the objective totality of the Notion. Consequently it is dependent itself, but in such a manner that it is on the other hand subject to tension through its own nature and that it begins the Process by self-determination.

B

THE PROCESS

1. The Process begins with the presupposition that the Objects, however great the tension of each against itself, have an equal tension, for this very reason, against one another: this relation is called their affinity. Each, by virtue of its Notion, stands in contradiction with the one-sidedness of its own existence and tends to cancel it; and this fact immediately implies that each tends to cancel the one-sidedness of the other, and,

by means of this reciprocal compensation and connexion, to posit the reality in conformity with the Notion, which contains both moments.

In so far as each is posited as self-contradictory and self-transcending in itself, they are held only by external force in separation from each other, neither completing the other. Now the mean through which these extremes are bound together is, first, the self-existent nature of both, the whole Notion which holds both within itself. But secondly, since both are opposed to each other in Existence, their absolute unity is also an element which still is formal and exists in distinction from them—the element of communication, through which they enter into external community with each other. The real distinction belongs to the extremes, and hence this mean is only their abstract neutrality or real possibility; it is, so to speak, the theoretic element of the existence of Chemical Objects, of their Process and its result. In matter the function of this medium belongs to water; in spirit, in so far as it contains an analogue to such a relation, the symbol in general, and more precisely language, must be regarded as this analogue.

In this element the relation between the Objects, as bare communication, is (1) a quiet coincidence, but also and equally (2) a negative attitude, since the concrete Notion which is their nature is, in communication, posited into reality, so that the real distinctions of the Objects are reduced into the unity of this Notion. Thus their former independent determinateness is transcended in the unification conformable to that Notion which is one and the same in both; their opposition and tension are blunted, and so the process of tending achieves its quiet neutrality in this mutual completion.

In this manner the Process is extinguished; the contradiction between Notion and Reality being removed, the extremes of the Syllogism have lost their opposition, and simultaneously have ceased to be extremes both against each other and against the mean. The product is neutral, that is, it is a product in which the ingredients (which no longer can be called Objects) have lost their tension and, consequently, those properties which belonged to them while they were in a state of tension, while the capacity for this former independence and tension survives. For the negative unity of the neutral proceeds

from a presupposed difference; the determinateness of the Chemical Object is identical with its objectivity, it is original. The Process which has been considered transcends this difference in a merely immediate manner; consequently the determinateness as yet does not exist as absolutely intro-reflected, and the product of the Process is only a formal unity.

2. Now in this product the tension of opposition, and negative unity as activity of the Process, are extinct. Nevertheless, since this unity is essential to the Notion, and also has itself come into existence, it is still present, but has passed outside the neutral Object. The Process does not kindle itself again spontaneously, in so far as it had the difference only for pre-supposition and did not itself posit it.—This negativity, which is independent outside the Object, the existence of abstract individuality whose Being-for-Self has its reality in the indifferent Object, now contains its own tension against its abstraction and is an inwardly restless activity which consumes itself and turns outwards. It relates itself *immediately* to the Object, whose quiet neutrality is the real possibility of its opposite; the Object is now the mean of the neutrality which before was merely formal; now it is concrete and determinate within itself.

Taken more closely the immediate relation of the extreme of the negative unity to the Object is, that the latter is determined by it and thus is sundered. This disruption may now be regarded as the reconstitution of the opposition of tense Objects with which Chemism began. But this determination does not constitute the other extreme of the Syllogism, but belongs to the immediate relation of the differentiating principle to the mean, in which the latter gives itself its immediate reality: it is that determinateness which in the Disjunctive Syllogism belongs to the mean apart from the fact that it is the general nature of the object, whereby the latter is objective universality as well as determinate particularity. The other extreme of the Syllogism stands opposed to the external independent extreme of individuality; consequently it is the equally independent extreme of universality; and hence the disruption which the real neutrality of the mean experiences in it is that it is analysed into moments which are not different but indifferent to each

other. Accordingly these moments are (1) the abstract indifferent base and (2) its animating principle, which, through its separation from the base, also attains the form of indifferent objectivity.

This Disjunctive Syllogism is the totality of Chemism. Here the same objective whole is represented as independent negative unity, and next, in the mean, as real unity;—finally Chemical Reality is represented, resolved into its abstract moments. In these last the determinateness has reached its intro-Reflection not in an Other (as it did in the neutral), but has in itself passed back into its abstraction, and is an element determined originally.

3. Accordingly, these elementary Objects are set free from chemical tension; in them, the original foundation of that pre-supposition with which Chemism began has been posited by means of the Real Process. Now further, first, their internal determinateness as such is essentially the contradiction between their simple indifferent persistence and themselves as determinateness, and is the outward impulse which sunders itself and posits a tension in their Object and in an Other, in order that it may have an entity against which it may take up a relation of difference and may neutralize itself and give existent reality to its simple determinateness; and, in so far, Chemism has now passed back to its beginning, in which Objects in reciprocal tension seek each other and then unite into a neutral entity through a formal and external mean. Secondly, Chemism transcends itself through this regress into its Notion, and has passed over into a higher sphere.

C

TRANSITION OF CHEMISM

Even ordinary chemistry exhibits examples of chemical changes in which a body (for example) assigns a higher oxidation to one part of its mass and thereby reduces another part to a lower degree of oxidation, so that now only can it enter into a neutral combination with some other different body which is approached to it—a combination to which it would not have been susceptible in the first and immediate degree.

What here happens is this: the Object does not relate itself to another according to some immediate and one-sided determinateness, but, in accordance with the inner totality of an original relatedness, posits the presupposition which it requires for a real relation; thus it gives to itself a mean through which it binds together its Notion with its reality. It is individuality determined in and for itself, the concrete Notion as principle of disjunction into extremes, the reuniting of which is the activity of the same negative principle, which thus returns to its first determination, but returns to it having been objectivated.

Chemism itself is the first negation of indifferent objectivity, and of the externality of determinateness; accordingly Chemism is still infected with the immediate independence of the Object and with externality. Consequently for itself it is not yet that totality of self-determination which emerges from it, or rather in which it transcends itself.—The three Syllogisms which have resulted constitute its totality. The first has formal neutrality for middle, and the Objects in a state of tension for extremes; the second has for middle the product of the first, that is, real neutrality, and for extremes the sundering activity and its product, the indifferent element; while the third is the self-realizing Notion, which posits for itself the presupposition by which the process of its realization is conditioned,—a Syllogism which has the universal for its Essence. But chemical objectivity is subject to the determination of an immediacy and externality, and these cause these Syllogisms as yet to fall apart. The first Process, whose product is the neutrality of the Objects in tension, is extinguished in its product, and it is kindled again only by a differentiation which is added from without: it is conditioned by an immediate presupposition, and it exhausts itself in it.—Similarly the segregation of the different extremes from the neutral, and likewise their analysis into their abstract elements, must start from conditions and stimulants to activity which are added externally. But the two essential moments of the Process—first neutralization and next separation and reduction—are connected in one and the same Process, and the union of the extremes by loosening of the tension between them is also a separation into such elements; and, in so far, and also by reason of the externality which is still the foundation, these two constitute two different sides. The extremes which are

segregated in the same Process are Objects or kinds of matter different from those which unite in it; and in so far as the former emerge again different they must turn outwards. Their new neutralization is a different Process from that which took place in the first Process.

These various Processes, however, which have proved to be necessary, are as many stages through which externality and conditionedness are transcended; whence the Notion emerges as a totality determined in and for itself and not conditioned by externality. In the first process the mutual externality of the different extremes which constitute the whole of reality, or the distinctness of the determinate Notion which is *in itself* from its *existent* determinateness, transcends itself; in the second, the externality of the real unity—the union as merely neutral—is transcended. (Considered more closely, the formal activity first transcends itself in equally formal bases or indifferent determinatenesses, whose inner Notion now is absolute activity which has passed into itself, as realizing itself in itself; that is, as an activity which posits within itself the determinate distinctions and constitutes itself as real unity by means of this mediation—a mediation which accordingly is the self-mediation of the Notion, its self-determination and, with respect to its intro-Reflection thence, a process of immanent presupposition.) The third Syllogism is on the one hand a reconstruction of the preceding Processes; on the other hand it cancels the last remaining moment of indifferent bases—the wholly abstract external immediacy, which in this manner becomes a proper moment of the self-mediation of the Notion. The Notion thus has transcended as external all the moments of its objective Determinate Being and has posited them into its simple unity; it is thus completely set free from objective externality, to which it relates itself only as to an unessential reality. This objective and free Notion is *the End*.

CHAPTER III

TELEOLOGY

WHEN adequacy to an End is perceived, an understanding is assumed as its origin: that is, the proper and free existence of the Notion is demanded for the End. Teleology is chiefly contrasted with Mechanism, where the determinateness posited in the Object, being external, is essentially of such a kind as manifests no self-determination. The opposition between *causae efficientes* and *causae finales*—between merely efficient and final causes—refers to this distinction; and to this, taken in a concrete form, the investigation reverts whether the absolute essence of the world must be taken as a blind natural Mechanism or as an understanding which determines itself by Ends. The antinomy between fatalism or determinism and freedom also regards the opposition between Mechanism and Teleology; for the Free is the Notion in its existence.

Older metaphysics have treated these Notions as they have treated the rest; partly they have presupposed an idea of the world, and have attempted to prove that one or another Notion fits it and that the opposite is defective because it does not suffice to explain it; and partly, in doing so, they have not investigated the Notions of mechanical cause and of End in order to ascertain which has truth in and for itself. When this has been established for itself, then the objective world may offer mechanical and final causes; its existence is not the measure of truth; the truth is rather the criterion which shows which of these existences is its true existence. As subjective understanding exhibits errors in itself, so also the objective world exhibits those sides and stages of truth which for themselves are only one-sided and incomplete, and are but relations of appearance. If Mechanism and adequacy to an End stand opposed to each other, they cannot, for that very reason, be taken as indifferent to each other; nor can it be assumed that each by itself is a correct Notion having as much validity as the other, the only question being *where* either of

them may be applied. This equal validity of the two depends upon the fact that they *are*, and are because we *have* them both. But the necessary preliminary question is, since they are opposed, which of them is true; and the higher and proper question is whether a third term is not their truth after all, or whether one is not the truth of the other.—But the End-relation has turned out to be the truth of Mechanism.—That which represented itself as Chemism is comprehended together with Mechanism in so far as the End is the Notion in free existence: the unfreedom and submersion of the Notion into externality stand opposed to the End. Thus both Mechanism and Chemism are, then, comprehended under natural necessity: in the first the Notion does not exist in the Object because the latter, being mechanical, does not contain self-determination; whereas in the second the Notion either has a tense and one-sided existence or else, in so far as it emerges as the unity which holds the neutral Object in tension into extremes, it is external to itself, in so far as it cancels this separation.

The more the teleological principle was connected with the notion of an extra-mundane understanding, and, to this extent, favoured by piety, by so much it seemed to be removed from the true investigation of nature, which attempts to understand the properties of nature not as extraneous but as immanent determinatenesses, and admits only this kind of cognition as a forming of Notions. The End is the Notion itself in its Existence, so that it may seem strange that the cognition of Objects from their Notion appears as an unjustified trespass into a heterogeneous element, whereas Mechanism, in which the determinateness of an Object is a determinateness posited externally in it by an Other, is held to be a more immanent view than Teleology. Mechanism (or at least the ordinary and unfree Mechanism) and Chemism must indeed be regarded as immanent principles in so far as the determining external element is in turn an Object of the same kind, determined externally and indifferent to such determining, while in Chemism the other Object is likewise determined chemically: in short, an essential moment of the totality always lies in an external term. Consequently these principles remain within the same natural form of finitude; but, although they do not attempt to pass beyond the finite and only lead to finite causes of

phenomena, which causes demand further progress, yet still they extend themselves partly into a formal totality in the Notion of force, cause, and similar reflection-determinations which are intended to denote originality; while partly they do so through the abstract universality of an *all* of forces, or a *whole* of reciprocal causes. Thus Mechanism manifests itself as a tendency of totality in that it seeks to seize Nature for itself as a whole which requires no Other for its Notion—a totality which is not found in End and the extra-mundane understanding which is associated therewith.

Adequacy to an End now manifests itself in the first place as something *higher* in general, as an understanding which externally determines the manifoldness of the Objects by a unity which is in and for itself, so that the indifferent determinatenesses of the Objects become, by virtue of this relation, essential. In Mechanism they become essential through the mere form of necessity, and their content remains indifferent, for they are designed to remain external: understanding alone as such is designed to be satisfied in recognizing its connexion, which is abstract identity. But in Teleology the content becomes important, for Teleology presupposes a Notion, that is, something determinate in and for itself and therefore self-determining; it has, accordingly, distinguished between the relation of the distinctions and their reciprocal determinateness, in other words *form*, on the one side, and on the other the intro-reflected unity, something determinate in and for itself, that is, a *content*. But if this content is otherwise finite and insignificant, it is contrary to its design; for formally the End is a totality infinite within itself—especially if activity which operates by Ends is taken to be absolute will and understanding. Teleology has incurred the reproach of triviality so heavily because the Ends which it demonstrated are, as it befell, more significant or more trifling; the End-relation of Objects thus necessarily often appeared merely childish, because this relation appears to be so external and therefore contingent. Mechanism on the contrary allows to the determinatenesses of its Objects their value as contingent according to their content; and the Object is indifferent to these, which are supposed to have a higher validity neither for the Objects nor for subjective understanding. Consequently, in its connexion of external necessity,

this principle affords the consciousness of infinite freedom as against Teleology, which sets up as something absolute whatever it contains that is trivial or even contemptible; and here a more universal thought can only feel infinitely cramped or even nauseated.

The formal disadvantage to which this Teleology is subject is this, that it does not progress beyond *external adequacy to an End*. Accordingly the Notion is posited as something formal, and thus the content, for Teleology, is something given externally to the Notion in the multiplicity of the objective world—given in precisely that collection of determinatenesses which is also content of Mechanism, but there is external and contingent. By reason of this community the form of adequacy to an End constitutes by itself alone the essential part of Teleology. In this respect, and without regard to the distinction between outer and inner adequacy to an End, the End-relation has proved to be, generally and in and for itself, the truth of Mechanism.—Teleology has in general the higher principle, the Notion in its existence which is in and for itself the infinite and absolute—a principle of freedom which, utterly certain of its self-determination, is absolutely removed from the external determination of Mechanism.

One of Kant's great merits in philosophy is, that he established a distinction between relative or external, and internal, adequacy to an End. In the latter he has opened up the Notion of Life, or the Idea, and has thereby *positively* raised philosophy above the determinations of reflection and the relative world of metaphysics; though in the Critique of Reason this is done only *negatively*, incompletely, and in a very crooked fashion.—It was mentioned that the opposition between Teleology and Mechanism is, in the first instance, the more general opposition between freedom and necessity. Kant sets out the opposition in this form under the Antinomies of Reason, as the "Third Conflict of Transcendental Ideas."—I briefly quote his exposition, which was referred to before; its essential part is so simple that it requires no lengthy analysis, and the general manner of Kant's Antinomies has been examined elsewhere in greater detail.

The thesis of the Antinomy here to be considered runs as follows:—Causality according to natural laws is not the only

one from which all the phenomena of the world may be derived ; it is necessary to assume another causality through freedom in order to explain them.

The antithesis is :—There is no freedom, but everything in the world happens solely according to natural laws.

The proof, as with the other Antinomies, proceeds (1) apagogically, the opposite of either thesis being assumed ; (2) in order to demonstrate the contradictoriness of this assumption, its opposite conversely is assumed (that is, the proposition which is to be proved), and is presupposed as valid. Thus the whole circumlocution in the proof might be spared, since it consists merely in the assertion of the two opposed propositions.

For, in order to prove the thesis, the assumption is first to be made that there is no causality except according to natural laws, that is, according to the necessity of Mechanism in general, which includes Chemism. It is said that this proposition is self-contradictory because natural law consists just in this, that nothing happens without a cause sufficiently determined *a priori*, which cause thus contains an absolute spontaneity ;—that is, the assumption which is opposed to the thesis is contradictory because it contradicts the thesis.

In order to prove the antithesis it has to be posited that there is a freedom as a particular kind of causality—a freedom to initiate a state and hence also a series of consequences of the state. But since such an initiation presupposes a state (namely that of freedom) which has no causal connexion with the preceding state of freedom, therefore the initiation contradicts the law of causality, according to which alone unity of experience, or indeed any experience, is possible ;—that is, the assumption of freedom, which is the opposite of the antithesis, cannot be made because it contradicts the antithesis.

Essentially the same Antinomy returns in the Critique of the Teleological Faculty of Judgment, as the contradiction that all production of material things takes place according to merely mechanical laws and that some production of them according to such laws is impossible.—Kant's solution of this Antinomy is the same as the general solution of the others : that reason can prove neither of these propositions, since we can have no determinant principle *a priori* about the possibility of things according to merely empirical laws of nature ; consequently

the two must not be regarded as objective propositions but as subjective maxims: on the one hand I ought always to reflect upon all natural events according to the principle of pure natural mechanism; but this does not prevent me from investigating certain forms of nature, should the occasion be given, according to another maxim, namely, that of final causes;—as though these two maxims (which further are supposed to be required only by human reason) were not in the same opposition in which the propositions stand.—As was observed above, at this whole standpoint the only question which is demanded by philosophic interest is not looked into, namely, which of these two principles is true in and for itself; but, for this point of view, it is irrelevant whether the principles are to be considered as objective determinations of nature (that is here, as determinations existing externally) or as mere maxims of a subjective cognition.—But in fact this is a subjective, that is, a contingent, cognition, which applies one or the other maxim as the occasion may suggest according as it thinks it appropriate to the given objects, but otherwise does not concern itself about the truth of these determinations themselves, or ask whether both are determinations of the objects or of cognition.

But however inadequate Kant's discussion of the teleological principle may be in regard to the essential point of view, still the position which Kant assigns to it is remarkable. He ascribes it to a reflecting faculty of judgment, and thus makes it the connecting middle link between the universal of reason and the individual of intuition;—further, he distinguishes between this reflecting faculty of judgment and the determining faculty, which latter according to him merely subsumes the particular under the universal. Such a merely subsuming universal is an abstract which becomes concrete only in an Other, the particular. The End on the other hand is the concrete universal which contains in itself the moment of particularity and externality, and consequently is active and is the impulse to repel itself from itself. It is true that the Notion as End is an objective judgment, in which one determination, the subject (that is, the concrete Notion), is self-determined, while the other is not only a predicate but also is external objectivity. But the End-relation is not for this reason a reflecting process of judgment which

considers external objects only according to a unity, *as though* some understanding had given them for the benefit of our powers of cognition: the relation is the truth which is in and for itself, which judges objectively and absolutely determines external objectivity. Thus the End-relation is more than Judgment; it is the Syllogism of the independent and free Notion, which through objectivity binds itself together with itself.

The End has turned out to be the complementary third term of Mechanism and Chemism; it is their truth. Since it still stands within the sphere of Objectivity or of the immediacy of the total Notion, it is still affected by externality as such; an objective world to which it relates itself still stands opposed to it. From this side mechanical causality (in which generally Chemism must be included) still appears in this End-relation (which is external), but as subordinated to it and as transcended in and for itself. With regard to the closer relation, the mechanical Object is in the relation of immediate totality to its determinedness, so that it is indifferent to it whether it determines or not. This external determinedness is now developed into self-determination, and thus the Notion, which in the Object is merely internal (or, what is the same thing, merely external), is now posited; at first the End is just this Notion itself which is external to the Mechanical Notion. Thus the End is the self-determining entity for Chemism too; that entity which brings back into the unity of the Notion that external determinedness by which it is conditioned.—From this results the nature of the subordination of the two previous forms of the objective process: the Other, which in them lies in the infinite progress, is the Notion which at first is posited as external to them, which is End; not only is the Notion their substance, but also externality is the moment which is essential to them and constitutes their determinateness. Thus mechanical or chemical technique spontaneously offers itself to the End-relation by reason of its character of being determined externally; and this relation must now be further considered.

A

THE SUBJECTIVE END

In the centrality of the objective sphere, which is an indifference as against determinateness, the subjective Notion has now again discovered and posited the negative point of unity; in Chemism it has posited the objectivity of the Notion-determinations, by means of which alone it is posited as concrete objective Notion. Its determinateness or its simple distinction now contains the determinateness of externality, and therefore its simple unity is the self-repelling and in this process self-preserving unity. Consequently the End is the subjective Notion as essential tendency and impulse towards external self-positing. In this process it is saved from transition. It is neither a force which manifests itself, nor a substance and cause which exhibits itself in accidents and effects. Force is only an abstractly internal entity in so far as it has not manifested itself; or, it has Determinate Being only in the manifestation which it must be solicited to produce; and so with cause and substance: because they have actuality only in accidents and in effect, their activity is a transition against which they cannot preserve themselves in freedom. The End may, indeed, be determined as force and cause, but these expressions fulfil only an incomplete side of its significance; if they are to be predicated of it in its truth, they can be predicated only in a manner which transcends their Notion—as a force which solicits itself to manifest itself, or as a cause which is its own cause, or whose effect immediately is the cause.

If that which is adequate to an End is ascribed to an understanding, then, as was previously observed, regard is being had to the determinate aspect of the content. But the content must be taken in general as the reasonable in its existence. It manifests reasonableness because it is the concrete Notion which preserves the objective distinction in its absolute unity. Consequently it is essentially the Syllogism in itself. It is the universal which is equal to itself, and, as containing self-repellent negativity, it is here universal, in so far as it is still indeterminate, activity. But, since this is negative self-relation, the activity immediately determines itself and gives itself the moment of

particularity and this, since it is likewise the intro-reflected, totality of form, is content as against the posited distinctions of form. Equally immediately this negativity, by virtue of its self-relation, is absolute intro-Reflection of form, and individuality. This Reflection is (1) inner universality of the subject, and (2) Reflection outwards; and, to this extent, the End is still subjective, and its activity is directed against external objectivity.

For the End is the Notion which has reached itself in Objectivity; the determinateness which it has assumed in Objectivity is that of objective indifference to and externality of determinedness; consequently its self-repelling negativity is such as has moments which, being only determinations of the Notion itself, have also the form of objective indifference to each other.—Already in the formal Judgment subject and predicate are determined as independent as against each other; but as yet their independence is only abstract universality. Now it has reached the determination of Objectivity; but, as moment of the Notion, this complete variousness is enclosed in the simple unity of the Notion. Now the End is this total intro-Reflection of Objectivity, and is so immediately; and, in so far as it is this, first, self-determination or particularity as simple intro-Reflection is distinct from the concrete form and is a determinate content. Accordingly the End is finite, although formally it is infinite subjectivity. Secondly, its determinateness has the form of objective indifference, and therefore has the shape of a presupposition; in this direction its finitude consists in this, that it has before it an objective, Mechanical and Chemical world, to which its activity relates itself as to something already given; thus its self-determining activity is in its identity immediately external to itself, and as much as it is intro-Reflection it is Reflection outwards. And to this extent it still has a truly extra-mundane existence, namely, in so far as this objectivity stands opposed to it; while the latter on the other hand stands opposed to it as a Mechanical and Chemical whole, not yet determined and penetrated by the End.

Consequently the movement of the End may now be expressed in this manner, that it proceeds to cancel the presupposition of the End—that is. the immediacy of the Object—

and to posit the Object as determined through the Notion. This negative attitude to the Object is equally a negative attitude to itself, a cancellation of the subjectivity of the End. Positively, this is the realization of the End, the union of objective being with it, so that this being, which as moment of the End is immediately the determinateness identical with it, is to exist as external determinateness; while conversely the Objective is to be posited as presupposition rather than as determined by Notion.—The End is in itself the impulse towards its realization; the determinateness of the Notion-moments is externality; but their simplicity, in the unity of the Notion, is inadequate to that which this unity is; and consequently the Notion repels itself from itself. This repulsion is, in general, the resolution of the self-relation of negative unity, by means of which the latter is exclusive individuality; but through this exclusion it resolves itself, or unfolds, because this is self-determination, or self-positing. On the one hand, while subjectivity determines itself, it makes itself particularity and gives itself a content which, enclosed in the unity of the Notion, is as yet internal; but this positing or simple intro-Reflection is also, immediately (as has appeared), a presupposing; and in the same moment in which the subject of the End determines *itself*, it is related to an indifferent and external objectivity which it is to equate with that inner determinateness, that is, to posit as something determined by the Notion: this, at first, is *Means*.

B

THE MEANS

The first immediate positing in the End is also the positing of something internal, that is, something determined as posited, and also the presupposing of an objective world which is indifferent to the End-determination. But the subjectivity of the End is absolute negative unity: its second determining is therefore the transcendence of this presupposition in general; this transcendence is the return to self in so far as through it that moment of first negation, the positing of the negative as against the subject (or, the external object), is transcended. But, as against presupposition or the immediacy of determining,

or against the objective world, it is only the first (and consequently immediate and external) negation. Hence this positing is not yet the Realized End itself, but only a beginning in that direction. The object thus determined is only the Means.

The End binds itself together with objectivity through a Means, and in objectivity with itself. The Means is the middle of the Syllogism. The End requires a Mean for its realization because it is finite,—a Means, that is, a Mean, which at the same time has the shape of an external Determinate Being, indifferent to the End itself and to its realization. The absolute Notion contains mediation in such a way that its own first positing is not a presupposing, in whose object indifferent externality would be the fundamental determination: rather, the world as creature has only the form of such externality, but its negativity, and positedness, constitute its fundamental determination.—The finitude of the End thus consists in this, that its process of determining is altogether external to itself, so that its first determining (as we saw) falls apart into a positing and a presupposing; consequently the negation of this determining is also intro-Reflection in one direction only; in the other it is only first negation. Or again, intro-Reflection is itself self-external and is Reflection outwards.

The Means is therefore the formal middle of a formal syllogism; it is external as against the extreme of the Subjective End, and consequently also against the extreme of the Objective End: similarly particularity in the formal syllogism is an indifferent *medius terminus*, whose place might be taken by any other. Further, particularity is middle only because it is determinateness in relation to one extreme and universal in relation to the other, so that its mediating determination belongs to it only relatively and through others; and similarly the Means is mediating mean only (1) because it is an immediate object, and (2) because it is Means by virtue of the relation (which is external to it) to the extreme of the End—which relation is for it a form to which it is indifferent.

Consequently Notion and Objectivity are connected only externally in the Means, which in so far is a merely mechanical object. The relation of the object to the End is a premiss; or it is an immediate relation which with regard to the End (as was shown) is intro-Reflection. The Means is an inhering predicate;

its objectivity is subsumed under the End-determination, which, because of its concretion, is universality. Because of this End-determination which exists in the Means, it now also subsumes the other extreme of the objectivity which up to this point was indeterminate.—Conversely the Means, as immediate objectivity, has universality of Determinate Being as against the Subjective End. The subjective individuality of the End still lacks this.—Thus at first the End is merely external determinateness in the Means, and so is outside it, as negative unity; while the Means is only mechanical object having the End merely as a determinateness and not as simple concretion of the totality. But the middle, by virtue of its connecting function, must itself be the totality of the End. It has appeared that the End-determination in the Means is at the same time intro-Reflection; in so far it is formal self-reference, since determinateness, as real indifference, is posited as the objectivity of the Means. But for this very reason this subjectivity—which from one side is pure subjectivity—is also activity.—In the Subjective End negative self-relation remains identical with determinateness as such—with content and externality. But in the objectivation of the End which is commencing—in the becoming-other of the simple Notion—these moments separate; or, conversely, this becoming-other or externality itself consists in this.

Thus this whole middle is itself the totality of the syllogism, in which abstract activity and the external Means constitute the extremes, whose middle is constituted by the determinateness of the object through the End by virtue of which it is Means.—But further, universality is the relation of the End-activity and the Means. The Means is object, and is in itself the totality of the Notion; it has no force of resistance to the End such as it has against some other immediate object. Thus it is entirely penetrable by the End (which is the posited Notion), and is susceptible of this communication because, *in itself*, it is identical with the End. But now it is also *posited* as that which is penetrable by the Notion, for in centrality it is something which strives after negative unity; similarly, in Chemism, it has, as neutral, and also as different, become dependent.—Its dependence consists just in this, that it is only *in itself* the totality of the Notion; but the Notion is Being-for-Self. Thus as against the End the object has the character of

impotence and subservience; the End is its subjectivity or soul, which has its external side in the object.

The object, being in this manner immediately subjected to the End, is not an extreme of the syllogism; but this relation constitutes one of its premisses. But the Means also has a side according to which it still has independence as against the End. The objectivity which is connected with the End in the Means is still external to it, because it is only immediately so connected; and consequently the presupposition still persists. The activity of the End through the Means is still therefore directed against this presupposition, and the End is activity and not merely impulse and tendency, just in so far as the moment of objectivity in the Means is posited in its determinateness as external and the simple unity of the Notion now has objectivity as such in itself.

C

THE REALIZED END

1. The End in its relation to the Means is already intro-reflected; but its objective return upon itself has not yet been posited. The activity of the End through its Means is still directed against objectivity as original presupposition, which is precisely this, to be indifferent to determinateness. In so far as the activity should again consist just in determining the immediate objectivity, the product would again be only a Means, and so on to infinity: only a Means adequate to the End would result, but not the objectivity of the End itself. Consequently the End which is active in its Means must not determine the immediate object as something external, which therefore must collapse through itself into the unity of the Notion; in other words, this external activity of the End through its Means must determine itself as mediation and must transcend itself.

The relation of the activity of the End to the external object through the Means is at this point the second premiss of the syllogism—an immediate relation of the middle to the other extreme. The relation is immediate because the middle has in it an external object, and the other extreme is such an external object. The Means is effective and powerful against the latter

because its object is connected with the self-determining activity, while the immediate determinateness which it has is indifferent to this object. In this relation its process is no other than the mechanical or chemical process; in this objective externality the former relations emerge, but under the supremacy of the End.—But, as has been seen, these processes pass back, through themselves, into the End. If then at first the relation of the Means to the external object which is to be operated upon is immediate, it has earlier already presented itself as a syllogism, the End having turned out to be its true middle and unity. If then the Means is the object which stands on the side of the End and contains its activity, then the mechanism which here operates is also self-return of objectivity into the Notion, which, however, is already presupposed as End; in so far the negative attitude to the object of the activity which is adequate to the End is not external, but is the change and the transition of objectivity in itself into the End.

It may be considered as *force* that the End immediately relates itself to an object and makes it a Means, and that through this Means it determines another; for the End seems to be quite heterogeneous from the object, and the two objects are also mutually independent totalities. But it may be regarded as the cunning of Reason when the End puts itself into mediate relation with the object and inserts another object between itself and it. As has been observed, the finitude of rationality has this side, that the End is related to the presupposition, that is, the externality of the object. In immediate relation to the object the End would itself enter into Mechanism or Chemism, and thus would be subject to contingency and to the destruction of its determination as Notion which is in and for itself. But as it is it exposes an object as Means, allows it to exhaust itself externally in its place, and, surrendering it to attrition, shields itself behind it from mechanical force.

Further, since the End is finite it has a finite content; accordingly it is not absolute or utterly and in and for itself reasonable. The Means however is the external middle of the syllogism which is the realization of the End; in it therefore reasonableness manifests itself as such—as preserving itself in this external Other and precisely through this externality. In so far the Means is higher than the finite Ends of external

usefulness: the plough is more honourable than are immediately those enjoyments which are procured by it, and are Ends. The instrument is preserved, while the immediate enjoyments pass away and are forgotten. In his tools man possesses power over external nature, even although, according to his Ends, he frequently is subjected to it.

But the End does not only remain outside the Mechanical process: it also preserves itself within it, and is its determination. The End, as the Notion which exists as free against the object and its process and is self-determining activity, equally is the truth which is in and for itself of Mechanism; and therefore in it the End coincides only with itself. The power of the End over the object is this identity which is for itself, and the activity of the End is the manifestation of this identity. The End as content is determinateness which is in and for itself, and which in the object is indifferent and external; but its activity is on one side the truth of the process, and as negative unity it is the transcendence of the show of externality. From the point of view of abstraction it is the indifferent determinateness of the object which equally externally is replaced by another determinateness; but the simple abstraction of determinateness in its truth is the totality of the negative—the concrete Notion which posits externality within itself.

The content of the End is its negativity as simple intro-reflected particularity, distinct from its totality as form. Because of this simplicity, whose determinateness in and for itself is the totality of the Notion, the content appears as that which remains identical in the realization of the End. The teleological process is the translation into objectivity of the Notion which exists distinctly as Notion; it appears that this translation into a presupposed Other is the coincidence of the Notion with and through itself. Now the content of the End is this identity which exists in the form of the identical. The Notion preserves itself in every process of transition; for example, when the cause becomes effect it is the cause which in the effect coincides with itself: while in the teleological transition it is the Notion which as such already exists as cause, as the absolute and concrete unity which is free as against objectivity and its external determinability. The externality into which the End translates itself is, as we saw, itself already posited as moment of the

Notion, as form of its internal distinction. Consequently the **End** has its peculiar moment in externality; and the content, as content of the concrete unity, is its simple form, which, in the distinct moments of the End—as Subjective End, as Means and mediated activity, and as Objective End—not only remains *implicitly* self-equal, but also exists as that which remains self-equal.

It may then be said of the teleological activity that in it the end is the beginning, the consequence the ground, and the effect the cause; that it is a becoming of that which has become, that in it only that which already exists comes into existence, and so forth: that is, that altogether all relation-determinations which belong to the sphere of Reflection or of immediate Being have lost their distinctions; and that which is designated as Other (like end, consequence, effect, and so on) no longer has the determination of Other in the End-relation, but rather is posited as identical with the simple Notion.

2. If now the product of the teleological activity is more closely considered, the End belongs to it only externally in so far as it is absolute presupposition as against the Subjective End; that is, in so far as a halt is made at the point where the activity which is adequate to an End is related through its Means only mechanically to the object, and posits, instead of one indifferent determinateness of it, some other determinateness which is equally external. Such a determinateness which an object has through the End differs generally from a merely mechanical determinateness in that the former object is moment of a unity; whence, even if it (that is, the determinateness) is external to the object, yet in itself it is not merely something external. The object which shows such a unity is a whole, and its parts—its own externality—are indifferent to this; it is a determinate, concrete unity, which unites within itself various relations and determinatenesses. This unity, of which no notion can be formed from the specific nature of the object, and which according to its determinate content is other than the peculiar content of the object, is, for itself, no mechanical determinateness; but it is still mechanical in the object. In this product of the activity which is adequate to an End the content of the End and the content of the object are external to each other, and in the other moments of the syllogism the determinations

of this activity are similarly related:—these are, in the comprehensive middle, the activity which is adequate to the End, and the object which is Means; and in the Subjective End (the other extreme), infinite form as the totality of the Notion, and its content. According to the relation by which the Subjective End is bound together with objectivity, both premisses alike—the relation of the object which is determined as Means to the object which still is external, and also the relation of the Subjective End to the object which is made Means—are immediate relations. Consequently the syllogism has the common fault of the formal Syllogism, namely, that the relations of which it consists are not themselves conclusions or mediations, and that in fact they presuppose the conclusion, to produce which they are to serve as Means.

If we consider the one premiss—the immediate relation of the Subjective End to the object which thus becomes Means, then the relation of the End to the Means cannot be immediate; for this object is as much immediate as is the object of the other extreme, in which the End is to be realized through mediation. In so far therefore as they are posited as distinct, a Means of their relation must be inserted between this objectivity and the Subjective End; but this Means equally is an object already determined by the End, between whose objectivity and teleological determination a new Means must be inserted, and so on to infinity. This is the positing of the infinite progress of mediation.—The same also takes place with regard to the other premiss, the relation of the Means to the as yet undetermined object. These are utterly independent, and therefore they can be united only in a third term, and so on to infinity.—Or, conversely, the premisses already presuppose the conclusion, and therefore the latter must needs be incomplete in the state in which it is when it is only by virtue of these merely immediate premisses. The conclusion, or the product of activity which is adequate to an End, is simply an object determined by an End external to itself: it is thus the same thing as the Means. In such a product therefore only a Means and not a Realized End has resulted; or, the End in it has not truly reached any objectivity.—It is therefore quite indifferent whether an object determined by external End is considered as Realized End or only as Means: this is a relative

determination, external to the object itself, and not objective. All objects, then, in which an external End is realized are equally only Means of the End. That which is required for the realization of an End, and must essentially be taken as Means, is Means, according to its determination as something which is to be exhausted by attrition. But the object which is to contain the Realized End and to exhibit itself as its objectivity is also perishable: it too does not fulfil its End by a stable and self-preserving existence, but only in so far as it is exhausted by attrition, for only in so far does it correspond to the unity of the Notion, inasmuch as its externality, that is, its objectivity, cancels itself in this unity.—A house, a clock, may seem to be Ends as against the instruments which are used to produce them; but the stones and beams, or wheels and axles, and so on, which constitute the actuality of the End, fulfil it only through the pressure which they undergo, or through the chemical processes in combination with air, light, or water to which they are exposed, and of which they relieve man, by their friction and so forth. Thus they fulfil their determination only by their use and wear, and correspond to what they are supposed to be only by their negation. They are not positively united with the End, because self-determination is applied to them only externally, and they are only relative Ends; or, essentially, they are only Means.

Altogether these Ends, as has been shown, have a restricted content; their form is the infinite self-determination of the Notion, which, through the End, has restricted itself so as to be external individuality. The restricted content makes these Ends inadequate to the infinity of the Notion, and makes them untrue: such a determinateness is offered up to Becoming and to change already through the sphere of necessity and through Being, and is perishable.

3. Thus the result is reached that external adequacy to an End, which as yet has only the form of Teleology, really only achieves Means and not an objective End, since the Subjective End remains as an external and subjective determination. Or, in so far as the End is active and realizes itself, if only in a Means, it is still immediately connected with and immersed in objectivity: it is itself an object, and it might be said that in so far the End cannot reach the Means because it requires the realization of the End before realization through a Means can take place.

But in fact the result is not only an external End-relation, but also is its truth—inner End-relation and an objective End. The externality of the object, independent against the Notion, which the End presupposes for itself, is posited in this pre-supposition as an unessential show, and also is already transcended in and for itself; hence properly the activity of the End is only the exhibition and transcendence of this show.—As has appeared through the Notion, the first object becomes Means by virtue of communication, because it is totality of the Notion in itself, and because its determinateness (which is just externality itself) is posited only *as* external and unessential, and consequently is in the End itself as the peculiar moment of the latter, and not as independent of it. Hence the determination of the object as Means is utterly immediate. Consequently the Subjective End requires no force nor other affirmation against the object than self-affirmation, in order to make it Means; the determination of itself in resolution or solution is the merely posited externality of the object, which here exists immediately as subjected to the End, and has no other determination as against it except that of the nullity of Being-in-and-for-Self.

The second transcendence of objectivity by objectivity differs from this: here the former term (as the first) is the End in objective immediacy, while the latter consequently is the transcendence not only of a first immediacy but of both—of the objective as something merely posited, and of the immediate. In this manner negativity returns upon itself in such a way that it is equally reconstruction of objectivity, but of objectivity as identical with it, and therefore is also a positing of objectivity as only determined by the End, and external. By reason of the latter fact this product, as before, remains Means: by reason of the former, it is the objectivity which is identical with the Notion, the realized End, in which the side of being Means is the reality of the End itself. In the Realized End the Means vanishes because it would only be objectivity immediately subsumed under the End—which in the realized End is as return of the End into itself; with it, further, mediation itself vanishes, as being an attitude of an external entity, partly into the concrete identity of the objective End, and partly into the same as abstract identity and immediacy of Determinate Being.

This also contains the mediation which was demanded for the first premiss—the immediate relation of the End to the object. The Realized End is also Means, and conversely the truth of the Means is equally this, that it itself is real End; and the first transcendence of objectivity is already the second, just as the second showed itself to contain also the first. For the Notion determines itself: its determinateness is external indifference, which is immediately determined in the resolution as transcended (namely, as internal and subjective), and also as presupposed object. Its further passage out of itself, which appeared as immediate communication and subsumption under itself of the presupposed object, is also transcendence (1) of that internal determinateness of externality which is enclosed in the Notion, that is, is posited as transcended, and at the same time (2) of the presupposition of an object. Thus this apparently first transcendence of indifferent objectivity is also the second: it is an intro-Reflection which has passed through mediation, or it is the Realized End.

Here, in the sphere of Objectivity, where the Notion has its determinateness in the form of indifferent externality and is in reciprocal action with itself, it becomes doubly difficult and complicated to represent its movement, since it is itself immediately twofold, and whatever is first is also second. In the Notion for itself, that is, in its subjectivity, its distinctness from itself exists as immediate identical totality for itself; but here its determinateness is indifferent externality, and therefore its self-identity therein is also and immediately self-repulsion, since that which is determined as external and indifferent to it is in fact itself, while itself (the identity) as itself and as intro-reflected is rather its Other. The objective return upon itself of the Notion, that is, its true objectivation, is apprehended only if this fact is held fast,—when it is also apprehended that each of the individual moments through which this mediation takes its course is itself its whole syllogism. Thus the original inner externality of the Notion, by means of which it is self-repellent unity, End, and its struggle into objectivation, is the immediate positing or presupposition of an external object; self-determination is also determination of an external object which is not determined by the Notion; and conversely it is self-determination, that is, externality transcended and posited as inner,

—or the certainty of the unessentiality of the external object.—It has just been shown of the second relation—the determination of the object as Means—how it is in itself the self-mediation of the End in the object.—Similarly the third term, or Mechanism which operates under the domination of the End and transcends the object by the object, is (1) transcendence of the Means or of the object which is already posited as transcended, and hence also second transcendence and intro-Reflection; and (2) a first determining of the external object. The latter, as has been observed, is again in the Realized End no more than the production of a Means; the subjectivity of the finite Notion contemptuously casts aside the Means—and, reaching its goal, has reached nothing better than this. But the reflection that the End is reached in the Means and that in the fulfilled End the Means and mediation are preserved, is the last result of the external End-relation,—a result which, after transcending itself, this relation has exhibited as its truth.—The third syllogism which has just been considered differs in this respect, that it is, first, the subjective End-activity of the preceding syllogisms, but is also the transcendence of external objectivity and is therefore externality in general through itself, and, consequently, the totality in its positedness.

We have now watched the Subjectivity or Being-for-Self of the Notion pass over into its Being-in-Self or Objectivity; and in the latter the negativity of its Being-for-Self has once more come into view. In it the Notion has determined itself in such a manner that its particularity is external Objectivity, or is as the simple concrete unity whose externality is its self-determination. The movement of the End has now achieved that the moment of externality is posited not only in the Notion, and the Notion is not only Ought and tendency, but, as concrete totality, is identical with immediate Objectivity. On the one hand this identity is the simple Notion and equally *immediate* Objectivity; but on the other it is, likewise essentially, *mediation*, and is that simple immediacy only through the latter as self-transcending mediation. Thus the Notion is essentially this, that it is distinct from its Objectivity, which is in itself, as identity which is *for* itself; thence it has externality, but, in this external totality, it is the self-determining identity thereof. Thus now the Notion is *the Idea*.

SECTION THREE

THE IDEA

THE Idea is the adequate Notion : objective truth, or the truth as such. If anything has truth it has it through its Idea ; or something has truth only in so far as it is Idea.—Elsewhere in philosophy and in ordinary life the expression “idea” has often been used for Notion and even for a mere image. “I have no *idea* yet of this law-suit, building, or region” signifies no more than *image*. Kant has claimed the expression “idea” again for the Notion of reason.—Now according to Kant the Notion of reason is to be the Notion of the unconditioned, and, with respect to phenomena, to be *transcendent*, which means that it is impossible to make any adequate empirical use of it. Notions of reason are to serve for the conceptual comprehension, and Notions of understanding for the bare understanding, of perceptions.—But in fact, if the latter really are Notions, then they *are* Notions,—conceptual or notional comprehension takes place through them, and a process of understanding perceptions through Notions of understanding will be such a process of comprehension. But if understanding is only a determining of perceptions through such determinations as, for example, whole and parts, force, cause, and the like, then it signifies only a determining through reflection ; and similarly by understanding only determinate imagining of a fully determinate sensuous content can be meant : as one who, having been told the road and that he must turn to the left at the end of the wood, replies “I understand” means nothing more by those words than an apprehension into imagination and memory.—“Notion of reason” too is a somewhat clumsy expression ; for the Notion is altogether rational ; and, in so far as reason is distinguished from understanding and the Notion as such, it is the totality of the Notion and of Objectivity.—In this sense the Idea is the rational ;—it is the unconditioned because only that has conditions which essentially relates itself to an objectivity—an objectivity not determined by that itself, however, but remain-

ing in the form of indifference and externality against it, as was the objectivity which belonged to the external End.

The expression "Idea" being thus retained for the objective or real Notion, and being distinguished from the Notion itself, and, still more, from the mere image, that valuation of the Idea is even more to be rejected which takes it for something merely unreal. It is said of true thoughts that they are *merely Ideas*: now if thoughts are merely subjective and contingent they certainly have no further value; but in this they are not inferior to the temporal and contingent actualities, which also have no value except that which is proper to contingencies and phenomena. And if conversely the Idea is not to be rated as true because, with respect to phenomena, it is transcendent, and no object can be assigned to it, in the sensuous world, to which it conforms, this is a strange lack of understanding,—for so the Idea is denied objective validity because it lacks that which constitutes appearance, or the untrue being of the objective world. With respect to practical Ideas Kant recognizes that "nothing could be found more harmful or more unworthy of a philosopher than the vulgar appeal to an experience which is asserted to conflict with the Idea. Such an experience would never exist if, for example, political institutions were made at the fit moment in accordance with Ideas,—in the place of which rough notions, just because they were drawn from experience, frustrate every good intention." Kant looks upon the Idea as necessary and as the goal, which, as the prototype, should be set up as a maximum, and to which it should be the object of endeavour to cause the condition of actuality progressively to approach.

But, the result having been reached that the Idea is the unity of the Notion and Objectivity, or the truth, it must not merely be considered as a goal which must be approached while it still remains a kind of beyond: it must be held that whatever is actual *is* only in so far as it contains and expresses the Idea. The object, and the objective and subjective world, not merely *ought* to conform to the Idea, but *are* themselves the conformity of Notion and reality: that reality which does not correspond to the Notion is mere appearance, or that subjective, contingent, capricious entity which is not the truth. If it is said that no object is found in experience which completely conforms

to the Idea, then the latter is opposed to the actual as a subjective criterion. But it is hard to say what an actuality is supposed in truth to be, if its Notion is not in it, and if its objectivity is quite inadequate to this Notion; for it would be Nothing. The Mechanical and Chemical Object, like the non-spiritual subject and the spirit which is conscious only of the finite and not of its Essence, have their Notion existing in them, according to their respective natures, but not in its own free form. But altogether they can be true only in so far as they are the union of their Notion and reality—of their soul and their body. Wholes like the State or the Church cease to exist when the unity of their Notion and their reality is dissolved. Man, the living entity, is dead when soul and body are severed in him; dead nature, the mechanical and chemical world (if the dead is taken as equivalent to the inorganic world—it has no other positive significance), if separated into its Notion and its reality, is just the subjective abstraction of a form which is the work of thought, and a formless matter. A spirit which is not Idea, or unity of the Notion with itself,—a spirit which would be the Notion having the Notion itself for its reality, would be dead or spiritless spirit, a material object.

Being has reached the significance of truth, since the Idea is the unity of Notion and reality; so that now Being is only what is Idea. Finite things therefore are finite in so far as they do not fully possess the reality of their Notion in themselves, but require something further for that end,—or, conversely, in so far as they are presupposed as objects, and thus have the Notion applied to them as an external determination. The highest development which they reach according to the side of this finitude is external adequacy to an End. The fact that actual things do not conform to the Idea is the side of their finitude or untruth, according to which they are Objects, determined according to their several spheres and in the relations of Objectivity either mechanically, chemically, or through an external End. It is possible that the Idea should not completely have leavened its reality, and should have subjected it imperfectly to the Notion, for this reason, that it itself has a restricted content, and that it is as essentially the distinction between as it is the unity of the Notion and reality; for only the Object is immediate unity, that is, unity which is only in itself. But if

an object—for example, the State—were to be wholly inadequate to its Idea (that is, rather, were not to be the Idea of the State), if its reality, which is that of the self-conscious individuals, in no way corresponded to the Notion, then its soul and its body would have parted: the former would fly into the various regions of thought, the latter would have fallen apart into the single individualities. But the Notion of the State so essentially constitutes their nature, and therefore is so powerful an impulse in them, that they are forced to translate it into reality (even if only in the form of external adequacy to an End), or to submit to it as it is, or else perish. The worst State, whose reality least corresponds to the Notion, is still Idea in so far as it exists; the individuals still obey a ruling Notion.

But the Idea has not only the more general meaning of true Being, or of the unity of Notion and reality, but also the more definite meaning of the unity of the Subjective Notion and Objectivity. For the Notion as such is already identity of itself and reality, since the indeterminate expression “reality” means just determinate Being, and this the Notion has in its particularity and individuality. And further Objectivity equally is the total Notion which out of its determinateness has collapsed into self-identity. In the former Subjectivity, the determinateness or distinction of the Notion is a Show which has been transcended immediately and has passed back into Being-for-Self or negative unity, or is inhering predicate. But in this Objectivity the determinateness is posited as immediate totality, or external whole. The Idea has thus shown itself as the Notion, liberated again into its subjectivity out of the immediacy into which it is immersed in the Object, distinguishing itself from its Objectivity, which, however, is equally determined by it and has its substantiality only in the Notion. This identity has therefore rightly been determined as the Subject-Object, since it is the formal or Subjective Notion as much as it is the Object as such. This however must be apprehended in a more closely determinate manner. The Notion, having veritably reached its reality, is this absolute Judgment, whose Subject, as self-relating negative unity, distinguishes itself from its Objectivity and is the Being-in-and-for-Self of the latter, but essentially relates itself through itself to it, and consequently is its own End and impulse. But for this very reason Objectivity is not applied

immediately to the Subject, for then the Subject would only be this totality of the Object as such wasted into Objectivity. In fact Objectivity is the realization of the End, an Objectivity posited through the activity of the End, which, as positedness, has its persistence and its form only as penetrated by its Subject. As Objectivity it has in it the moment of the externality of the Notion, and consequently is, in general, the side of finitude, variability, and appearance, which however perishes in the return to the negative unity of the Notion; that negativity in which its indifferent mutual externality of elements shows itself as unessential and as positedness, is the Notion itself. Hence in spite of this Objectivity the Idea is utterly simple and immaterial, for externality is only as determined by the Notion and is taken up into the latter's negative unity; in so far as it persists as indifferent externality, it is not only laid open to Mechanism, but exists only as the perishable and untrue.—Although then the Idea has its reality in some kind of matter, still this is not an abstract Being persisting for itself against the Notion, but is only as Becoming, through the negativity of indifferent Being as simple determinateness of the Notion.

From this result the following closer determinations of the Idea.—First it is simple truth, the identity of the Notion and Objectivity as a universal, in which the opposition and the persistence of the particular is resolved into its self-identical negativity and exists as self-equality. Secondly it is the relation of the Subjectivity, which is for itself, of the simple Notion to the Objectivity which is distinct from it: the former is essentially the impulse to transcend this separation; the latter is indifferent positedness, or persistence which in and for itself is null. In this relation the Idea is the process in which it sunders itself into individuality and its inorganic nature, and again brings the latter back under the power of the subject, returning to the first simple universality. The self-identity of the Idea is one with the process; and the thought which frees actuality from the show of purposeless changeability and transfigures it into the Idea must not imagine this truth of actuality as a dead repose or bare picture, spent and without impulse or motion, or as a genius, number, or abstract thought. In the Idea the Notion reaches freedom, and because of this the Idea contains even the harshest opposition; its repose consists in the security

and certainty with which it eternally creates and eternally overcomes it, coinciding in it with itself.

But again at this point the Idea is merely immediate, or merely in its Notion; objective reality is indeed adequate to the Notion, but is not yet freed so as to be Notion, and the Notion does not exist for itself *as* Notion. In this manner the Notion is *Seele*, but the *Seele* is in the fashion of something immediate, that is, its determinateness is not as itself, it has not apprehended itself as *Seele*, or its own objective reality in itself; the Notion is as a *Seele* which is not yet filled with *Seele*.

Thus the Idea first is *Life*: the Notion which, distinct from its Objectivity and simple within itself, penetrates its objectivity and, as its own End, has its Means in this and posits it as its Means, but is immanent in this Means and in it is the realized and self-identical End.—Because of its immediacy this Idea has individuality for the form of its existence. But the intro-Reflection of its absolute process is the transcendence of this immediate individuality; hence the Notion, which in it and as universality is the inner, makes externality to be universality or posits its Objectivity as self-equality. Thus the Idea is,

secondly, *the Idea of the True and of the Good*, as Cognition and Volition. At first it is finite Cognition and finite Volition, where the True and the Good are still distinct and each is only a goal. So far, the Notion has only freed itself into itself and has given itself only an abstract objectivity by way of reality. But the process of this finite cognition and action makes the universality (which at first is abstract) into a totality, whence it becomes perfect objectivity.—Or, considered from the other side, finite, that is, subjective Spirit presupposes to itself an objective world; *Life* has such a presupposition; but its activity is that of transcending this presupposition and of making it something posited. Thus for Spirit its reality is the objective world, or, conversely, the objective world is the ideality in which it recognizes itself.

Thirdly, Spirit recognizes the Idea as its *absolute truth*, as Truth which is in and for itself; the infinite Idea in which cognition and action balance, an Idea which is *absolute self-knowledge*.

CHAPTER I

LIFE

THE Idea of Life concerns so concrete, or, if that is preferred, real an object, that when it is touched logic as it is commonly imagined may seem to have overstepped its province. And indeed if logic is to contain nothing but empty and dead thought-forms, then there can be no question of such a content as the Idea of Life. But if absolute truth is the object of logic, and truth as such essentially is in Cognition, then at least Cognition ought to be treated.—And indeed in general so-called pure logic is commonly followed by an applied logic,—a logic which has much to do with concrete cognition, quite apart from the mass of psychology and anthropology which it is frequently deemed necessary to introduce into logic. But the anthropological and psychological side of cognition relates only to its appearance, in which the Notion for itself has not yet reached the point of having an Objectivity equal to it, that is, of having itself for Object. That part of logic which considers this concrete cognition does not belong to applied logic as such; for then every science must be absorbed in logic, since each is an applied logic in so far as it consists in apprehending its object in forms of thought and of the Notion.—The Subjective Notion has presuppositions which present themselves in psychological, anthropological, or some other form. But logic is the place only for the presuppositions of the Pure Notion, in so far as they have the form of pure thoughts or abstract essentialities—the determinations of Being and Essence. And similarly logic must treat, in Cognition (which is the self-comprehension of the Notion), not the other shapes of its presupposition but only that which is itself Idea; this however logic must necessarily consider. Now this presupposition is the immediate Idea; for Cognition is the Notion in so far as it is for itself, but as subjective in relation to what is objective; and thus it is related to the Idea as presupposed or immediate Idea. But the immediate Idea is Life.

So far, the necessity of considering the Idea of Life in logic would then be founded on the necessity, otherwise too recognized, of here treating of the concrete Notion of Cognition. But this Idea has introduced itself through the proper necessity of the Notion. The Idea—that which in and for itself is true—is essentially an object of logic; and since it must first be considered in its immediacy, it must be apprehended and understood in this determinateness, in which it is Life, in order that its consideration may not be something empty and indeterminate. All that it can be necessary to remark is how far the logical view of Life differs from any other scientific view of it. But this is not the place for a discussion of the treatment it receives in non-philosophic sciences; only the distinction must here be made between logical Life as pure Idea and natural life which is considered in natural philosophy, and also life in so far as it is connected with Spirit.—The first, as the life of nature, is Life in so far as it is expelled into the externality of persistence and has its condition in inorganic nature, where the moments of the Idea are a multiplicity of actual formations. Life in the Idea is without such presuppositions which are as formations of actuality: its presupposition is the Notion as it has been considered, both as subjective and as objective also. In nature life appears as the highest stage which is reached by its externality by the process of passing within itself and transcending itself in subjectivity. In logic it is simple Being-in-Self, which in the Idea of Life has reached the externality which truly corresponds to it; the Notion, which comes on the scene earlier because it is subjective, is the soul of Life itself; it is the impulse which mediates its reality through objectivity. Nature, in reaching this idea from its own externality, overpasses itself; its end is not as its beginning, but as its limit in which it transcends itself.—And equally, in the Idea of Life the moments of its reality do not acquire the shape of external actuality, but remain locked within the form of the Notion.

But in Spirit, Life appears partly as opposed to it and partly as posited as at one with it; and again, Spirit gives a clear birth to this unity. For here Life in general must be taken in its proper sense of natural life, for what is called the life of Spirit as Spirit is its peculiarity which stands opposed to bare life. Similarly the nature of Spirit is spoken of, although Spirit

is not natural and, indeed, is the opposite of nature. Thus Life as such is partly the Means of Spirit, and as such opposed to it; and partly it is the Living Individual, and Life is its body; while partly this unity of itself with its living corporality receives birth out of Life itself into the *ideal*. None of these relations to Spirit concerns the Life of logic, and it must not here be considered either as the Means of a Spirit, or as its living body, or as moment of the ideal and of beauty.—In both cases—both as natural life and in its relation to Spirit—Life has a determinateness of its externality; in the first case through its presuppositions, which are other formations of nature, and in the second through the Ends and activity of Spirit. The Idea of Life for itself is free, in the first case from presupposed and conditioning objectivity, and in the second from relation to subjectivity.

Now Life, further considered in its Idea, is absolute universality in and for itself; that objectivity which it contains is wholly penetrated by the Notion—it has its substance in the Notion alone. That which is distinguished as part, or in accordance with some other external reflection, has the whole Notion within itself: the Notion is the omnipresent *Seele*, which is simple self-relation, and remains one in that multiplicity which belongs to objective Being. This multiplicity, as self-external objectivity, has an indifferent persistence, a persistence which, in space and time (if it were possible here already to mention these), is a juxtaposition of separate and independent entities. But in Life, externality at the same time is the simple determinateness of its Notion; and thus the *Seele* in its omnipresence is poured into this multiplicity and at the same time remains just the simple self-unity of the concrete Notion.—In considering Life, or this unity of its Notion in the externality of objectivity and in the absolute plurality of atomic matter,—thought, which clings to the determinations of the relations of reflection and of the formal Notion, reaches its thought's-end; for reflection, the omnipresence of the simple in a multiple externality is an absolute contradiction, and, in so far as reflection at the same time must take this omnipresence from the perception of Life and must thus admit the actuality of this Idea, it is an incomprehensible mystery; for reflection does not apprehend the Notion, or, apprehending it, does not apprehend it as the

substance of Life.—But simple Life not only is omnipresent, but is just the persistence and immanent substance of its objectivity; as subjective substance, however, it is impulse—the specific impulse of the particular distinction, while equally essentially it is the one and universal impulse of the specific, which leads back into unity this its particularization and there preserves it. Life is self-relating Life which is for itself—or a *Seele*—only as this negative unity of its objectivity and particularization. It is thus essentially individual, relating itself to objectivity as to an Other, or to a not-living nature. Consequently the original Judgment of Life consists in this, that it separates itself as individual subject from the objective, and, constituting itself as the negative unity of the Notion, makes the presupposition of an immediate objectivity.

First therefore Life must be considered as *Living Individual*, which is subjective totality for itself and is presupposed as indifferent to an objectivity which opposes it and is indifferent.

Secondly, it is *the Life-Process*, transcending its presupposition, positing the objectivity (which is indifferent to it) as negative, and realizing itself as the power and negative unity of this objectivity. Thus Life makes itself a universal which is the unity of itself and its Other. Consequently Life is,

thirdly, the Process of *the Kind*, transcending its individualization and relating itself to its objective Determinate Being as to itself. This process is accordingly (1) the return to its Notion and the repetition of the first diremption, the becoming of a new individuality and the death of the first and immediate individuality; (2) the Notion of Life which has passed into itself is the becoming of the self-relating Notion which exists universally and freely for itself—the transition to *Cognition*.

A

THE LIVING INDIVIDUAL

1. The Notion of Life, or universal Life, is the immediate Idea, the Notion to which its objectivity is adequate; but it is adequate only in so far as the Notion is the negative unity of this externality, or, in other words, posits it as adequate to itself. The infinite self-relation of the Notion is negativity and,

as such, is self-determination, that is, its own diremption into itself as subjective individuality and itself as indifferent universality. The Idea of Life in its immediacy is, so far, only the creative universal *Seele*. By reason of this immediacy its first negative relation of the Idea in itself is self-determination of the *Seele* as Notion—that positing *in itself* which becomes Being-*for-Self* only as return into itself, or creative presupposing. Through this self-determination universal Life is a particular; it has thus divided into the two extremes of the Judgment, which immediately becomes Syllogism.

The determinations of the opposition are the general determinations of the Notion, for division is proper to the Notion; the completion of it, however, is the Idea. The one side of it is the unity of the Notion and reality, which is the Idea, as immediate Idea, which previously showed itself as Objectivity. But here the Idea is in a different determination. There it was the unity of the Notion and reality in so far as the Notion has passed over into reality and is only lost in it: the Notion did not stand opposed to it, or because the Notion is only its inner, it is only a reflection which is external to it. Consequently, that Objectivity is the immediate itself in an immediate manner. Here on the other hand the Idea is that which has emerged out of the Notion, so that its essence is positedness or the fact that it is negative.—It is to be regarded as the side of universality of the Notion, and hence as *abstract* universality, essentially inhering only in the subject, and in the form of immediate Being which, posited for itself, is supposed to be indifferent to the subject. Thus the totality of the Notion which belongs to Objectivity is, in a manner, only a borrowed Objectivity; its last independence which it has against the subject is this Being, which in its truth is only that moment of the Notion that exists as presupposing in the first determinateness of a positing which is *in itself* and does not yet exist *as* positing and as intro-reflected unity. Thus, having emerged from the Idea, independent Objectivity is immediate Being only as the predicate of the Judgment of the self-determination of the Notion,—a Being which is different from the subject, but is at the same time essentially posited as moment of the Notion.

According to its content this Objectivity is the totality of the Notion, which, however, is faced by the Subjectivity (or

negative unity) of the latter; and this constitutes its true centrality, namely, its free self-unity. This subject is the Idea in the form of individuality as simple but negative self-identity—the Living Individual.

This latter is, first, Life as *Seele*, as Notion of itself which is completely determined within itself, or beginning and self-moving principle. The Notion in its simplicity contains enclosed within itself determinate externality as simple moment.—But further this *Seele*, in its immediacy, is immediately external and has an objective being in itself,—it is reality which is subjected to an End, the immediate Means, or, in the first instance, Objectivity as predicate of the subject; but besides the *Seele* is the middle of the Syllogism; the corporality of the *Seele* is that by means of which it joins itself with external objectivity.—Here the Living has corporality as reality which is immediately identical with the Notion; and in so far it has this reality by nature.

Now this Objectivity is predicate of the Individual and is taken up into the subjective unity, and hence the earlier determinations of the Object do not belong to it—namely the Mechanical or Chemical relation, still less the abstract reflection-relations of Whole and Parts, and the rest. As externality it is capable of such relations, but to that extent it is not living existence; if the Living Entity is taken as a whole which consists of parts or as the object of mechanical or chemical causes—a mechanical or chemical product—whether it is taken merely as such or as determined by an external End, then the Notion is taken as external to it, and itself as dead. The Notion is immanent in it, and therefore the adequacy to an End of the Living Entity must be taken as inner; this Notion exists in it as a determinate Notion, distinct from its externality, and, in its process of distinguishing, penetrating the latter and remaining self-identical. This objectivity of the Living Entity is Organism; the objectivity is the Means and instrument of the End, and wholly adequate to the latter, since the Notion constitutes its substance. But, for this very reason, this Means and instrument itself is the Realized End, in which, in so far, the Subjective End is immediately bound together with itself. According to its externality, the organism is a multiplicity not of parts but of members; and these, as such, (a) consist only

in individuality. They are separable in so far as they are external and can be taken in this externality; but in so far as they are separated they revert to the rule of the mechanical and chemical relations of ordinary Objectivity. (b) Their externality is opposed to the negative unity of the Living Individuality; the latter therefore is the impulse to posit the abstract moment of the determinateness of the Notion as real distinction. This distinction is immediate, and thus is the impulse of each individual specific moment to produce itself and equally to raise its particularity to universality, to cancel the other moments which are external to it and to develop at their expense; equally, however, to cancel itself and to make itself a Means for the others.

2. This process of the Living Individuality is restricted to the latter and falls entirely within it.—In the Syllogism of external adequacy to End, its first premiss (namely, that the End relates itself immediately to Objectivity and makes it a Means) was considered in a manner which showed that in it the End remains self-equal and has passed back into itself, but that in spite of this Objectivity in itself has not yet transcended itself, so that in it the End, to that extent, is not in and for itself: it achieves this only in the conclusion. The process of the Living Entity with itself is this premiss, in so far, however, as the latter also is conclusion, and in so far as the immediate relation of the subject to Objectivity (which thereby becomes Means and instrument) is at the same time the negative unity of the Notion in itself. In this its externality the End realizes itself, because it is the subjective power of the former and that process by which externality exhibits its self-dissolution and return into this the negative unity of the End. The unrest and changeability of the external side of the Living Entity are the manifestation of the Notion in it; the Notion, which is negativity in itself, has Objectivity only in so far as its indifferent persistence shows itself as self-transcending. Thus the Notion, by means of its impulse, produces itself in such a manner that the product, while it is its essence, is itself that which produces; for it is product only as externality which equally posits itself as negative, or as the process of producing.

3. The Idea which has just been considered is the Notion of the Living Subject and of its Process; the two determinations

which are in relation to each other are the self-relating negative unity of the Notion, and Objectivity, which is its Means although in it the Notion has returned to itself. But these are moments of the Idea of Life within its Notion, and therefore they are not the determinate Notion-moments of the Living Individual in its reality. The objectivity or corporality of the latter is concrete totality; but these moments are the sides out of which vitality constitutes itself, and consequently they are not the moments of this vitality which has already been constituted by the Idea. But the living objectivity of the Individual, as such, gets its *Seele* from the Notion and has the latter for substance, and therefore it has for essential distinction such terms as are determinations of the Notion, namely Universality, Particularity, and Individuality; the shape, as existing in which they are externally distinct, is hence divided or cut up (*insectum*) in accordance with these.

Accordingly it is, first, Universality; the pure internal tremor of vitality, or *sensibility*. The Notion of Universality as it has turned out above is simple immediacy, but it is this only as absolute negativity in itself. This Notion of absolute distinction, where its negativity is dissolved in simplicity and is equal to itself, is exemplified in sensibility. It is Being-in-Self, not as abstract simplicity, but as an infinitely determinable receptivity which, in its determinateness, does not become something manifold and external, but is simply reflected into itself. In this Universality determinateness is as simple principle; the individual external determinateness, or a so-called impression, passes back out of its external and manifold determination into this simplicity of self-feeling. Sensibility may thus be considered as the Determinate Being of the *Seele* which is in itself, since it absorbs all externality, but also reduces it into the perfect simplicity of self-equal Universality.

The second determination of the Notion is Particularity, the moment of posited distinction; it is the laying open of the negativity which is locked up in simple self-feeling, or in it is ideal, and not yet real, determinateness,—that is, *irritability*. Because of the abstraction of its negativity, feeling is impulse: it determines itself; the self-determination of the Living Entity is its judgment or finalization, whereby it relates itself to the external as to a presupposed objectivity and is in reciprocal

action with it.—Now according to its Particularity it is partly species among other living species; the formal intro-Reflection of this indifferent variety is the formal genus and its systematization; while the individual Reflection is this, that Particularity (or the negativity of its determinateness as a direction outwards) is the self-relating negativity of the Notion.

According to this third determination then the Living Entity is an Individual. Further, this intro-Reflection determines itself in such a manner that the Living Entity in irritability is its own externality against itself, against objectivity, which, as its Means and instrument, belongs to it immediately and is externally determinable. Intro-Reflection transcends this immediacy, —(1) as theoretical Reflection, namely, in so far as negativity exists as simple moment of sensibility, which moment was considered in it and constitutes feeling; and (2) as real, the unity of the Notion positing itself in its external objectivity as negative unity—which is *reproduction*.—The first two moments, sensibility and irritability, are abstract determinations; in reproduction Life is concrete and is vitality; in it, as its truth, it first has feeling and power of resistance. Reproduction is negativity as simple moment of sensibility, and irritability is only living power of resistance, so that the relation to the external is reproduction and individual self-identity. Each of the individual moments is essentially the totality of all; their distinction is constituted by the ideal form-determinateness, which in reproduction is posited as concrete totality of the whole. Consequently this whole is opposed to these determinate totalities as a third, namely as a *real* totality, while at the same time it is their self-existent essentiality, being also that in which they are comprehended as moments and have their subject and persistence.

With reproduction as the moment of Individuality the Living Entity posits itself as actual Individuality, a self-relating Being-for-Self; but at the same time it is a real relation outwards, the Reflection of Particularity or irritability against an Other, against the objective world. The Process of Life which is enclosed within the Individual passes over into relation to presupposed objectivity as such, because the Individual, in positing itself as *subjective* totality, becomes also the moment of its determinateness as relation to externality, and so becomes *totality*.

B

THE LIFE-PROCESS

The fact that the Living Individual moulds itself within itself implies a tension against its original process of presupposition, and opposes it, as subject which is in and for itself, to the presupposed objective world. The subject is the End which is its own End, the Notion which has its Means and subjective reality in the objectivity which is submitted to it; and hereby it is constituted as the Idea which is in and for itself and as the essentially independent, against which the presupposed external world has the value only of something negative and dependent. In its self-feeling the Living Entity has this certainty of the essential nullity of the otherness which opposes it. Its impulse is the need to transcend this otherness and to give itself the truth of this certainty. As subject, the Individual so far is only the Notion of the Idea of Life; its subjective internal process, in which it draws upon itself, and the immediate objectivity which it posits in accordance with its Notion as natural Means, are mediated by the Process, which relates itself to a completely posited externality, to an objective totality that stands by its side indifferent.

This Process begins with the *need*, that is, with the moment that the Living Entity (*a*) determines itself and thus posits itself as denied, whereby it relates itself to an indifferent objectivity which is Other to it;—and (*b*) is equally not lost in this loss of itself, preserves itself in it, and remains the identity of the self-equal Notion; whereby it is the impulse to posit this other world for itself as equal to itself, to transcend it, and to objectivate itself. Hereby its self-determination has the form of objective externality, and, since at the same time it is self-identical, it is absolute contradiction. The immediate shape is the Idea in its simple Notion, or objectivity which is adequate to the Notion: thus it is *good* by nature. But since its negative moment realizes itself so as to be objective particularity, that is, since the essential moments of its unity are each realized so as to be totality, therefore the Notion is severed into absolute inequality of itself with itself; and, since just as much it is absolute identity in this severance, the Living Entity is for itself

this severance and has the feeling of this contradiction, which is *pain*. Pain therefore is the privilege of living natures; they are the existing Notion and therefore they are an actuality of infinite force by which they in themselves are their own negativity, and by which their negativity is *for them* and they preserve themselves in their otherness.—It is said that contradiction cannot even be thought: but in the pain of the Living Entity it is even an actual existence.

This internal diremption of the Living Entity is feeling, the diremption being absorbed into the simple universality of the Notion, into sensibility. From pain that need and impulse begin which constitute the transition by which the Individual, while it is the negation of itself for itself, is also to become identity for itself—an identity which exists only as the negation of this negation.—The identity which is in the impulse as such is subjective self-certainty, according to which it relates itself to its external and indifferently existing world as to an appearance, an actuality Notion-less and unessential in itself. This latter is designed to acquire the Notion in itself only through the subject, which is the immanent End. The indifference of the objective world to determinateness, and therefore to the End, constitutes its external capacity for being adequate to the subject; whatever specifications may otherwise belong to it, its mechanical determinability, its lack in the freedom of the immanent Notion, constitutes its impotence to preserve itself against the Living Entity.—In so far as the object is at first an indifferent external to the Living Entity, it can act upon the latter mechanically: but then it does not act as upon a Living Entity; in so far as it stands in a relation to this it does not act as cause but as *irritant*. The Living Entity is impulse, and therefore externality approaches and enters it only in so far as in and for itself it is already in it; the action upon the subject consequently consists in this alone, that the latter finds the externality which is offered to it already corresponding;—and even if the externality is not adequate to its totality, it must at least correspond to a particular side in it, and the possibility of this rests precisely in the fact that, preserving its external attitude, it is a particular.

Now the subject (in so far as, determinate in its need, it relates itself to the external, and therefore is itself external or

instrument) exerts *force* upon the object. Its particular character and its finitude in general fall within the more definite appearance of this relation.—The external aspect of this is the Process of Objectivity in general, Mechanism and Chemism. But this Process is immediately cut short, and externality is changed into internality. The external adequacy to an End which at first is produced in the indifferent object by the activity of the subject is cancelled through the fact that the object is not a substance as against the Notion, so that the Notion not only can become its external form but also must posit itself as its essence and immanent penetrating determination in accordance with its original identity.

Consequently, the object being subjected to force, the mechanical Process passes over into the internal, by means of which the Individual appropriates the object in such a manner as to deprive it of its peculiar nature, making it its Means and giving it its subjectivity for substance. Hereby this assimilation coincides with the process of reproduction of the Individual which was considered above: in this process the Individual at first draws upon itself, making its own objectivity its object; the mechanical and chemical conflict of its members with external things is an objective moment of itself. The mechanical and chemical elements of the process are a commencement of the dissolution of the Living Entity. Now Life is the truth of these processes, and therefore, as Living Entity, is the existence of this truth, and its power; it accordingly reaches beyond them and penetrates them as their universality, and through it their product is completely determined. And this their change into Living Individuality constitutes the return of the latter upon itself, in such a manner that the production (which as such would be the transition into an Other) becomes reproduction, wherein the living entity posits itself for itself as self-identical.

The immediate Idea is also the immediate identity, which is not for itself, of Notion and reality. The Living Entity gives itself its self-feeling through the objective Process; for here it posits itself as that which it is in and for itself—namely, as the negative unity of the negative, or, as self-identical in its otherness (which is posited as indifferent). In this coincidence of the Individual with its objectivity, which at first is presupposed as

indifferent to it, it has from one side constituted itself as actual unity; but equally it has transcended its particularity and raised itself into universality. Its particularity consisted in the diremption by which Life posited as its species individual life and the objectivity which is external to it. By means of the external Life-Process it has thus posited itself as real, universal life, as *Kind*.

C

THE KIND

The Living Individual, abstracted at first out of the general Notion of Life, is a presupposition which is not yet verified by itself. Through the Process, together with the world (which is presupposed simultaneously) it has posited itself—for itself as the negative unity of its otherness,—as the foundation of its own self; thus it is the actuality of the Idea in such a manner that now the Individual produces itself out of actuality, while before it merely emerged out of the Notion, and that its origin, which was a process of presupposing, now becomes its production.

The further determination, however, which it has obtained by transcending the opposition is that it is *Kind* as the identity of itself with its previously indifferent otherness. This Idea of the Individual, since it is this essential identity, is essentially its own particularization. According to the totality from which it emerges, this its diremption is the duplication of the Individual—a presupposing of an objectivity which is identical with it, and an attitude of the Living Entity to itself as to another Living Entity.

This universal is the third stage, the truth of Life in so far as it is still enclosed within its own sphere. This stage is the self-relating Process of the Individual, when externality is its immanent moment; and secondly this externality is itself, as living totality, an objectivity, which for the Individual is the Individual itself, and in which (not as something cancelled but as something persisting) it has its own self-certainty.

Now the relation of the *Kind* is the identity of the individual self-feeling in an entity which at the same time is itself another independent Individual; it is, therefore, contradiction;

and thus the Living Entity is again impulse.—Now the Kind is the completion of the Idea of Life, but at this point it is still within the sphere of immediacy; and consequently this universality is actual in individual form—the Notion whose reality has the form of immediate objectivity. Hence, although the Individual is Kind *in itself*, it is not Kind *for itself*: as yet that which is *for* it is only another Living Individual; the Notion which is distinguished from itself has for object with which it is identical, not itself as Notion, but a Notion which as Living Entity at the same time has external objectivity for it,—a form which in consequence is immediately reciprocal.

The identity with other or universality of the Individual is thus as yet merely internal or subjective; it therefore has the desire to posit this identity and to realize itself as universal. But this impulse of the Kind can realize itself only by the transcendence of the single individualities which still are particular as against one another. And now, in so far as it is these that in themselves universally satisfy the tension of their desire and resolve themselves into their universality of Kind, their realized identity is the negative unity of the Kind which intro-reflects itself out of the division. In so far it is the individuality of Life itself, created no longer out of its Notion but out of the actual Idea. At first it is itself only the Notion which has first to objectivate itself, but the *actual Notion*—the germ of a Living Individual. In it, that which the Notion is is given to ordinary perception; and it is given that the subjective Notion has external actuality. For the germ of the living is the perfect concretion of individuality, in which all its various sides, properties, and organic distinctions are contained in their complete determinateness, and totality (at first immaterial and subjective) is embryonic, simple, and non-sensuous; thus the germ is the whole Living Entity in the internal form of the Notion.

According to this side the intro-Reflection of the Kind is that by means of which it obtains actuality, because the moment of negative unity and individuality is posited in it—the propagation of living generations. The Idea (which, as Life, is still in the form of immediacy) falls back into actuality in so far, and this its Reflection is only repetition and the infinite progress in which it does not emerge out of the finitude of its

immediacy. But this return into its first Notion has also this higher side, that the Idea has not only run through the mediation of its Processes within immediacy, but also by this very fact has transcended them and has thereby raised itself into a higher form of its existence.

For the Process of the Kind (in which the single Individuals cancel in one another their indifferent and immediate existence and die away in this negative unity) has further, and for the other side of its product, the Realized Kind, which has posited itself as identical with the Notion.—In the Process of Kind the separated individualities of individual Life perish; the negative identity in which the Kind returns into itself is (a) the creation of individuality, but (b) is also its transcendence: it is thus the self-coinciding Kind, or universality, *which becomes for itself*, of the Idea. In the process of generation the immediacy of living individuality perishes: the death of this Life is the emergence of Spirit. The Idea, which as Kind is *in itself*, is *for itself*, since it has transcended its particularity which constituted the living generations, and has so given itself a reality, which is itself simple universality: it is thus the Idea which is related to itself as Idea, the universal which has universality for its determinateness and existence, or, *the Idea of Cognition*.

CHAPTER II

THE IDEA OF COGNITION

LIFE is the immediate Idea, or the Idea as its Notion which is not yet realized in itself. In its Judgment it is Cognition in general.

The Notion is as Notion *for itself* in so far as it exists freely as abstract universality, or as Kind. Thus it is its own pure self-identity, which distinguishes itself within itself in such a manner that that which is distinguished is not an objectivity, but has become freed so that it too is subjectivity or the form of simple self-equality; hence the object of the Notion is the Notion itself. Its reality in general is the form of its existence, and what matters is the determination of this form; upon this depends the distinction of that which the Notion is *in itself* or as subjective, and of what it is as submerged into Objectivity, and next in the Idea of Life. It is true that in the last it is distinct from its external reality and is posited *for itself*; but it has this its Being-for-Self only as the identity which is a relation to itself as submerged into its subordinate objectivity or to itself as indwelling and substantial form. The elevation of the Notion above Life means this, that its reality is the Notion-form freed so that it becomes universality. By means of this Judgment the Idea is duplicated—into the subjective Notion whose reality is itself, and into the objective Notion, which is as Life.—Thought, Spirit, and self-consciousness are determinations of the Idea in so far as it has itself for object and its Existence, that is, the determinateness of its Being, is its own distinction from itself.

The metaphysics of Spirit, or, as was the more usual term, of the soul, turned upon the determinations of substance, simplicity, and immateriality;—determinations, in which the general idea of spirit as it exists in empirical consciousness as subject was made the foundation, whereupon the question next was asked what predicates agree with the observed phenomena. This procedure could go no further than that of physics, which

reduces the world of appearance to general laws and determinations of reflection, since here too Spirit has its foundation only in its appearance. Indeed this method necessarily fell short of the method of physical science, since Spirit not only is infinitely richer than Nature, but the absolute unity of opposites in the Notion constitutes its essence, and therefore in its appearance and its relation to externality it manifests contradiction in its highest determinateness. Consequently it must be possible to cite an experience for each of the opposite determinations of reflection, or to arrive, from experience, at contradictory determinations according to the method of the formal syllogism. The predicates which immediately result in appearance belong properly to empirical psychology, and therefore all that is left over for metaphysical consideration is some rather tenuous determinations of reflection.—Kant, in his criticism of the rational doctrine of the soul, nails down this metaphysics at this point, that, in so far as it is supposed to be a rational science, the smallest element which is introduced from perception into the general idea of self-consciousness makes this science empirical and taints its rational purity and complete independence of experience.—Thus, he argues, nothing remains but the simple idea (which in itself is quite void of content) of the Ego, of which it is impossible even to say that it is a concept, since it is a mere consciousness which accompanies all concepts. Now this Ego or It (the Thing), which thinks, represents nothing more (according to Kant's further conclusions) than a transcendental subject of thoughts = x , which is known only through the thoughts that are its predicates, and of which by itself we can never have the slightest notion. At the same time this Ego, according to Kant's own expression, is awkward in this respect, that we must always make use of it in order to make any judgment about it; for it is not an idea by which a particular object is distinguished so much as a form of ideation in general, in so far as it is to be called cognition.—The paralogism which according to Kant is committed by the rational doctrine of the soul consists in this, that modes of self-consciousness in thought are made into notions of the understanding which imply an object; the "I think" is taken as a thinking being or Thing-in-itself;—in consciousness the Ego always occurs as subject which is singular and, in spite of the

multiplicity of ideation, identical, distinguishing its self from this multiplicity which is external; and hence the invalid conclusion is drawn in this manner that Ego is a substance, and further that it is qualitatively simple and one and exists independently of the things of space and time.—

I have set out this exposition in some detail because the nature of the old metaphysics of the soul, as well as the criticism which destroyed it, can clearly be seen in it.—The former attempted to determine the abstract essence of the soul; it began originally in this attempt with perception, and changed its empirical universality and the reflection-determination (which is altogether external to the individuality of the actual) into the form of the determinations of essence which have been recited.—Kant had in mind mainly the condition of contemporary metaphysics, which generally halted at such abstract and one-sided determinations, without dialectic; he neither considered nor investigated the truly speculative ideas of older philosophers about the notion of Spirit. In his criticism of these determinations he simply followed Hume's sceptical manner: he holds fast to that which appears as Ego in self-consciousness, from which however (he insists) everything empirical must be omitted, since the aim is to know its essence, or the Thing-in-itself. Now nothing remains but the phenomenon of the "I think" which accompanies every idea; and nobody has the slightest notion of this "I think."—It must certainly be admitted that it is impossible to have the slightest notion of Ego or anything else (the Notion included), if no Notion is formed and a halt is made at the simple, fixed general idea and name.—It is a strange thought (if it is to be called a thought) that Ego must make use of Ego in order to judge about Ego; the Ego which makes use of self-consciousness as a means in order to judge is indeed an x , of which (as also of this relation of making use) it is impossible to have the slightest notion. But it is ridiculous to call awkward and to stigmatize as circular this property of self-consciousness—that Ego thinks itself and that it cannot be thought unless it is Ego that thinks. It is by this very relation that its absolute and eternal nature, and that of the Notion, manifests itself in immediate empirical self-consciousness, and manifests itself because self-consciousness is precisely the existing and therefore empirically perceptible pure

Notion, the absolute self-relation which, as separating Judgment, makes itself its own object and is just this process of thereby becoming a circle.—A stone does not suffer from this awkward property; if it is the object of thought or judgment it does not stand in its own way;—it is exempted from the trouble of being its own instrument in this operation; something else is outside it which must undertake this burden.

These ideas, which may be called barbarous, set it down as a defect that, in the process of thinking the Ego, Ego itself as *subject* cannot be omitted; and the same defect also appears conversely in this form, that Ego occurs only as subject of consciousness, or that Ego can only use itself as subject of a judgment, while the intuition is said to be lacking by which it could be given as an object; and further the Notion of a thing which can exist only as subject implies no objective reality.—If objectivity is said to demand external intuition determined in time and space, and it is this which is missing, it is quite clear that by objectivity only that kind of sensuous reality is meant which it is a condition of thought and truth to have superseded. But, of course, if Ego is taken not as a Notion but as bare and simple idea in the manner in which we pronounce I in everyday consciousness, then it is the abstract determination and not a self-relation having itself for object;—in this manner it is only one of the extremes, or one-sided subject without its objectivity; and it could also be object without subjectivity but for the implication of the awkward fact, already mentioned, that the thinking subject cannot be forced away from the Ego as object. But in fact the same awkwardness is also to be found in the first determination, or the Ego as subject: the Ego thinks *something*—either itself or something else. This inseparability of the two forms in which it opposes itself belongs to the most peculiar nature of its Notion and of the Notion itself; it is precisely that which Kant wishes to ward off in order to hold fast simply the general idea which does not distinguish itself within itself and therefore of course is Notion-less. Now it is true that such a Notion-less entity may oppose itself to the abstract determinations of reflection or categories of the earlier metaphysics;—for in respect of one-sidedness it stands on a level with them, although these are higher as products of thought; on the other hand it appears

all the poorer and emptier compared with the profounder ideas of older philosophy with regard to the notion of the soul or of thought—for example, the truly speculative ideas of Aristotle. If Kant's philosophy investigated these determinations of reflection, it ought still more to have investigated the abstraction of the empty Ego, which was held fast, and the supposed Idea of the Thing-in-itself, which, just because of its abstraction, shows itself to be wholly untrue; the experience of that awkwardness which was deplored is itself the empirical fact in which the untruth of this abstraction expresses itself.

Kant's criticism of rational psychology mentions only Mendelssohn's proof of the persistence of the soul; and I cite the refutation of this proof because of the remarkable nature of that which is opposed to it. The proof is based upon the simplicity of the soul, which is asserted to render it incapable of change, of a temporal transition into an Other. Qualitative simplicity is the form of abstraction in general which was considered above; as qualitative determinateness it was investigated in the sphere of Being, when it was shown that the Qualitative is such an abstractly self-relating determinateness, and as such is for that very reason of dialectic nature and only the transition into an Other. But under the Notion it was shown that, if the Notion is considered with respect to persistence, indestructibility, and imperishability, it is the eternal and that which is in and for itself, just because it is concrete and not abstract simplicity; not abstractly self-relating determinedness, but the unity of itself and its Other, into which accordingly it cannot pass over in such a manner as to undergo change in it, precisely because the Other, the determinedness, is itself, and therefore in this transition it only reaches itself.—Now Kant's criticism opposes the quantitative determination of the Notion-unity to this qualitative. The soul (he says) is not a manifold of juxtaposed parts and contains no extensive magnitude; but still, consciousness has a degree, and the soul, like every existent, has an intensive magnitude; and hereby the possibility is posited of the transition into nothing by gradual disappearance.—Now what else is this refutation but the application to Spirit of a category of Being—to wit, Intensive Magnitude?—a determination which has no truth in itself and in fact is transcended in the Notion.

Metaphysics—even that kind which restricted itself to fixed notions of understanding without rising to the speculative and to the nature of the Notion and the Idea—had for its end the cognition of truth, and asked of the objects of its investigation whether they were something veritable or not, substances or phenomena. But the victory of Kant's Critique over this consists rather in abolishing the investigation which has truth for end, together with this end itself; it does not ask the one question which is of interest, namely, whether a certain subject (in this instance the abstract Ego of imagination) has truth in and for itself. But to stand fast at appearance and the data given to mere sensuous representation in everyday consciousness is tantamount to a resignation of the Notion and of philosophy. What goes beyond this is given in Kant's Critique the name of something extravagant, to which Reason has no title at all. The Notion does in fact range beyond the Notionless, and its immediate title to this transgression is (*a*) itself and (*b*), from the negative side, the untruth of appearance and of sensuous representation, as well as of abstractions such as the Things-in-themselves and that Ego which is supposed not to be its own object.

In the connected course of our logical exposition it is from the Idea of Life that the Idea of Spirit has emerged; or, what is the same thing, the latter has proved itself to be the truth of the former. As being this result this Idea has its truth in and for itself, with which now the empirical element, or the Appearance of Spirit, may be compared, to see how far they agree; nevertheless the empirical itself can be grasped only through and from the standpoint of the Idea. We have seen of Life that it is the Idea, but at the same time Life showed itself to be not yet the true representation or fashion of the existence of the Idea. For in Life the reality of the Idea is as Individuality; Universality, or the Kind, is inner; consequently the truth of Life as absolute negative unity is that it transcends abstract or (what is the same thing) immediate individuality, and that, as identical, it is self-identical, and as Kind, self-equal. Now this Idea is Spirit.—But in this regard the further remark may be made that Spirit is here considered in that form which belongs to this Idea as logical. For the Idea has other shapes too, which may here be mentioned in passing, under which it

must be considered in the concrete sciences of Spirit—namely as soul, consciousness, and Spirit as such.

The name of soul was formerly used of the individual finite spirit in general, and rational or empirical doctrine of the soul was intended to mean the same as doctrine of spirit. Where the expression “soul” is used, the idea is present that it is a thing like other things; its seat (the spatial determination whence its forces operate) is asked for, and the further question is put how this thing can be imperishable, subject as it is to the conditions of temporality but free from temporal change. The system of *monads* raises matter to the status of the soul: the soul in this view is an atom like the atoms of matter in general; it is said that the atom which rises as steam from the coffee-cup might, with luck, develop into a soul, and that it is only the greater obscurity of its process of mirroring that distinguishes it from the kind of thing that appears as a soul.—The Notion which is for itself is necessary also in immediate Existence; in this substantial identity with Life—in its immersion into its externality—it has to be considered in anthropology. But this metaphysics, where this form of immediacy becomes a soul-thing, an atom like the atoms of matter, must remain alien to anthropology too.—To anthropology those dark regions alone may be ceded where spirit stands under influences formerly called sidereal or terrestrial, living as a natural spirit in sympathy with nature and becoming aware of its changes in dreams and premonitions, and dwelling in brain, heart, ganglia, or liver, and so on; to which last part, according to Plato, the god gave that gift of prophecy above which self-conscious man is raised, in order that the unreasonable part too might partake of his goodness and have a share in higher things. To this unreasonable side belongs further the relation of sensuous representation, and of higher intellectual activity in so far as it is exposed in the individual subject to the play of wholly contingent corporeal nature, external influences and particular circumstances.

This is the lowest of the concrete forms in which Spirit is immersed in materiality; its immediately higher form is in consciousness. In this form the free Notion as Ego which is for itself is withdrawn out of objectivity, but it relates itself to objectivity as its Other, as opposed object. Here Spirit no

longer is soul, but, in the certainty of itself, the immediacy of Being rather has the significance of something negative for it; hence the self-identity in which it remains in objectivity is at the same time only a show, since the objective also has still the form of something which is in itself. This stage is the object of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*—a science which stands midway between the sciences of Natural Spirit and of Spirit as such, and considers Spirit which is for itself at the same time in its relation to its Other (which thus, as was mentioned, is determined both as object which is in itself and also as negated object)—as appearing and as representing itself in its own opposite.

But the higher truth of this form is Spirit *for itself*, for which the object, which for consciousness is *in itself*, has the form of its own determination, or of sensuous representation in general; this Spirit, which operates upon determinations as determinations proper to itself—sensations, images, and thoughts—is, in so far, in itself and in its form infinite. The contemplation of this stage belongs to the doctrine proper of Spirit, which would comprise that which is the object of ordinary empirical psychology, yet cannot go to work in an empirical manner if it would be science of Spirit, but must be taken scientifically.—At this stage Spirit is *finite* Spirit, in so far as the content of its determinateness is immediate and given; the science which is concerned with it must present the process in which it sets itself free from this its determinateness and passes on to the comprehension of its truth, which is Infinite Spirit.

On the other hand the Idea of Spirit, which is an object of logic, is already within pure science, which therefore need not witness its progress where it is implicated in nature, in immediate determinateness and in matter, or in sensuous representation, which is what is considered in these three sciences; this progress it has already left behind, or (which is the same thing) it rather has it before it,—the former, in so far as logic is taken as the last science, the latter, in so far as it is taken as the first, out of which at last the Idea passes over into Nature. Consequently in the logical Idea of Spirit Ego forthwith is the free Notion (as appeared from the Notion of Nature as the truth of this Idea); the free Notion which in its Judgment is itself the object, or, the Notion as its Idea. But even in this form the Idea is not yet complete.

It is indeed the free Notion, which has itself for object; but, just because it is immediate, it is still immediately the Idea in its subjectivity, and therefore in its finitude in general. It is the End which is to realize itself; or, it is the Absolute Idea itself still in its appearance. What it seeks is the True, this identity of the Notion itself and reality, but, as yet, it merely is seeking; for here still (as it is at the beginning) it is subjective. Consequently the object which is object of the Notion is here also a given object, but it does not enter into the subject as an Object which operates upon it, or in its quality as object having a nature for itself, or as image: on the contrary the subject changes it into a Notion-determination; it is the Notion that sets itself to work in the object, relates itself to itself therein, and finds truth in giving itself its reality in the Object.

Thus at this point the Idea is one extreme of a Syllogism, as the Notion which as End has itself for subjective reality; the other extreme is the barrier of the subjective, namely, the objective world. The two extremes are identical in being the Idea; their unity, first, is that of the Notion, which in the one is only for itself and in the other only in itself; secondly, reality in the one is abstract and in the other in its concrete externality.—Now this unity is *posited* by Cognition; and, since it is the subjective Idea that starts from itself as End, this unity is at first only as *middle*.—The cognizing entity relates itself to an external world by means of the determinateness of its Notion (namely abstract Being-for-Self), but does so in absolute self-certainty in order to raise its own reality in itself (a formal truth) to real truth. In its Notion it has the whole essentiality of the objective world; its process is, to posit the concrete content of the objective world for itself as identical with the Notion, and conversely the latter as identical with the objectivity.

Immediately the Idea of appearance is theoretic Idea, or Cognition as such. For immediately the objective world has the form of immediacy or of Being for the Notion which is for itself, while the latter at first is to itself only the abstract Notion of itself, bound up as yet in itself. The Notion consequently is only as *form*; its reality, which it has in itself, is no more than its simple determinations of Universality and Particularity: this form receives from without Individuality or determinate determinateness, or, its content.

A

THE IDEA OF THE TRUE

At first the subjective Idea is *impulse*. For it is this contradiction in the Notion, that it has itself for object, and is its own reality, while at the same time the object is not as an Other, independent of the Notion, nor again has the distinction of itself from itself the essential determination of difference and of indifferent Existence. Consequently the impulse has the determinateness of cancelling its own subjectivity, of making concrete its reality (which was abstract at first), and of filling it, for content, with the world which is presupposed by its subjectivity.—From the other side it determines itself in the following manner by this process: the Notion is absolute self-certainty, but its Being-for-Self is faced by its presupposition of a world which is in itself, whose indifferent otherness, however, has the significance only of something unessential for this self-certainty. In so far the Notion is the impulse to transcend this otherness and to contemplate self-identity in contemplating the Object. In so far as this intro-Reflection is transcended opposition and *posited* individuality which has been effected for the subject (and which at first appears as presupposed Being-in-Self), it is the self-identity of the form, which has been constructed out of the opposition,—an identity which thereby is determined as indifferent to the form in its distinctness, and is content.

This impulse consequently is impulse of truth in so far as truth lies in Cognition—of truth therefore as *theoretic* Idea in its proper sense.—Objective truth is the Idea itself as the reality which corresponds to the Notion, and in so far an object may or may not have truth in it; but the more definite meaning of truth is this, that it is *for* or *in* the subjective Notion, or, in *knowledge*. Truth is the relation of the Notion-judgment, which proved to be the formal judgment of truth; for in it the predicate is not only the objectivity of the Notion, but is also the relating comparison of the Notion of the fact and its actuality.—This realization of the Notion is theoretic in so far as the Notion, as form, still has the determination of something subjective, or the determination, for the subject, of belonging to

it. Cognition is the Idea as End or as subjective, and so the negation of the world which is presupposed as being in itself is first negation; the conclusion, where the objective is posited as subjective, at first therefore signifies only that that which is in itself is posited only as subjective or is only *posited* in the Notion-determination, but, in consequence, is not there in and for itself. In so far the conclusion reaches merely a neutral unity or a synthesis, that is, a unity of terms which originally are separate and are connected in this manner only externally.—Consequently, when in this Cognition the Notion posits the Object as being its own, the Idea at first merely gives itself a content whose foundation is *given*, and in which only the form of externality has been transcended. In so far this Cognition retains its *finitude* in its Realized End; in its End it has, at the same time, not reached its End, and in its truth has not yet arrived at truth. For in so far as the content in the result is still determined as given, the presupposed Being-in-Self standing against the Notion is not transcended; equally therefore the unity of Notion and reality, or truth, is not contained in it.—Strangely enough this side of finitude has latterly been seized upon and has been taken to be the absolute relation of Cognition—as though the finite as such was to be the absolute! At this point of view the Object is assigned the property of being an unknown Thing-in-itself behind all knowledge, which property, together with truth, is considered an absolute Beyond for Cognition. The determinations of thought in general, the categories and the determinations of reflection as well as the formal Notion and its moments, are here given the position not that they are finite determinations in and for themselves, but that they are so in the sense that they are subjective as against that empty Thinghood-in-itself: the error of taking this relation of the untruth of Cognition as valid has become the universal opinion of modern times.

It is immediately obvious from this determination of finite Cognition that it is a contradiction which cancels itself—the contradiction of a truth which at the same time is not to be truth, of cognizing that which is while it does not cognize the Thing-in-itself. In the collapse of this contradiction its content, namely subjective Cognition and the Thing-in-itself, collapses, that is, proves itself to be untrue. But Cognition must by its

own process resolve its finitude and therefore its contradiction. The contemplation to which we subject it is an external reflection; but Cognition is itself the Notion which is its own End and accordingly is realized in its realization, and in this realization transcends its subjectivity and the presupposed Being-in-Self.—Cognition must therefore be considered by itself in its positive activity. This Idea, as was shown, is the impulse of the Notion to realize itself *for itself*; consequently its activity is to determine the Object and in this process to relate itself in the Object identically to itself. The Object is just simply the determinable, and in the Idea it has the essential side that it is not opposed in and for itself to the Notion. This Cognition still is finite and not speculative, and therefore the presupposed objectivity has not yet for it the form of being simply in itself the Notion, containing nothing particular for itself as against the Notion. But now that objectivity is counted as a Beyond which is in itself, the determination of being determinable by the Notion is essential in it—for this reason, because the Idea is the Notion which is for itself and that which is utterly infinite in itself, wherein the Object is transcended *in itself* and the End now only is to transcend it *for itself*. Consequently, although the Object is presupposed by the Idea of Cognition as being in itself, yet it is so essentially in this relation, that, being certain of itself and of the nullity of this opposition, the Idea is to reach the realization of its Notion in the Object.

In the syllogism in which now the subjective Idea combines with objectivity, the first premiss is that same form of immediate seizure and relation of the Notion to the Object that we saw in the End-relation. The determining activity of the Notion upon the Object is an immediate communication; it spreads itself upon the Object unresisted. Here the Notion remains in its pure self-identity; but this its immediate intro-Reflection equally has the determination of objective immediacy; that which for it is its own determination is equally a Being, for it is the *first* negation of the presupposition. The posited determination consequently counts equally as a presupposition which is merely *found* or as the taking up of something which is given, wherein the activity of the Notion itself is rather said to consist in this, that it is negative as against itself, restraining itself in face of the given and making itself passive, so that the given

may be able to show itself as it is in itself and not as determined by the subject.

In this premiss therefore this Cognition does not at all appear as an *application* of logical determinations: it merely accepts and apprehends them as found, and its activity appears as restricted to the removal of a subjective obstacle or external husk from the object. This is *Analytic Cognition*.

(a) ANALYTIC COGNITION

It is sometimes stated that the difference between Analytic and Synthetic Cognition is that the one proceeds from known to unknown, while the other proceeds from unknown to known. But if this distinction is more closely considered, it will be found difficult to discover in it any definite thought, much less a Notion. It may be said that Cognition altogether begins with the realm of the unknown, since one does not become acquainted with what is known already. And conversely Cognition begins also with the known. This is a tautology;—that with which it begins (and which therefore it actually cognizes) is, for that very reason, known; that which is not yet, and still remains to be, cognized, is still unknown. In so far it must be said that Cognition, once it has begun, always proceeds from known to unknown.

The distinguishing part of Analytic Cognition has already determined itself to the effect that, since it is the first premiss of the whole syllogism, mediation does not yet belong to it, but that it is the immediate communication of the Notion, not yet containing otherness: here the activity resigns its negativity. But this immediacy of the relation is itself mediation, since it is the negative relation of the Notion to the Object, which relation however annuls itself and thereby makes itself simple and identical. This intro-Reflection is merely subjective, because in its mediation the distinction is present only as pre-supposed and being in itself, as differentiation of the Object within itself. Consequently the determination which results from this relation is the form of simple identity or abstract universality. Consequently Analytic Cognition has this identity for its general principle, and the transition into other, the

connexion of different terms, is excluded from itself and from its activity.

If now Analytic Cognition is further considered, its beginning is made from a presupposed (and therefore individual) and concrete object; an object either *ready* for sensuous representation or else a *problem*—given only in its circumstances and conditions, but not yet developed out of these by itself and presented in simple independence. Now the analysis of such an object cannot consist merely in its dissolution into the various ideas which may be contained in it; such a dissolution and its comprehension are a business which does not belong to Cognition, but would merely concern a closer acquaintance, a determination within the sphere of sensuous representation. Analysis has the Notion for its foundation, and therefore has for products essentially Notion-determinations—namely, those which are immediately contained in the object. It has resulted from the nature of the Idea of Cognition that the activity of the subjective Notion from the one side is to be regarded merely as the development of what already is in the Object, since the Object itself is just the totality of the Notion. It is one-sided to imagine analysis in such a manner as though nothing were in the object except what has been put into it; and it is equally one-sided to think that the determinations which result are simply taken out of it. The former idea is of course the thesis of subjective idealism, which in analysis takes the activity of Cognition only as a one-sided positing, beyond which the Thing-in-itself remains hidden; the latter idea belongs to so-called realism, which takes the subjective Notion as an empty identity that absorbs the thought-determinations from without.—Analytic Cognition, or the transformation of the given material into logical determinations, has shown itself to be two in one—a positing which equally immediately determines itself as a presupposing; and therefore, because of the latter, the logical element can appear as something ready in the object, and, because of the former, as the product of a merely subjective activity. But the two moments cannot be separated; in its abstract form, into which analysis elaborates it, the logical is certainly present only in Cognition; while conversely it is not only something posited but also something which is in itself.

Now in so far as Analytic Cognition is the transformation

which has just been pointed out, it passes through no further intermediate terms: the determination in so far is immediate and has this meaning, that it is peculiar to the object and in itself belongs to it: it is therefore taken up out of it without subjective mediation.—But further, Cognition is to be a progress, or a development of distinctions. Now according to its present determination it is Notion-less and undialectical; the distinction which it has is therefore only *given*, and its progress takes place solely along the determinations of the material. It appears to have an immanent progress only in so far as the derivative thought-determinations can be analysed afresh in their quality as concrete: the highest and final stage of this process of analysis is the abstract highest essence or abstract subjective identity—and, opposed to it, variety. But this progress is nothing further than the repetition of the original activity of analysis, namely, the iterated determination as concrete of the term which has already been taken up into the abstract Notion-form; which action is followed by its analysis, after which the resultant abstract is determined anew as concrete, and so forth.—The thought-determinations appear, however, to contain a transition in themselves also. If the object has been determined as whole, then it is true that a progress has been made from that to the other determination, the part, and from the cause to the other determination of effect, and so on. But here this is no progress, in so far as whole and parts, and cause and effect, are relations—relations which for this kind of formal Cognition are *ready* in such a manner that one determination is *found* in an essential connexion with the other. The object which has been determined as *cause* or as *part* is, by this fact, determined already by the *whole* of the relation, and by both sides of it. Although in itself it may be synthetic, still this connexion, for Analytic Cognition, is *given* as much as any other connexion of its material, and therefore does not belong to its peculiar business. Whether such a connexion is otherwise determined as *a priori* or *a posteriori* is here indifferent in so far as it is taken as *found*, or, as it has been called, as a fact of consciousness—namely, the fact that the determination “part” is connected with the determination “whole,” and so on. When Kant advances his profound observation of synthetic principles *a priori*, and recognizes that their root is the unity of

self-consciousness and therefore the self-identity of the Notion, he nevertheless takes up the *determinate* connexion (the relations and the synthetic principles themselves) from formal logic as given. They ought to have been deduced by the exposition of the transition of this simple unity of self-consciousness into these its determinations and distinctions; but Kant spared himself the trouble of demonstrating this veritably synthetic progress—the self-producing Notion.

Arithmetic and the more general sciences of discrete magnitude are of course by preference called analytic science, and analysis. And indeed their method of cognition is in the most immanent manner analytic; and the foundation of this fact must briefly be considered.—Elsewhere Analytic Cognition begins with a concrete material which contains a contingent manifold; from this every distinction of content and progress to further content depends. On the other hand, arithmetical and algebraic material has already been made something wholly abstract and indeterminate, where every peculiarity of relation has been expunged, so that every determination and connexion is external. Such is the principle of discrete magnitude, or the One. This relationless and atomic unit can be increased to a plurality and can be determined externally and unified into an amount; this multiplication and limitation are an empty progress and determining, which do not move beyond the same principle of the abstract One. The composition and separation of numbers further depends wholly upon the positing activity of the cognizing being. The general category within which these determinations are made is magnitude, which is determinateness made indifferent, so that the object has no determinateness which is immanent in it and therefore *given* to Cognition. Now in so far as Cognition has given itself a contingent variety of numbers, these merely constitute material for a further treatment and for manifold relations. Such relations and their discovery and treatment do not indeed appear as something immanent in Analytic Cognition—they appear as contingent and given; and indeed these relations and the relative operations are generally set forth in a series and as different, without intimation of any inner connexion. However, it is easy to recognize a guiding principle: it is the immanent element of analytic identity which appears as equality in

variety; and progress is the reduction of the unequal to an ever greater equality. To give an example in the first elements, addition is the comprehension of quite contingently unequal numbers, while multiplication comprehends equal numbers; the relation of equality of amount and unit appears later, and, with it, the power-relation.

Now the determinateness of the object and of the relations is a posited determinateness, and therefore the further operation with them is wholly analytical; whence analytic science has problems but no theorems. The analytic theorem contains the problem as already solved for itself; and the wholly external distinction between the two sides which it equates is so unessential that such a theorem would appear as a trivial identity. Kant indeed declared the proposition $5 + 7 = 12$ to be synthetic because the same thing is represented on one side in the form of a plurality (5 and 7) and on the other in the form of a one (12). But unless analytic is to mean the quite abstractly identical and tautological statement $12 = 12$, and if there is to be any progress in it at all, then there must be some distinction,—a distinction, however, which is founded on no quality, nor determinateness of reflection, nor (much less) of Notion. $5 + 7$, and 12, are entirely the same content; the former side also expresses the demand that 5 and 7 are to be comprehended into one expression, that is, that, five being the end, arbitrarily reached, of a series which might equally have been prolonged, so now the process of enumeration is to be continued, with the provision that the ones which are to be added are to number seven. Thus 12 is the result of 5 and 7 and of an operation which is already posited according to its nature as a wholly external and thoughtless activity, an activity which may for that reason be left to a machine. There is here not the least transition to an Other; it is a mere continuation, that is, repetition, of the same operation that created 5 and 7.

If such a proposition were synthetic it would demand a proof; and such a proof would consist merely in the operation of counting on from 5 with the determination of 7, and in the recognition that the result thus reached agrees with what otherwise is known as 12 and in fact is nothing else than this particular process of counting. Consequently, in place of the form of theorem the form of problem is at once chosen—the

demand for the operation, that is, the enunciation of the one side only of the equation, which would constitute the theorem and whose other side is now to be found. The problem includes the content and indicates the particular operation which is to be undertaken with it. The operation is not restricted by any stubborn material having specific relations for properties, but is an external subjective activity whose determinations are accepted with indifference by the material in which they are posited. The only distinction between the conditions set in the problem and the result in the solution is this, that in the latter these unions and separations have actually taken place in the required manner as they were indicated in the former.

The application of the form of geometrical method relating to synthetic propositions, and the addition of a proof to the solution of the problem, is here therefore an entirely superfluous framework. The proof can only express the tautology that the solution is correct because the operation has been concluded as was prescribed. The problem being to add together certain numbers, the solution is to add them; the proof shows that the solution is correct because the problem was to add and addition has taken place. If the problem contains more composite determinations and operations (for example to multiply decimal numbers), and the solution indicates merely the mechanical procedure, then a proof does become necessary; but the proof can be nothing else but the analysis of these determinations and of the operation whence the solution emerges by itself. This separation of the *solution* as a mechanical procedure and the *proof* as a recollection of the nature of the object which was to be treated and of the operation itself, leads to the loss of the advantage of the analytic problem, which is that the construction can be derived immediately from the problem and therefore can be represented as reasonable in and for itself; while the other way expressly affects the construction with a flaw which is peculiar to the synthetic method.—In the higher analysis, where, with the power-relation, relations of discrete magnitude appear which are chiefly qualitative and depend on notion-determinatenesses, the problems and theorems certainly contain synthetic determinations; there other determinations and relations must be taken as intermediate terms, than are indicated immediately in the problem or theorem.

But even these auxiliary determinations must be of such a kind that they are founded upon the consideration and development of one side of the problem or theorem; the synthetic appearance arises solely from the fact that the problem or theorem does not itself announce this side.—For example, the problem of finding the sum of the powers of the roots of an equation is solved by the consideration and subsequent connexion of the functions which are the coefficients of the equation of the roots. The determination of the functions of the coefficients and their connexion, which here is employed, is not already expressed in the problem; but for the rest the development itself is wholly analytical. Another synthetic solution is the solution of the equation $x^{m-1} = 0$ by the help of the sine, and also the immanent algebraic solution through the consideration of the residuum of $x^{m-1} - 1$ divided by m and of the so-called primitive roots;—this was of course discovered by Gauss, and is one of the most important modern extensions of analysis. And these solutions are synthetic because the determinations employed—the sine, or the consideration of the residua—are not determinations of the problem itself.

The nature of the analysis which considers the so-called infinitesimal differences of variable magnitudes—the differential and integral calculus—was treated at greater length in the first part of this Logic. It was shown there that the foundation of this is a qualitative determination of magnitude which can be apprehended through the Notion alone. The transition to this from magnitude as such is no longer analytic; whence to this day mathematics has failed in justifying these operations, which are based upon this transition, through themselves, that is, in a mathematical manner: for the transition is not of mathematical nature. Leibniz is given the credit of having transformed the arithmetic of the infinitesimal differences into a calculus; but (as was shown in the same place) he made the transition in the most inadequate manner, a manner both thoroughly notionless and unmathematical: once, however, the transition is presupposed—and in the present state of the science it is no more than a presupposition—the further course is nothing but a series of ordinary operations.

It was mentioned that analysis becomes synthetic when it reaches determinations which are no longer posited by the

problems themselves. But the *general* transition from Analytic to Synthetic Cognition is implied in the necessary transition from the form of immediacy to mediation, from abstract identity to distinction. The analytic function halts in its activity at the determinations in general in so far as they are self-related; but by reason of their determinateness they have the essential property of relating themselves to an Other. It has already been mentioned that, although Analytic Cognition proceeds upon relations which are not a material given externally, but thought-determinations, it still remains analytic, since for it these relations too are *given* relations. But the abstract identity which is the peculiar object of this Cognition, is essentially identity of distincts; hence this identity even as such must belong to this Cognition; while the connexion must both be posited by and become identical with the subjective Notion.

(b) SYNTHETIC COGNITION

Analytic Cognition is the first premiss of the whole syllogism,—the immediate relation of the Notion to the Object. Consequently *identity* is the determination which it recognizes as its own: it is only the apprehension of what *is*. Synthetic Cognition endeavours to form a Notion of what is, that is, to seize the multiplicity of determinations in their unity. Hence it is the second premiss of the syllogism in which terms various as such are related. Its goal is therefore necessity in general.—The terms which are connected are partly related, and then, although related, they are also independent and indifferent to one another; and partly they are knit together in the Notion, which is their simple but determinate unity. Now in so far as Synthetic Cognition passes over from abstract identity to relation, or from Being to Reflection, it is not the absolute Reflection of the Notion which the Notion cognizes in its object: the reality which it gives itself is the next stage, namely the identity (already indicated) of various terms as such, which consequently is also still inner (and only necessity) and not subjective and existing for itself, and is not yet, therefore, the Notion as such. Consequently, although Synthetic Cognition has the Notion-determinations for its content, and the Object is posited in these, yet they are merely *related* to one another or are in

immediate unity, which unity for this very reason is not that by which the Notion is as Subject.

This constitutes the finitude of this Cognition: this real side of the Idea in it still possesses identity as inner; and therefore the determinations of the latter are still external for themselves. It is not as subjectivity, and therefore that peculiar entity which the Notion has in its object still lacks individuality; and it is no longer the abstract but the determinate form (that is, the *particular* element of the Notion) which corresponds to it in the Object, while the individual part of it is still a *given* content. Consequently, although this Cognition transforms the objective world into Notions, it gives it only a form according to the Notion-determinations and must *discover* the Object in its individuality or determinate determinateness: it is not yet itself determinant. Similarly it finds propositions and laws and demonstrates their necessity, but not as a necessity of the case in and for itself (that is, out of the Notion), but of Cognition which progresses along given determinations (the distinctions of appearance) and cognizes for itself the proposition as unity and relation, or cognizes out of appearance the ground of appearance.

The further moments of Synthetic Cognition must now be considered.

1. DEFINITION

First of all the objectivity (which still is given) is transformed into the simple and first form, that is, into the form of the Notion. Consequently the moments of this apprehension are just the moments of the Notion, namely, universality, particularity, and individuality.—The individual is the Object itself as immediate image, or that which is to be defined. The universal aspect of its Object has turned out in the determination of the objective judgment or the Judgment of Necessity to be the Kind and further to be the next term, namely, the universal plus that determinateness which at the same time is the principle for the distinction of the particular. This distinction exists in the object as specific difference which makes it a certain species and is the basis of its disjunction as against the other species.

In this manner Definition leads back the object to its Notion, and in doing so strips off those of its externals which are requisite for existence; it abstracts from that which in its realization is added to the Notion, by means of which it emerges first into the Idea and secondly into external existence. *Description* is for imagination, and absorbs this further content which belongs to reality. But Definition reduces this wealth of the manifold determinations of intuited existence to the simplest moments; it is implied in the Notion what is the form of these simple elements and how they are determined relatively to one another. Thus, as has been indicated, the object is taken as universal which at the same time is essentially determinate. The object itself is the third term, the individual, in which genus and particularization are posited in one: here something immediate is posited, which is external to the Notion, since the latter is not yet self-determining.

In these determinations—the form-distinction of Definition—the Notion finds itself and has the reality which corresponds to it. But the intro-Reflection of the Notion-moments, or individuality, is not yet contained in this reality; the Object, accordingly, in so far as it lies in Cognition, is not yet determined as subjective; and hence, relatively to it, Cognition is subjective and has an external beginning; or again it is subjective because it has an external beginning in the individual. Consequently the content of the Notion is given and contingent. Hence the concrete Notion is itself contingent, in a dual aspect: (1) in its content generally, and (2) according to the content-determinations which are selected for the Notion from the manifold qualities which the object has in external existence, and are made to constitute its moments.

The latter respect demands further consideration. Individuality is determinedness in and for itself, and therefore lies outside the peculiar Notion-determination of Synthetic Cognition. Consequently there is no principle to determine which sides of the object are to be looked upon as belonging to its Notion-determination and which as belonging merely to external reality. This constitutes a difficulty in Definitions which cannot be removed for this kind of Cognition. A distinction however must here be made.—Firstly, it is easy to discover the definition of products of self-conscious aim at an End; for the

End which they are to serve is a determination which is created out of subjective resolution and constitutes that essential particularization or form of the existing which here alone is important. The further nature of its material and other external properties is contained in its determination in so far as they correspond to the End; and the others are unessential.

Secondly, geometrical objects are abstract spatial determinations; the fundamental abstraction (so-called absolute space) has lost all further concrete determinations, and now has only such shapes and figurations as are posited in it: they *are* therefore essentially only what they *ought* to be; their Notion-determination, and, more precisely, the specific difference, has its simple unimpeded reality in them; in so far they are the same as the products of external adequacy to End, and they also agree with arithmetical objects in this respect; for in these too only that determination which was posited in them is fundamental.—It is true that space has further determinations; it has three dimensions, and continuity and divisibility, which are not posited in it by the external determination. But these belong to the material which is absorbed and are immediate presuppositions; and synthetic relations and laws are produced only by the connexion and complication of these subjective determinations with this peculiar nature of the soil into which they were introduced.—With numerical determinations the simple principle of the unit is the foundation, and therefore the connexion and further determination are entirely posited; whereas the determinations in space, which, for itself, is a continuous juxtaposition, spread themselves still further, and have a reality different from their Notion but no longer belonging to the immediate Definition.

But, thirdly, the Definition of concrete objects of nature as well as of spirit is a wholly different matter. For sensuous representation such objects are things of many properties. And it is here important to apprehend what is their nearest genus, and then what is their specific difference. It must consequently be determined which of the many properties belongs to the object as genus and which as species, and further which of these properties is the essential one; and, for the latter end, it is necessary to understand their inter-connexion and whether the positing of one implies that of another. But no criterion is given

for this end except their existence itself.—The essentiality of a property for Definition (where it is to be posited as simple undeveloped determinateness) is its universality. But in existence this is merely empirical,—a temporal universality, where the property is permanent while the others show themselves transitory in the persistence of the whole,—or a universality which emerges from the comparison with other concrete wholes and in so far does not go further than community. Now if comparison presents the total habitus, as it offers itself empirically, as common foundation, then it is the office of reflection to collect it into a simple thought-determination and to apprehend the simple character of such a totality. The attestation, however, that a thought-determination or any one of the immediate properties constitutes the simple and determinate essence of the object, can only consist in a derivation of such a determination from the concrete quality. But this would require an analysis which transforms into thoughts the immediate qualities and reduces their concrete element to something simple; an analysis which is higher than that which has just been considered, because it ought not to abstract but ought to preserve in the universal the determinate part of the concrete, uniting it and showing it as dependent upon the simple thought-determination.

But the relations of the manifold determinations of immediate existence to the simple Notion would be Propositions requiring proof. But Definition is the first and, as yet, undeveloped Notion, and therefore, when it is required to apprehend the simple determinateness of the object (which apprehension is to be immediate), it can use only one of its immediate so-called properties—a determination of sensible existence or of sensuous representation; its individualization, which takes place through abstraction, thus constitutes its simplicity, while for universality and essentiality the Notion is referred to empirical universality, to persistence in changed circumstances, and to reflection, which looks for the Notion-determination in external existence and in sensuous representation—where precisely it cannot be found.—Consequently Definition automatically renounces proper Notion-determinations, which would essentially be the principles of the objects, and is satisfied with *characteristics*, that is, determinations in which essentiality is indifferent

for the object itself, their end being to furnish tokens for external reflection.—Such an individual and external determinateness is so inadequate to the concrete totality and to the nature of its Notion that it cannot be selected for its own sake nor taken in such a manner that a concrete whole could have its true expression and determination in it.—Blumenbach,¹ for example, observed that the lobe of the ear is absent in all other animals, whence, according to the ordinary phrases about common and distinguishing characteristics, it might be used with perfect correctness as the differentiating mark in the definition of physical man. But such a wholly external determination immediately shows itself to be utterly inadequate to the idea of the total habitus of physical man, and to the demand that the Notion-determination is to be something essential. It is quite contingent whether the characteristics admitted into Definition are such pure makeshifts or approach more closely to the nature of a principle. Also their externality proclaims that no beginning was made from them in Notion-cognition; in fact some dim feeling, some indefinite although profounder sense, some premonition of the essential, preceded the discovery of genera in Nature and in Spirit; a determinate externality was sought only subsequently for understanding.—In existence the Notion has entered into externality, and thus is unfolded into its distinctions; it cannot therefore be entirely attached to any one of such properties. Properties, as the externality of the thing, are external to themselves; and in the sphere of Appearance (under the Thing of many Properties) it was shown that for this reason they even became independent matters; and Spirit, considered from this same standpoint of appearance, becomes an aggregate of many independent forces. The individual property or force, even when it is posited as indifferent to the others, ceases, through this standpoint, to be a characterizing principle; and then the determinateness, as determinateness of the Notion in general, disappears.

Further, besides the differences between properties, the distinction between the Notion and its actualization emerges in concrete things. In Nature and in Spirit the Notion has an external representation, where its determinateness shows itself

¹ Blumenbach, Johann Friedrich, 1752–1840, Professor at Jena; a pioneer in comparative anatomy and physiology.

as dependence upon the external, as transitoriness and inadequacy. Thus although the actual something shows in itself what it *ought* to be, it can equally show (according to the negative Notion-judgment) that its actuality corresponds to this Notion but imperfectly, or that it is bad. Now Definition must indicate the determinateness of the Notion in some immediate property; and there is no property against which some instance could not be adduced in which the whole habitus allows the concrete entity (which is to be defined) to be known, while at the same time the property which is taken for the mark of the entity appears crude or stunted. In a bad plant or bad animal genus, a contemptible man or a bad State, some sides of existence are defective or wholly obliterated which otherwise might be taken as the distinguishing mark and essential determinateness for Definition in the existence of such a concrete entity. But a bad plant or animal (and so on) still remains a plant or animal. If therefore the bad is to be admitted into the Definition, then all those properties which empirical search wished to regard as essential, elude it through instances of malformation which lack those properties. Thus, for example, the brain is proved unessential for physical man by the occurrence of acephalous births, and the protection of life and property unessential for the State by instances of despotic States and tyrannous governments.—If the Notion is asserted against the instance, and the latter is styled a bad specimen as measured against that standard, then the Notion ceases to be certified by Appearance. But the independence of the Notion is antithetical to the meaning of Definition, which is supposed to be the immediate Notion, and so can take up its determinations for objects only out of the immediacy of existence and can justify itself only in its discoveries.—Whether its content *in and for itself* is truth or contingency is a question that lies outside the sphere of Definition; but formal truth, or the agreement between the Notion which is subjectively posited in the Definition, and some object which is actual outside it, cannot be established, since the individual object may also be bad.

The content of Definition in general comes from immediate existence, and, because it is immediate, it has no justification, and the question after its necessity is set aside through the origin; for this question pronounces the Notion to be merely

immediate, and therewith renounces the attempt to conceive the Notion itself. Consequently Definition represents nothing but the form-determination of the Notion upon a given content, without any intro-Reflection of the Notion, that is, *without its Being-for-Self*.

But immediacy in general only emerges out of mediation, and must therefore pass over into the latter. In other words the content-determinateness which Definition contains is not only immediate because it is determinateness, but it is mediated through other terms. Hence Definition can comprehend its object only through the opposite determination, and consequently must pass over to *Classification*.

2. CLASSIFICATION

The universal must particularize itself: in so far the universal implies the necessity of Classification. But Definition itself already begins with the particular, and therefore the particular implies its necessary transition to Classification, since for itself the particular points on to another particular. Conversely the particular distinguishes itself from the universal in that the determinateness is held fast in the need for its distinction from that which is its other; thus the universal is presupposed for Classification. Thus the process is this, that the individual content of Definition rises through particularity to the extreme, or universality; but the latter must now be taken as objective foundation; and, from this foundation, Classification is presented as disjunction of the universal as *prius*.

Hereby a transition has arisen which takes place from universal to particular and therefore is determined through the form of the Notion. By itself Definition is individual; a plurality of definitions belongs to a plurality of objects. The progress from universal to particular, which belongs to the Notion, is the foundation and possibility of a synthetic science, of a system and of systematic Cognition.

The first requisite for this is, as has been shown, that a beginning shall be made with the object in the form of a universal. In actuality (either natural or spiritual) the concrete individuality is the first thing that is given to subjective and natural Cognition; but in Cognition (which is a process of form-

ing Notions at least in so far as it has the form of the Notion for foundation) the simple term segregated from the concrete must be the *prius*, because the object has in this form alone the form of a self-relating universal and of something immediate according to the Notion. It may be objected to this scientific process that, since intuition is easier than Cognition, that which can be intuited (concrete actuality) should be made the beginning of science; and it may be added that this course is more natural than that which begins from the object in its abstraction and thence follows the opposite course to its particularization and concrete individualization.—But, where Cognition is demanded, comparison with intuition has already been judged and surrendered, and the only question can be what is to be the first thing within the process of Cognition and what is to be the nature of the sequel: a cognitive progress, and no longer a natural, is now required.—If ease is the only question, then it is self-evident that it is easier for Cognition to seize the abstract simple thought-determination than the concrete, which is a manifold concatenation of such thought-determinations and their relations: and this is the manner in which the concrete is to be apprehended, not as it is in intuition. In and for itself the universal is the first Notion-moment, since it is the simple, and the particular comes after, because it is mediated; conversely the simple is the more universal, and the concrete, since it is differentiated in itself and consequently mediated, is that which presupposes the transition from a first term.—This observation applies not only to the order of the progress in the determinate forms of Definitions, Classifications, and Propositions, but also to the order of Cognition in general and merely with respect to the general distinction between abstract and concrete.—Consequently, for example, where reading is learnt, the beginning, rightly, is not made with whole words or even syllables, but with the elements of words and syllables and with the symbols of abstract sounds. In written characters the analysis of the concrete word into its abstract sounds and their symbols has already been completed; for this very reason a reading lesson is a first occupation with abstract objects. In geometry a beginning must be made not with a concrete three-dimensional figure, but with the point and the line and next with plane figures; and among those not with polygons but with

the triangle, and, among curves, with the circle. In physics the several natural properties or matters must be set free from the manifold complications which beset them in concrete actuality, and must be represented with their simple and necessary conditions: they too, like three-dimensional figures, may be intuited; but first the way for their intuition must be cleared by causing them to appear, and be held fast, free from all modifications through circumstances external to their peculiar determinateness. Magnetism, electricity, various kinds of gas, and the like, are such objects as admit of determinate Cognition only if they are taken as removed out of those concrete circumstances in which they appear in actuality. It is true that experiment presents them to intuition in a concrete example; but, in order to be scientific, an experiment (*a*) must admit only the necessary conditions and (*b*) must multiply itself in order to show that the inseparable concretion of these conditions is unessential, since they appear first in one and then in another concrete shape, so that for Cognition only their abstract form remains.—To mention one more example, it might have appeared natural and profound to consider colour first in the concrete appearance to the subjective animal sense, next as a spectral appearance suspended outside the subject, and finally as fixed upon objects in external actuality. But, for Cognition, the universal and therefore truly prior form is the middle one of the above-mentioned, where colour stands midway between subjectivity and objectivity as the well-known spectrum, unentangled as yet with either subjective or objective circumstances. The latter merely disturb the pure contemplation of the nature of colour, for they operate as active causes and therefore make it impossible to decide whether the definite changes, transitions, and relations which take place in a colour are grounded in its own specific nature, or must rather be ascribed either to the abnormal specific quality of these circumstances, to the particular affections and effects, healthy or diseased, of the organs of the subject, or to the chemical, vegetable, and animal forces of the objects.—Several further examples might be cited from the cognition of organic nature and of the world of spirit: the abstract must everywhere constitute the beginning and the element in which and from which the particularities and rich shapes of the concrete spread out.

Now in **Classification** (or in the particular) the distinction between it and the universal arises; but this universal is itself already determinate and thus is only a member of a Classification. Hence there is for it some higher universal; but there is again a higher universal for the latter, and so, at this point, to infinity. The Cognition which is here considered has no immanent limit, since it starts from what is given and the form of abstract universality is peculiar to its first term. Accordingly any object which seems to have an elementary universality is made the object of a particular science, and is an absolute beginning in so far as imagination is presupposed to be acquainted with it and for itself it is taken not to need any derivation. Definition takes it as immediate.

Next the further progress from this term is Classification. For this progress only an immanent principle, that is, a beginning from the universal and the Notion, would be required; but the Cognition which has here been considered lacks this, because it pursues only the form-determination of the Notion without its intro-Reflection: it consequently takes the content-determinateness out of what is given. There is no peculiar ground for the particular which arises in Classification, either in regard to that which is to constitute the basis of Classification or to the definite relation which is to subsist between the members of the disjunction. Consequently in this respect the office of Cognition can only be, partly to order the particular which is discovered in the empirical material, and partly to find its universal determinations by means of comparison. The latter determinations then count as grounds of Classification; and there is a similar number of Classifications accordingly. The mutual relation of the members of a Classification (the species) has only this general determination, that they must be determinate as against one another in accordance with the ground of Classification which has been assumed; if their variety rested upon a different consideration they would not be co-ordinated upon a level basis.

Since a principle of determinedness for self is lacking, the laws which are employed for this operation of Classification can consist only of formal and empty rules which lead nowhere. —Thus the rule is set up that the Classification should exhaust the Notion; but in fact each individual member of the Classi-

fication must exhaust the Notion. Really however the determinateness of the Notion is meant, and this it is which is to be exhausted ; but, since species here have an empirical multiplicity which in itself is without determination, the number, greater or less, of species which are discovered does not contribute to the exhaustion of the Notion. For example it does not concern the exhaustion of the genus whether a further dozen is discovered in addition to the existing sixty-seven species of parrots. The demand for exhaustion can mean only the tautological proposition that all species should be specified completely.—Now with the growth of empirical knowledge it may well happen that species are discovered which do not lie under the determination of the genus which has been adopted ; for the latter is adopted more frequently in accordance with a dim idea of the general habitus than in accordance with the more or less individual characteristic which is expressly designed to serve for its determination.—In such a case the genus would have to be changed, and a justification would have to be furnished for regarding some other number of species as species of a new genus ; that is, the genus would be determined in accordance with a collection made under some respect which is accepted as unity, and this respect itself would here be the basis of Classification. Conversely, if the determinateness which originally was accepted were held fast as the peculiarity of the genus, that material would be excluded which it was desired to comprehend in one as species with former species. This Notionless activity, which first assumes a determinateness to be an essential moment of a genus and accordingly subordinates or excludes particulars, but next begins with the particular and, in arranging it, is guided by some other determinateness, produces an appearance of arbitrariness, to which it is left to determine what part or side of the concrete it shall hold fast and arrange accordingly.—Physical nature offers of itself such a contingency in the principles of Classification ; because of its dependent and external actuality it stands in a connexion which is manifold and is given for it too. Consequently a multitude of principles is found to which it must conform, following one in one of the series of its forms and another in another, and producing hybrids which simultaneously diverge in opposite directions. It thus results that in one series of natural objects

characteristics emerge as extremely expressive and essential, which become insignificant and purposeless in others, so that it becomes impossible to retain a principle of Classification of this kind.

The general determinateness of empirical species can be only this, that they are generally different from one another without being opposite. The disjunction of the Notion has already been demonstrated in its determinateness; if particularity, without the negative unity of the Notion, is accepted as immediate and given, then the distinction does not move beyond the reflection-form of difference in general, which has already been considered. That externality, which is the peculiar habitat of the Notion in Nature, introduces the total indifference of the distinction; consequently a common determination for Classification is derived from number.

However contingent the particular is here as against the universal, and therefore against Classification in general, it may be ascribed to an instinct of reason if Classifications and grounds for Classification are found in this Cognition which, so far as sensuous properties admit, show themselves to be more adequate to the Notion. Thus for animals the organs of eating (teeth and claws) are used in the various systems as a comprehensive ground of Classification; at first they are taken merely as sides in which the characteristics for the subjective purpose of Cognition are more easily designated. But in fact these organs not only contain a distinction which belongs to external reflection, but also they are the vital centre of animal individuality, where it posits itself, in distinction from external nature (its Other), as self-relating individuality, separating itself from the continuity with Other.—For the plant the fructifying organs constitute the highest point of vegetable life, by which it intimates the transition to sexual differentiation and thus to distinct individuality. Systems therefore have rightly turned to this point as a ground for Classification which, if not wholly adequate, goes far, and have thus based themselves on a determinateness which is not only a determinateness for external and comparative reflection, but is also in and for itself the highest that a plant admits.

3. THE PROPOSITION

1. The third stage of this Cognition, which progresses in accordance with the Notion-determinations, is the transition of particularity into individuality; the latter constitutes the content of *the Proposition* (or Theorem). What must here be considered is the self-relating determinateness, the internal distinction of the object and the relation to one another of the distinct determinatenesses. Definition contains one determinateness only, and Classification one determinateness as against others: in individualization the object has fallen apart within itself. Just as Definition does not go beyond the general Notion, so in Propositions the object is cognized in its reality, in the conditions and forms of its real existence. Thus, joined to Definition, it represents the Idea, which is the unity of Notion and Reality. But the Cognition which is here considered and is still engaged in search does not reach this representation in so far as Reality with it does not emerge out of the Notion, and so the dependence of Reality upon the Notion, and therefore the unity itself, is not cognized.

Now according to the determination which has been indicated the Proposition is the properly synthetic part of an object, in so far as the relations of its determinatenesses are necessary, that is, are founded upon the inner identity of the Notion. In Definition and Classification the synthetic element is a combination admitted from outside; what is found given is reduced into the form of the Notion, but, as given, the whole content is merely pointed at, whereas the Proposition ought to be demonstrated. This Cognition does not deduce the content of its Definitions and determinations of Classification, so that it might seem that it could also spare itself the *proof* of these relations, which are expressed by Propositions, remaining satisfied with perception in this respect too. But Cognition is distinguished from bare perception and sensuous representation by the Notional form generally which it imparts to the content; this is the work of Definition and Classification. Now the content of the Proposition is derived from the Notion-moment of individuality, and consequently it consists in determinations of reality which no longer have merely the simple and imme-

mediate Notion-determinations for their relation; in individuality the Notion has passed over to otherness, to the Reality by virtue of which it becomes Idea. Thus the synthesis which is contained in the Proposition no longer has the Notional form for justification: it is a combination of *various* terms; consequently the unity, which has not yet been posited, remains to be demonstrated,—so that proof becomes actually necessary for this Cognition.

Here the first difficulty which arises is to distinguish accurately between the determinations of the object which can be admitted into the Definition and those which must be relegated to the Propositions. There can be no principle which governs this. A principle appears to lie in the fact that that which immediately belongs to the object belongs to the Definition, while the rest, being mediated, must first have its mediation exposed. But the content of Definition is determinate in general, and therefore is essentially mediated itself; its immediacy is merely subjective, that is, the subject makes an arbitrary beginning and allows the object to count as presupposition. Now the object is an object concrete in general in itself; it must also be classified, and thus a number of determinations result which by their nature are mediated, and are taken as immediate and undemonstrated,—not by virtue of a principle, but only by subjective determination.—Even in Euclid, who has always been justly recognized as the master of this synthetic kind of Cognition, a presupposition about parallel lines is found, under the name of axiom, which has been thought to require proof; and attempts have been made in various ways to supply this want. In several other theorems it has been thought that presuppositions have been discovered which should not have been assumed immediately but should have been proved. With regard to the axiom about parallel lines, it may be observed that it is a clear example of the justness of thought of Euclid, who accurately valued the element and nature of his science. The proof of this axiom might have been deduced from the *Notion* of parallel lines; but such a proof is no more part of his science than the deduction of his definitions and axioms or of his subject in general, namely, space and its first determinations, the dimensions. Such a deduction can only be made out of the Notion, and the Notion lies outside the peculiar sphere of

Euclid's science; these therefore are necessarily presuppositions for it, or relative *priora*.

The axioms may be mentioned in this connexion; they are members of the same class. As a rule they are incorrectly taken as absolute *priora*, as though in and for themselves they required no proof. If this were in fact the case they would be mere tautologies, since only in abstract identity is there no variety and consequently no need for mediation. But if the axioms are more than tautologies they are propositions of some other science, since they are to be presuppositions for the science in which they serve as axioms. Consequently they are really theorems, and generally logical ones. The axioms of geometry are such lemmata, or logical propositions which approximate to tautology since they refer to magnitude only, so that qualitative distinctions are extinguished in them; the capital axiom—the purely quantitative Syllogism—has been mentioned above.—Thus the axioms, considered in and for themselves, require proof as much as Definitions and Classifications, and the reason why they are not made into Propositions (or theorems) is only that they are taken as relatively first for a certain standpoint and therefore as presuppositions.

With respect to the content of Propositions a further distinction is to be made. The content consists in a relation of determinatenesses of the reality of the Notion: consequently these relations may be more or less incomplete and individual relations of the object, or else may be such a relation as comprehends the whole content of the reality and expresses its determinate relation. But the unity of the complete content-determinatenesses is equal to the Notion: consequently a proposition which contains them is in turn a Definition, which however expresses the Notion not only as taken up immediately but as developed into its determinate and real distinctions; it expresses the complete existence of the Notion. Consequently the two together are the Idea.

If the Propositions of a synthetic science, and especially of geometry, are more closely compared, the distinction will be observed that some of its Propositions contain only single relations of the object, and others contain such as express the full determinateness of the object. It is a very superficial view which holds that all propositions have the same value because

each contains a truth anyhow, and each is equally essential in the formal demonstrative progress or train of proof. The distinction with regard to the content of Propositions has the closest connexion with this progress; some further observations upon the latter will serve to elucidate this distinction and also the nature of Synthetic Cognition. We will take for example Euclidean geometry, as representative of the synthetic method, of which it furnishes the most perfect model; it has always been praised for the consecutive arrangement of its Propositions, whereby for each theorem those other propositions which its construction and proof require are always discovered to have been already demonstrated. This circumstance relates to formal consecutiveness; and however important this is, it rather regards external arrangement for convenience, and for itself has no relation to the essential distinction between Notion and Idea, which involves a higher principle of necessary progression.—For the Definitions with which a beginning is made take the sensible object as immediately given, and determine it according to its nearest genus and specific difference; and these too are the simple immediate determinatenesses of the Notion, Universality and Particularity, whose relation is not further developed. Now the first Propositions can only have recourse to such immediate determinations as are contained in the Definitions; moreover their reciprocal dependence can only regard this general point, that one is, generally, determined through the other. Thus Euclid's first theorems about triangles regard only their equality, that is, the number of pieces in a triangle which must be determined in order that the other pieces of the same triangle (or the whole) shall be altogether determined. The comparison of two triangles with each other and the plan of placing equality in coincidence is a detour required by a method which is forced to use sensuous coincidence in place of the concept of determinedness. Considered otherwise by themselves, these theorems themselves contain two parts, one of which may be regarded as the Notion and the other as the Reality, or that which completes the former into Reality. For that which completely determines (for example the two sides and the included angle) is already the whole triangle for understanding; nothing further is wanted for its complete determinateness, and the remaining two angles and third side are

the excess of Reality over the determinateness of the Notion. Thus the work of these theorems is really to reduce the sensuous triangle (which of course does require three sides and three angles) to the simplest conditions; the Definition had mentioned only the three lines which enclose the plane figure and make it a triangle: the Proposition at length contains expressly the determinedness of the angles through the determinedness of the sides; and the other Propositions contain the dependence of three further parts on three such parts.—The complete determinateness of the magnitude of a triangle within itself according to its sides is contained in the theorem of Pythagoras: this is the equation of the sides of a triangle, whereas previously the sides achieve only a general determinateness of its parts relatively to one another, and not an equation. Consequently this Proposition is the perfect and real Definition of the triangle, and primarily of the right-angled triangle, which in its distinctions is simplest and most regular.—With this Proposition Euclid ends the first book; and indeed it is a perfect determinateness which has here been reached. And similarly, after he has reduced to uniformity the triangles which are not right-angled and are affected with greater inequality, he ends the second book with the reduction of the rectangle to the square,—which is the equation of the self-equal (the square) and the self-unequal (the rectangle). Similarly the hypotenuse (which corresponds to the right angle, or self-equal) in the theorem of Pythagoras constitutes one side of the equation, while the other side is constituted by the self-unequal, namely the two catheters. This equation between square and rectangle is the basis of the second definition of the circle—which in turn is the theorem of Pythagoras just in so far as the catheters are taken as variable magnitudes. The first equation of the circle bears the same relation of *sensuous* determinateness to *equation* as the two different definitions of conic sections in general bear to each other.

This true synthetic progress is a transition of the universal to individuality, namely to that which is determined in and for itself or to the unity of the object within itself, in so far as the latter has fallen apart and has been distinguished into its essential real determinatenesses. In other sciences however the usual and wholly incomplete progress is that, while the

beginning is made from a universal, its individualization and concretion are only the application of the universal to material which is introduced from elsewhere. In this manner the truly *individual* element of the Idea is an empirical addition.

But however complete or incomplete, more or less, the content of a Proposition is, it must be proved. It is a relation of real determinations which have not the relation of Notion-determinations; if they have this relation (as can be demonstrated in those Propositions which we called second or real Definitions), then for this very reason these (*a*) are Definitions; but (*b*) because their content at the same time consists in a relation of real determinations and not merely in the relation of a universal and of simple determinateness, they are both in need and capable of a proof in comparison with such a first Definition. They are real determinatenesses, and as such have the form of entities persisting indifferent and various; consequently they are not immediately one, and for this reason their mediation must be exposed. The immediate unity in the first Definition is that in accordance with which the particular is in the universal.

2. The mediation must now be more closely considered. It may be simple, or may pass through several mediations. The members which mediate are connected with those which are to be mediated; but it is not the Notion out of which the mediation and Proposition are reduced in this Cognition—the transition into opposite being altogether alien to the Notion—, and therefore the mediating determinations must be produced from somewhere, without the notion of connexion, as a provisional material for the framework of the proof. This preliminary procedure is the *construction*.

Among the relations of the content of the Proposition, which may be extremely various, only those must now be enumerated and made imaginable which are used in the proof. It is only in the proof that this collection of material achieves a meaning: in itself it appears blind and Notionless. After the proof it is of course seen that it was suitable to draw such further lines, for example, in a geometrical figure as are indicated in the construction; but in the construction it demands blind obedience, so that this operation for itself is without understanding, since the end which guides it has not yet been expressed.—It

is indifferent whether it is a theorem proper or a problem for which the construction is undertaken: such as it appears *before* the proof, it is something not derived out of the determination given in the theorem or problem, and is therefore a meaningless activity for anyone who does not yet know the end; always it is ruled by an external end.

This temporary secret emerges in the proof. As has been stated, the proof contains the mediation of that which the Proposition enunciated as connected; it is only through this mediation that this connexion appears necessary. The construction by itself is without the subjectivity of the Notion; and the proof similarly is a subjective activity without objectivity. For the content-determinations of the Proposition are not also posited as Notion-determinations, but as given and indifferent parts which stand in manifold external relations to one another; and therefore the necessity shows itself only in the formal and external Notion. The proof is not a *genesis* of the relation which constitutes the content of the Proposition; the necessity exists only for intellectual discernment, and the whole proof for the subjective purpose of Cognition. For this reason it is altogether an external reflection which goes from without inwards, that is, draws conclusions about the inner nature of the relation from external circumstances. The circumstances which the construction represented, *followed* from the nature of the object: here conversely they become *ground* and mediating relations. Consequently the middle or third term, in which the terms connected in the Proposition represent themselves in their unity—it is the nerve of the proof—is only an entity in which this connexion *appears* and is external. The consequence which this proof pursues is the converse of the nature of the thing, and therefore that which there is regarded as ground is a subjective ground from which the nature of the thing emerges for Cognition only.

What has been said so far makes clear the necessary limit of this Cognition, which very frequently has been misunderstood. The brilliant example of the synthetic method is the science of geometry,—but it has been improperly applied to other sciences, and even to philosophy. Geometry is a science of magnitude, and therefore formal syllogizing most fittingly belongs to it. Here the merely quantitative determination is

considered, and abstraction is made from the qualitative determination; it can therefore remain within formal identity or Notionless unity, which is *equality* and belongs to external abstracting reflection. The object (spatial determinations) is such an abstract object as has been prepared for the end of having a complete finite and external determinateness. By virtue of its abstract object this science has on the one hand the sublime quality that in its void and silent spaces colour is extinguished and every other sensuous property has vanished, and that every other appeal is silent which speaks more intimately to living individuality. On the other hand the abstract object still remains space, an unsensuously sensuous entity;—intuition is raised into its abstraction. It is a *form* of intuition, but still it is intuition;—it is sensuous, the external juxtaposition of sensuousness itself, its pure Notionlessness.—Enough has been heard in our time about the excellence of geometry from this side;—the fact that it has sensuous intuition for its foundation has been declared its greatest advantage, and it has been thought that this is even the basis of its high standing as a science, and that its proofs rest upon intuition. This shallow observation must be met by the platitude that no science is made through intuition, but through thought alone. Geometry, by virtue of its still sensuous material, rests to some extent on intuition; but this gives it only that kind of evidence which the sensuous in general has for spirit without thought. And, by a pitiful error, this very sensuousness of material has been counted an advantage which in fact marks the lowness of its standpoint. It owes its capacity for a higher scientific quality to the abstraction of its sensuous object alone; hence also its great advantage over all the other collections of pieces of knowledge which men are likewise pleased to call sciences and which have for content a concrete and perceptible sensuous, showing a dim foreboding and allusion to the demands of the Notion only through the order which they attempt to introduce.

Geometrical space is the abstraction and void of external juxtaposition; only by virtue of this is it possible that the configurations can be plotted into its indeterminateness in such a manner that their determinations remain separate in stable fixity and contain no transition into opposite. The science of

geometry is thus simple science of the finite which is compared according to magnitude, and whose unity is external, or is *equality*. But in this process of figuration a start is made at the same time from different sides and principles, and the various figures arise each for itself; and thus being compared they still show qualitative unlikeness and incommensurability. These properties are the force which drives geometry from finitude, where it was pursuing its safe and regular advance, to infinity—a region where entities which are qualitatively different are posited as like. Here its self-evidence ceases in this respect, that elsewhere it is based upon fixed finitude and has nothing to do with the Notion and its Appearance, which is the transition that has just been mentioned. Finite science has here reached its limit, since the necessity and mediation of the synthetic element are no longer founded upon merely positive, but upon negative, identity.

Geometry, like algebra, soon strikes upon its limit with its abstract objects of mere understanding; and with other sciences the synthetic method proves from the beginning all the more inadequate—most of all with philosophy. With respect to Definition and Classification what is required has already resulted; and this would be the place for a discussion of the Proposition and proof only; but, apart from the presupposition of Definition and Classification, which demands and presupposes the proof, the inadequacy consists in their general attitude to the Propositions. This attitude is chiefly remarkable with the empirical sciences (physics for example) when they attempt to assume the form of synthetic sciences. The following method is used. Reflection-determinations about particular forces or other internal and essential forms which result from the manner in which empirical data are analysed, and can justify themselves only as results, must be given the prior place, in order that a general foundation may thus be obtained which may afterwards be applied to and demonstrated in the individual. These general foundations have no foothold for themselves; they are postulated for the time being; and it is noticed only in the *conclusions* derived that the said conclusions are the real ground of these foundations. It is now seen that the so-called explanation and proof of the concrete element which is brought into Propositions is partly a tautology and partly a confusion of the

true relation; further it is seen that this confusion served to disguise the trick of Cognition, which took up empirical data one-sidedly (the only manner in which it could reach its simple definitions and formulae), and eludes empirical refutation by examining experience and allowing it validity not in its concrete totality but as example, and only in that direction which is serviceable for the hypotheses and the theory. Concrete experience being thus subordinated to the presupposed determinations, the foundation of the theory is obscured, and is exhibited only from that side which is in conformity with the theory; and altogether this method makes it much more difficult to contemplate without bias concrete perceptions by themselves. Only if the entire course which has been followed is inverted does the whole obtain the right relation, where the connexion between ground and consequence and the correctness of the transformation of perception into thought may be checked. Consequently one of the main difficulties in the study of such sciences is, to penetrate into them; and this can be done only if certain presuppositions are blindly granted, and the determinations are, for the time being, memorized, about the forces and matters which are assumed, together with their hypothetical formations, directions, and rotations, while as yet it is impossible to form a Notion about them or even a definite image—at best a confused mental picture can be made. If the necessity and the Notion of the presuppositions are demanded before they are accepted and counted as valid, then no progress can be made beyond the beginning.

The occasion arose above of speaking about the impropriety of applying the synthetic method to strictly analytic science. Wolf extended this application to every possible kind of knowledge, and drew them all into philosophy and mathematics,—knowledge which partly is of wholly analytic nature and partly of a contingent and merely professional kind. Such a material, which by its nature is easily apprehended and admits of no strict and scientific treatment, being contrasted with the stiff circumlocution and armour of science, automatically demonstrated and discredited the clumsiness of such an application.¹

¹ For example, in Wolf's *Rudiments of Architecture* the eighth Theorem runs: A window must be wide enough to allow two persons to lean through it side by side in comfort.

Proof. It is a common practice to lean through a window with another person

Nevertheless this abuse could not extinguish the belief in the fitness and essentiality of this method for scientific exactness in philosophy; and Spinoza's example in the presentation of his philosophy was long held to be a pattern. But in fact Kant and Jacobi overturned the whole manner of the older metaphysics, and with the manner the method. Kant, in his own fashion, proved of the content of these metaphysics that it led by strict demonstration to antinomies, whose further nature has been examined at the proper places. But he did not reflect upon the nature of this demonstration, which is bound to a finite content; yet the two stand and fall together. In his *Foundations of Natural Science* he has himself given an example of treating as a science of reflection, and by the method appropriate to such, a science which he had intended to reclaim for philosophy by the other means.—Of the older metaphysics Kant chiefly attacked the matter, while Jacobi attacked its method of demonstration, elaborating in the clearest and profoundest manner the point which is of chief importance—namely, that such a method of demonstration is simply bound within the circle of the rigid necessity of the finite, and that freedom (that is, the Notion, and whatever is true) lies beyond its sphere and scope.—According to Kant's result it is the peculiar material of metaphysics that leads it into contradictions, and the inadequacy of Cognition consists in its subjectivity; according to Jacobi's it is the method and entire nature of Cognition itself, which seizes only a connexion of conditionedness and dependence, thus proving itself inadequate to that which is in and for itself and is the absolutely true. And indeed the principle of philosophy is the infinite free Notion, and all its content rests upon this alone; and thus the method of Notionless finitude does not

and to look about. But the architect must satisfy the requirements of his principal in all essentials (§ 1); therefore he must make the window so wide as to allow two persons to lean through it side by side in comfort. Q.E.D.

In his *Rudiments of Fortification* the second Theorem runs: If the enemy camps near by and it is supposed that he will attempt to relieve the fortress, then lines must be drawn round the whole fortress.

Proof. Such lines prevent anyone from penetrating into the camp from without (§ 311). But those who wish to relieve the fortress require to penetrate into the camp from without. Therefore if it is desired to keep them out lines must be drawn round the camp. If therefore the enemy camps near by and it is supposed that he will attempt to relieve the fortress, then the camp must be entirely enclosed in lines. Q.E.D.

fit the Notion. The synthesis and mediation of this method (that is, the process of proof) achieve only a necessity which is the opposite of freedom,—that is, an identity of the dependent which is only *in itself* whether it is taken as internal or as external, where that which constitutes the real element (that which is distinct and has entered into existence) remains something which is just *independently* different and therefore finite. Here this identity does not reach existence and remains the merely internal; or, it is that which is merely external, its determinate content being given it. In both views it is abstract and does not contain the side of reality within itself, and is not posited as identity which is determined in and for itself. Thus the Notion is excluded from this Cognition, and it is the Notion which is the only goal and is the infinite in and for itself.

Thus in Synthetic Cognition the Idea reaches its end only in so far as the Notion now is for the Notion according to its moments of identity and the real determinations, or according to universality and the particular distinctions, and, further, as identity which is connexion and dependence of the different. But this its object is not adequate to it; for the Notion does not become unity with itself in its object or its reality. In necessity its identity is for it; but in this identity the necessity is not itself determinateness, but is a material external to it, that is, not determined by the Notion, so that in it the Notion does not cognize itself. Thus altogether the Notion is not determined for itself, not determined both in and for itself according to its unity. Hence in this Cognition the Idea does not yet reach truth because of the inadequacy of the object to the subjective Notion.—But the sphere of Necessity is the highest point of Being and of Reflection; in and for itself it passes over into the freedom of the Notion, while the inner identity passes over into its manifestation, which is the Notion as Notion. It was shown under the heading of Necessity how the transition from the sphere of this latter into the Notion takes place *in itself*; and indeed this transition presented itself as the genesis of the Notion at the beginning of this Book. Here Necessity has this position, that it is the reality or object of the Notion, while the Notion into which it passes over is now as object of this same. But the transition itself remains unchanged. Here too it is only

in itself, and as yet lies outside Cognition in our reflection; that is, it is the Necessity (which as yet is inner) of this Cognition. Only the result is for it. The Idea, in so far as the Notion is now *for itself* the Notion determinate in and for itself, is the Practical Idea, or Action.

B

THE IDEA OF THE GOOD

Since the Notion which is its own object is determined in and for itself, the subject is determined for itself as individual. As subjective the Notion has again the presupposition of an otherness which is in itself; it is the impulse to realize itself, or the end which tries to give itself objectivity in the objective world, and to execute itself, *through itself*. In the Theoretical Idea the subjective Notion stands opposed, as the universal which is indeterminate in and for itself, to the objective world, from which it draws determinate content and fulfilment. But in the Practical Idea it stands opposed as actual to the actual. But the self-certainty which the subject has in the fact of its determinedness in and for itself, is a certainty of its own actuality and of the non-actuality of the world; what is null for it is not only the world's otherness as abstract universality, but its individuality and the determinations of its individuality. The subject has here appropriated objectivity for itself; its determinateness within itself is the objective, for it is universality which equally is just determinate; the heretofore objective world, on the other hand, is only something posited, something *immediately* determined in manifold ways; but, because it is only immediately determined, it lacks the unity of the Notion within itself and for itself is null.

This determinateness, which is contained in the Notion, and is equal to it, and includes within itself the demand of the individual external actuality, is *the Good*. It appears with the dignity of absoluteness, because it is the totality of the Notion within itself—the objective in the form simultaneously of free unity and subjectivity. This Idea is higher than the Idea of Cognition which has already been considered, **for it has not only the dignity of the universal but also of the simply actual.**—It is impulse in so far as this actual is still subjective and posits itself

and has not at the same time the form of immediate pre-supposition; its impulse towards self-realization is not really the impulse to give itself objectivity (for this it has in itself), but is only this empty form of immediacy.—Consequently the activity of the end is not directed against itself, for the purpose of absorbing and assimilating a given determination; it aims rather at positing its own determination, and, by transcending the determinations of the external world, at giving itself reality in the form of external actuality.—The Idea of Will as self-determining for itself has the content within itself. This content is determinate, and as such is finite and restricted: self-determination is essentially particularization, since the intro-Reflection of Will as negative unity in general is also individuality in the sense of the exclusion and presupposing of an Other. But still the particularity of the content is at this point infinite through the form of the Notion whose peculiar determinateness it is, while in it the Notion has negative self-identity and therefore not only a particularity, but also its infinite individuality. The finitude of content in the Practical Idea, which has been mentioned, is therefore identical with the fact that as yet it is not realized Idea; for the content, the Notion is that which is in and for itself; here it is the Idea in the form of objectivity which is for itself. For this reason (1) the subjective is no longer merely posited, arbitrary, or contingent, but is absolute; but (2) this form of existence, or Being-for-Self, has not yet also the form of Being-in-Self. That which purely formally appears as opposition appears as simple determinateness of the content in the content, which is the form of the Notion reflected so as to be simple identity; hence, although valid in and for itself, the Good is some particular end, which however is not merely to receive its truth through its realization, but already is the true for itself.

The syllogism of immediate realization itself requires here no further exposition; it is nothing whatever but the syllogism of external adequacy to End which was considered above; the only distinction lies in the content. In external adequacy to End (since it is formal) this content was merely indeterminate and finite in general; and although here too it is finite, it also has, as such, absolute validity. But a further distinction arises in regard to the conclusion, that is, the Realized End. In the

process of realization the finite End equally reaches only the Means; and, since in its beginning it is not already an End determinate in and for itself, it remains in its realization something which is not in and for itself. And if the Good in turn is fixed as finite and is essentially so, then, in spite of its internal infinity, it cannot escape the fate of finitude—a fate which appears in more forms than one. The realized Good is good by virtue of what it is already in the Subjective End, in its Idea; realization gives it an external existence; but this existence is determined only as an externality which in and for itself is null, and therefore in it the Good has reached only an existence which is contingent and subject to destruction, and not a realization corresponding to its Idea.—And further, since with respect to its content it is restricted, there are varieties of Good; the existent Good is subject to destruction not only through external contingency and through evil, but also through the collision and conflict of the Good itself. An objective world is presupposed to the Good, a world which constitutes the subjectivity and finitude of the Good and, as being other, pursues its own course: and in it even the realization of the Good is exposed to obstacles, which may sometimes be insuperable. Thus the Good remains an Ought; it is in and for itself, but Being, as last and abstract immediacy, remains determined against it as a Not-being too. Although the Idea of the perfected Good is an absolute postulate, it is no more than a postulate,—that is, the absolute infected with the determinateness of subjectivity. The two worlds still remain in opposition; one a realm of subjectivity in the pure spaces of transparent thought, the other a realm of objectivity in the element of an externally manifold actuality, which is an unexplored realm of darkness. The complete development of the unresolved contradiction, of that *absolute* end which the barrier of this actuality *insuperably* opposes, has been considered more closely in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Eng. tr., pp. 610 *sqq.*).—Since now the Idea contains the moment of perfect determinateness, the other Notion, to which this Notion stands related in the Idea, contains in its subjectivity the moment of an Object; consequently the Idea here enters into the shape of self-consciousness and, in this one respect, coincides with the presentation of the latter.

The Practical Idea still, however, lacks the moment of real consciousness, which would mean that the moment of actuality in the Notion had reached for itself the determination of external Being.—This lack may also be considered in this way, that the Practical Idea is still wanting the moment of the Theoretical Idea. For in the latter it is only the determination of universality that stands on the side of the subjective Notion which comes to be intuited by the Notion within itself; Cognition knows itself only as apprehension, as the self-identity of the Notion, which for itself is indeterminate: fulfilment, that is, objectivity determined in and for itself, is *given* to it, and that which truly is is the actuality that is present independently of subjective positing. The Practical Idea on the other hand counts this actuality (which at the same time opposes it as an insuperable barrier) as that which in and for itself is null, which is to receive its true determination and sole value through the ends of the Good. Will itself consequently bars the way to its own goal in so far as it separates itself from Cognition and external actuality does not, for it, obtain the form of that which truly is; consequently the Idea of the Good can find its complement only in the Idea of the True.

But it makes this transition through itself. In the syllogism of action one premiss is the immediate relation of the good end to actuality, of which it makes itself master, directing it (in the second premiss) as external *means* against external actuality. For the subjective Notion the Good is the objective; actuality in its existence opposes it as insuperable barrier only in so far as itself still has the determination of immediate existence, and not of something objective in the sense of Being-in-and-for-Self; rather, actuality is either the evil or the indifferent and merely determinable, which does not contain its value in itself. But the Practical Idea has itself already transcended this abstract Being which stands opposed to the Good in the second premiss; the first premiss of its action is the immediate objectivity of the Notion, according to which the end communicates itself to actuality without any resistance and is thus in simple and identical relation with it. In so far, then, only the meanings of its two premisses need be brought together. That which in the first premiss is already immediately consummated by the objective Notion, is only complemented in the second by being

posited through mediation and hence *for* the objective Notion. In the End-relation in general the Realized End is also only a Means, but conversely the Means is also the Realized End; and similarly in the syllogism of the Good the second premiss is immediately present implicitly in the first; but this immediacy does not suffice, and the second premiss is already postulated for the first Good;—the realization of the Good in the teeth of an opposing and other actuality is the mediation which is essential for the immediate relation and actualization of the Good. For it is only the first negation or the otherness of the Notion,—an objectivity which would mean that the Notion was submerged in externality. The second negation is the transcendence of this otherness, whereby now the immediate realization of the end becomes actuality of the Good as Notion which is for itself, since here the Notion is posited as identical with itself, not with an Other, and therefore alone as free. If now in spite of this the end of the Good should not be realized, then this is a relapse of the Notion to the standpoint which the Notion has before its activity—the standpoint of that actuality which was determined as null and yet was presupposed as real. This relapse becomes a progress to bad infinity; it has its only ground in the fact (1) that in the transcendence of this abstract reality the transcendence is equally immediately forgotten, or (2) that it is forgotten that this reality has already been presupposed as non-objective actuality which is null in and for itself. This repetition of the presupposition of the non-realized end after the actual realization of the end consequently also determines itself in the following manner: the subjective attitude of the objective Notion is reproduced and perpetuated, whence the finitude of the Good as permanent truth (with respect to both its form and its content), as well as its actualization, still appears merely as an individual and not as a universal act.—In fact this determinateness has transcended itself in the actualization of the Good. The objective Notion is still limited by its own view of itself, which vanishes by its reflection upon what its actualization is *in itself*. By this view it stands only in its own way, and in this matter must turn, not against any outer actuality, but against itself.

For in the second premiss only a one-sided Being-for-Self is produced, whence the product appears as subjective and

individual, so that in it the first presupposition is repeated; and in truth this activity is equally the positing of the identity (which is in itself) of the objective Notion and the immediate actuality. By the presupposition the latter is determined as having a reality of appearance only, being null in and for itself, and utterly determinable by the objective Notion. By the activity of the objective Notion its external actuality is altered, and its determination is accordingly transcended; and by this very process it loses merely apparent reality, external determinability, and nullity, and it is thus *posited* as being in and for itself. Presupposition in general is here transcended,—that is, the determination of the Good as an end which is merely subjective and restricted in its content, the necessity of realizing it by subjective activity, and this activity itself. In the result mediation transcends itself; the result is an immediacy which is not the reconstitution of the presupposition but rather the fact of its transcendedness. The Idea of the Notion which is determined in and for itself is thus posited no longer merely in the active subject, but equally as an immediate actuality; and the latter conversely is posited as it is in Cognition, as objectivity which is veritable. Hereby the individuality of the subject, with which it was affected by its presupposition, has disappeared; it is thus now as free and universal self-identity; for it the objectivity of the Notion is given, and immediately present for the subject, just as much as the subject knows itself to be the Notion determined in and for itself. In this result then Cognition is reconstructed and united with the Practical Idea; the actuality which is found as given is at the same time determined as the realized absolute end,—not however (as in inquiring Cognition) merely as objective world without the subjectivity of the Notion, but as objective world whose inner ground and actual persistence is the Notion. This is *the Absolute Idea*.

CHAPTER III

THE ABSOLUTE IDEA

THE Absolute Idea has now turned out to be the identity of the Theoretical and the Practical Idea; each of these by itself is one-sided and contains the Idea itself only as a sought Beyond and an unattained goal; each consequently is a synthesis of the tendency, and both contains and does not contain the Idea, and passes from one concept to the other, but, failing to combine the two concepts, does not pass beyond their contradiction. The Absolute Idea, as the reasonable Notion which in its reality coincides only with itself, is the return to Life by reason of this immediacy of its objective identity; but on the other hand it has equally transcended this form of its immediacy, and contains the highest opposition within itself. The Notion is not only *Seele* but also is free and subjective Notion, which is for itself and therefore has personality,—the practical and objective Notion, determined in and for itself, which, as person, is impenetrable and atomic subjectivity; while at the same time it is not exclusive individuality, but is, for itself, universality and cognition, and in its Other has its own objectivity for object. Everything else is error and gloom, opinion, striving, caprice, and transitoriness; the Absolute Idea alone is Being, imperishable Life, self-knowing truth, and the whole of truth.

The Absolute Idea is the only object and content of philosophy. As it contains every determinateness, and its essence is to return to itself through its self-determination or particularization, it has various phases. It is the business of philosophy to recognize it in them. Nature and Spirit are different manners of presenting its existence; art and religion, different manners in which it comprehends itself and gives itself an adequate existence. Philosophy has the same content and end as art and religion; but it is the highest manner of comprehending the Absolute Idea, because its manner is the highest—the Notion. Consequently it comprehends within itself these phases of real and ideal finitude, as well as infinitude and holiness, and under-

stands both them and itself. The derivation and cognizance of these particular modes is the further business of the particular philosophic sciences. The logical element of the Absolute Idea may also be called one of its modes; but mode denotes a particular manner, or determinateness of form, while the logical is the general mode in which each severally is transcended and enfolded. The logical Idea is itself in its pure essence when it is enclosed in its Notion in simple identity and has not yet entered into the state of *showing* in any form-determinateness. Consequently the Logic represents the self-movement of the Absolute Idea only as the original *word*, which is an *expression*; an expression, however, which as *external* has immediately vanished again because it *is*. The self-determination therefore in which alone the Idea is, is to hear itself speak: it is in pure thought, where the distinction is not yet any otherness, but is and remains completely transparent to itself.—Thus the logical Idea has itself as infinite form for content,—form which is the opposite of content in so far as the latter is the form-determination which has passed into itself and in identity has transcended itself, which it has done in such a manner that this concrete identity stands opposite to that which is developed as form. As opposed to form, content appears as Other and as given, while the former simply stands related, its determinateness being at the same time posited as show.—The Absolute Idea itself has only this further content, that the form-determination is its own perfected totality—the pure Notion. Now the determinateness of the Idea and the whole evolution of this determinateness constituted the object of the Science of Logic, in whose course the Absolute Idea has emerged for itself; but, for itself, it has turned out to be this fact, that the determinateness has not the shape of a content, but is simply as form, and that accordingly the Idea is simply the universal Idea. What remains therefore to be considered here is not a content as such, but the universal element of its form—that is, the *method*.

Method at first may appear as the mere manner and fashion of cognition, and indeed such is its nature. But manner and fashion as method are not only a modality of Being, determinate in and for itself, but are posited as modality of cognition as determined by the Notion, and as form in so far as form

is the soul of all objectivity and every content otherwise determined has its truth in form alone. If content is assumed as given to method, and is assumed to be of peculiar nature, then, in such a determination, both the method and logic in general are a merely external form. Against this, however, an appeal can be made not only to the fundamental notion of logic; its whole course too, in which every shape of a given content, of every object, occurred, has demonstrated their transition and untruth; and it has turned out, not that some given object could be the foundation, to which the absolute form would be related as a merely external and contingent determination, but on the contrary that the form is the absolute foundation and ultimate truth. Thus the method has emerged as the Notion which knows itself and has for object itself as the Absolute, both subjective and objective, that is, as the pure correspondence between the Notion and its Reality, as an existence which the Notion itself is.

Accordingly, what must now be considered as method is no more than the movement of the Notion itself, whose nature has already been understood. This meaning, however, is now added, that the Notion is everything and that its movement is the universal and absolute activity, the self-determining and self-realizing movement. Hence the method must be recognized to be universal without restriction, to be a mode both internal and external, and the force which is utterly infinite, which no object can resist in so far as it presents itself as external and as removed from and independent of reason, while also it can neither have a particular nature as against it nor fail to be penetrated by it. The method therefore is both soul and substance, and nothing is either conceived or known in its truth except in so far as it is completely subject to the method; it is the peculiar method of each individual fact because its activity is the Notion. This is also the truer meaning of its universality: according to the universality of reflection it is merely taken as the method for everything; but according to the universality of the Idea it is both the general manner of cognizing (of the subjectively self-knowing Notion) and also the objective general manner (or rather the substantiality) of things—that is, of Notions, in so far as at first they appear as Others to imagination and reflection. For this reason it is not only the highest,

or rather the sole and absolute, force of Reason, but also its highest and only impulse, by means of which it finds and recognizes itself, through itself, in everything.—Furthermore the distinction between the method and the Notion as such—the characteristic of the method—is here indicated. The Notion considered by itself appeared in its immediacy; reflection, or the Notion which contemplated it, formed part of our knowledge. The method is this knowledge itself, and for this knowledge the Notion is not only as object, but is its own peculiar and subjective activity, or the instrument and means of cognitive activity, distinct from it, but as its own peculiar essentiality. In inquiring cognition the method is likewise in the position of a tool, of a means which stands on the subjective side, whereby the method relates itself to the object. In this syllogism the subject is one extreme and the object the other, and by its method the former attaches itself to the latter, but does not therein, for itself, attach itself to itself. The extremes remain distinct because subject, method, and object are not posited as the one identical Notion, and the conclusion consequently is always the formal conclusion; the premiss, in which the subject posits the form (as its method) on its own side, is an immediate determination, and consequently contains the determinations of form, of Definition, Classification, and so on, as facts discovered existing in the subject—as was seen. But in true cognition the method is not merely a quantity of certain determinations: it is the fact that the Notion is determined in and for itself, and is the mean only because it equally has the significance of objective, so that, in the conclusion, it does not merely achieve an external determinateness through the method, but is posited in its identity with the subjective Notion.

1. Thus the method constitutes the determinations of the Notion itself and their relations, which must now be considered in their significance as determinations of the method.—First we must begin from the *beginning*. This beginning was mentioned at the commencement of the Logic and also, above, under Subjective Cognition, and it was shown that, unless it is made arbitrarily and with categorical unconsciousness, it may seem to cause many difficulties, but is really of extremely simple nature. Because it is the beginning its content is imme-

diate, but an immediate which has the meaning and form of abstract universality. If otherwise it is a content of Being or of Essence or of the Notion, then, in so far as it is immediate, it is something taken up or discovered externally, and assertoric. But, first, it is not an immediate entity of sensuous intuition or of imagination, but of thought, which, because of its immediacy, may also be called a supersensuous or internal intuition. The immediate of sensuous intuition is a manifold and individual. But Cognition is Notion-forming thought, and consequently its beginning is *only* in the element of thought—it is simple and universal.—Mention was made of this form above, under Definition. At the beginning of finite cognition universality is likewise recognized as essential determination, but is only taken as determination of thought and of Notion in opposition to Being. In fact this first universality is immediate, and, for this reason, equally has the meaning of Being; for Being is precisely this abstract self-relation. Being requires no other derivation, as though it belonged to the abstract part of Definition only because it was taken from sensuous intuition or some other source, and only in so far as it may be possible to point it out. This pointing and derivation relate to a mediation which is more than a mere beginning, and which does not belong to the formation of Notions by thought, but is the elevation of imagination, of empirical and reasoning consciousness, to the standpoint of thought. According to the current distinction between thought or Notion and Being, it appears an important truth that the former, by itself, has no being, and that the latter has its own ground which is independent of thought. But the simple determination of Being is in itself so poor that, if only for that reason, it need not be seriously considered; the universal is itself immediately this immediate because, as abstract, it is merely the abstract self-relation which is Being. In fact the demand for the demonstration of Being has a further, inner meaning, which does not contain merely this abstract determination: here it is meant that the realization of the whole Notion is demanded, and this does not lie in the beginning itself, but is the goal and task of the entire further development of cognition. And further the content of the beginning is to be justified by this process of pointing out, in inner or outer perception, and is to be certified as something

true or correct: therefore now it is not the *form* of universality as such that is meant, but its determinateness—which will soon have to be discussed. The certification of the determinate content with which the beginning is made seems to lie *behind* it; but in fact it must be considered as an advance—that is, if the certification belongs to Notion-forming Cognition.

Thus the beginning has for the method no other determinateness than that of being the simple and universal: and this is just the determinateness which vitiates it. Universality is the pure and simple Notion, and the method, as consciousness of the Notion, knows that universality is only moment and that the Notion is in it not yet determined in and for itself. With this consciousness, however, which would develop the beginning only for the sake of the method, the method would be something merely formal and posited in external reflection. But the method is the immanent and objective form, and therefore the immediate element of the beginning must be inherently defective and must be endowed with the impulse of self-development. In the absolute method, however, the universal does not mean the merely abstract but the objectively universal, that is, that which is *in itself* the concrete totality, but not as *posited* or *for itself*. Even the abstract universal considered as such in the Notion (that is, according to its truth) is not only the simple: as abstract it is already posited as affected with a negation. For this reason there is neither in actuality nor in thought anything so simple and abstract as is commonly imagined. Such a simple entity is a mere illusion which is based on ignorance of what in fact is given.—That which begins was above determined as the immediate; the immediacy of the universal is the same as that which here is expressed as Being-in-Self without Being-for-Self.—Consequently it may well be said that every beginning must be made from the Absolute, while every progress is merely the exhibition of the Absolute in so far as that which is in itself is the Notion. But just because as yet it is only *in itself*, it equally is neither the Absolute nor the posited Notion nor yet the Idea, for these are the fact that Being-in-Self is only an abstract, one-sided moment. The progress is therefore not a kind of overflow, which it would be if in truth that which begins were already the Absolute; rather the progress consists in this, that the universal determines itself

and is the universal *for itself*, that is, is equally also individual and subject. It is the Absolute only in its completion.

It may be recalled that the beginning, which in itself is concrete totality, can also be free as such, and that its immediacy may have the determination of an external existence: the germ of life and the subjective end in general have shown themselves to be such beginnings, and both therefore are themselves impulses. The non-spiritual and non-living on the other hand are the concrete Notion only as real possibility; *cause* is the highest stage in which the concrete Notion as beginning has an immediate existence in the sphere of necessity; but it is not yet a subject which, as such, preserves itself also in its actual realization. For example the sun, and in general whatever is not living, are determinate existences in which the real possibility remains an inner totality; their moments are not *posited* in them in a subjective form, and in so far as they do realize themselves they acquire an existence through other corporeal individuals.

2. The concrete totality which is the beginning contains as such the beginning of progress and of development. As concrete it is internally differentiated; but by reason of its original immediacy the first differentiations are *various*. The immediate, however, as self-relating universality and as subject, is also the unity of these various terms.—This Reflection is the first stage of advance—the emergence of difference, judgment, determination in general. The essential thing is that the absolute method finds and recognizes in itself the determination of universal. The procedure of common-sense finite cognition here is that it takes up again equally externally from the concrete that which it had left out in the abstractive creation of this universal. The absolute method on the other hand does not hold the position of external reflection; it draws the determinate element directly from its object itself, since it is the object's immanent principle and soul.—It was this that Plato demanded of cognition, that it should consider things in and for themselves, and that while partly considering them in their universality, it should also hold fast to them, not catching at externals, examples, and comparisons, but contemplating the things alone and bringing before consciousness what is immanent in them.—In so far the method of Absolute Cognition is

analytic. If it discovers the further determination of its original universal in that universal alone, then this fact is the absolute objectivity of the Notion, whose certainty the method is.—But equally the method is synthetic, since its object, determined immediately as simple universal, shows itself to be an Other, by means of the determinateness which it possesses by virtue of its immediacy and universality. But this relation of *various*, which thus the object is within itself, is no longer what is meant by synthesis in finite cognition; finite cognition equally determines the synthesis (analytically) as being relation in the *Notion*, and this alone distinguishes it completely from this other synthesis.

This equally synthetic and analytic moment of the Judgment, by which the original universal determines itself out of itself to be its own Other, may rightly be called the *dialectic* moment. Dialectic is one of those ancient sciences which have been most misjudged in modern metaphysics and in the popular philosophy of ancients and moderns alike. Diogenes Laertius says of Plato that, while Thales was the founder of natural philosophy and Sokrates of moral philosophy, he was the founder of the third science which belongs to philosophy, namely dialectic;—so that this was counted as his highest merit by the ancients, although it was often quite neglected by those who were fullest of him in their speech. Dialectic has often been considered an art, as though it rested upon a subjective talent and did not belong to the objectivity of the Notion. The shape and result which it had in Kant's philosophy have been shown by the definite examples which express his view of it. It must be regarded as a step of infinite importance that dialectic has once more been recognized as necessary to reason, although the opposite conclusion must be drawn to that which was reached by Kant.

Dialectic generally appears as contingent; but, further, it usually has this form, that opposite determinations are demonstrated in the same object (such as the world, motion, or point, and so on): for example (in the above order), finitude in space and time, presence at a given point, absolute negation of space,—and also, with equal necessity, infinity in space and time, non-presence at a given point, and a relation to space and, consequently, spatiality. The elder Eleatic school applied

its dialectic chiefly against motion, Plato frequently against contemporary ideas and concepts (especially those of the Sophists), but also against pure categories and reflection-determinations; the developed later scepticism extended it not only to the immediate so-called data of consciousness and maxims of ordinary life, but also to all the concepts of science. The conclusion which is drawn from such a dialectic is contradiction in general and the nullity of the assertions made. But it may be drawn in a twofold manner,—in the objective sense, the self-contradictory object being held to cancel itself and to be null (—the Eleatic conclusion, by which, for example, the world, motion, and the point were deprived of truth), and in the subjective sense, cognition being held to be defective. The latter conclusion is sometimes understood to mean that it is only this dialectic that effects the trick of an illusive show. This is the ordinary view of so-called sound common sense, which holds fast to the evidence of the senses and to customary ideas and expressions; sometimes quietly (as in the case of Diogenes the Cynic, who exposes the dialectic of motion in its weakness by silently walking up and down), and sometimes indignantly, the whole matter being regarded as sheer folly, or (if it concerns objects of moral importance) sheer wickedness, which tries to shake what is essentially firm and to give reasons to vice. The view occurs in Sokrates's dialectic against that of the Sophists; the indignation in turn cost Sokrates his life. That vulgar refutation which confronts thought (as Diogenes did) with sensuous consciousness and thinks that in the latter it holds the truth, must be left to itself; but in so far as the dialectic transcends moral determinations, reason must be trusted to reconstitute them, but in their truth and in the knowledge of their limitations no less than of their rights.—Or again the result reached—that of subjective nullity—may relate not to the dialectic itself, but rather to the cognition against which it is directed, or, as in the case of scepticism and likewise of the Kantian philosophy, to cognition in general.

The fundamental prejudice here is that the dialectic has only a negative result; this will soon receive its further determination. Here it may be observed about the form mentioned, in which the dialectic usually appears, that it and its result refer to the *object* which is examined, or to subjective *cognition*,

declaring the latter, or the object, to be null; while the determinations which are demonstrated in the object, as in a third term, remain disregarded and are presupposed as valid for themselves. It is an infinite merit of Kant's philosophy that it drew attention to this uncritical procedure, and thus initiated the reconstruction of logic and dialectic in the sense of the consideration of the determinations of thought in and for themselves. The object in its existence without thought and Notion is an image or a name: it is what it is in the determinations of thought and Notion. They alone therefore are of real importance; they are the true object and content of reason, and whatever is elsewhere meant by object and content in opposition to these is valid in them and through them alone. It must not therefore be considered the fault of an object, or of cognition, if they prove their dialectic nature through their quality or through an external connexion. In this manner both alike are imagined as a subject into which determinations (in the shape of predicates, properties, or independent universals) are so introduced that, fixed and correct in themselves, they are placed in a dialectical and contradictory relation only by an alien and contingent connexion operating in and through a third term. Such an external and fixed subject of imagination and understanding, and such abstract determinations, cannot be regarded as ultimate terms which remain as secure foundations, but must rather be considered as themselves immediate, or as just such presupposed and original terms as must, as was shown above, in and for themselves be the foundation of dialectic because they must be taken as Notions *in themselves*. Thus all opposites which are taken as fixed, like (for example) finite and infinite or individual and universal, are contradictory not in virtue of some external connexion, but rather are transitions in and for themselves, as the consideration of their nature showed; the synthesis and the subject in which they appear are the product of the auto-Reflection of their Notion. Notionless contemplation halts at their external relation, isolates them and leaves them as fixed presuppositions: the Notion scrutinizes their very selves, is their moving soul, and stimulates their dialectic.

Now this is the standpoint which was referred to above, in which any first term considered in and for itself shows itself to

be its own Other. Taken quite generally this determination may be held to mean that what first was immediate is thus mediated and related to an Other, or that the universal is as a particular. The second term which has thus arisen is accordingly the negative of the first and (if we allow in advance for the further development) is the first negative. From this negative side the immediate has become submerged in the Other, but the Other is essentially not the empty negative or Nothing which is commonly taken as the result of the dialectic: it is the Other of the first, the negative of the immediate; it is thus determined as mediated,—and altogether contains the determination of the first. The first is thus essentially contained and preserved in the Other.—To hold fast the positive in its negative, and the content of the presupposition in the result, is the most important part of rational cognition; also only the simplest reflection is needed to furnish conviction of the absolute truth and necessity of this requirement, while with regard to the examples of proofs, the whole of Logic consists of these.

We thus have now the mediated term, which at first, taken as immediate in its turn, is itself a simple determination, since, the first term having perished in it, its only content is the second. But also the first is contained in the second, and the second is the truth of the first; this unity can therefore be expressed as a proposition in which the immediate term is the subject and the mediated term the predicate, as “The finite is infinite,” “One is many,” “The individual is the universal.” But it is obvious that such propositions and judgments are formally inadequate. It was shown under the Judgment that its general form, and more particularly the immediate form of the Positive Judgment, is incapable of comprehending within itself speculation and truth. Its next complement, the Negative Judgment, would at least have to be added equally. In the Judgment the first term as subject has the appearance of an independent persistence, while in fact it is transcended in its predicate as in its Other. This negation is contained in the content of the above propositions, but their positive form contradicts the content; thus their content precisely eludes positing, although this is the whole purpose of the employment of propositions.

The second or negative and mediated determination is at

the same time the mediating determination. At first it may be taken as simple determination, but in truth it is a reference or relation; for it is negative—the negative, however, of *the positive*, and includes the latter. It is not therefore the Other of a term to which it is indifferent, for thus it would be neither an Other, nor a reference or relation; it is the Other in itself, the Other of an Other. It thus includes its own Other, and so is contradiction, or the posited dialectic of itself.—The first or immediate term is the Notion *in itself*, and therefore is the negative only *in itself*; the dialectic moment with it therefore consists in this, that the *distinction* which it implicitly contains is posited in it. The second term on the other hand is itself the determinate entity, distinction or relation; hence with it the dialectic moment consists in the positing of the *unity* which is contained in it.—If then the negative, the determinate, the relation or judgment, and all determinations which fall under this second moment, do not of themselves appear as contradictory and dialectical, this is a mere fault of thought which does not confront its thoughts one with another. For the materials—opposite determinations in one relation—are posited already and are at hand for thought. But formal thought makes identity its law, and allows the contradictory content which lies before it to drop into the sphere of sensuous representation, into space and time, where the contradictory terms are held apart in spatial and temporal juxtaposition and thus come before consciousness without being in contact. In this connexion this thought makes it its fixed principle that contradiction is unthinkable; but in truth the thinking of contradiction is the essential moment of the Notion. In point of fact formal thought does think contradiction, but immediately disregards it, and with the empty assertion of that principle passes over to abstract negation.

The negativity which has just been considered is the turning-point of the movement of the Notion. It is the simple point of negative self-relation, the innermost source of all activity, of living and spiritual self-movement, the dialectic soul which all truth has in it and through which it alone is truth; for the transcendence of the opposition between the Notion and Reality, and that unity which is the truth, rest upon this subjectivity alone.—The second negative, the negative of the negative

which we have reached, is this transcendence of the contradiction, but is no more the activity of an external reflection than the contradiction is: it is the innermost and most objective moment of Life and Spirit, by virtue of which a subject is personal and free.—The self-relation of the negative must be considered as the second premiss of the whole syllogism. If the determinations of analytic and synthetic are used as opposite, then the first premiss may be regarded as the analytic moment, the immediate being here in an immediate relation to its Other, and its transition into it being thus in progress or, rather, accomplished. At the same time this relation, as was mentioned, is also synthetic, because the term into which it passes over is its Other. The second premiss, which has been considered here, may be determined as the synthetic, because it is the relation of the distinct as such to its distinct.—The first premiss is the moment of universality and communication; the second is determined by individuality, which at first is in an exclusive relation to the Other, as existing for itself and as different. The negative appears as mediator, since it includes both itself and the immediate term of which it is the negation. In so far as these two determinations are taken as externally related in any manner, the negative moment is merely the formal mediating element; but as absolute negativity the negative moment of absolute mediation is the unity which is subjectivity and soul.

At this turning-point of the method the course of cognition also turns back upon itself. This negativity, as self-transcending contradiction, is the reconstitution of the first immediacy, of simple universality; for, immediately, the Other of the Other and the negative of the negative is the positive, identical, and universal. If number is applicable, then in the whole course this second immediate is the third term, the first immediate and the mediated being the other terms. But it is also third of a series composed besides of first (or formal) negative and absolute negativity or second negative; now, since the former (the first negative) is itself the second term, the third term may now be counted as fourth, and the abstract form of it may be taken as a quadruplicity in place of triplicity; the negative, or distinction, is in this manner counted as a duality.—The third (or fourth) term is just the unity of the first and the second moments, of the immediate and the mediated.—It is the wholly

superficial and external side of the manner of cognition that apprehends this as a unity, and the form of the method as a whole as a triplicity: but it must be regarded as an infinite merit of Kant's philosophy that it demonstrated this, and demonstrated it in a more particular application; for the abstract form of number itself was, of course, set up earlier, but without any concept and therefore without consequence. The syllogism, and the threefold generally, has always been recognized as the general form of reason; but it was considered as a wholly external form which did not determine the nature of the content, and, further, the syllogism in the formal sense ends in the determination of identity, made by understanding, and therefore it lacks the essential dialectic moment, or negativity. But this moment does enter with the triplicity of determinations, because the third is the unity of the first two determinations, and the latter, being different, can be in unity only as transcended.—Formalists have seized even upon triplicity, and have held fast to its skeleton; and this form has been rendered tedious and of ill-repute by the shallow misuse and the barrenness of modern so-called philosophic *construction*, which consists simply in attaching the formal framework without concept and immanent determination to all sorts of matter and employing it for external arrangement. But its inner value cannot be diminished by this vapid misuse, and it must still be deemed a great matter that the outward form of rational procedure has been discovered, albeit not understood.

Considered further, the third term is the immediate through transcendence of mediation, the simple through transcendence of distinction, and the positive through transcendence of the negative,—the Notion which realizes itself through its otherness, and has coincided with itself through the transcendence of this reality, and has established its absolute reality, or simple self-relation. Consequently this result is *truth*. It is immediacy as much as mediation;—but it is not properly comprehended by forms of judgment like “the third term is immediacy and mediation” or “it is their unity,” for it is not a quiescent third term, but, as this unity, is self-mediating movement and activity.—The beginning was the universal; the result is the individual, the concrete, and the subject; what the former is *in itself*, the latter now is equally *for itself*; the universal is *posited* in

the subject. The first two moments of the triplicity are the abstract and false moments, which for this very reason are dialectical and make themselves into the subject by virtue of this their negativity. For us the Notion itself is (1) the universal which is in itself, (2) the negative which is for itself, and (3) the third term, which is in and for itself, the universal which runs through all the moments of the syllogism. But the third term is the conclusion, in which it mediates itself with itself through its negativity, and is thus posited for itself as the universal and the identity of its moments.

Now this result, as the self-identical whole which has passed into itself, has recovered the form of immediacy. It is thus an entity of the same kind as the beginning had determined itself to be. As simple self-relation it is a universal, and the negativity which constituted its dialectic and mediation has, in this universality, also collapsed into a simple determinateness which in turn can be a beginning. It might at first appear as though this apprehension of the result must be an analysis of it, separating out again, in the manner already considered, the various determinations and their movement, through which it has arisen. If however the treatment of the object is in fact made in this analytic manner, then it belongs to the stage of the Idea which was considered above, namely inquiring Cognition, which merely states of its object what *is*, without the necessity of its concrete identity and of the Notion of the latter. But the method of truth, which forms a Notion of the object, is indeed itself analytic (as was shown), since it simply remains within the Notion, but is equally synthetic, since the object becomes dialectical by virtue of the Notion, and is determined as other. The result which is reached now becomes object and is the new foundation, but the method remains the same as in the previous foundation. The distinction concerns only the relation of the foundation as such: it is still foundation, but its immediacy is only form, because at the same time it was result; the fact that it is determined as content is therefore no longer a mere assumption, but is deduced and demonstrated.

Here at last the content of cognition as such enters within the sphere of our contemplation, for now, being derivative, it belongs to the method. By the addition of this moment the **method** itself is extended into a *system*.—At first the beginning

of the method had to be quite indeterminate in regard to content: in so far the method appears as the merely formal soul, for and through which the beginning was determined only formally, as the immediate and universal. By means of the movement which has been demonstrated, the object has obtained for itself a determinateness which is a content because negativity which has collapsed into simplicity is transcended form, and, as simple determinateness, stands opposed to its development, and, first of all, to its very opposition to universality.

Now this determinateness is the next truth of the indeterminate beginning: it thus is a reproach to its incompleteness and to the method itself which, starting from it, was only formal. This may be expressed now as the definite demand that the beginning, because it is itself determinate as against the determinateness of the result, shall be taken not as immediate but as mediated and derivative: this may seem equivalent to the demand for an infinite *backward* progress in proof and derivation, while, from the new beginning which has been obtained, a result likewise emerges in the course of the method, so that the progress also rolls *forward* to infinity.

It has been shown many times that the infinite progress in general belongs to Notionless reflection: the absolute method, which has the Notion for soul and content, cannot lead into it. At first, beginnings like Being, Essence, and Universality may appear to be of the kind which have that perfect universality and lack of content that is demanded for a proper, wholly formal, beginning, so that, as absolutely first beginnings, they neither demand nor admit any regress. Since they are pure self-relations, and purely immediate and indeterminate, they have not indeed that distinction which is at once posited in any other beginning between the universality of its form and its content. But the indeterminateness which these logical beginnings have for sole content precisely constitutes their determinateness; for the latter consists in their negativity, as transcended mediation; and the particularity of the latter imparts a particularity to their indeterminateness, by means of which Being, Essence, and Universality are distinguished from one another. Now the determinateness which belongs to them is their immediate determinateness if they are taken for

themselves, and is a determinateness as much as one which applies to any content; it therefore requires a derivation; and it is indifferent to the method whether it is taken as determinateness of form or of content. Hence in fact no radical change is introduced in the method because a content has been determined through the first of its results: the method remains no less formal than before. For it is the absolute form, the Notion which knows itself and everything to be Notion; there is therefore no content which could stand opposed to it and determine it as one-sided and external form. The lack of content of the various beginnings does not make them absolute beginnings; and similarly it is not the content as such that could lead the method into the infinite progress forwards or backwards. From one side the determinateness which it produces in its result is the moment through which it effects self-mediation and makes the immediate beginning a mediated entity. Conversely, however, this its mediation takes its course through determinateness; it goes through a content as through an apparent Other back to its beginning in such a manner that it not only reconstitutes the beginning (as determinate, however), but that the result equally is transcended determinateness, and therefore is the reconstitution of the first indeterminateness with which the method began. The method effects this as a *system of totality*. It still remains to be considered in this determination.

It has been shown that that determinateness which was result is itself a new beginning by virtue of the form of simplicity into which it collapsed; and, since this beginning is distinct from its antecedent by precisely this determinateness, cognition rolls forward from content to content. This progress determines itself, first, in this manner, that it begins from simple determinatenesses and that each subsequent one is richer and more concrete. For the result contains its own beginning, and the development of the beginning has made it the richer by a new determinateness. The universal is the foundation; the progress therefore must not be taken as a flow from Other to Other. In the absolute method the Notion preserves itself in its otherness, and the universal in its particularization, in the Judgment and in reality; it raises to each next stage of determination the whole mass of its antecedent content, and by its

dialectical progress not only loses nothing and leaves nothing behind, but carries with it all that it has acquired, enriching and concentrating itself upon itself.

This expansion may be regarded as the moment of content, and, in the whole, as the first premiss; the universal is communicated to the richness of the content and is immediately contained in it. But the relation also has the second (the negative or dialectic) side. The process of enriching advances along the necessity of the Notion, it is supported by the latter, and each determination is an intro-Reflection. Each new stage of exteriorization (that is, of further determination) is also an interiorization, and greater extension is also higher intensity. The richest consequently is also the most concrete and subjective term, and that which carries itself back into the simplest depth is also the most powerful and comprehensive. The highest and acutest point is simple personality, which, by virtue alone of the absolute dialectic which is its nature, equally holds and comprehends everything within itself because it perfectly liberates itself,—becoming simplicity which is first immediacy and universality.

In this manner it comes about that each step in the progress of further determination in advancing from the indeterminate beginning is also a rearward approach to it, so that two processes which may at first appear to be different (the regressive confirmation of the beginning and its progressive further determination) coincide and are the same. The method thus forms a circle, but, in a temporal development, it cannot anticipate that the beginning as such shall already be derivative: it is sufficient for the beginning in its immediacy that it is simple universality. In so far as it is this it is completely conditioned, and it need not be objected that it should be allowed to count merely as provisional and hypothetical. Any objections which might be advanced—about the limits of human cognition, or the need of a critical investigation of the instrument of cognition before the problem is attacked—are themselves suppositions which, as concrete determinations, imply the need of their mediation and proof. Formally then they are no better than that beginning against which they protest, and rather require a derivation by reason of their more concrete content; so that it is sheer presumption to demand that they should

have preferential consideration. Their content is untrue, for they make incontrovertible and absolute what is known to be finite and untrue (namely, a restricted cognition which is determined as form and instrument as against its content); and this untrue cognition is itself form and regressive confirmation.—The method of truth too knows the beginning to be incomplete because it is beginning, but also knows this incomplete term in general as necessary, because truth is only self-coincidence, through the negativity of immediacy. That impatience whose only wish is to go beyond the determinate (whether in the form of beginning, object, finite, or in any other form) and to be immediately in the absolute, has nothing before it as object of its cognition but the empty negative, the abstract infinite,—or else a would-be absolute, which is imaginary because it is neither posited nor comprehended; it can be comprehended only through the mediation of cognition, of which the universal and immediate is a moment, while the truth itself is only in its extended course and at its end. The subjective need of ignorance and the resulting impatience may be satisfied with a preliminary conspectus of the whole, by means of a classification for the use of reflection, which, after the manner of finite cognition, predicates the particular as given in the universal and to be looked forward to in philosophy. Nevertheless this affords no more than a picture to imagination; for the true transition from universal to particular and to the whole which is determined in and for itself (where this first universal itself, according to its true determination, again is a moment) is foreign to this type of classification and is only the mediation of philosophic science itself.

By reason of the nature of the method which has been demonstrated the science is seen to be a circle which returns upon itself, for mediation bends back its end into its beginning or simple ground. Further, this circle is a circle of circles; for each member, being inspired by the method, is intro-Reflection which, returning to the beginning, is at the same time the beginning of a new member. The various sciences, of which each has a before and an after, are fragments of this chain; or rather, each *has* only a before, and in its conclusion shows its after.

Thus the Logic too in the Absolute Idea has returned to this

simple unity which is its beginning. The pure immediacy of Being, in which at first all determination appears to be extinct or omitted by abstraction, is the Idea which has reached its adequate self-equality through mediation—that is, through the transcendence of mediation. The method is the pure Notion which is related only to itself; it is therefore the simple self-relation which is Being. But now it is also Being fulfilled, the self-comprehending Notion, Being as the concrete and also thoroughly intensive totality.—In conclusion the following observations may be made about this Idea. 1. In it the science of Logic has comprehended its own Notion. In Being (the beginning of its *content*) its Notion appears as a knowledge external to the content in subjective reflection. But in the Idea of Absolute Cognition the Notion has become its own content. Logic is itself the pure Notion, which has itself for object, and with itself for object passes through the totality of its determinations; in doing which it develops into the whole of its reality, into the system of philosophic science, and ends by comprehending this process by which it forms its Notion about itself, whereby it transcends its position as content and object, and understands the Notion of philosophy.—2. This Idea still is logical, it is enveloped in pure thought, and is the science only of the divine *Notion*. The systematic development is itself a realization, but is maintained within the same sphere. In so far the pure Idea of Cognition is enclosed in subjectivity, and therefore is an impulse to transcend the latter; and, as last result, pure truth becomes *the beginning of another sphere and science*. This transition need here only be intimated.

For the Idea posits itself as the absolute unity of the pure Notion and its Reality, and thus gathers itself into the immediacy of Being; and in doing so, as totality in this form, it is *Nature*.—But this determination is not a perfected becoming or a *transition*, like that by which above the subjective Notion in its totality becomes objectivity and the Subjective End becomes Life. Rather, the pure Idea, in which the determinateness or reality of the Notion is itself raised to the level of Notion, is an absolute *liberation*, having no further immediate determination which is not equally *posited* and equally Notion. Consequently there is no transition in this freedom; the simple Being, as which the Idea has determined itself, remains per-

fectly transparent to it, and is the Notion which in its determination stands fast by itself. The transition here therefore must rather be taken to mean that the Idea freely releases itself in absolute self-security and self-repose. By reason of this freedom the form of its determinateness also is utterly free—the externality of space and time which is absolutely for itself and without subjectivity.—In so far as this externality is only in accordance with the abstract immediacy of Being, and is comprehended by consciousness, it exists as mere objectivity and external life; but in the Idea it remains, in and for itself, the totality of the Notion, and Philosophy related to Nature as divine knowledge. But this next resolution of the pure Idea—to determine itself as external Idea—thereby only posits for itself the mediation out of which the Notion arises as free existence that out of externality has passed into itself; arises to perfect its self-liberation in the *Philosophy of Spirit*, and to discover the highest Notion of itself in that logical science as the pure Notion which forms a Notion of itself.

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